

Nietzsche's Middle Period

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Ruth Abbey

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Abbreviations

- A *The Anti-Christ*, published with TI.
- AOM “Assorted Opinions and Maxims,” published in HH.
- BGE *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
- D *Daybreak*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, intro. Michael Tanner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
- EH *Ecce Homo*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979).
- GM *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Francis Golffing (New York: Anchor Books, 1956).
- GS *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974).
- HC “Homer’s Contest” in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954).
- HH *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, intro. Erich Heller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
- SE “Schopenhauer as Educator” in *Untimely Meditations* (UM), trans. R. J. Hollingdale, intro. J. P. Stern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

- TI *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
- TLM "On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense" in Sander Gilman et. al., ed., *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
- WP *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1968).
- WS "The Wanderer and His Shadow," published in HH.
- Z *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).

German quotations come from *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Einzelbänden*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988).

All emphases are italicized and are from the original.

Introduction

Nietzsche without the will to power, Apollo and Dionysus, the master/slave dyad, *ressentiment*, Zarathustra, the *übermensch*? Is this not a contradiction in terms? Even if a logical possibility, surely what this conjures is a horribly eviscerated Nietzsche, one stripped of the features that make him the innovative, interesting, important thinker he is. Such a Nietzsche is not only a logical possibility, but a reality, and as this book shows, knowledge of this ‘other’ Nietzsche enhances our understanding of the more familiar one in important ways. I argue further, and more controversially, that such a Nietzsche is by some criteria a more interesting and valuable thinker than the more familiar one.

This ‘other’ Nietzsche is the author of *Human, All Too Human* (1878), “Assorted Opinions and Maxims” (1879), “The Wanderer and His Shadow” (1880), *Daybreak* (1881), and the first four books of *The Gay Science* (1882).¹ These three works constitute what has come to be known as Nietzsche’s middle period. This period is demarcated at one end by contrast with his early writings and their enthusiasm for Wagner and Schopenhauer and at the other by *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883) and subsequent works. These middle works tend to be neglected in commentaries on Nietzsche,² although GS has enjoyed considerable critical inter-

est and HH has had more attention than D.³ As this study repeatedly reveals, our intuitions about who Nietzsche is and what he stands for have often been formed in neglect or ignorance of the works of the middle period.

The classification of Nietzsche's work into three periods was coined by Lou Salomé,⁴ although this schema has become such a commonplace in Nietzsche scholarship that she is rarely credited with it. Salomé's periodization is offered as a heuristic device only; she is too subtle and perceptive a reader of Nietzsche to suggest that each period represents a clean and complete 'epistemological break' with the earlier one.⁵ She points out, for example, that in his last phase Nietzsche returns to some of the concerns of his first, but approaches them in a different way.⁶ Thus it is possible to employ this schema while acknowledging that the boundaries between Nietzsche's phases are not rigid, that some of the thoughts elaborated in one period were adumbrated in the previous one, that there are differences within any single phase and that some concerns pervade his oeuvre.⁷ Nor is there homogeneity across the three books of the middle period in topic or treatment. Therefore, while the works of the middle period are often referred to as if they were a single entity, it is important to remain sensitive to differences among them. To this end, I distinguish throughout between the first volume of HH and the later additions, AOM and WS.⁸

These qualifications notwithstanding, certain major changes of temper across Nietzsche's works can be identified, and here Salomé's schema is useful. Such a change is undeniable between the early and middle periods, and it is one that Nietzsche himself acknowledges. In EH he draws attention to the new 'era' in his writings ushered in by HH, calling it "the memorial of a crisis. . . . [W]ith this book I liberated myself from that in my nature which did not belong to me. . . . The tone, the sound of the book has completely changed."⁹ Regarding the other end of the periodization, in a note on the back cover of the first edition of GS, Nietzsche depicted the works of the middle period as a set, declaring that "this book marks the conclusion of a series of writings by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE whose common goal is to erect *a new image and ideal of the free spirit*."¹⁰ Later, in a retrospective appraisal of his works, he claims that Z "stands altogether alone" and that "within my writings my *Zarathustra* stands by itself."¹¹

Yet contrary to the suggestions of some of Nietzsche's readers, the middle period is not the mere intermezzo between the *Untimely Meditations* (1873–76) and Z (1883) nor simply a prelude to Nietzsche's "mature" works.¹² The works of the middle period are rich and fruitful books, deserving close attention.¹³ Their general neglect could help to ex-

plain why discussions of Nietzsche often proceed as if his oeuvre were a monolith. Although there are continuities in his thought, many commentators seem impervious to the fact that he did not say quite the same thing all his life and attribute what are actually the views of a specific period or text to Nietzsche unqualified.

When closer attention is paid to the works of the middle period, it becomes apparent that the attribution of views to Nietzsche unmodified often involves exaggeration and misrepresentation. Many critics construct a single, unchanging Nietzsche by associating him with views and attitudes that are actually peculiar to one of his periods or some of his texts. Just some examples of this tendency include the commonplace claims that he condemns pity and benevolence, that he is an ultra-individualist who disavows friendship and glorifies autonomy and solitude, that he puts the demands of self-development before all other ties, that he condemns women to perpetual inferiority and is implacably anti-feminist, that he is hostile to love and marriage, that he holds science in low esteem, that he abjures moderation and praises excess, that he advocates symptomatic readings of texts, that he delights in hyperbole and extremism and that he is a radical critic of Western philosophy from Socrates onward. Studying the works of the middle period shows "how coarsely does language assault with its one word so polyphonous a being!"¹⁴

Yet reading the works of the middle period does more than just militate against a static or essentialist reading of Nietzsche; studying them also illuminates the processes by which Nietzsche becomes who he is, or rather the "he" who is well-known to most readers. The works of the middle period represent the genealogist's apprenticeship: in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche presents himself as resuming some of the middle period's explorations of morality: "It is those same ideas I wish to take up in the present treatise: let us hope that the long interval has done them good, that they have become more mature, brighter, stronger, more perfect."¹⁵ He points to the importance of knowing his earlier works in order to understand his later ones: "Should this treatise seem unintelligible or jarring to some readers, I think that the fault need not necessarily be laid at my door. It is plain enough, and it presumes only that the reader will have read my earlier works with some care—for they do, in fact, require careful reading."¹⁶ Although Nietzsche sometimes highlights the continuity across his oeuvre,¹⁷ studying the works of the middle period brings to light the important ways in which his ideas changed. It also allows us to identify some of the theoretical choices he made and the approaches he discarded as his thinking developed.¹⁸

Some of Nietzsche's interpreters have recently drawn attention to the seriousness with which he took his psychological inquiries.¹⁹ This is be-

cause, despite Nietzsche's depictions of himself as a psychologist,²⁰ this dimension of his work has been undervalued by many of his readers. Yet students of the middle period can be in no doubt about the power of Nietzsche's analyses of the psyche, for these works attest to his careful, sensitive analyses of motivation and the moral life. The works of this period offer a range of nuanced and delicate analyses of particular drives, virtues, and vices in their myriad manifestations. A point to emerge repeatedly from the study of these three works is that the "native fastidiousness in matters of psychology" on which Nietzsche prides himself²¹ is at its peak in the works of the middle period, for they illustrate abundantly his fascination with the mystery and complexity of psychology.²² This is one of the reasons why the three works of the middle period deliver a different sort of Nietzsche, one who is a more careful and less extreme thinker than he becomes; they offer a series of careful, variegated moral analyses compared to many of the later cruder, more black and white moral arguments, caricatures, and essentializing gestures.

While in the middle period Nietzsche is so obviously a psychologist enthralled with the mystery and complexity of action, in the later works his psychological insights are offered in the service of some larger themes.²³ His earlier freer and more open curiosity contrasts with his pronouncement in a later work that "he who examines the conscience of the present-day European will have to extract from a thousand moral recesses and hiding places always the same imperative, the imperative of herd timidity."²⁴ In the works of the middle period, Nietzsche's psychologist's curiosity is allowed to roam and inquire more freely; his observations, findings and questions are not contained by his larger, unifying theses about the fundamental nature of the psyche, social life, or history. This is not to suggest that the later analyses are devoid of the powerful sense of the complexity that comes with the middle period's careful study of psychology and morality.²⁵ However, as his reduction of the contemporary sensibility to herd timidity heralds, in the later works Nietzsche's practice as an inquirer into the variegated aspects of identity is not always as faithful to his claims about the complexity of the psyche as it was in the middle period because of the introduction of such larger themes as the will to power and master/slave morality.

A consideration of the transition from the middle to the later works suggests, therefore, some explanation for the neglect of Nietzsche as a psychologist, for it is the later works which have enjoyed most critical attention and they present his psychological insights as illustrative of his will to power thesis and master/slave schema rather than as important insights in their own right. In the works of the middle period, by contrast, Nietzsche's psychological inquiries are less encumbered by such

grand themes. In these works he is, of course, interested in the origins of morality, but his powerful sense of the complexity and mobility of the psyche has a fuller and freer expression. His attention is directed to the significance of minutiae as much as it is to large-scale cultural shifts. Paradoxically then, in the course of Nietzsche's intellectual development, "that art of nuance which constitutes the very best thing we gain from life"²⁶ diminishes rather than develops. This suggests that his hope, expressed in the Preface to *GM*, that his moral analyses have grown more mature remains unfulfilled. He also hopes that they have become stronger and brighter. If strong means robust and able to withstand challenges, they do indeed grow stronger, for the closure of Nietzsche's outlook in the later works makes many of his claims invulnerable to challenge. However, strong in this sense is antithetical to insightful illumination of the life of the psyche, and the more porous, fine-grained analyses of the middle period are in many ways more luminous than the later approaches.

The writings of the middle period are, therefore, superior to the subsequent works by some measures, and some of these measures are Nietzsche's own. These three works realize more fully some of the intellectual virtues he prizes throughout his writings and with which he is associated, such as self-reflexive criticism, antidogmatism, and "schooling in suspicion."²⁷ In these works, Nietzsche is more open to possibilities, including the possibility that goodness and love are genuine forces between some people just as envy, malice, and vanity are. The unmasking of becoming in being, the made in the given, and contingency in necessity for which he is renowned are also powerfully evident in the works of the middle period. Sensitivity to contingency is especially apparent in some of his historicist arguments about gender and in the new view of aristocracy he adduces, allowing for the "accident" of superior spirits being born into inferior social classes.

While Nietzsche is often referred to in discussions of subjectivity, he is rarely mentioned in accounts of how relations with others shape and influence identity. Yet the writings of the middle period deliver a Nietzsche who can enrich an appreciation of the dialogical aspects of selfhood²⁸ and the dynamics of intersubjectivity at a number of levels. The works of the middle period suggest, for example, that some friendships unite individuals in a way that retains pity's positive features while overcoming its degenerate ones. The idea of Nietzsche as a theorist of friendship seems odd, if not misguided, given the typical portrayal of him as a misanthropist reveling in solitude. Yet an interest in friendship and its authentic form is a real and powerful feature of the middle period.

An interest in women and gender relations is also evident in the works of the middle period. Although Nietzsche is the target of frequent accu-

sations of misogyny, many positive references to women are made in this period. Relations between the genders are also explored in these works, with Nietzsche raising some of the issues associated with love, marriage, and reproduction. At times he does this in a traditional way, but there are also some innovative aspects to his thinking about these matters. Nietzsche's concern with face-to-face relationships, whether these involve the love of romance or of friendship shows, moreover, that he is not the grand advocate of solitude and autonomy he is usually taken to be.

Rather than presenting himself as a radical and heroic critic of the Western philosophical tradition, one of the distinctive features of the middle period is the way Nietzsche presents himself as productively engaged with this tradition, as continuing some of its ideas, expanding some of its possibilities, and repudiating other of its claims. As this willingness to present himself as fruitfully engaged with the Western philosophical tradition shows, there is also a metatheoretical level to the middle period's suggestion of the dialogical self. The writing style of the middle period is characterized by the absence of what I call "the invention of invention." The Nietzsche of the middle period does not adopt a primarily adversarial stance toward this heritage nor invent himself as a *sui generis* thinker. Rather, he portrays himself as one who both descends and dissents from the Western philosophical tradition. Reading the works of the middle period thus challenges the image of Nietzsche as the radical critic of the Western philosophical tradition. It also allows us to see how the image of Nietzsche as the master innovator, as the radical critic of tradition, has developed, for it is only in his later works that Nietzsche invents himself as inventor rather than legatee. That he does this can only be witnessed when the later works are contrasted with those of the middle period.

Yet if the three books of the middle period are so vivid and absorbing, how has this eluded general attention? One possible reason is that once critics focus on some subset of Nietzsche's works, those who would respond are forced to discuss the same texts, and so on.²⁹ However this relocates rather than resolves the problem, for something has to explain the greater appeal of those texts that critics initially focused on. Another explanation is the more traditional nature of the works of the middle period, for in many respects they simply continue the enlightenment project. Nietzsche's advocacy of a more rational approach to morality, his belief that truth can and should be pursued, and his more moderate stance on issues like pity, gender, and social decline all seem to make these three works less arresting, less radical, and less innovative than those of the early and later periods.³⁰

This could also imply that the major value of the works of the middle period is contrastive, that they are interesting because they disclose a new traditional Nietzsche rather than being inherently interesting. While the works of the middle period are useful for their contrastive function, this does not exhaust their appeal. The works of this period have an integrity and value that should be acknowledged if the force and fascination of Nietzsche's work are to be felt as fully as possible. The energy that drives Nietzsche's inquiries at this time is fueled not by anger and bitterness, but by an indefatigable and infectious desire to know. This Nietzsche unites a poet's command of language with a novelist's attention to detail and an interest in who should rule and how the future of European civilization could best be served. These are all combined with the incisiveness of a great philosophical mind.

In his genealogy of nihilism, Michael Gillespie casts Nietzsche as the culmination of a tradition that champions a Promethean vision of humans as omnipotent because they possess an infinite will with which the world can be reordered. His history of nihilism exposes Nietzsche's supposed solution to its crisis of meaning—the creation of the *übermensch*—as simply a variation on an old theme within the tradition of nihilism: that of the omnipotent will. Gillespie associates this vision with “a politics of terror and destruction.”³¹ Yet it is difficult to reconcile the Nietzsche of the middle period with this sort of vision, either in its grandiosity or its terror. The Nietzsche delivered by a reading of these works is a more careful, moderate, and modest thinker than the Nietzsche usually talked about. These works are not home to the enthusiast for the power of unbounded willing but to one whose curiosity and openness to possibilities is less limited and bounded than it becomes. In other respects, however, the Nietzsche of the middle period harbors a greater recognition of limits than the later Nietzsche, for in what he practices and in what he preaches, the goods of modesty, humility, caution, fascination for minutiae, and acceptance of the all-too-human recur. This Nietzsche also knows that we are limited not just by our human fallibility but by the legitimate claims of our fellow human beings and that through these relations, or some of them at least, we are both limited and expanded at the same time.

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The Genealogist's Apprenticeship

Looking back on his earlier writings, Nietzsche suggests that the beginning of the middle period marked his apprenticeship as a genealogist of morals: "My ideas about the provenance of our moral prejudices . . . found their first brief and tentative formulation in a collection of aphorisms called *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*."¹ This chapter considers the findings and purposes of his inquiries into morality as well as his naturalism and his rationalism.

Genealogy

At the outset of his middle period, Nietzsche presents himself as valiantly opening up new vistas in studying the evolution of morality: "Mankind likes to put questions of origins and beginnings out of its mind: must one not be almost inhuman to detect in oneself a contrary inclination?"² Instead of scrutinizing beginnings in the way Nietzsche intends to, most approaches to morality simply "glorify the origin" in the belief that "what stands at the beginning of all things is also what is most valuable and essential."³ However, while Nietzsche's investigations show this assumption

to be fallacious, they also show the prudence of not scrutinizing the source of moral evaluations, for the conclusion "*pudenda origo*" surfaces repeatedly.⁴ His probings continually expose the mundane, natural, venal, and sometimes sordid beginnings of many of morality's loftiest claims. This explains his observation, "How little moral would the world appear without forgetfulness! A poet could say that God has placed forgetfulness as a doorkeeper on the threshold of the temple of human dignity."⁵

The recurring "*pudenda origo*" exclamation is, however, made ironically, for Nietzsche is not really urging shame at morality's past: indeed, he aims to transcend conventional standards of praise and blame. "There is no longer any 'ought'; for morality, insofar as it was an 'ought,' has been just as much annihilated by our mode of thinking as has religion."⁶ Rather, he is suggesting that many of the things that have made morality possible would now be deemed shameful by that same morality. Instead of generating a sense of shame, Nietzsche aims to highlight the blinkers, limitations, and vulnerabilities of current moral frameworks.

Nietzsche uses history to explain morality at two levels—the particular and the general. At the general level, history is marshaled to show that moral designations have evolved. Despite the varnish of eternity coating moral values and doctrines of human nature, Nietzsche repeatedly insists on their mutability. "Everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths."⁷ At this level, the question of how particular moral values have developed is less pertinent, for the mere fact that things were done or seen differently indicates their malleability. At the particular level, Nietzsche is interested in showing how moral designations have evolved, and traces the origins of a drive back to need, fear, weakness, or the quest for self- or communal-preservation. At this level, he provides several examples of old moral evaluations and experiences to illustrate how things have changed over time.⁸

Although the works of the middle period explore the evolution of morality from several angles, what binds Nietzsche's analyses of its history is his claim that traditionally morality has been a collective force quashing individuality.⁹ While sometimes conceding that collective dominance was necessary for societies to endure and prosper, he believes that it can now be superannuated, making room for an ethos which encourages those who can to expose and extend their strong individuality.¹⁰

Just as Nietzsche uses history at two levels, the general and the particular, when analyzing morality, so he assembles reminders about morality's past for two main purposes—the scholarly and the practical. The scholarly is simply the service of truth—he sees his histories as giving an accurate account of how morality evolved. The practical reason for his histories of morality is connected with his project of changing values, or at

least changing why certain values are valued. However, these purposes of genealogy are closely related to one another: in the middle period writings, Nietzsche seems to believe that exposing the undignified origins of much moral life and the limitations of prevailing moral frameworks will accelerate the attrition of existing values. There is a sense in these works that knowing the truth about the origins of many traditional moral values will set people free from them. As he says, "your understanding of the manner in which moral judgments have originated would spoil these grand words for you, just as other grand words like 'sin' and 'salvation of the soul' and 'redemption' have been spoiled for you."¹¹ A demonstration of the mundane origins of a belief in God, for example, can obviously threaten such belief, given that God is supposed to be without origins and beyond the mundane. Nietzsche claims, for example, that how the idea of God "originated can at the present stage of comparative ethnology no longer admit of doubt; and with the insight into this origination that belief falls away."¹² This erosion would also seem to take values based explicitly on Christianity with it. He likewise suggests that exposing the origins of Kantian morality can undermine the appeal of its values, declaring that the supposed compelling respect for the moral law that inspires adherence to its goods is actually a form of selfishness.¹³ Because this selfishness is blind to itself, it can present its own judgments as those which all rational beings should respect.

The belief that there is a practical interest animating Nietzsche's genealogy has not, however, gone unchallenged. Raymond Geuss has argued that undermining values by disclosing their history is not part of Nietzsche's enterprise. He infers this from the fact that Nietzsche's explorations of origins often disclose how far values have mutated from their source. Revealing the origins of a value need, therefore, have no bearing on its current status or appeal. Although Geuss draws mostly from works outside the middle period,¹⁴ one of the examples he offers, the belief in God, also appears in the middle period. Geuss concludes that if a Christian's beliefs and hence values are destroyed by Nietzsche's inquiries into their origins, this is a personal problem but "not part of the intention of genealogy."¹⁵ Yet this seems a poor illustration of the point Geuss wants to make, namely, that exposing the banal or self-interested origins of a system of values does not, *ipso facto*, destroy the hold those values might have on one's moral commitments. Rather, it would seem that the power of genealogy to dislodge values is contingent upon the story a morality tells about the source of its values. In a naturalistic morality like the one Nietzsche sometimes espouses, exposing the natural origins of values will seem tautological and hence unshocking. Any morality that acknowledges the "all-too human" grounds of its goods will not be shaken

by genealogy's exposure of the same. Similarly, an ethic that did not repose upon binary oppositions between good and bad, moral and interested or noble and quotidian would not be embarrassed by revelations that the latter was the ground of the former.

Utilitarianism would seem to be an ethic that acknowledges the all-too-human origins of its values, for it does not claim to transcend individual desire or interest in espousing moral values. Although Nietzsche suggests some criticisms of utilitarianism, he does not try to show that the things it holds dear actually originate in things it deems bad. Instead, he challenges the authority of the supposedly sovereign masters—pain and pleasure—by questioning the reliability of the individual's immediate knowledge of what brings pleasure or pain. He shows that these judgments too are tainted by error. He claims that individuals are socialized into experiencing certain things as pleasures or pains, irrespective of their actual desires.¹⁶ This makes Nietzsche's critique of utilitarianism different from that of the other moralities he targets. Utilitarianism's problem is that it assumes too ready a knowledge of the self and its appetites and aversions, but Nietzsche does not claim, as he does of Christian and Kantian morality, that the things it prizes as good actually originate in the very things it condemns as bad.

As a moral code then, utilitarianism is qualitatively different from its Christian or Kantian alternatives, for these latter moralities claim their power from being ordained by the transcendent or by speaking to the noble and dignified part of the human.¹⁷ As such, their status is vulnerable when Nietzsche's historical inquiries yield mundane or "base" sources for these goods. To suggest that such threats were not part of Nietzsche's goal as a genealogist, to deny the existence of any practical interest in these inquiries, deprives the genealogical project of much of its power. Whereas Geuss claims that the exposure of origins is irrelevant to Nietzsche's assessment of the value of goods, it seems that the power of genealogy to loosen the hold of values will depend upon how any morality presents itself, how it gives itself authority.¹⁸

Yet Nietzsche's interest in loosening the hold of existing values is not just an exercise in active nihilism; along with discrediting old values, he strives to make individuals more willing to entertain and experiment with new ones. Loosening the hold of existing values is, in fact, preparatory to the generation of new, higher ones.¹⁹ This is evident in the following claim, which also illustrates the entwinement of the scholarly and the practical motives of his genealogies of morals: "He who wants to dissect has to kill; yet only for the sake of better knowledge, better judgement, better living."²⁰ The passage "Only as creators!" likewise concedes that changing morality requires the dual project of generating new values as

well as discrediting old ones: "How foolish it would be to suppose that one only needs to point out this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts for real. . . . We can destroy only as creators."²¹

The practical interest of Nietzsche's genealogies is therefore itself twofold; his aim is to discredit elements of existing moralities and to make room for new values and for new understandings of moral life.

Naturalism

In contrast to such "other-worldly" and anti-natural moralities as Christianity and Kantianism, when it comes to prescribing values for the future, Nietzsche offers a range of values that do not recoil from their source in all-too-human forces like interest, ego, and desire. The appeal to nature plays an important part in his preferred approach to ethics, as well as assuming a significant role in several of his explanations about how morality has evolved. The twin dimensions of genealogy—the scholarly and the practical—are, therefore, evident in the naturalism that manifests itself in the middle period's approach to morality. For example, Nietzsche predicts that as a consequence of accepting his account of the history of morality, "one would be free of emphasis, and no longer prodded by the idea that one is only nature or more than nature."²² Any strict separation between the natural and the human is challenged, and he recommends that the natural aspects and desires of the self be embraced or reshaped and redirected rather than shunned altogether. As he observes, "we speak of nature and forget to include ourselves: we ourselves are nature, *quand même*."²³ Placing themselves "in a false order of rank in relation to animals and nature"²⁴ has been one of humanity's four errors which has, nonetheless, contributed to its humanization. In contrast to these attempts to separate the human from the natural and place the human over and above it, Nietzsche embraces "the dear animal world in which we live."²⁵

Part of Nietzsche's assault on morality's self-understanding is to show that rather than raising humans above animals, what has been called moral action, when carefully studied, actually exhibits many of the features of animal behavior. Hence his surprising conclusion that "the entire phenomenon of morality" can be described as animal.²⁶ It might be easy to accept that traits like adaptability, submissiveness, self-concealment, and anger have parallels with animal behaviors.²⁷ However, Nietzsche shows how serious his claim about the animal origins of morality is by attributing something as lauded and supposedly uniquely human as the

pursuit of truth to animals. Tracing truth's pursuit to "the sense for security," he contends that humans resemble animals in seeking a correct understanding of their environment to arm themselves against predators and other threats. "The animal assesses the movement of its friends and foes, it learns their peculiarities by heart, it prepares itself for them."²⁸ His willingness to portray the pursuit of truth, which is a good he endorses in the middle period, as having animal origins shows that naturalism is not just invoked to deflate moral values. Indeed, the passage in which he diagnoses the quest for truth as an animal function goes on to acknowledge that the Socratic virtues of justice, prudence, moderation, bravery, and the pursuit of self-knowledge, which are all prized in the middle period, all have animal beginnings.²⁹

Nietzsche's naturalism is not, however, a form of determinism. Identifying certain traits as common to humans and animals does not mean that all of humans' animal traits are insuperable. Although he contends that "wrath and punishment is a present to us from the animal world," these things can be overcome; indeed, humanity's progress requires that humans "return this birthday gift to the animals."³⁰ This possibility that some animal origins can be transcended recurs when he refers to the way religion, morality, and metaphysics have placed humans in so many chains that they no longer have to behave like animals. These fetters have not just confined humans but transformed them, making them "gentler, more spiritual, more joyful, more reflective than any animal is."³¹ Nietzsche believes that the time has come to liberate humans from their humanizing chains, but doing so will not release the animal in them. Instead, when the characteristics acquired in bondage appear in unbound humans, they will be distinguished from the animals.

Nietzsche's naturalism is further qualified by the fact that when he wants to praise something, he sometimes falls back into the traditional habit of showing how this laudable thing raises humans above the animals. His definition of friendship as "joying-with" is a good example. He discredits pity by claiming that even "the lowest animal can imagine the pain of others. But to imagine the joy of others and to rejoice at it is the highest privilege of the highest animals, and among them it is accessible only to the choicest exemplars—thus a rare humanum."³² However, in contrast to this image of those with rare human qualities surpassing other humans and animals comes the claim that noble humans sometimes act like animals; higher human beings and animals are prepared to risk danger and death for the things they love or that bring them great pleasure. Unlike mediocre humans, both higher individuals and animals can lose sight of reason and be motivated by passions and

instincts, so that higher individuals resemble animals more than they do cautious, calculating humans.³³

The fact that some superior human characteristics resemble those of animals while others transcend them, combined with the fact that Nietzsche offers no indication of which of nature's legacies can be returned, which can be overcome, and which are given in perpetuity, provokes the suspicion that his naturalism is more important as a rhetorical device than as a strict hypothesis about the development and function of morality. At times he does show the things he values to have natural bases. It is also the case that when he wants to puncture the esteem in which current moralities hold some good, he typically shows it to have animal origins. However, when he celebrates something, there are times when he allows either that its animal origins can be transcended or that they never existed.³⁴

Nietzsche's appeal to the animal bases of morality also contributes to the practical aim of his genealogies and, in particular, the move toward new ways of feeling about moral values. He encourages humans to accept themselves without shame, and he associates this ability to accept "the animal" in the human with freedom from guilt and shame about the self. He further associates this freedom from shame with the Greeks,³⁵ which indicates that the virtues and values, the new "things," he advocates are not entirely novel. Instead, he appropriates certain traditional goods³⁶ but justifies them in a new way, hoping that individuals will come to feel differently about certain old values and to value them for different reasons. In the middle period, it is not so much a transvaluation of values that Nietzsche aspires to as a transvaluation of the evaluation of values, one which allows certain goods to endure but to be esteemed for different reasons. This is apparent in his speculation on what it will mean to be "Free of morality": "the individual virtues, moderation, justice, repose of soul, are not [in decline]—for when the conscious mind has attained its highest degree of freedom it is involuntarily led to them and comes to recognise how useful they are."³⁷ It is echoed in his classification of "two kinds of deniers of morality" which distinguishes his approach to morality from La Rochefoucauld's and concludes that "I do not deny—unless I am a fool—that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged—but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto. We have to learn to think differently—in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently."³⁸

Ultimately, Nietzsche adduces an ethos which synthesizes old and new

goods but which justifies certain traditional values by reference to different criteria. These criteria are sometimes rational and sometimes aesthetic.³⁹

Rationalism

Nietzsche's concern with rational criteria for evaluating morality emerges with the realization that one of the middle period's major criticisms of moral life is Socratic—that it is lived without reflection and examination.⁴⁰ Against this state of affairs, he sometimes advocates a rationalized morality, requiring that values be respected and actions admired for defensible reasons rather than from habit and custom. Opposed to “instinctive morality” is “a morality of rationality,”⁴¹ and he expounds his ambition for a more rational moral life early in GS:

the great majority of people lacks an intellectual conscience. . . . Everybody looks at you with strange eyes and goes right on handling his scales, calling this good and that evil. Nobody even blushes when you intimate that their weights are underweight; nor do people feel outraged; they merely laugh at your doubts. I mean: the great majority of people does not consider it contemptible to believe this or that and to live accordingly, without first having given themselves an account of the final and most certain reasons pro and con. . . . what is good-heartedness, refinement or genius to me, when the person who has these virtues tolerates slack feelings in his faith and judgements and when he does not account the desire for certainty as his inmost craving and deepest distress—as that which separates the higher human beings from the lower.⁴²

So thoroughgoing is Nietzsche's demand for a more rational approach to morality, that he even urges that death become more rational. Comparing natural to voluntary death, he finds the idea of choosing to die far more defensible than the Christian-inspired practice of living until the body wears out. The latter amounts to allowing the “stunted, often sick and thick-witted prison warder” [the body] to decide when the “noble prisoner” shall die. Natural death is thus the triumph of irrationality.⁴³

The rationalist dimension to the middle period's approach to morality is reinforced when Nietzsche casts Socrates as an opponent of the belief that egoism is reprehensible.⁴⁴ Socrates was the first of the ancient philosophers to urge that happiness could be found by individuals reflecting on their actions rather than simply living according to the rules or their neighbors' opinions. Nietzsche sees him as challenging the rival ap-

proach to happiness which identified egoism as the source of unhappiness and promoted the belief that happiness could be only found in selflessness. In the works of the middle period, Nietzsche presents himself as continuing Socrates' legacy in two ways, for he both attacks unreflective morality and strikes out against the belief that the ego is hateful and must be effaced before happiness can be attained. Those commentators who adhere to the view that Nietzsche despised the rational mode of life Socrates represented fail to consider his position in the works of the middle period, relying instead on the early and later works to reach this conclusion.

Custom

As the middle period's attack on unreflective morality indicates, a recurrent theme in Nietzsche's exposé is that much moral life, which is such a source of human pride and supposedly raises humanity above the animals, is actually based on something as inglorious and unconscious as habit and custom. For the individual to be counted as moral simply requires following the rules laid down by the community without demur; "he is called 'good' who does what is customary as if by nature."⁴⁵ And such familiarity breeds content. Because of its ease, acting habitually creates pleasure so that the individual is rewarded with a pleasing sensation in moving within the grooves of custom.⁴⁶ The pleasure comes to be associated with moral action and is mistaken for its effect. Of course this is not how individuals experience their moral life; they believe that they are acting for good, indeed elevated reasons. For Nietzsche though, the agent's self-understanding and experience of morality are insufficient to explain it and his further probing of what are taken to be moral motivations discloses collective interest.

Attributing morality to custom relocates rather than resolves the problem of its genesis. To explain custom, Nietzsche posits the interest a group has in its preservation, so that the real source of morality becomes communal self-interest. Hence his dramatic conclusion that "morality is herd instinct in the individual."⁴⁷ Seeing the precepts of custom as collective utility whose origins have been forgotten and obscured explains why moral values are hostile to real individuality, for morality arises to keep the community alive and prosperous and cannot tolerate deviations that might threaten these goals. Indeed, any deviation is seen automatically to threaten them,⁴⁸ so that actions or ideas which either did not serve or which violated the common interest or were simply unusual acquired a moral hue and were dubbed evil, rather than just being seen as

novel, risky, idiosyncratic, or imprudent. As Nietzsche explains, "in all the original conditions of mankind, 'evil' signifies the same as 'individual,' 'free,' 'capricious,' 'unusual,' 'unforeseen,' 'incalculable.'" ⁴⁹ In this process, the normal became the normative.

Along with masking morality's beginnings in things it deems base or even immoral, moral discourse also conceals the individual's subordination to collective utility, persuading individuals that they achieve their highest potential by acting in accordance with its rules. Through the education process, society inculcates its collective interests in individuals so that they come to identify and honor these general interests as goods, no matter what their particular interests and desires. Here Nietzsche offers a deconstruction of morality, for while much morality prides itself on being untainted by considerations of utility, he shows that utility, or at least that of the collective, which can differ from and even be antithetical to that of individuals, is at the heart of moral evaluations rather than being their other. Declaring that moral actions are simply those whose origins in collective utility have been eclipsed over time, he asks "where does it come from, this hatred of utility which becomes visible here, where all praiseworthy behaviour formally excludes behaviour with a view to utility?" ⁵⁰ However, this traditional denigration of utility as a motive for morality was changing somewhat with the rise of utilitarianism, as Nietzsche later observes: "Moral sensibilities are nowadays at such cross-purposes that to one man a morality is proved by its utility, while to another its utility refutes it." ⁵¹

In giving his account of the evolution of moral designations, Nietzsche points out that the community is not always the best judge of its long-term interests. The new, which is perceived as threatening to the group and hence labeled evil, actually promotes the group's preservation in some instances: "It is the more unfettered, uncertain and morally weaker individuals upon whom spiritual progress depends in such communities: it is the men who attempt new things and, in general, many things." ⁵² What is new and thus nominally evil can sometimes be functional and, from the standpoint of enlightened collective interest, should be labeled good. To further turn the screw, Nietzsche points out that when these new cultural forces which are dubbed evil but which may do good, meet strong resistance, this can further strengthen them. ⁵³ Hence, the bulwark of custom, which is deemed to be good by the collective, can serve what it would dub evil, innovation, just as that originally dubbed evil, innovation, can end by contributing to community survival and thus become good. This suggestion that what are seen as opposing forces can actually serve and strengthen one another complements Nietzsche's more

general belief that many supposed antitheses are mutually constitutive and not as antagonistic as they seem.

Community Life

As a good genealogist, Nietzsche goes yet further in seeking out the origins of morality in custom, for community life had to exist before it could be preserved. In one passage he portrays the basis for common life not as sociability nor the need for cooperation but power and coercion. Like Thomas Hobbes, he suggests that morality is coeval with organized social life: "The ground for any kind of morality can then be prepared only when a greater individual or collective-individuality, for example society, the state, subjugates all other individuals, that is to say draws them out of their isolation and orders them within a collective."⁵⁴ Prior to this creation of a community, individuals were free to kill and harm one another and other animals for self-defense, as per the Hobbesian state of nature.⁵⁵ But whereas Hobbes emphasises the consensual foundations of the social contract, Nietzsche holds that the state was forged by coercion; its founders were men "of violence, of power." Thus if morality is only possible within the sort of organized social life represented by the state, and if the state is founded on force, Nietzsche concludes that "morality is preceded by compulsion" which then evolves through the stages of custom, willing compliance and ultimately "almost instinct."⁵⁶ In arguing thus, Nietzsche effects another deconstruction of morality. Having shown that utility is not morality's 'other' but its very essence, he now claims that rather than violence and coercion being antithetical to morality, they are its condition of possibility.

This idea that violence lies at the base of communal life recurs in one of Nietzsche's responses to socialism. Replying to the socialist point that property relations are a consequence of "countless acts of injustice and violence," he declares that "the entire past of the old culture was erected upon force, slavery, deception, error."⁵⁷ Showing the violent origins of an institution is, therefore, no argument against it. If all outcomes with unjust origins were repudiated, the self too would have to be denied, for we are "the heirs and inheritors of all these past things."⁵⁸

This insistence that violence, injustice, and exploitation are at the source of social life and institutions could contribute to the later Nietzsche's famous will to power thesis. Indeed, one of its central expressions in the later works comes as part of a critique of socialism. Observing that "everywhere one enthuses, even under scientific disguises, about coming

states of society where there will be 'no more exploitation'," Nietzsche depicts this goal as impossible for exploitation is inevitable; "it pertains to the essence of the living thing as a fundamental organic function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic will to power which is precisely the will to life."⁵⁹ If there is a connection between this passage and the middle period one, it means that one of the sources of Nietzsche's will to power thesis is politics and, in particular, the role of coercion and slavery in European history. Thus to the usual claim that the idea of the will to power has a metaphysical or a psychological source, it must be added that Nietzsche's knowledge of explicitly political forces such as wars, invasions, slavery, and struggles over property shaped his later belief in the ubiquity of the will to power.

However, elsewhere in the middle period, Nietzsche's attempt to find the genesis of custom yields a slightly different scenario about the basis of state formation, one that harks back to TLM's story about individuals coming to a peaceful agreement to live in a society in order to better preserve themselves.⁶⁰ This story does not focus on aggression and subjugation but follows the social contract approach by suggesting that individuals founded a community "for the sake of their security."⁶¹ In creating this community they also manufactured equality. When security seems assured, inequality reemerges, mainly in the form of seeking recognition: "in the division of classes, in the claim to special dignities and privileges, and in vanity in general."⁶² When security is threatened, these distinctions are abolished as the majority reimposes equality. However, if the threat is great enough to dissolve the community, inequality is again unleashed: "that condition of unreflecting, ruthless inequality that constitutes the state of nature."⁶³ Notwithstanding these different scenarios about the route to organized collective life, with the state being formed either by the exertions of violent men or by agreement among calculating, security-conscious individuals, the larger point about morality being a social construct remains: "There exists neither a natural right nor a natural wrong."⁶⁴

The Later Works

By the time of GM, Nietzsche's definitive position is akin to his first scenario from the middle period, which emphasized the violent origins of states. He seems to have forgotten that he once also forwarded a more conventional social contract approach to society. Describing the founders of states as conquerors who were sufficiently organized and violent to dominate an amorphous mass, he reflects "Such was the beginning of human polity; I take it we have got over that sentimentalism that would have it

begin with a contract. What do men who can command, who are born rulers, who evince power in act and deportment, have to do with contracts?"⁶⁵ Thus, in the course of his career, Nietzsche jettisons an approach to collective life that emphasizes self-interest and consensus in favor of one driven by violence. That this is a choice made within the course of Nietzsche's work, rather than one of its permanent fixtures, only becomes apparent when the works of the middle period are studied.

The shift from the middle to the later works also sees the replacement of the appeal to self-preservation by the appeal to the will to power. In outlining the will to power thesis, the later Nietzsche insists that the real urge in humans is not self-preservation but self-aggrandizement: indeed, the push toward self-expansion can even discharge itself at the cost of self-preservation.⁶⁶ In the middle period, by contrast, he repeatedly appeals to the instinct to self-preservation to explain collective life, morality, and the subordination of the individual. He asserts that history shows that "the branch of a nation that preserves itself best [*sich am besten erhält*] is the one in which most men have . . . a living sense of community."⁶⁷ Morality is defined as "first of all a means of preserving [*zu erhalten*] the community and warding off its destruction; then it is a means of preserving the community at a certain height and in a certain quality of existence."⁶⁸ Nietzsche claims that "the instinct for the self-preservation of the species" [*der Treib der Arterhaltung*] is "at work equally in the highest and the basest men"⁶⁹ and explains variations in morality by the different conditions that were conducive to the preservation [*die Erhaltung*] of different communities.⁷⁰

These two illustrations from the middle period—its rival approaches to state formation and its appeal to self-preservation to explain collective life—show how valuable the examination of Nietzsche's apprenticeship as a genealogist of morals is for understanding how he becomes who he is. They indicate what his thought was like before the will to power thesis grew to dominate it, and they disclose the sort of theoretical choices that were part of Nietzsche's development as a thinker. Looking at the middle works makes it clear that the later Nietzsche's view of social dynamics was deliberately adopted; he was drawn to an explanation emphasizing violence, aggression, and expansion rather than to a more conventional one which emphasized individual and collective self-preservation.

Many of the approaches to morality expressed in the middle period persist into the later works, such as Nietzsche's exposé of the base origins of some of morality's loftiest claims, the important role he imputes to custom in explaining morality, and his appeal to nature to explain behavior. His later inquiries into morality also perpetuate the Socratic practice of probing the moral prejudices of his age, although the call for individ-

uals to exercise their reason is replaced by a valorization of instinct. In the later works, superior individuals act spontaneously and impulsively; they neither calculate nor reflect on their actions before or after. In the move from the middle to the later writings, Nietzsche goes from demanding to decrying the application of reason to moral life when it comes to individuals, their actions, and values.⁷¹ Any attacks on rationalism should, therefore, be understood in part as critiques of his earlier self.



Nietzsche as Psychologist

The quest for “psychological perspicacity” through the close observation of the psyche’s movements is one of the major developments of the middle period.¹ Nietzsche presents his inquiries into psychology and the history of morality as participating in the scientific tradition, making allusions to or comparisons with the natural sciences.² However, the sort of science of morals and manners he practices during the middle period is more a combination of history and psychology than anything resembling the natural sciences. The scientific aspect of his approach comes from his ambition to look at how views and values have evolved and at their myriad motivations and driving forces in an honest, dispassionate way, maintaining that “mankind can no longer be spared the cruel sight of the psychological dissecting table and its knives and forceps. For here there rules that science which asks after the origin and history of the so-called moral sentiments.”³ In this sense then, Nietzsche’s aspirations to a scientific analysis of morality and the psyche in the middle period can be seen as expressing his later ambition to think “beyond good and evil,” to think about morality in a way that transcends the dominant moral judgments of the time.

One of the things the middle period attests is just what a careful, sen-

sitive analyst of moral life Nietzsche could be. Its works offer a range of nuanced and delicate analyses, especially those dealing with individual virtues and drives and their multiple manifestations. The exaggeration, extremism, and overstatement that so often characterize Nietzsche's thought are far less evident in the works of the middle period.⁴ Indeed, he implies that his sort of inquiry into "the history of the moral sensations" discourages moral Manichaeism, for he observes that Plato "lacked a history of the moral sensations, an insight into the origin of the good and useful qualities of the human soul. Like the whole of antiquity he believed in good and evil as in white and black: thus in a radical difference between good and evil men, good and bad qualities."⁵ Nietzsche's endless fascination with the intricacy and elusiveness of moral life binds him to those moralists he describes as sensitive to "the complexity in the apparent simplicity" of human behavior, who direct their attention to "the interlacing of motives, to the delicate conceptual illusions woven into it, and to the individual and groups of sensations inherited from of old and slowly intensified."⁶

The middle period's less reductionist approach to moral life and identity is evident as Nietzsche does not employ the binary opposition of herd and nobility when discussing humans as freely as in the later works. Although distinctions are made between the many and the few or between free and fettered spirits, the master/slave dichotomy and the hyperbole, vitriol, and unabashed elitism accompanying it are the product of the later Nietzsche. This is not to suggest that in the middle period he adopts an egalitarian outlook; many distinctions are drawn between the elite minority and the majority of inferior human beings. Nietzsche suggests, for example, that "petty natures" who, to think well of themselves must think poorly of others, are in the majority.⁷ At one point he contends that what divides the majority from the superior minority of humans is the way each group views their quotidian experiences; the majority diminish their significance and as inverted gods "create nothingness out of the world" while the minority, "know how to make much of little."⁸ The "noble soul" contrasts with "basar souls" on the basis of how obligation and gratitude are handled.⁹ Elsewhere Nietzsche gestures toward an elite of readers for whom good books are written and distinguishes "little people" from "us."¹⁰ While the many/few distinction grows stronger throughout this period, with the label "herd" emerging in GS,¹¹ even there the distinction is sometimes expressed as minority and majority, common versus noble, or lower and higher.¹²

The later works, by contrast, depict the mass of ordinary humans as a herd of sick, degenerate, contemptible non-individuals. The elitism of

the later works is more pronounced and more vitriolic: "Where the people eats and drinks, even where it worships, there is usually a stink."¹³ Nietzsche's yardstick for evaluating others becomes, moreover, whether his elitism is shared: "The first thing in which I 'test the reins' of a person is whether he has in him a feeling for distance, whether he sees everywhere rank, degree, order between man and man, whether he distinguishes: one is thereby a gentleman."¹⁴ The move from the middle to the later works thus sees Nietzsche's shift from a concern with the human, all-too-human to one with the many-too-many.¹⁵ As this elitism is one of the features of Nietzsche's work that so many contemporary readers either find difficult or prefer to ignore,¹⁶ the middle period's comparative freedom from such splenetic outbursts against the majority of humans should add to its value and interest.

The lesser role played by the noble/base dichotomy in the works of the middle period also signifies the presence of a greater benevolence in these works than in the later ones. Nietzsche is more willing and more able to acknowledge goodness in others than he is in the later works. Thus while the works of the middle period manifest the suspicion for which he is renowned, this suspicion has a different quality from that of his later works, for it does not foreclose the possibilities of love, goodness, and friendship as readily as they do. By contrast with this more open questioning of the middle period, the later Nietzsche seems too often to be wise before the event.

Greater openness to possibilities, a sense of "astonishment at the countless hidden pleasures existence contains,"¹⁷ and a concomitant willingness to be surprised by one's findings permeate the middle period. These qualities are captured in Nietzsche's observation that one can discern "much more happiness in the world than clouded eyes can see . . . if one calculates correctly and does not overlook all those moments of pleasure in which every day of even the most afflicted human life is rich."¹⁸ He conveys some sense of this in his retrospective assessment that in the whole of D "there is no negative word, no attack, no malice. . . . This affirmative book pours its light, its love, its tenderness upon nothing but evil things, it restores to them their 'soul,' the good conscience, the exalted right and *privilege* to exist."¹⁹ Although it is an exaggeration to claim that this book launches no attacks and contains no criticism, Nietzsche's claim about its absence of malice expresses something of the character of the middle works in general. While "the man of science has to be suspicious of all higher feelings,"²⁰ the middle period's scrutiny of these feelings in ordinary life does not render them chimerical. Instead, the unclouded suspicion of these works allows Nietzsche to turn up many surprises as he scrutinizes things which are usually "ne-

glected and undervalued" in everyday life, such as the small manifestations of the unegoistic drive—politeness, good naturedness, and friendliness.²¹

Reductionism?

Nietzsche acknowledges that the sort of pellucid inquiry into morality and motivation that he advocates, which does not resile from the human, all-too-human, or even all-too-animal origins of the most lofty goods, could be accused of implanting "a sense of suspicion and reductionism into the souls of men."²² However, the works of the middle period typically evince such sensitivity to the knottiness of moral life that the fear of reductionism has little warrant. Although Nietzsche posits egoism as the provenance of action, this represents the beginning rather than the conclusion of his psychological inquiries.²³ And given his own insistence on the enormous variety of ways in which egoism can manifest itself and the different outcomes this can have, as well as his concessions that egoism can sometimes be transcended, his insistence on the egoistic foundations of action is also better understood as a rhetorical blow against Christianity and other ethics that lionize self-denial rather than as an invincible explanatory claim.

In fact in these works, Nietzsche tries to distance himself from a reductionist approach to morality, fearing that he might be confused with those moralists who project their own pettiness onto all humans and thus reject the possibility of "grandiose, mighty, self-sacrificing dispositions" and "the pure, enlightened, heat-conducting state of soul of truly good men and women."²⁴ A similar concern appears in his vignette of moralists whose inquiries into moral life are motivated by malice rather than "love of knowledge." Like naughty boys, they "are never happy unless they are chasing and mistreating something living or dead."²⁵ Although the most convincing repudiation of any charge of reductionism comes in the middle period's analyses of emotions like love, pity, and vanity and relationships like friendship and marriage, several of Nietzsche's general characterizations of morality reveal how little founded the fear of reductionism is. They also illustrate that claims about the "paucity of moral types" in Nietzsche's work and "the gross immodesty of his claims to psychological acumen" are less applicable to the works of the middle period than to their successors.²⁶

Nietzsche's general observation that "anyone who now wishes to make a study of moral matters opens up for himself an immense field for work"²⁷ is borne out in myriad particular ways in the middle period. His attunement to the complexity and mobility of the psyche shows itself in

the belief that several paths and motives can lead to the same action, be this within the same individual or across individuals.²⁸ Alternatively, what is nominally the same 'cause' can have markedly different effects on different people.²⁹ Things known by the same name can have very different sources³⁰ and things given quite different names, or actions that seem antithetical to one another, might stem from the same drive.³¹ Nietzsche's strong sense that what looks simple and unified is actually complicated and diverse is reflected in his observation that "one speaks of the moral feelings, of the religious feelings, as though these were simple unities: in truth, however, they are rivers with a hundred tributaries and sources. Here too, as so often, the unity of the word is no guarantee of the unity of the thing."³² The task of understanding action and motivation is further complicated by the fact that the gap between professed and actual motivation can be wide. This can derive from actors misunderstanding their own motives³³ as much as from the desire to conceal themselves and to deceive others.

Self-Knowledge

The powerful sense in the middle period writings of the mystery and complexity of the psyche is enriched by their identification of myriad impediments to self-knowledge. These include the power of the unconscious, the self's changeability and the absence of a fixed criterion for its measurement, the multiple forces at play in the self even at the same time, uncertainty about one's motives and a tendency to read these differently after the fact, the desire for self-flattery, as well as proximity to, and familiarity with, the self.³⁴ Indeed, the mystery and complexity of motivation seems to make self-knowledge an impossible goal in the passage "Long Live Physics": "Your judgment 'this is right' has a pre-history in your instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences, and lack of experience. . . . there neither are nor can be actions that are the same; . . . every action that has ever been done was done in an altogether unique and irretrievable way, and . . . this will be equally true of every future action . . . as one contemplates or looks back upon any action at all, it is and remains impenetrable. . . . every action is unknowable."³⁵

Nietzsche's claims about the complexity of the psyche, combined with his contrast between superior types who will a self and "inactive and contemplative" types who follow the dictum "'know thyself'" suggests that despite his admiration for Socrates, Nietzsche could not endorse the Socratic injunction to self-knowledge.³⁶ Yet in the works of the middle period, he does not abandon this quest as an ideal. His warning that those

who refuse to join his interrogation of morality "will never travel around the world (which you yourself are!) but will remain an impenetrable enigma to yourselves!"³⁷ implies that these inquiries enhance self-knowledge. Nietzsche does, to be sure, reject the idea that the self can be readily known and his rejection of the belief in fixed character threatens the possibility of that knowledge ever being complete. Nor does he promote self-knowledge as a good for everyone.³⁸ However, a conception of self-knowledge as a continuous quest to understand a protean, multiple, mysterious self is not repudiated; on the contrary, it is essential for the sort of aesthetic self-refashioning he advocates. In order to refigure themselves, individuals must know their faults and weaknesses, strengths and virtues, whence these originate and whether they can be modified. As Nietzsche says, "all those who regularly enjoy success possess a profound skill in always exposing their errors and weaknesses only as apparent strengths; for which reason they have to know these errors and weaknesses uncommonly well and with uncommon clarity."³⁹ Conversely, those who do not engage in careful self-observation misunderstand their passions and are unable to master them.⁴⁰

The necessity for self-knowledge in seekers after truth is further suggested by Nietzsche's claim that "those who conceal something of themselves *from themselves* and those who conceal themselves from themselves as a whole . . . perpetuate a robbery in the treasure-house of knowledge."⁴¹ Self-knowledge is again depicted as an indispensable component of the wider quest for truth when Nietzsche contrasts earlier figures who "have never made their experiences a matter of conscience for knowledge" with "we others who thirst after reason, [who] are determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a scientific experiment—hour after hour, day after day. We ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs."⁴² He clearly believes that serious students of morality and the psyche must turn their inquiries upon themselves and use themselves as raw material for their investigations.

Rather than being repudiated then, the traditional quest for self-knowledge becomes a central component in Nietzsche's conception of psychology in the middle period. In fact, when it comes to the sort of knowledge he seeks, the self/other and inside/outside dichotomies tremble. As the passage "'Know yourself' is the whole of science" claims, "only when he has attained a final knowledge of all things will man have come to know himself. For things are only the boundaries of man."⁴³

Nietzsche's approach to self-knowledge is, moreover, informed by his genealogical outlook. Not only does he claim that certain values and valuations have a history, but he emphasizes the way the past informs the self at its most personal level: "Direct self-observation is not nearly suf-

ficient for us to know ourselves: we require history, for the past continues to flow within us in a hundred waves; we ourselves are, indeed, nothing but that which at every moment we experience of this continued flowing."⁴⁴ As this vignette of the self flowing with history intimates, understanding the past and especially the history of moral sensations is a crucial component of self-knowledge. Another reason for Nietzsche's interest in genealogy is, therefore, its contribution to such knowledge. A genealogy of morals informs contemporaries about part of the process through which they have become what they are.

In connection with this, Nietzsche's genealogy of morals illustrates the ways in which the potential of the superior has been truncated by the values propounded by the mediocre many: "Our weak, unmanly, social concepts of good and evil and their tremendous ascendancy over body and soul have finally weakened all bodies and souls and snapped the self-reliant, independent, unprejudiced men, the pillars of a strong civilisation."⁴⁵ In this approach, the twin dimensions of Nietzsche's appeal to the past—the scholarly and the practical—reappear, for his aim is not just to show how the potential of superior types has become suppressed but also to begin to undo this distortion. Coming to see what is damaging in inherited values and ideas can instigate emancipation from them.

In the later works, by contrast, Nietzsche is far more skeptical about the possibility of individuals attaining self-knowledge.⁴⁶ One reason for this is his increased sense of the limitations of language. Each individual's actions are unique and incomparable, yet for these to become conscious, they must be expressed in language. However, because language is collective and general, it is too crude an instrument for the understanding of the self in its particularity. Hence the conclusion that "given the best will in the world to understand ourselves as individually as possible, 'to know ourselves,' each of us will always succeed in becoming conscious only of what is not individual but 'average.'"⁴⁷

Such skepticism toward the traditional Socratic goal of self-knowledge seems also to be connected with the changed role of reason and Nietzsche's dwindling faith in science in the later works, for the middle period's emphasis on self-knowledge was bound up with its neo-Socratic approach to the moral life which bemoaned the fact that values and customs were not subjected to rational scrutiny. However, the later works' suspicion of the role of reason in moral life does not mean that the pursuit of self-knowledge is expurgated altogether. Although the Socratic commitment to examining values is no longer prescribed for higher individuals, at a broader level an interrogation of the collective self-understanding of modern culture remains inextricably linked with the practice of genealogy.⁴⁸ Moreover, these examinations of current morality and the sort of

human it creates enable superior types to better understand themselves by identifying the forces that work against them in the present.⁴⁹ The genealogies are also vital to the transvaluation of values, for only by doing this sort of inquiry into morality can those with the potential for nobility see what has been lost in past moralities and be offered a new way of understanding themselves, one that does not denigrate the instincts nor believe that happiness comes from virtue and reason. Noble types can, as a consequence of Nietzsche's examinations, see that their happiness precedes, produces, and defines their virtue.⁵⁰

Clearly then, despite Nietzsche's professed skepticism about the possibility of self-knowledge, its pursuit is not entirely eradicated from the later works. The change from the middle to the later works is here more a change in degree than kind: the pursuit of self-knowledge is still possible and desirable for some, and it is still closely linked with Nietzsche's genealogies of the past and prescriptions for the transvalued future.

Free Will

Nietzsche's belief that his approach to morality and psychology contributes to self-knowledge and emancipation from damaging inherited ideas and beliefs is well illustrated in the middle period's critique of the doctrine of free will. This doctrine posits that individuals choose to act morally, and from this comes their personal responsibility, dignity as individuals, hope for eternal happiness, or simple pleasure in their actions. A certain joy attends "the performance of good works, which rests on belief in the voluntary nature of our good or wicked acts, that is to say on an error."⁵¹ The obverse of this is the belief that people choose to act immorally, a belief that makes accountability possible. "People who judge and punish as a profession try to establish in each case whether an ill-doer is at all accountable for his deed, whether he was able to employ his intelligence, whether he acted for reasons and not unconsciously or under compulsion."⁵²

As well as assisting judges in their duty, the belief in free will appeals to human vanity, which helps to explain why challenges to its supremacy in accounts of moral life and psychology incur such resistance.⁵³ The assumption of free will is also obdurate because it is deeply embedded in language;⁵⁴ indeed, it has seeped beyond the ethical into other realms so that free will is now treated as humans' ontological condition. Faith in free will is so widespread that people assume that freedom is their elemental condition and dependence or confinement aberrant.⁵⁵ So in challenging this faith, Nietzsche meets resistance from a range of forces.

Nietzsche's practice as a genealogist of morals gives him some immediate leverage against the idea of free will. His forays into the history of morality reveal that the worth of an action has not always been interpreted in terms of free will. "Only in Christendom did everything become punishment, well-deserved punishment: it also makes the sufferer's imagination suffer, so that with every misfortune he feels himself morally reprehensible and cast out."⁵⁶ Against Christianity's ubiquitous attribution of praise and blame (but mostly blame), Nietzsche poses antique conceptions of guilt and responsibility, pointing out that the Greeks believed in pure misfortune; things could befall a person without it being presumed that they were deserved.

Politics also plays a role in Nietzsche's account of how the belief in free will developed, for at one point he suggests that this belief originated in the sociopolitical realm. He defends his thesis that "the theory of freedom of will is an invention of *ruling* classes"⁵⁷ by claiming that only the strong person feels free. In areas where individuals feel powerful, they feel their will to be free; they believe, albeit mistakenly, that they have willed their achievements. However, this feeling of freedom is class specific; only members of powerful classes experience it. Those who are socially subordinate feel enslaved and could never concoct a theory of free will.

Initially, it seems difficult to reconcile these two accounts of the development of the doctrine of free will, for the feeling of power that characterizes the second is not typically associated in Nietzschean analysis with Christianity. Decadent Christianity is usually held to attract those who feel enslaved, weak, and dependent whereas feelings of power and freedom are associated with the aristocratic Greeks. However, this tension can be partly explained by the fact that this characterization of decadent Christianity is much more apparent in the later works than it is in the middle period. Furthermore, the sociopolitical account tries to explain the origins of the idea of free will, not its dissemination or appeal. While such an idea might only occur to those who feel themselves free, once conceived it could be highly, and even especially, appealing to those who feel confined and powerless in their daily lives.

Nietzsche also offers a nonhistorical critique of the doctrine of free will, one that could be leveled even if his historical investigations showed that all humans had always believed in free will. In the light of his powerful appreciation of the complexity of moral life, he finds the doctrine of free will too facile an approach to morality. Locating causality in the will, as doctrines of free will do, and going on to impute individual responsibility for actions is specious. Much of what is called moral action is not free, as Nietzsche's exposure of the part coercion, custom, and habit

play in forming moral evaluations and actions demonstrates. At the individual level, actions cannot be considered free because they are the product of a web of dependencies—history, drives, motivations, opportunities, experiences, and circumstances.⁵⁸ Even nonevents influence moral character by omission: “Our character is determined even more by the lack of certain experiences than by that which we experience.”⁵⁹

Yet no matter how historically specific or theoretically flawed it is as an account of morality and the psyche, Nietzsche concedes that the doctrine of free will has had some beneficial consequences. It is one of “the fundamental errors” that has allowed the notion of humanity to evolve and that of individuality to develop.⁶⁰ It has enriched and beautified life by allowing people to be moved by tales of great and noble deeds.⁶¹ However, it should now be superannuated, rendered obsolete by the sort of “scientific study”⁶² into the history of morality that he conducts.

Defying the whole ethos of free will, Nietzsche rejects its premise that action is chosen and its corollary that individuals are answerable for their actions. He advances instead “the proposition of the strict necessity of human actions, . . . the unconditional unfreedom and unaccountability of the will.”⁶³ Rather than actions being freely chosen they, and indeed the individual’s whole nature, are “altogether a necessary consequence and assembled from the elements and influence of things past and present . . . man can be made accountable for nothing, not for his nature, nor for his motives, nor for his actions, nor for the effects he produces . . . the history of the moral sensations is the history of an error, the error of accountability, which rests on the error of freedom of will.”⁶⁴

So rather than being born of choice, actions discharge some vital, necessary force, and in this they resemble natural forces which move not out of any sense of right or wrong but simply because they must—doing so is part of what they are. As Nietzsche says, “we do not accuse nature of immorality when it sends us a thunderstorm and makes us wet: why do we call the harmful man immoral? Because in the latter case we assume a voluntarily commanding free will, in the former necessity. But this distinction is an error.”⁶⁵ He later adds a comparison with works of art. Just as it is a category error to judge either art or nature by moral criteria, so actions should be seen as necessary and therefore innocent: “It is absurd to praise and censure nature and necessity. As he [the man of knowledge] loves a fine work of art but does not praise it since it can do nothing for itself, as he stands before the plants, so he must he stand before the actions of men and before his own. He can admire their strength, beauty, fullness, but he may not find any merit in them.”⁶⁶

Instead of a morality underpinned by this erroneous faith in free will, Nietzsche envisages a new morality becoming habitual, one that compre-

hends without loving or hating because it recognizes the power of necessity in action.⁶⁷ His alternative to free will is a belief in the original innocence of action, in action stemming from compulsion or necessity rather than choice or calculation.⁶⁸ Some people produce good and beautiful deeds without this being their goal, just as some have good effects on others effortlessly, simply by being who they are. Yet because they are not willed, the good and beautiful consequences of these actions are undervalued by current moralities.⁶⁹

Yet some tension can readily be discerned between Nietzsche's enthrallment with the mystery of the psyche and his confident pronouncements that free will is chimerical. His acute awareness of the difficulty of making judgments about or even characterizing moral actions—one's own or others'—is difficult to reconcile with his thesis about the innocence of actions, for this thesis assumes that it is easy to identify the source of actions: they are born not of choice but necessity. Given its incompatibility with his many other claims about the complex and multifarious character of the psyche and moral motivation, it seems that Nietzsche's insistence on the innocence and necessity of actions is an overreaction to what he sees as the extremes and imperial aspirations of the doctrine of free will, rather than a carefully considered and systematic thesis about the nature of personality, moral life, and action.

Moreover, Nietzsche's seemingly global thesis about the necessity of action is sometimes selectively applied. In a variation on his claim that higher human beings resemble animals by acting from passion rather than reason, he depicts inferior humans as acting on the basis of calculation of utility rather than innocent necessity.⁷⁰ The assumption underpinning both these views, that the calculation of utility is a somehow base and demeaning motive for action, suggests furthermore some convergence between Nietzsche's moral framework and that of the traditional moral codes that he usually condemns.

Along with the inconsistency of his application of the innocent necessity explanation of action, come several reasons why Nietzsche's seemingly swingeing attack on free will and his emphasis on necessity and fate cannot amount to a rejection of all forms of volition in human action. The middle period repeatedly describes the higher type of human as a free spirit, one who is "the exception, the fettered spirits are the rule."⁷¹ This suggests that some freedom is available to this elite which, if Nietzsche is to be true to his attack on free will, must differ from freedom of the will. Paradoxically perhaps, abandoning belief in primal and unfettered free will is an example of the freedom of free spirits and, more generally, in keeping with the enlightenment flavor of the middle period, such spirits are devoted to liberating themselves from all obstacles to

fresh and critical thinking. Impediments include convictions,⁷² tradition, their own settled opinions, and Christian belief.⁷³ The free spirit “demands reasons, the rest demand faith” which is why “he is called a free spirit who thinks differently from what, on the basis of his origin, environment, his class and profession, or on the basis of the dominant views of his age, would have been expected of him.”⁷⁴

Just like the pursuit of self-knowledge, this emancipation from custom, tradition, and the prevailing ideas and beliefs is an ongoing process for the free spirit. Such a person “hates all habituation and rules, everything enduring and definitive, that is why he sorrowfully again and again rends apart the net that surrounds him. . . . He has to learn to love where he formerly hated, and the reverse.”⁷⁵ Free spirits thus exercise their freedom in challenging convention and in pursuing the truth, projects that usually coincide: “What characterizes the free spirit is not that his opinions are the more correct but that he has liberated himself from tradition. . . . As a rule, though, he will nonetheless have truth on his side, or at least the spirit of inquiry after truth.”⁷⁶ Daring to know thus represents an invaluable form of freedom in the middle period, as does the energy to have one’s “own individual opinion concerning everything about which an opinion is possible.”⁷⁷ This must be combined with the courage to pursue knowledge and to withstand the opprobrium this incurs.⁷⁸ The forces that make a free spirit represent the sort of marriage of old and new values that Nietzsche advocates in his middle period, for while the belief that knowledge provides “*supreme happiness*” is ancient,⁷⁹ the honesty now possible, due to the growth of skepticism and science is “the youngest virtue, still very immature . . . still hardly aware of itself.”⁸⁰

It would be curious to consider the freedom required for this sort of pursuit of knowledge as an overflow of spontaneous instinct in the way that Nietzsche’s critique of free will would seem to require. Indeed, at one point he imputes volition to the seeker after knowledge, writing that the earnest desire to become free robs the individual of vices and flaws because “his will will desire nothing more earnestly than knowledge.”⁸¹ Yet at other times he does remove any element of choice from the way a free spirit thinks. He depicts the “tug towards freedom as the strongest drive of our spirit”⁸² and declares that “thinking in a way that is not customary is much less the result of a superior intellect than it is the result of strong, evil inclinations that detach and isolate one.”⁸³

However, the ability and determination to practice the sort of psychological perspicuity necessary for knowledge, be it of self or others, is also partly a product of will, suggesting again that Nietzsche’s critique of free will is not as swingeing as his rhetoric suggests. Among the things that dedicated seekers after knowledge must ask themselves is

"Was my will opposed to all deceptions of the senses and bold in resisting the fantastic?"⁸⁴ He advises that, whether the object of scrutiny be self or others, it is necessary at times to "close one's inward eye" to enter into the action or conversation with others as unreservedly as possible. The requisite "closing of the eyes is a perceptible act achievable by an act of will."⁸⁵ This belief that the self can be trained to look at the world in a particular way recurs when Nietzsche urges observers of the human psyche to "open your theatre-eye, the great third eye which looks out into the world through the other two!" Although these suggestions appear contradictory, with Nietzsche on the one hand encouraging less awareness and attentiveness and on the other hand more in the service of knowledge, it may be that the later advice is preliminary, directed as it is to those who "still need the theatre" for entertainment.⁸⁶ Once aware of the rich material daily life offers for psychological observation, Nietzsche's other point about the occasional need for the spontaneous involvement that fosters better understanding becomes appropriate. But whether or not these different techniques are suggested for different stages of the process of psychological observation, they share a faith in the ability to choose, to will the way one looks at the world, even if what starts as willed behavior eventually becomes habitual. This indicates again that Nietzsche's approach to psychology in the middle period does not really rule out any notion of freedom or volition, notwithstanding some of the more global claims he makes about free will being an error.

Nietzsche's attack on the doctrine of free will is, however, misunderstood when construed solely as an explanatory approach to morality and psychology. This critique is also inspired by his emancipatory, aesthetic interest, in the same way as his naturalism is.

As his assertions of the original innocence of all action indicate, a Nietzschean ideal is the person who discharges innate energies and inclinations without shame or self-consciousness. Doctrines based on free will make people feel guilty about themselves and their actions, and Nietzsche reviles the way Christianity in particular makes humans feel uncomfortable about and even ashamed of their natural inclinations. He wants to slough off these oppressive ideas; hence his warning that "as long as you are in any way ashamed before yourselves, you do not yet belong with us."⁸⁷ This concern to liberate people to love themselves is also evident in the passage "Distant prospect" which predicts that once the equation of the value of an action with free will is severed, "we shall restore to men their goodwill towards the actions decried as egoistic and restore to these actions their value—we shall deprive them of their bad conscience! . . . we thus remove from the entire aspect of action and life its evil appear-

ance! This is a very significant result! When man no longer regards himself as evil he ceases to be so!"⁸⁸

While the potential for the emergence of such innocent types exists, it is distorted by the morality of the antinatural concocted by those "in whom every natural inclination immediately becomes a sickness." As opposed to these who condemn the natural, "there are enough people who *might well* entrust themselves to their instincts with grace and without care; but they do not, from fear of this imagined 'evil character' of nature. That is why we find so little nobility among men."⁸⁹ As Nietzsche's confident prediction that "when man no longer regards himself as evil he ceases to be so!"⁹⁰ indicates, one way of promoting beautifying self-love is to free people from beliefs and doctrines that blame individual wickedness for bad outcomes or which make individuals feel ashamed of themselves. Beautiful action is more likely to emanate from those who take pleasure in themselves, rather than the weak and timorous. As he notes, "he who has finally attained to power pleases in almost all he does and says, and . . . even when he causes displeasure he still seems to please."⁹¹ The good person must first be "benevolently and beneficently inclined *towards himself*!"⁹² because true goodness is incompatible with self-hatred. By contrast, "whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims, if only by having to endure his ugly sight."⁹³ Beautiful action can thus be expected from confident individuals bathed in self-love who act spontaneously. It is impossible in those cramped by moral imperatives, especially those who "want to decry the desires as heretical and to exterminate them."⁹⁴

For an alternative to this sort of moral and psychological self-mutilation, Nietzsche looks admiringly to the Greeks. He notes their techniques for dealing with drives that could have destructive consequences; rather than trying to deny or expunge them, they regulated and channeled their destructive drives and "evil natural inclinations." Nietzsche contends that "this is the root of all the moral free-mindedness of antiquity. One granted to the evil and suspicious, to the animal and backward . . . a moderate discharge, and did not strive after their total annihilation."⁹⁵ He also claims that antiquity abounded with types who enjoyed the sort of moral innocence he wants to recapture. Untroubled by the doubts about their own goodness that are inculcated by Christianity, "those paragons of virtue . . . imbued with faith in their own perfection, went about with the dignity of a great matador."⁹⁶ Thus some of the motives behind Nietzsche's critique of free will are emancipatory and aesthetic: he wants to reduce the shame individuals feel about themselves and their drives that are labeled wicked by antinaturalist doctrines. He hopes that when individuals interpret themselves differently, they will

experience a healthy self-love and enjoy the freedom to perform beautiful deeds.⁹⁷

However, in condemning the misattribution of individual blame made possible by the doctrine of free will, Nietzsche goes too far. To proceed as if the only way to allow individuals to feel noble or beautiful is by absolving them of all responsibility for their actions, as the thesis about the original innocence of all action does, is not just excessive but ultimately self-defeating. If individuals cannot enjoy any credit for their noble actions, if their beauty is just the discharge of necessary forces, how is something as positive as self-love possible? All that could emanate from this stance would seem to be a bland, disengaged neutrality toward the self.⁹⁸

The hyperbole of Nietzsche's insistence on the original innocence of actions, which accompanies his attack on free will, is further evident from the fact that he does not conclude from this that evaluating and discriminating among originally innocent actions is impossible. Despite the many claims about discharging natural and necessary forces, this is not an ethic where "anything goes." As he declares, when the idea of humans as intrinsically evil is surmounted, we "come to recognise that there is no such thing as sin in the metaphysical sense; but, in the same sense, no such thing as virtue either; that this whole domain of moral ideas is in a state of constant fluctuation, that there exist higher and deeper conceptions of good and evil, of moral and immoral."⁹⁹ Thus despite the passages celebrating the necessity of actions, unmediated natural instincts and impulses are not necessarily good. Consider his criticism of the current "delight in all the coarser eruptions and gestures of passion."¹⁰⁰ As his concern to promote beautiful action and self-love intimates, Nietzsche adumbrates aesthetic criteria that will replace traditional moral judgments as a way of measuring the value of actions.

Just as Nietzsche injects ethical evaluations with aesthetic considerations, so he permits artistry into the self, allowing that a cosmetic touch can be added to render the natural more beautiful, to make weaknesses and defects appear less offensive. What is natural, therefore, need not go unmediated to be valuable. Consider Nietzsche's explanation of the claim that "One thing is needful: To 'give style' to one's character—a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye."¹⁰¹

Just as Nietzsche does not suggest that all that is natural, necessary, and unmediated in human drives and desires is equally valuable, so he concedes that this sort of artistry of the self is not devoid of volition. So

notwithstanding his emphasis on compulsion, necessity, and spontaneity in action, he refers to "the passion of their tremendous will" when describing such types, indicating that the sort of action he admires and prescribes can include a willed component. Those who can give such style to their character are contrasted with weak types who have no control over themselves.¹⁰² Nor is this sort of aesthetic work on the self done without freedom; Nietzsche depicts the possibilities for self-rearrangement through a series of horticultural metaphors and concludes "all this we are at liberty to do: but how many know we are at liberty to do it?"¹⁰³ In this vein comes his anticipation of a new, higher notion of genius in which great types turn their artistic power and taste upon themselves, making themselves their own work of art. Along with self-control, this artistry of the self requires "the imposition of order and choice [*Auswahl*] upon the influx of tasks and impressions,"¹⁰⁴ suggesting again not just the possibility but the necessity of volition, freedom, and self-knowledge in his portrait of the aesthetic self.

Believing that the philosophical idea of the fixed self has kept people in thrall to a self they believed was fixed, Nietzsche suggests that correcting people's self-understanding by showing them they are free to alter themselves adds to their freedom. Clearly then, his aesthetic approach to the self smuggles something very like free will back into his ethical ideal. This is most explicit when he writes that "active, successful natures act . . . as if there hovered before them the commandment: will [*wolle*] a self and thou shalt become [*wirst*] a self. Fate seems to have left the choice [*die Wahl*] still up to them."¹⁰⁵ This sort of freedom that higher types can exercise in making themselves might not be the absolute and unconditioned freedom associated with the doctrine of free will, but nor is it the spontaneous discharge of energy posited when Nietzsche outlines his original innocence of all actions thesis.¹⁰⁶

From all this it emerges that the terms of Nietzsche's assault on free will are hyperbolic, for the things that this critique condemns—freedom, volition, choice, and control—are restored in some of his other arguments and ideals about an aesthetic approach to the self. While critical of the accent on guilt and blame in Christian and post-Christian ethics, he does not, despite his rhetoric, aim to strip all individuals of all responsibility for all actions. The repeated claims about the original innocence of action seem to have as their target doctrines like Christianity that execrate natural desires and bodily functions, rather than advocating the more substantive position that any emanation of any self is necessary and therefore beyond reproach. Imbuing his view of ethics with a strong aesthetic component, Nietzsche is concerned with self-love that in turn gives birth to beauty in action and comportment. Yet this concern rein-

forces the claim that all discharges of immediate emotion and desire are not equally valued by him and suggests that the burden of his critique of doctrines that evoke shame and guilt is not so much that they misunderstand the real nature of action but the fear that they cramp individuals and hinder them from feeling themselves to be, or aspiring to make themselves, beautiful.

As a psychologist, Nietzsche reveals the mystery and complexity of the psyche and moral motivation. He highlights the web of dependencies that hems action in and makes freedom an achievement rather than a given in human life. Because of these constraints, traditional notions of praise and blame for moral outcomes, of responsibility and accountability, demand reconsideration. Yet despite his repeated attacks on the notion of free will, Nietzsche does not conclude that all forms of freedom, volition, or choice are chimerical. Instead, he advocates that those who strive for his sort of freedom recognize the web of dependencies within which all humans operate. They must then etch out some freedom within those parameters. While Nietzsche sometimes appeals to what is natural in defense of these goods, all natural things are not equally worthy or beautiful. On the contrary, when adducing his idea of a higher form of morality, he suggests that careful, aesthetic management of the self is required.

The sort of psychology Nietzsche practices in the middle period is therefore an incongruous blend of attentiveness to the fine details and differences of the psyche and bold assertions against the doctrine of free will. However, a careful examination of the notion of the aesthetic self, which he adumbrates as an alternative to traditional Christian-inspired morality, reveals that some notions of freedom and will are restored there. This means that some of Nietzsche's more dramatic expressions of his counterthesis to the doctrine of free will must be modified if his own position is to be fully understood. Probably the best way of appreciating the sort of psychologist Nietzsche is in the middle period comes, however, not from analyzing his various claims about morality and the psyche but by looking in detail at his depictions of drives like vanity, self-love, and pity, of gender issues, and of relationships like friendship and marriage.

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All Is Not Vanity

One of the purposes of Nietzsche's genealogy of morals is practical; he strives to discredit or demote values whose only purpose is to serve the common interest, and he wants to clear the ground for the creation, resurgence, or justification of those which foster individualism. Nietzsche believes that a necessary ingredient of such individualism is self-love; he wants to free people of the shame that Christianity and other moral frameworks have inspired in them. Hence, his injunction to "Throw off discontent with your nature, forgive yourself your own ego"¹ and his suggestion to "love yourselves as an act of clemency."² Nietzsche believes that only when individuals experience self-love are they capable of good or beautiful action. In the twin practical concerns of genealogy—to expose values that simply serve the common good and to promote individualism and noble action—questions of egoism, self-love, and vanity acquire central importance.

As part of his critique of free will, Nietzsche tries to forge an analysis of action that is devoid of the dominant evaluations of good and evil, one which has an a priori assumption of moral innocence. In attempting to think about drives outside the confines of current morality, he does not give the terms egoism and self-love their usual adverse connotations,

insisting instead that “*egoism is not evil*.”³ That they usually do carry negative connotations testifies to morality’s traditional function of preserving the collective and treating self-interest and individualism as threatening. So when it comes to egoism and self-love, Nietzsche is not just calling for a reconsideration of the process of evaluating values; he is encouraging a transvaluation of the values themselves; instead of forwarding new reasons for valuing these things, he gives drives that had been discredited a new status. In the passage “Distant Prospect,” for example, he proposes to “restore to men their goodwill towards the actions decried as egoistic and restore to these actions their *value*.”⁴

Nietzsche concedes, however, that the process of transvaluation is not easy: “It is troublesome that certain words which we moralists cannot avoid using bear within them a kind of moral censure deriving from those ages in which the most immediate and natural impulses in man were made heretical. . . . There is no help for it, we are obliged to use such words, but when we do so we must close our ears to the whisperings of ancient habits.”⁵ Yet despite the fact that this passage is about vanity, the term vanity typically retains its traditional critical force in the writings of the middle period. Unlike egoism and self-love, it does not undergo any transvaluation, allowing Nietzsche to show that while all action emanates from egoism, all is not vanity.⁶

Egoism

At the core of Nietzsche’s analysis of moral life is the idea that all action is to some degree egoistic: “Without vanity and egoism—what are the human virtues? Which is not intended remotely to imply that these are merely names and masks of such virtues.”⁷ Egoistic action (a tautology in his estimation) is accompanied by a sensation of power which in turn brings a diffuse feeling of enjoyment, the pleasure of self-assertion.⁸ Nietzsche even applies this insight to himself, giving in the passage “Pleasure in Knowledge” pride of place to the feeling of power that comes from pursuing knowledge. “Firstly and above all . . . one here becomes conscious of one’s strength.”⁹

Yet this contention that egoism is the provenance of all action seems difficult to reconcile with the middle period’s many other claims about the mystery and complexity of moral life, for it seems to offer a clear and simple explanation of the source of action. However, while all action might derive from egoism, not all egoism is the same. For example, the way people decide what is in their interest varies; “precisely the immature, undeveloped, crude individual will understand it [one’s advantage] most

crudely.”¹⁰ Nietzsche distinguishes among types of egoism when, reflecting on magnanimity, he concludes that it “contains the same degree of egoism as does revenge, but egoism of a different quality.”¹¹

Nor should the thesis that all action is initially egoistic imply that moral action is impossible, for Nietzsche challenges the regnant belief that goodness comes only from altruism. Egoism can produce goodness by omission for “most people are much too much occupied with themselves to be wicked”¹² and many good outcomes have self-centered motives.¹³ But rather than quarrel about whether egoism can ever give rise to moral action, Nietzsche applies his thesis about the original innocence of actions to egoism to suggest that, at least in the first instance, egoism is neither good nor bad but innocent. As the passage entitled “The innocent element in so-called evil acts” asserts, “all ‘evil’ acts are motivated by the drive to preservation or, more exactly, by the individual’s intention of procuring pleasure and avoiding displeasure; so motivated, however, they are not evil.”¹⁴ In “The innocent element in wickedness” Nietzsche declares that “pleasure in oneself is neither good nor bad,”¹⁵ and this idea is developed in the passage “Unaccountability and innocence”: “It is the individual’s sole desire for self-enjoyment (together with the fear of losing it) which gratifies itself in every instance, let a man act as he can, that is to say as he must: whether his deeds be those of vanity, revenge, pleasure, utility, malice, cunning or those of sacrifice, sympathy, knowledge. . . . Everything is innocence [*Unschuld*]; and knowledge is the path to insight into this innocence.”¹⁶

Egoism is, therefore, the primary datum of human life, with morality appearing later to interpret and judge the actions it generates. Egoism only acquires a moral character “when it enters into relations with drives already baptised good or evil or is noted as a quality of beings the people has already evaluated and determined in a moral sense.”¹⁷ Nietzsche advances a more general proposition about the superimposition of moral interpretations on originally innocent drives when he declares that, “there is nothing good, nothing beautiful, nothing sublime, nothing evil in itself, but . . . there are states of soul in which we impose such words upon things external to and within us. We have again *taken back* the predicates of things, or at least remembered that it was we who *lent* them to them.”¹⁸

Yet notwithstanding his desire to advance a disinterested analysis of the initial innocence of egoism, at many points Nietzsche’s discussion takes on a moral hue of its own and egoism becomes not just a brute fact about human action but something to be celebrated. Supposedly amoral descriptions of egoism become celebrations of self-love, with Nietzsche urging that the egoism at the core of action be not just acknowledged but embraced. Despite his attempt to analyze action in its original innocence

before imposing moral judgment, the tendency to give positive moral value to egoism seeps through. Instead of such egoism representing the primary, neutral datum of human life, with his new moral interpretations being added later, in some instances Nietzsche's analysis of egoism has an *a priori* normative element.

The slide from a neutral to an evaluative stance, from the claim that egoism is natural, necessary and innocent to its affirmation, is apparent in Nietzsche's description of the Christian who, if only momentarily, is freed of the self-contempt aroused by his religion's "false, unscientific interpretation of his actions and sensations." The Christian is not released into a dispassionate view of the self and its actions but into self-love, experiencing the novelty of "pleasure in himself, his contentment at his own strength. . . . he loves himself again, he feels it." Although the Christian misinterprets "the love with which fundamentally he loves himself"¹⁹ as divine, Nietzsche's approbation of this self-love is unmistakable. Another illustration of the affirmation of egoism comes when Nietzsche imputes to Jesus a belief in his innocence and unaccountability. The Nazarene might have arrived at this now scientific position via a series of erroneous beliefs, but as the son of God he felt himself to be sinless; his "whole being is flooded with the light of certain delusions" which made him "in the highest degree attractive."²⁰ Nietzsche's general account of the effect of realizing that the doctrine of sin is an error and that humans are not as base as it had painted them also illustrates his tendency to affirm some egoism as self-love. Using religious language to describe what happens when the scales fall, he says that "all one's feelings are very much relieved and lightened, and man and world sometimes appear in a halo of harmlessness the sight of which fills one with a thorough sense of wellbeing. In the midst of nature man is always the child in itself. The child does once dream a dismal, fear-inspiring dream it is true, but when it opens its eyes it sees it is still in Paradise."²¹

It may be that when he praises, rather than just describes, egoism in these ways, Nietzsche is deliberately compensating for the calumny it has suffered and continues to suffer in moral frameworks. Such correction could be required before egoism can be restored to a position of neutrality in future moral schemas, for it cancels out past condemnations. As his discussion of the "Morality of the mature individual" observes, "we all of us, to be sure, still suffer from the all-too-little regard paid to the personal in us, it has been badly cultivated."²² This makes his praise for egoism a short-term, strategic measure adopted for the purpose of eventually neutralizing the terms of analysis. However, it also means that his supposedly scientific analyses have a therapeutic intent.

An alternative cause of this praise of egoism could be that Nietzsche's

very ambition to isolate it as a neutral, primal force is fatally flawed, for one could never separate the primary data of moral life from supposedly *ex ante* projections in a clear and distinct way. From this perspective, the slide into a normative evaluation of egoism is inevitable and not really an elision at all, for when it comes to understanding things like moral life and identity, the two things—fact and interpretation—are knotted together from the start. This is the sort of explanation Nietzsche's later work inspires, when it questions the fact/value separation and the disinterested pursuit of truth modeled on the natural sciences that the middle period so lauds.

Vanity

Along with egoism and self-love, there is a third important component to Nietzsche's analysis of such primal drives in the self—vanity [*die Eitelkeit*]. The term vanity appears frequently in the middle period, particularly in the works that became the two volumes of HH,²³ and *prima facie* it could seem to be synonymous with egoism [*der Egoismus*]. Their equivalence is suggested by the claim that human vanity is both the most vulnerable and the most invincible thing.²⁴ Vanity and egoism again seem to mean the same thing when Nietzsche points out that “pleasure, egoism [and] vanity” [*Lust, Egoismus, Eitelkeit*] “might be *necessary* for the production of moral phenomena.”²⁵ Their synonymy is further implied in the first exchange between the Wanderer and his Shadow, which concludes that vanity is, like egoism, ubiquitous, but not always visible:

The Wanderer: I thought a man's shadow was his vanity: but his vanity would never ask: “ought I, then, to flatter?”

The Shadow: Neither does a man's vanity, insofar as I know it, ask . . . *whether* it may speak; it never ceases from speaking.²⁶

However, there is much to suggest that for Nietzsche vanity is not the fundamental feature of action that egoism is, that vanity is typical, not universal. He reflects on “how poor the human spirit would be without vanity,”²⁷ yet without egoism the human spirit would be bankrupt. Similarly, the observation that “there are always innumerable vain people”²⁸ assumes a distinction between vanity and egoism, for Nietzsche insists that the egoistic person is not common but universal.

A careful analysis of the concept of vanity in the writings of the middle period reveals that it provides an alternative to seeing egoistic actions as either neutral or positive, for when Nietzsche wants to criticize some

of the ego's emanations, he typically employs this traditional notion. This is a slightly imperfect account of his lexicon, for there are occasions when vanity does seem to bear neutral connotations.²⁹ However, as a rule, while he strips the terms egoism and self-love of their pejorative connotations, the notion of vanity is not similarly transvalued. So notwithstanding his express desire to rehabilitate the term vanity and free it of its "moral censure," for the most part when analyzing vanity, Nietzsche does not close his "ears to the whisperings of ancient habits."³⁰

Some support for the argument that vanity retains its traditional critical force in the work of Nietzsche's middle period comes from his observation that one of the things making the mistaken belief in free will so obdurate is its appeal to human vanity.³¹ Were vanity synonymous with egoism and, like egoism, universal and inevitable, then the belief in free will would be insuperable. If Nietzsche believed this, the considerable energy he expends arguing against free will would be in vain. However, most of the evidence for this interpretation emerges from a detailed consideration of the several passages depicting this drive.

Its first sustained discussion comes in a passage entitled "Vanity"³² which diagnoses vanity as a dearth of self-love. Unable to take pleasure in themselves, the vain look to others for confirmation of their worth. Testifying to the subtlety of the middle period's analyses of moral life, Nietzsche is careful to indicate that not all quests for social approval derive from vanity—the good opinion of others is also sought for reasons like utility and benevolence [*Wohlwollen*]. The danger of inferring motives from outcomes is again signaled in the discussion of the way love generates similar outcomes to vanity. As the passage "Without vanity" observes, "when we are in love we wish that our defects might remain concealed—not from vanity but to keep the beloved from suffering. Indeed, the lover would like to seem divine—and this, too, not from vanity."³³

Vanity is a corrupt way of seeking affirmation because it signals an absence of self-love and autonomy. Using terms that challenge his own equation of vanity, egoism, and pleasure, Nietzsche writes that "interest in oneself, desire to feel pleasure, attains in the vain person to such an intensity that he seduces others to a false, much too high assessment of himself, yet then submits to the authority of these others."³⁴ The vain person's preoccupation with the opinion of others reappears in Nietzsche's claim that "the vain man wants not so much to predominate as to feel himself predominant. . . . What he treasures is not the opinion of others but his own opinion of their opinion."³⁵

Because the vain lack a sense of self, they often strive to demean others. One way in which they can feel affirmed is by feeling superior and subordinating others to confirm their falsely inflated value. Because those

in the grip of vanity need to feel superior and to inspire fear in others,³⁶ they become rivalrous and profoundly concerned with comparing themselves with others.³⁷ Vanity can even make them “go so far as to neglect their own advantage,” for this need to triumph over others can incur the others’ hostility.³⁸ Some of the symptoms of vanity are shared by the trait Nietzsche calls “Presumptuousness” [*Anmaassung*]. He diagnoses this as “a pretended and hypocritical pride,” whereas genuine pride must have a solid basis and cannot be feigned.³⁹ So, like the vain, the presumptuous suffer from a lack of self-love. He examines the dangers of the drive to extract more acknowledgment and honor from others than one has actually earned. The victory that attends this quest is often Pyrrhic, for those compelled to pay respect at inflated rates later extract their revenge by holding the presumptuous person in lower esteem than ever. As a consequence, “the presumptuous person can make his actual merits, which may be great, seem so suspect and small in the eyes of others that they are trampled in the dust.”⁴⁰

Vanity is, therefore, a corrupt form of egoism, taking egoism’s natural interest in the self and pleasure in self-assertion to the extreme. Vanity is directly associated with excess and criticized when, discussing “The Religious Life,” Nietzsche attributes the ascetic division of the self into tyrant and tyrannized to “a very high degree of vanity.”⁴¹ What connects this analysis of vanity with the others is not so much the ascetic’s need to find affirmation in the eyes of others as the dearth of self-love, for Nietzsche presents this sort of self-flagellation as “*spernere se sperni*”—answering contempt with contempt.

The middle period’s first long passage on vanity⁴² outlines most of its contours and many of the subsequent discussions of vanity amplify or modify its ideas. However, Nietzsche’s analyses are so nuanced and attuned to the multifarious quality of moral life that there is no tedium or repetition in his examinations of vanity. Some sense of how variegated vanity is comes in Nietzsche’s illustration of the way a single trait can spawn quite different outcomes: “One person retains an opinion because he flatters himself it was his own discovery, another because he acquired it with effort and is proud of having grasped it: thus both do so out of vanity.”⁴³ Vanity can even give rise to antithetical forms of behavior: “When a man conceals his bad qualities and vices or openly admits them, in both cases his vanity is seeking its advantage: one has only to observe how subtly he distinguishes before whom he conceals these qualities, before whom he is honest and open-hearted.”⁴⁴

Although vanity can drive its victims to neglect their own interests, the vain are capable of careful calculation and manipulation—they do not always act excessively nor jeopardize their interests. Yet just as vanity can

be lucid when attempting to manipulate and deceive others, it can be purblind regarding itself, engaging in massive self-deception. The capacity of vain people for self-deception extends even to their vanity—they deny it so as not to hate themselves.⁴⁵ Thus vanity, which stems from a dearth of self-love, can also protect the individual from self-loathing. Vanity's myopia becomes visible in another way when Nietzsche claims that vain people interpret displays of generosity or diffidence by others as attempts to humiliate them.⁴⁶ Vain people project their own motives onto others and are consequently unable to discern the real reasons for another's acts.

At one point, Nietzsche defines vanity as the demand for public acknowledgment of one's superiority without possessing the superiority that would earn this.⁴⁷ The need vain people have to feel that they enjoy the good opinion of others indicates that while vanity manifests itself in many forms, heteronomy is its recurrent symptom. The works of the middle period repeatedly indicate vanity's need for an audience because, lacking self-love, the vain cannot live by their opinion of themselves alone but must be fortified by the opinion they believe others hold of them.⁴⁸ Even the "very rare and sublimated" kind of vanity Nietzsche identifies is concerned with the self's appearance to the world.⁴⁹ Two brief passages detecting vanity in those of whom it is not characteristic make its heteronomy manifest. Of the first, who is not exceptionally vain but "Vain exceptionally" Nietzsche writes, "he who is usually self-sufficient is vain and receptive to fame and commendation on exceptional occasions, namely when he is physically ill. To the extent that he feels himself diminishing he has to try to recoup himself from outside through the opinion of others."⁵⁰ The second's vanity is "behind the times": "The vanity of many people who have no need to be vain is a habit, retained and exaggerated, from a time when they did not yet have the right to believe in themselves and had first to beg for this belief from others in small coinage."⁵¹

Nietzsche's sensitivity to the variegated quality of moral life also allows him to discern that quite different traits can cohabit a single personality and that strikingly different motivations can cooperate to produce a single action. Thus vanity blends with "goodwill [*Wohlbollen*] towards our admirers" to let us "harvest love or honour for deeds or works which we have long since cast from us."⁵² Although he usually depicts vanity as antithetical to beneficence, the subtlety and acuity of his analyses of human behavior prevent him from drawing strict boundaries between moral forces, so that the findings of his psychology continue to surprise.

One of vanity's major features is its need to assert superiority. This can involve diminishing others, even if only in the vain person's mind. This

need is symptomatic of an all too common pettiness.⁵³ The wider connection between a lack of self-love and a desire to hurt others is indicated in Nietzsche's warning that "we have cause to fear him who hates himself, for we shall be the victims of his wrath and revenge."⁵⁴ It reappears in his prediction that "whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims."⁵⁵ That the desire to assert one's dominance is characteristic of inferior types is indicated again in a passage about "The embarrassed": "People who do not feel secure in society employ every opportunity afforded by the presence of someone to whom they are superior of publicly exhibiting this superiority at his expense before the company."⁵⁶ Nietzsche further associates the desire to hurt others with a lack of power when he writes that "the state in which we hurt others is rarely as agreeable, in an unadulterated way, as that in which we benefit others; it is a sign that we are still lacking power, or it shows a sense of frustration in the fact of this poverty."⁵⁷

However, in the light of the middle period's antireductionism, its discussion of egoism's pleasure in self-assertion and the distinction between egoism and vanity it usually draws, it cannot be assumed that the desire to feel one's power is necessarily a function of vanity. Nor is vanity responsible for all feelings of superiority. On the contrary, Nietzsche attacks the idea of universal equality and is anxious to demonstrate the superiority of some people to others.⁵⁸ This requires that some feelings of superiority be warranted: indeed one of his great complaints against the modern era is the way Christian and post-Christian equality doctrines have discouraged superior types from recognizing their greatness. However, while the vain strive to assert their superiority, higher individuals are not usually vain or hungry for praise: "When good friends praise a talented nature he will often exhibit pleasure at it, though he does so out of politeness and benevolence: in truth he is indifferent to it."⁵⁹ Their sufficiency of self-love obviates the need to inflate their significance or project it for its own sake, and they know no desire to harm or reduce others.⁶⁰ Yet while great individuals are devoid of vanity, they further manifest their greatness by showing forbearance toward the vanity of their inferiors.⁶¹

In stark contrast to the desire by some vain people to diminish others in order to inflate themselves, when superior types harm others, it is more likely to occur in action than in thought and as an unintended consequence, rather than goal, of their action. Nietzsche returns to the language of necessity to characterize moral life, at least with regard to the actions of the great, when he contrasts great types with weak ones: "The evil of the strong harms others without giving thought to it—it *has* to discharge itself; the evil of the weak *wants* to harm others and to see the signs of the suffering it has caused."⁶²

This negative correlation between greatness and the characteristic need of the vain to demonstrate their superiority did not always obtain however. Nietzsche offers a brief genealogy of this trait in "The great utility of vanity," claiming that strong individuals originally sought to magnify their image in others' eyes so as to intimidate them. This followed the realization that the amount of power others perceived one to have mattered more than, and thereby contributed to, actual power. "What bears him up or throws him down is not that which he *is* but that which he *counts* as being: here is the origin of vanity." Enhancing one's reputation for power was a way of increasing effective power—"when the fear he engenders increases, his power increases." From this Nietzsche concludes that vanity was originally very useful, at least to the powerful. Now, however, "we know vanity only in its feeblest forms, in its sublimations and small doses, because we live in a late and very ameliorated state of society." Whereas the current attenuated form of vanity attempts to inflate the perception others have of the self because of a dearth of self-love, vanity's original attempt at self-inflation was prompted not by lack but from the need to survive in a "painful and fear-ridden state" where life was insecure. While modern vanity remains preoccupied with the opinion of others, just how far it has mutated from "these primeval conditions"⁶³ is evident in its being no longer the preserve of the strong but of feeble types aspiring to undeserved greatness.

Ressentiment

From the standpoint of the later works, Nietzsche's negative portrayal of vanity in the middle period works can be seen as paving the way for his notion of *ressentiment*, which is not articulated in the middle period.⁶⁴ Vanity derives from a dearth of self-love, and this inability to affirm and love the self characterizes the slavish mentality in Nietzsche's later works. As he says, "with weak and impotent people it [*ressentiment*] occurs without fail."⁶⁵ Higher types suffer no shortage of self-love; rather "The noble soul has reverence for itself."⁶⁶ Just as in the middle period Nietzsche portrays Jesus as suffused with "the feeling of complete sinlessness, complete unaccountability,"⁶⁷ so in the later works he is cast as free of or beyond *ressentiment*. The same cannot, however, be said for his followers who demanded revenge for his death.⁶⁸ In this regard, then, Christianity is the mirror image of Socratic rationalism whose founder was, according to Nietzsche, motivated by *ressentiment* but who drew disciples for quite other motives, such as the agonistic character of dialectics.⁶⁹

Because they are unable to take pleasure in themselves, vain types look

to others for confirmation of their worth. The dependence of their self-esteem on the opinion of others contrasts markedly with the autonomy of higher types, and in this constant looking outward, vanity resembles *ressentiment*. "This reversal of direction of the evaluating look, this invariable looking outward instead of inward, is a fundamental feature of *ressentiment*."⁷⁰ The self-deception of vain people, their inability to acknowledge their motives, is another of the features linking vanity with *ressentiment*, for Nietzsche declares that "the man of resentment is neither truthful nor ingenious nor honest and forthright with himself."⁷¹

One difference between these two drives, however, appears in the quality of, and response to, the suffering associated with each. The suffering of vain people is caused by absence: they lack self-love and look to others to compensate for this. *Ressentiment* however, begins with embodied suffering that is more present and active, and it looks for others to blame for this misery. As Nietzsche says, "the wish to alleviate pain is, to my mind, the true physiological motive behind all manifestations of resentment."⁷² The trick of the ascetic priest is to reverse the blaming gaze of *ressentiment* and turn it inward, so that sufferers attribute their misery to their own wickedness. It is instructive to compare this with a passage from the middle period. In "The Religious Life," Nietzsche attributes the ascetic division of the self into tyrant and tyrannized to "a very high degree of vanity."⁷³ As we have seen, what this picture of vanity shares with Nietzsche's others is an absence of self-love. The source of ascetic self-punishment is self-hatred. The parallels between these positions suggest again that Nietzsche's thinking about vanity in the middle period shaped his later analysis of *ressentiment*.

Another difference between vanity and *ressentiment* is that in order to feel affirmed, vain people often need to demean, assert their superiority over, or inspire fear in, others. *Ressentiment*, by contrast, inspires the mediocre not to assert their superiority but to destroy the ascendancy of others by reducing them to their own level. As Nietzsche says, "the underprivileged, the decadents of all kinds are in revolt on account of themselves and need victims so as not to quench their thirst for destruction by destroying themselves."⁷⁴ Bringing others down, diminishing them to one's own level rather than raising the self, is thus an essential feature of *ressentiment* but a contingent feature of vanity; vain people only need to diminish others if they cannot assert their superiority by triumphing over them.

So it is possible to trace a link from Nietzsche's discussions of vanity in the middle period to his later portrait of *ressentiment*. Both drives characterize inferior personalities who lack self-love and practise self-deception. However, they differ slightly in the way they react to others. Because the

vain need other people to affirm their self-worth, they can aspire to compete with or surpass the greatness of others. Those consumed by *ressentiment*, however, can only hope to bring others down to their level.

Justice and Egoism

When Nietzsche's contention that superior humans do not intend to harm others in asserting their greatness is combined with his portrayal of action as not being the product of individual free will and as enjoying an original innocence, it seems that there is no obvious place for justice in his thinking about egoism. This has direct ramifications for my claim that part of what makes the middle works valuable is their attention to relations between and among people. The question arises whether there is room for obligations to others in a moral space that seems to be dominated by the ubiquity and innocence of egoism. His ideas about action and accountability seem to exclude the very things that constitute justice because, irrespective of its rival definitions, at the core of any notion of justice is the idea that one party can legitimately make some claim to be considered in the actions of another. While there is debate about the valid grounds for consideration (need, merit, concern, solidarity, inalienable right) and how far they extend, the central idea remains that justice requires one party to circumscribe its actions in consideration of another. The likely antagonism between this and Nietzsche's analysis of action is obvious. Indeed, he is explicit about the tension between the orthodox notion of justice and his attack on free will, declaring that: "He who has fully grasped the theory of total unaccountability can no longer accommodate so-called justice that punishes and rewards under the concept of justice at all: provided, that is, that this consists in giving to each what is his own."⁷⁵ He writes dismissively of justice as "so often a cloak for weakness,"⁷⁶ seeing it as one of the virtues society can practice without loss, as opposed to "virtues belonging among non-equals, devised by the superior, the individual."⁷⁷ It can be inferred that claims to justice do not obtain between unequals—a conclusion supported by Nietzsche's assertion that with a great goal "one is superior even to justice, not only to one's deeds and one's judges."⁷⁸

In order to see how this tension between egoism and justice has arisen, it is necessary to consider the middle period's genealogy of justice which inquires into the beginnings of justice and examines its connection with equality. Rather than assuming a priori equality of persons, justice develops only when such equality becomes manifest: "Justice (fairness) [*Die Gerechtigkeit (Billigkeit)*] originates between parties of approximately equal

power.”⁷⁹ Partners in conflict act justly toward one another because they realize the parity of their strength and that combat is likely to result in mutual attrition rather than a clear victory for either. Negotiation replaces competition but this bargaining assumes reciprocity only because of its partners’ equal coercive potential. Fairness thus begins as prudence and interest in self-preservation. As such, justice is no exception to Nietzsche’s thesis that egoism is the source of all action and that current moral schemas have obscured the ordinary, interested, and utilitarian beginnings of their highest moral claims.

When justice is conceived of as a system of rights and duties, its interested, utilitarian beginnings emerge. The passage “On the natural history of rights and duties” echoes the point that one party recognizes another’s equality out of prudence and self-interest rather than any moral sense of what is fair. Nietzsche argues that rights were not conferred by virtue of some abstract, universal equality among individuals but according to degrees of power. In conceding rights, others acknowledge and seek to preserve the recipient’s power. Should a dramatic alteration in that power occur, the rights change too: “Where rights *prevail*, a certain condition and degree of power is being maintained, a diminution and increment warded off. The rights of others constitute a concession on the part of our sense of power to the sense of power of those others. If our power appears to be deeply shaken and broken, our rights cease to exist: conversely, if we have grown very much more powerful, the rights of others, as we have previously conceded them, cease to exist for us.”⁸⁰

On this reading, the possession of rights was not initially inherent or inalienable but contingent upon power or, more precisely, the power an agent was perceived to possess. This reminds us of why vanity was so useful, for augmenting others’ perceptions of one’s power could yield more rights. The direct connection between rights and power, and the originally concrete, calculating, pragmatic quality of rights conferral is also expressed in the section “Of the rights of the weaker”: “*Rights* originally extend *just as far* as one *appears* valuable, essential, unlosable, unconquerable and the like, to the other. In this respect the weaker too possess rights, but more limited ones.”⁸¹

Nietzsche explains that the original circumstances of rights conferral have been forgotten, their connection with power obscured. An initial, temporary equilibrium between individuals and their powers gradually became encrusted and the possession of rights lost its pragmatic, realist justification. The distribution of rights came to be seen as “a sacred, immutable state of affairs.” The weak, having an interest in the status quo and not wanting to realign rights according to powers, saw their advantage in perpetuating the idea that the prevailing distribution of rights was

not fluid but fixed, "as *valid eternally*."⁸² Thus rights moved from reflecting mutual perceptions of relative power to being a source of power among unequals. The interest the weak had in the doctrine of equality has now become mixed up with a sense of honor and dignity, for Nietzsche suggests that the appeal to "human dignity" which is made to criticize practices like slavery is actually "that precious vanity which feels being unequal, being publicly rated lower, as the hardest lot." Indeed, he indicates that because of this equation of equality with honor, modern society places "more value on the satisfaction of vanity than on any other form of well-being."⁸³

Those who used to practice justice had to be attuned to both equality and inequality; equal treatment could not be presupposed but had to be merited. Because justice was based on how one party perceived another, equal status was not a premise of agents' exchanges but a consequence of recognizing equivalent power. Perceptions of parity and hence the sense of justice depended on the distance between the agents. When two parties were close enough to see how close their mutual power was, justice could enter their dealings. When some distance separated them, be it social, physical, or psychic, they did not see themselves as engaged in reciprocal relations nor having any mutual responsibility and questions of justice did not enter their calculations.

This link between justice and proximity becomes conspicuous by its absence when Nietzsche recounts a situation devoid of both. In "Errors of the sufferer and the doer," a poor person curses a rich one for taking one of his possessions, but the social and psychic gulf between them leaves the latter oblivious to the full extent of his crime:

The rich man does not feel nearly so deeply the value of a *single* possession because he is used to having many: thus he cannot transport himself into the soul of the poor man and has not committed nearly so great an injustice as the latter supposes. Both have a false idea of one another. The injustice of the powerful which arouses most indignation in history is not nearly as great as it seems. . . . we all, indeed, lose all feeling of injustice when the difference between ourselves and other creatures is very great, and will kill a gnat, for example, without the slightest distress of conscience.⁸⁴

Nietzsche's tenet that justice is only possible with closeness reappears when he explains how easy it is for rulers to be cruel. The leader who orders but does not execute cruelty "does not see it and his imagination therefore receives no strong impression of it. . . . From lack of imagination most princes and military leaders can easily seem harsh and cruel

without being so.”⁸⁵ The powerful only see their actions in terms of justice when the distance between them and their victim diminishes. Then they acquire some sense of the other as “neighbor” [*Nächsten*], as in some respect near to them. The idea that others are close to or like us is not innate but has to be learned, and Nietzsche links this directly with the question of egoism: “*Egoism is not evil*, because the idea of one’s ‘neighbour’ . . . is very weak in us; and we feel almost as free of responsibility for him as we do for plants and stones. That the other suffers has to be *learned*; and it can never be learned fully.”⁸⁶

However, while proximity might be a necessary condition for the growth of justice, it is not a sufficient one. Justice only becomes an issue when the things around one are also perceived as kindred. As the discussion of “Our traffic with animals” indicates, “where utility or harm do *not* come into consideration we have a feeling of complete irresponsibility; we kill and injure insects, for example, or let them live, usually without giving the slightest thought to the matter.”⁸⁷ Nietzsche further explores the problem of empathy, its relation to justice and the question of distance in “Self-defence” and concludes that as imagination can never bridge the chasm between individuals, it is impossible to fully know what suffering one’s actions inflict. They always occasion some unintended harm, and actors are therefore never entirely responsible for the pain: “When one does not know how much pain an act causes, it is not an act of wickedness; thus a child is not wicked, not evil, with regard to an animal: it investigates and destroys it as though it were a toy. But does one ever fully *know* how much pain an act causes another?”⁸⁸

This problem of imputing responsibility to others for the pain they have caused is later considered from the other side. The passage “What is our neighbour?” points to the difficulty of knowing exactly how much of what we experience originates from another. Our egoism might assume that others are the source of certain sensations, when really they are not responsible: “We attribute to him (our neighbour) the sensations his actions evoke in us, and thus bestow upon him a false, inverted positivity. According to our knowledge of ourself we make of him a satellite of our own system: and when he shines for us or grows dark and we are the ultimate cause in both cases—we nonetheless believe the opposite! World of phantoms in which we live! Inverted, upside down, empty world.”⁸⁹

Because the possibility of justice depends on closeness, growing closer to another would seem to heighten their claim to consideration in our actions. This can be inferred from the claim that “*egoism is not evil*, because the idea of one’s ‘neighbour’ . . . is very weak in us.”⁹⁰ When the image of someone or thing as my neighbor becomes stronger, when it has been learned that they suffer, there might be grounds for containing and per-

haps condemning egoism. However, just as another's suffering "can never be learned fully,"⁹¹ so the appeal for justice can never be complete because proximity never can; by definition, some distance always divides individuals. Nietzsche suggests that certain aspects of our dealings with even those we recognize will therefore escape the claims of justice for two major reasons. The first is that perpetrators can never fully know the harm they inflict and cannot justly be held accountable for what is either not their intention or not in their control. The second is that an honest victim is an uncertain one, admitting the probability of error in imputing the responsibility for their suffering to another.

Therefore, despite an original expectation that Nietzsche's thinking about action and accountability would allow no margin for justice, this concept does play some role in his thinking. Rather than jettison all notions of justice, he advocates one that differs from those prominent in modern political thought: "what is needful is a new *justice!*"⁹² This new notion of justice returns to traditional ones by repudiating any idea of inherent equality. Rejecting a priori notions of a fair distribution of rights and duties, it argues that just outcomes can only derive from the relative and shifting power of contending parties. As such, they can also only ever be temporary for as powers change, so should attendant rights and privileges. This explains why from his brief genealogy of rights and duties, Nietzsche concludes that "The 'man who wants to be fair' [*Der billige Mensch*] is in constant need of the subtle tact of a balance: he must be able to assess degrees of power and rights, which, given the transitory nature of human things, will never stay in equilibrium for very long . . . being fair is consequently difficult and demands much practice and good will, and very much very good *sense*."⁹³

Vanity in the Later Works

While the term vanity does not disappear altogether from later works, it is not as evident nor as extensively discussed in them as in the middle period. This absence lends further support to the argument that the concept of *ressentiment* does some of vanity's work in the later writings. When it does appear in these writings, the term continues to be used in a critical way;⁹⁴ vanity usually signifies some unhealthy concern with, or inflated conception of, the self and its need to project its own importance is often linked with a lack of self-love. Rousseau, for example, is described as "sick with unbridled vanity and unbridled self-contempt."⁹⁵

The concept of vanity is most in evidence in the later works where the concept of *ressentiment* does not yet appear. In Zarathustra's explanation

of the second aspect of “Manly Prudence,” for example, vain people are again characterized as needing an audience and depending on the opinion of others for a sense of their own value. The vain man’s “heart sighs in its depths” “What am I?”⁹⁶ However, compared with the middle period’s discussions of vanity, Zarathustra’s is briefer and, characteristically, more elliptical. The notion of vanity also appears in a discussion of “What is noble?” providing a foil to the noble disposition. The noble type cannot imagine why some individuals would try to instill in another a good opinion of themselves, even though they do not hold this opinion in the first place.⁹⁷ Echoing HH’s point that approval can be sought for reasons other than vanity, the noble person concedes that certain pleasures attend the good opinion of others but is bewildered by vanity as a motive for this. To explain vanity to those who find it so alien, Nietzsche offers a brief genealogy of this drive, although this differs markedly from the one in WS which contends that vanity was originally useful to the powerful as a way of enhancing their power. Vanity now has a different history, one intimately connected with the slavish mentality. In the past it was usual for large numbers of people to depend for their sense of self on the opinions of others or, more accurately, their masters. Hence the later Nietzsche’s conclusion that vanity is an atavism:

The vain man takes pleasure in *every* good opinion he hears about himself (quite apart from any point of view of utility and likewise regardless of truth or falsehood) just as he suffers from every bad opinion . . . he *feels* subject to them from that oldest instinct of subjection which breaks out in him.—It is “the slave” in the vain man’s blood, a remnant of the craftiness of the slave—and how much “slave” still remains in woman, for example!—which seeks to *seduce* him to good opinions about himself; it is likewise the slave who immediately falls down before these opinions as if he himself had not called them forth.⁹⁸

Yet while the content of this claim about vanity is similar to many of those from the middle period, its context has changed. In the middle period, Nietzsche saw vanity as an undesirable character trait, a failing that was sometimes evident even in superior human beings.⁹⁹ In most cases it was explained by a failure of self-love. In BGE, however, he subsumes vanity into the master/slave morality framework. The changed career of the concept of vanity illustrates anew how in the later works Nietzsche’s free-roaming fascination with psychological minutiae has been clipped and confined, for when this interest manifests itself it is subservient to his larger argument about master/slave morality. Once this framework for the analysis of morality has been adopted, it is easy

for Nietzsche to be wise before the event in his inquiries into psychology and morality.

Moderation

In one of the middle period's aphorisms, Nietzsche attributes moderate actions "to habit" and "extreme actions to vanity."¹⁰⁰ While he is typically seen as celebrating excess and condemning moderation as a necessity promoted by the weak as a virtue, this association of a weakness like vanity with excess suggests that the image of Nietzsche damning moderation requires modification. Interestingly, most of the support for the dominant reading comes from the later works where moderation [*Mässigkeit*] is classified among the herd virtues.¹⁰¹ The works of the middle period, by contrast, contain considerable praise of moderation. Although "measure and moderation" are often confused with "boredom and mediocrity," they are actually "two very exalted things [of which] it is best never to speak."¹⁰² Moderation [*Mässigkeit*] is one of the individual virtues that will survive rational scrutiny and prove useful in the future.¹⁰³ It is exercised by people who can control themselves, for it is easier to extirpate desires altogether than to enjoy them in moderation.¹⁰⁴ The further one travels along the path to free spirithood, the more "action tends to moderation."¹⁰⁵ Sobriety born of moderation is cheerful, whereas that born of exhaustion is tetchy.¹⁰⁶ Nietzsche traces excess [*Ausschweifung*] to joylessness,¹⁰⁷ although when employed selectively in the art of living, excess [*Ueberschuss*] can have a curative effect.¹⁰⁸

In his middle period, Nietzsche wants to see moderation reflected in thought too, believing that with the rise of science "that virtue of *cautious reserve*, that wise moderation"¹⁰⁹ will come to be appreciated in the theoretical realm. This will be in contrast to his claim that the "excesses and vices of the philosopher are always accepted first of all . . . for vices and excesses are always aped most easily and require no long training."¹¹⁰ A "moderate nature" is later attributed to Voltaire while passion, folly and excess are accorded to Rousseau.¹¹¹ Some of the middle period's praise for moderation is related to its critique of Christianity, for what makes this religion "in the profoundest sense barbaric, Asiatic, ignoble, un-Hellenic" is that "the one thing it does not desire is *measure*."¹¹²

Assembling the times when Nietzsche does speak of this exalted thing suggests that he praises moderation by associating it with forces he values such as the Greeks and the Enlightenment and by detecting its absence in those he condemns, such as Wagner and Christianity.

The considerable praise of moderation in the works of the middle period highlights the danger of generalizing from some of his works to Nietzsche's thought as a whole. It also means that the Nietzsche of the middle period practices what he preaches, for as he praises moderation, so he is more moderate and careful in his judgments and characterizations. This is especially clear from Nietzsche's portrayal of pity in the middle period which betrays a far more subtle and nuanced attitude toward pity than that which is usually imputed to him.

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The Greatest Danger?

Looking back at HH, Nietzsche writes that “the point at issue was the value of the non-egotistical instincts, the instincts of compassion, self-denial, and self-sacrifice, which Schopenhauer above all others had constantly gilded, glorified. . . . Yet it was these very same instincts which aroused my suspicion. . . . It was here, precisely, that I sensed the greatest danger [*die grosse Gefahr*] for humanity.”¹ This echoes a claim made in the middle period; the question “Where are your greatest dangers?” is answered by “In pity.”² This chapter explores the dangers detected in pity and its cognate emotions by Nietzsche in the middle period writings, as well as considering whether they can ever have any benefits.

One of the reasons why Nietzsche expends such energy analyzing emotions like pity, empathy, sympathy and benevolence is the challenge they pose to his contention that all action emanates from egoism, for these emotions seem to efface the self in favor of another. It could be expected that his emphasis on the universality and primacy of egoism and his celebration of self-love would lead him to repudiate a drive like pity entirely. As he says, “the most senile thing ever thought about man is contained in the celebrated saying ‘the ego is always hateful’; the most childish in the even more celebrated ‘love thy neighbour as thyself.’—In the

former knowledge of human nature has ceased, in the latter it has not even begun.”³

However, examining Nietzsche's views on this family of feelings in the middle period shows that while he does launch a frontal attack on pity, his opinions are actually more complex and nuanced than might be anticipated and than is usually acknowledged in the secondary literature.⁴ The commonplace view that Nietzsche holds drives like pity, empathy, and sympathy in contempt is thrown into question by a careful study of the middle period's more nuanced portrayals of these emotions. While he condemns the Christian inspired morality of pity, he does not see all manifestations of fellow-feeling as base or spurious.⁵ Indeed, from a long discussion of some of pity's various motivations, he concludes “All of this, and other, much more subtle things in addition, constitute ‘pity’: how coarsely does language assault with its one word so polyphonous a being!”⁶ This remark alone should make his interpreters pause before generalizing about his view of this drive.

Pity versus Egoism?

Nietzsche does hold pity to be grossly overvalued by current moral frameworks and, as is his wont, turns to history to show that it has not always been so valorized. “The high value pity has come to be accorded presents a problem, just as the praise now accorded selfless disinterestedness needs to be explained: originally it was despised, or feared as a deception.”⁷ As this association of pity with selflessness suggests, this exaggeration of pity's importance can be partly attributed to the fact that current moral frameworks suppress the expression and enhancement of individuality. Nietzsche sees pity and its cognate emotions as dangerous because they promote denial of one's own concerns and individuation by making a virtue of self-denial, of living and feeling for others rather than for the self.⁸

Officially then, pity and egoism are antagonists. Nietzsche often begins his critique of pity by accepting this premise but inverting the esteem in which each is held. Such acceptance of the official view appears in the warning that while pity draws us into the concerns of others, it distracts us from the much more important but also more demanding task of self-development: “All such arousing of pity and calling for help is secretly seductive, for our ‘own way’ is too hard and demanding and too remote from the love and gratitude of others, and we do not really mind escaping from it—and from our very own conscience—to flee into the conscience of the others and into the lovely temple of the ‘religion of

pity.”⁹ Pity is, therefore, dangerous to higher human beings precisely because it can be genuine, because it can involve shared feeling and a blurring of the boundaries of individuation.¹⁰

At other times, however, Nietzsche deconstructs, rather than simply transvaluing, the opposition between pity and egoism. In these instances, he exposes the egoism that drives most displays of pity; egoism becomes pity’s provenance, not its opposite.¹¹ That much pity derives more from concern with the self rather than from self-effacement and shared pain is clear in one of the middle period’s earliest analyses of pity where Nietzsche claims that displaying pity is not a negation but a manifestation of egoism and self-enjoyment. His catalog of pity’s pleasures is considerable. The emotion is pleasant in itself. If acted upon, it brings that primal gratification of all action—the pleasure of self-assertion. When the sufferer is close to the pitier, pity distances the parties rather than bringing them together, and it thereby mitigates the pitier’s suffering on the other’s behalf.¹²

The selfish reasons that attract some to showing pity are further illustrated in the brief passage on “Sympathizers” [*Die Mitleidigen*] which claims that “natures full of sympathy” are never as ready to delight in others’ success as in their misery. This would not be the case if their sympathy were primarily a function of fellow-feeling. Instead, such sympathizers are likely to be disgruntled by others’ success, for they “feel they have lost their position of superiority.”¹³ That showing pity can generate a sense of superiority is also evident in the vignette of the neighbors of a sufferer who come to express their condolences. “At length they go away content and elevated: they have gloated over the unfortunate man’s distress and over their own and passed a pleasant afternoon.”¹⁴

While much of Nietzsche’s commentary on pity takes the form of aphorisms or short paragraphs, the ironically entitled passage “No longer to think of oneself” explores the egoism of pity from several angles, revealing again how complex and multifaceted Nietzsche’s notion of the moral life is in the middle period. One of the self-interested motives for displaying pity is honor, for a person’s standing in their own or others’ eyes would be diminished if they did not help the needy. Another is the familiar desire to assert power, but this is power over the random misfortune that has befallen the victim rather than over the victim. In showing pity, a statement is made against fortune, for “an accident which happens to another offends us: it would make us aware of our impotence, and perhaps our cowardice, if we did not go to assist him.”¹⁵ A further motive appears when the suffering of another is seen as a warning to ourselves, “a signpost to some danger to us,”¹⁶ and in helping to remedy their pain, we assert our strength against possible threats to our well-being. This im-

pulse to pity can be motivated by revenge, and again, this is not revenge directed against an individual but against circumstance. Nor is it revenge in the usual sense of responding to something; it is a sort of preemptive revenge against what could happen, as signaled by another's misfortune. Much pleasure derives from "the feeling that our action sets a limit to an injustice which arouses our indignation," but as Nietzsche goes on to note parenthetically, "the discharge of one's indignation is itself refreshing."¹⁷ In many of the wellsprings for the demonstration of pity outlined by Nietzsche, its human object is immaterial, attesting in a different way to pity's primary concern with the self. In general then, the pleasures pity offers revolve around power, freedom, and honor. The pitier feels free of the other's pain, feels free to decide whether to assist, anticipates the praise to be enjoyed for helping, enjoys the sheer action involved in helping, and asserts some power in the face of fortune. Nietzsche's observation that "we never do anything of this kind out of one motive"¹⁸ conveys again the complexity of moral action, how a single deed can be the fruit of multiple impulses.

Another way in which this extended analysis illuminates the multiple motives behind pity is by presenting the pitiless as a foil to those who display it. Reflecting his insistence that egoism is the source of action, Nietzsche points out that both pitiers and the pitiless act from egoism but their egoism takes different forms. The pitiless do not scent danger everywhere so feel no threat from another's mishaps. Because they are not insecure, their sense of power is not affronted by another's misfortune. The pitiless also keep a greater distance from their fellows, not seeing themselves as their keeper; "(they love to think that each should help himself and play his own cards)."¹⁹ Having experienced more pain than pitiers, they are not so offended by it but accept the necessity of suffering. They detest pity's soft-heartedness and cannot bear to be seen as vulnerable or easily moved. However, Nietzsche later suggests that in rare accesses of pity, the pitiless feel liberty and ecstasy: "it is a draught appropriate to warriors, something rare, dangerous and bitter-sweet that does not easily fall to one's lot."²⁰ This helps to explain how they can find tragedy appealing and suggests that as an interruption to the usual flow of emotions, pity is tolerable in higher human beings. Only when it becomes the element of existence, as in the modern age, is it so roundly condemned.

In challenging La Rochefoucauld's belief that only foolish types are comforted by shows of pity, Nietzsche exposes egoism as the motive which drives sufferers to seek pity too. He contends that what motivates the afflicted to seek pity is not stupidity but the desire to hurt those not similarly disadvantaged. Moreover, the power to make another suffer on

one's behalf affirms the strength of the pitied, making them feel less vulnerable and pitiable. By Nietzsche's analysis then, making oneself an object of pity is a triumph rather than a diminution of the ego. Hence his conclusion that "the thirst for pity is thus a thirst for self-enjoyment, and that at the expense of one's fellow men; it displays man in the whole ruthlessness of his own dear self: but not precisely in his 'stupidity', as La Rochefoucauld thinks."²¹ He suggests that La Rochefoucauld has not sufficiently scrutinized pity-seekers' motives, making him probably the first to accuse the moralist of a deficit of suspicion!²² While Nietzsche's censorious tone toward those who make themselves objects of pity is hard to reconcile with his view that all action is egoistic and initially innocent, his criticism of pity-seekers is the same as that of the vain: both can only feel powerful by subordinating others which betokens weakness, dependence, and a dearth of self-love.

Higher and Lower

Although Nietzsche feels that La Rochefoucauld has misunderstood what motivates individuals to seek and display pity, he endorses the moralist's portrayal of pity as a game the inferior play. The moralist separates those capable of reason from others and suggests that pity be the province of the latter. Members of this group are not driven by reason so need emotions like pity to spur them to help others. For the rational, pity is not only redundant but dangerous because it "enfeebles the soul."²³ Only a show of pity is recommended to those with reason when they want to comfort a sufferer. In both its directions then, La Rochefoucauld maintains that pity has value only for the inferior, for they require its promptings before assisting the suffering of others, and only they are foolish enough to be comforted by its display.

While Nietzsche agrees that pity is a game for which only inferior types are suited, the capacity to reason is not for him the crucial variable separating higher and lower.²⁴ Instead, the major factor separating higher from lower seems to be the degree of rivalry one feels, the extent to which one takes independent pleasure in the self rather than needing to subordinate others for self-aggrandisement. As per vanity, such malicious, hierarchizing pity seems to derive from a shortage of self-love. Hence Nietzsche's observation that "pity is the most agreeable feeling among those who have little pride and no prospects of great conquests."²⁵

Combining these twin perspectives on pity, those of seeker and giver, seems to reveal pity as a positive-sum game accommodating the manifestation of complementary powers. Pity-seekers exercise power by in-

ducing pitiers to suffer on their behalf. The pitiers reply by quelling their suffering via their disengagement from the victim's suffering and through the many other sensations of pleasure pity affords. Instead of portraying pity as dangerous, Nietzsche could have presented it as a kind of modern "Homer's Contest" for the majority where the will to damage others enjoys a positive and mutually beneficial outlet.²⁶ However, one problem with this scenario is that while inciting pity might assert strength, receiving it does not. Even though pity-seekers are empowered by inducing another to suffer on their behalf, the resulting show of pity diminishes them and offends their vanity: "To show pity is felt as a sign of contempt because one has clearly ceased to be an object of fear as soon as one is pitied."²⁷ The only way in which the giving and receiving of pity can benefit everyone is indicated in the aphorism "Tried and Tested Advice." This passage contends that, paradoxically, the best way to console a sufferer is not to—namely, to persuade them they are beyond consolation. The consolation that cannot console relieves misery because "it implies so great a degree of distinction that they at once hold up their heads again."²⁸

As his suspicion of the sympathizers suggests, Nietzsche believes that Christian compassion, which emphasizes empathy with the pain of others, is suspicious of their joy.²⁹ The rarity of sharing another's pleasure is echoed in his account of "Joying with."³⁰ Against the dominant outlook, Nietzsche offers himself as one who teaches "what is understood by so few today, least of all by the preachers of pity: to share not suffering but joy [*die Mitfreude*]."³¹ Departing from his naturalism, he makes the capacity for such celebration the mark of a higher person: "the lowest animal can imagine the pain of others. But to imagine the joy of others and to rejoice at it is the highest privilege of the highest animals, and among them it is accessible only to the choicest exemplars—thus a rare humanum: so that there have been philosophers who have denied the existence of joying with [*die Mitfreude*]."³² From these references, it is clear that Nietzsche acknowledges, even countenances, a species of fellow-feeling that is not reducible to egoism; one that is based on the possibility of genuine feeling with and for another.

There is, moreover, a paradox at the heart of the regnant "religion of pity."³³ Inspired by Christianity, it praises pity as the highest virtue while also seeking to diminish pain and suffering.³⁴ Yet the suffering of another is a precondition for pity.³⁵ So while pity seems to recoil from, and strive to alleviate, suffering, it is actually parasitic upon it. Those who want this virtue to flourish must, therefore, wish for burgeoning misery. Here Nietzsche employs a conditions of possibility argument to discredit pity by exposing its contradictory logic. Yet the religion of pity does more than

just require suffering: it multiplies suffering. Like that rare generosity of feeling that increases joy by sharing it, pity too has a multiplier effect, but what it increases is misery by requiring pitiers to share in the suffering of another. So another of pity's dangers comes from its contribution to aggregate unhappiness. Nietzsche predicts, for example, that "he who for a period of time made the experiment of intentionally pursuing occasions for pity in his everyday life and set before his soul all the misery available to him in his surroundings would inevitably grow sick and melancholic."³⁶

As well as being self-contradictory and self-defeating, pity's demonizing of suffering militates against true happiness for, contrary to the spirit of his age, Nietzsche maintains not only that suffering can be productive but that it is a concomitant of real joy. The danger posed by pity's fear of pain is clear in one of the final passages of the middle period: "How little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent [*gutmütigen*] people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together."³⁷ This introduces another of pity's dangers: it creates soft-heartedness, which is a concern Nietzsche sees himself as sharing with La Rochefoucauld and Plato. "Are we not, with this tremendous objective of obliterating all the sharp edges of life, well on the way to turning mankind into sand? Sand! Small, soft, round, unending sand! Is that your ideal, you heralds of the sympathetic affections?"³⁸

A soul enervated by pity is dangerous because it threatens the martial qualities Nietzsche valorizes. When pity rules and suffering is seen as the greatest evil, people lose the ability to endure hardship and privation as well as the attendant personal strength and resistance. The reign of pity saps the capacity to inflict suffering as well as to endure it. The danger in this becomes evident in Nietzsche's contention that ruthlessness not only requires greater strength than surviving harm but is a precondition of greatness. "Not to perish of internal distress and uncertainty when one inflicts great suffering and hears the cry of this suffering—that is great, that belongs to greatness."³⁹ The capacity to inflict pain is part and parcel of the free spirit's pursuit of knowledge, for Nietzsche justifies this pursuit even though it might cause pain to others. "A higher and freer viewpoint" is needed—one that can rise above the suffering one's actions cause other people.⁴⁰ Greatness in any arena, but particularly in the unflinching pursuit of knowledge, requires the ability to endure, inflict, and witness pain.

Yet there is something of the gentleman protesting too much in Nietzsche's insistence upon the great person's capacity to witness and inflict pain when necessary. At one point he confesses that "I only need to expose myself to the sight of some genuine distress and I am lost. And if a

suffering friend said to me, 'Look, I am about to die; please promise to die with me,' I should promise it; and the sight of a small mountain tribe fighting for its liberty would persuade me to offer it my hand and my life."⁴¹ When these admissions are coupled with his claim about insistence compensating for uncertainty,⁴² the suspicion strengthens that in attacking pity so vehemently he is striving to curtail his own sympathetic side. To appreciate Nietzsche's attacks against pity, it is necessary to see them as targeted not just at Christianity and modern morality but also at himself, for he appears to be trying to purge himself of a powerful strain of fellow-feeling in his own personality.⁴³

To understand why Nietzsche sees such danger in his own impulse toward pity, it is necessary to return to the idea that a necessary antagonism exists between concern for others and self-development. If there is a zero-sum relationship between caring for others and for the self then reducing or annihilating the first must increase the second. Yet this approach can be questioned, even from a Nietzschean position, and some important discriminations are needed. There is a qualitative difference between the claim that purging oneself of pity frees one to focus on the self or that one's goals are important enough to be pursued despite distressing others on the one hand and the claim that ruthlessly hurting others contributes to self-development or is a precondition of greatness on the other.⁴⁴ Similarly, to posit that knowing true joy requires the knowledge of pain is not the same as holding that hurting others is a prerequisite of both. These tenets would only be inextricable if hurting others were the highest good or the deepest suffering, yet relying on another for one's greatest or lowest states would smack of the vanity, rivalry, and dearth of independence that Nietzsche so condemns. Indeed, noble types do not set out to harm others deliberately—that is the province of the petty. Thus it would seem that the tenet that greatness requires the ability to hurt others only holds when there is a zero-sum relationship between self-development and kindness to others, rather than being a general postulate of the middle period.

The middle period's critique of pity and its cognate emotions is not confined to exposing their real motives nor attacking their adverse consequences. Nietzsche also frequently criticizes the idea at the core of pity—that the *principium individuationis* can be transcended to allow one to enter another's feelings. In rejecting this possibility he is arguing against a central tenet of Schopenhauer's philosophy.⁴⁵ His attacks on pity can, therefore, be read as self-critique in two ways: he is not just trying to deny this powerful strain in his own personality but is also trying to purge himself of his past affinity with Schopenhauer. His claim that

when it comes to performing deeds of pity, “we never do anything of this kind out of one motive,” applies equally to his own analysis of this emotion.⁴⁶

The practical dimension and the naturalism of Nietzschean genealogy reappear when he attempts to discredit empathetic feeling by showing it to emanate from fear and mistrust:

Man, as the most timid of all creatures on account of his subtle and fragile nature, has in his timidity the instructor in that empathy [*Mitempfindung*], that quick understanding of the feelings of another (and of animals). Through long millennia he saw in everything strange and lively a danger: at the sight of it he at once imitated the expression of the features and the bearing and drew his conclusion as to the kind of evil intention behind these features and this bearing.⁴⁷

This depiction of primal insecurity echoes his suggestion that, unlike the pitiless, contemporary pitiers scent danger everywhere. Whereas pity’s growth is usually read as progress, Nietzsche discerns a certain atavism in this and postulates that such empathy is more typical of timid peoples as a whole. “Proud, arrogant men and peoples”⁴⁸ are less practiced in it because they need it less. Nietzsche offers in this another variation on La Rochefoucauld’s association of pity with inferior human types.

While manifestations of fellow-feeling might have lost their protective function, they retain their simulated quality, so that those who appear to feel the same emotion as their neighbor are really only successfully imitating its effects.⁴⁹ Indeed, it looks as if manifesting the signs of another’s emotions is the furthest that fellow-feeling can go, for Nietzsche contends that it is almost impossible to know exactly how another feels or what they suffer. Although curiosity is one of the things fueling pity,⁵⁰ pity does not yield real knowledge of the other but presumes to know what they feel and how best to remedy it.⁵¹ The way this trivializes the other’s experience is conveyed forcefully in GS:

Our personal and profoundest suffering is incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost everyone; here we remain hidden from our neighbour, even if we eat from one pot. But whenever people notice that we suffer, they interpret our suffering superficially. It is the very essence of the emotion of pity that it strips away from the suffering of others whatever is instinctively personal. Our “benefactors” [*Wohltäter*] are, more than our enemies, people who make our worth and will smaller.⁵²

In the middle period, Nietzsche examines an array of emotions that share the characteristic of absorbing the other into the self. The passage "Error regarding life necessary to life"⁵³ considers this emotion on a larger plane than face-to-face relations, exploring the idea that individuals can transcend individuation and come to feel one with a wider reality. He argues that such broad empathy is inaccessible to most, for the majority are simply concerned with themselves and their immediate interests, lacking the will or imagination to venture beyond. Only rare types have access to wider feeling, but even with them it is not truly universal empathy but extends only to a portion of the world. This limitation turns out to be an advantage though when Nietzsche reveals the danger of universal empathy. This would disclose an ultimately goalless humanity comprised predominantly of bland, banal individuals. Awareness of this would lead exceptional humans to despair and devastation, so even when achievable, this wider empathy is perilous to their well-being. Nietzsche concludes that because "every belief in the value and dignity of life rests on false thinking,"⁵⁴ it may be necessary for even superior individuals to retain illusions if they are to value life. Thus his response to doctrines advocating universal empathy is that it is impossible for most and dangerous for the few.

However, this claim about the danger of such wide empathy and its threat of nihilism is challenged by one of the final passages of the middle period. In "The 'humaneness' of the future," Nietzsche again entertains the possibility of the person with boundless sensitivity yet reaches vastly different conclusions. Such an individual is able to empathize with others and across time. Initially, the consequences of such a broad sensibility seem bleak: "Anyone who manages to experience the history of humanity as a whole as his own history will feel in an enormously generalized way all the grief of an invalid who thinks of health, of an old man who thinks of the dreams of his youth, of a lover deprived of his beloved, of the martyr whose ideal is perishing, of the hero on the evening after the battle that has decided nothing but brought him wounds and the loss of his friend."⁵⁵ However, the heroic person who can endure these sadnesses and "welcomes the dawn and his fortune" would know an unprecedented happiness, "a happiness that, like the sun in the evening, continually bestows its inexhaustible riches, pouring them into the sea, feeling richest, as the sun does, only when even the poorest fisherman is still rowing with golden oars! This godlike feeling would then be called—humaneness."⁵⁶ Nietzsche transfigures the bleak vision of boundless empathy into its ecstatic affirmation, illustrating anew that he is not relentlessly dismissive of all feeling with and for others as a Christian ruse. Notwithstanding his repeated attacks on Schopenhauer, he also does

sometimes concede that the *principium individuationis* can be transcended and that this can have positive consequences.

Benevolence

As this suggests, it should not be inferred from the middle period's multifaceted critique of pity and its cognate emotions that Nietzsche sees no room for a healthy, positive regard for or empathy with others. Indeed, by his analysis, most acts of pity are not this; pity's 'lovely temple' is crawling with proverbial moneylenders. A passage in HH advances benevolence [*Wohlwollen*] as an alternative to pity precisely because it expresses genuine goodness toward others. Although "immeasurably frequent" and "very influential," the small daily practices of benevolence are overlooked by most analyses of morals and manners. Nietzsche recommends that inquiry "pay more attention" to these small things, for his ethnomethodology shows benevolence to encompass:

those social expressions of a friendly disposition, those smiles of the eyes, those handclaps, that comfortable manner with which almost all human action is as a rule encompassed. . . . it is the continual occupation of humanity, as it were its light-waves in which everything grows; especially within the narrowest circle, within the family, is life made to flourish only through this benevolence. Good-naturedness, friendliness, politeness of the heart are never-failing emanations of the unegoistic drive and have played a far greater role in the construction of culture than those much more celebrated expressions of it called pity, compassion, and self-sacrifice.⁵⁷

Of course acknowledging the importance of benevolence or love and goodness and the determination to give pleasure to others as social forces⁵⁸ does not mean that they are the only ones. In HH, Nietzsche goes on to discuss the power of malice [*Bosheit*] in social relations which, by manifesting itself in innumerable small ways, resembles benevolence. "In the conversations of social life, three-quarters of all questions are asked, three-quarters of all answers given, in order to cause just a little pain to the other party."⁵⁹ As a later passage explains, malice "does not believe what it says but desires only to wound."⁶⁰ However, Nietzsche contends that benevolence, "disseminated through the human world" in "very small doses,"⁶¹ is the antidote to this drive to harm. Benevolence is not just the antidote to the desire to harm; it is also superior to it, as suggested by Nietzsche's later claim that "the state in which we hurt others

is rarely as agreeable, in an unadulterated way, as that in which we benefit others; it is a sign that we are still lacking power, or it shows a sense of frustration in the fact of this poverty.”⁶²

Benevolence differs from pity because its display does not involve a power struggle nor does it thrive on others' misery, suggesting that it has the oxymoronic quality of being unegoistic action. But Nietzsche points out that “there is indeed very little of the unegoistic” in benevolent deeds.⁶³ It is not freedom from egoism that elevates benevolence but its autonomy and generosity; it does not subdue the other to affirm itself, and it can give without counting the cost. Benevolent inclinations are fulfilled when others are uplifted; actions motivated by benevolence are done because they produce “joy and concurring faces.”⁶⁴ Nietzsche also describes as benevolent the superior spirit who dons the mask of mediocrity so as not to offend the majority—he acts “out of benevolence and pity.”⁶⁵ Praise for benevolence reappears when it combines with other drives identified as good in the middle period: “A warm benevolence and desire to help” are associated with “the drive to clean and clear thinking, to moderation and restraint of feeling.”⁶⁶ While pity is the social tie that binds and strangles, benevolence provides the basis for a more valuable social bond.

Friendship

However, benevolence as a diffuse and authentic expression of goodness does not substitute entirely for pity, empathy, or sympathy. A careful reading of the writings of the middle period reveals that rather than discrediting these latter emotions in toto, Nietzsche limits their authentic manifestation to a narrow band of association—friendship. This is hinted at in the passage which claims that our most personal suffering is incomprehensible to “almost everyone” among our neighbors and would-be benefactors. The exceptions are our friends, for Nietzsche counsels helping “only those whose distress you understand entirely because they share with you one suffering and one hope—your friends—and only in the manner in which you help yourself.”⁶⁷

Friends' ability to know one another this intimately echoes the passage “Sympathy [*Mitleiden*] more painful than suffering” which contends that feeling for another's suffering can be more painful than the suffering they have undergone. The passage justifies its title by claiming that while an individual might endure the shame and adverse consequences of his action, his friend suffers more from this act by feeling its shame more powerfully than she would if it were her own. This is because she believes in

“the purity of his [the friend’s] character more than he does.”⁶⁸ This faith shows that “the unegoistic in us . . . is affected more strongly by his guilt than is the unegoistic in him,”⁶⁹ which is not the sort of situation Nietzsche’s insistence on egoism usually recognizes. This passage goes against the grain of his analyses of pity in several other ways too. It makes no suggestion that entering the feelings of another is impossible but only that it can be destructive because aggregate suffering is increased. It offers strong testimony to friendship’s power to obscure boundaries between individuals and so departs from Nietzsche’s usual skepticism about transcending individuation. It does not scorn nor suspect the idea of an individual valuing a friend more than she might value herself, conceding that egoism is not always the paramount human emotion. And it illustrates again that Nietzsche sometimes accepts rather than deconstructs, the pity versus egoism binary. However, this time he does not lament the fact that pity can overwhelm egoism.

The sentiments expressed in “Sympathy more painful than suffering” are also significant in connection with Nietzsche’s wider argument about moral life which rejects the notion of free will and asserts the original innocence of all actions. He claims that individuals cannot be held accountable for their deeds because they are not free in discharging them. Yet this passage depicts an individual taking some responsibility, and bearing some of the shame, for the actions of another. Yet the freedom to will such action cannot be the source of this responsibility. Here then, Nietzsche imputes to the noble personality things he elsewhere criticizes or challenges, such as feeling genuine sympathy for another, being able to transcend the boundaries of the self, and taking responsibility for action, which occurs here in an extended way.

Genevieve Lloyd’s argument about the need to distinguish two types of responsibility is helpful here.⁷⁰ Building on the work of Joel Feinberg, she identifies the first type of responsibility as one that apportions praise and blame to individuals for their actions;⁷¹ this is the sort Nietzsche rejects in his attack on free will. Alongside this, Lloyd adduces a second type of responsibility where individuals take responsibility for something they might not have enacted personally but nonetheless feel answerable for. This sort of voluntary assumption of responsibility does not come from the acknowledgment of personal guilt but from a sense of responding to the issue in question because of one’s feeling with and for another. This second type of responsibility means that individuals can feel themselves answerable for things of which they could not be considered guilty.⁷² As Lloyd says, “in considering the operations of sympathetic identification and solidarity, we can see the join between . . . a self and its ‘other selves.’ We see the points where the opposition between self-

interest and concern for the good of others breaks down. These points of connection, where individual and group identities intersect, can be seen more clearly in relations of reciprocal friendship and love."⁷³ Interestingly, Feinberg raises a point directly related to Nietzsche's acknowledgment that an individual can feel responsible for the act of a friend. Discussing the features of solidarity he concludes that "there is perhaps no better index of solidarity than vicarious pride or shame."⁷⁴ Delineating "an authentically vicarious feeling, if there can be such a thing," he requires that it "be based on the doings or qualities of others considered entirely on their own account, unrelated to any doings or qualities of the principle."⁷⁵

While not typical of Nietzsche's thought, the sentiments expressed in the passage "Sympathy more painful than suffering" are not unique to it either. The discussion "Growing tenderer," for example, depicts a response to the suffering of a loved one. The first reaction is shock for it had been assumed that the happiness the friend radiated was a signal of well-being. The next is greater tenderness so that "the gulf between us and him seems to be bridged, an approximation to identity seems to occur,"⁷⁶ testifying again that friendship can blur individuation. The aim then becomes to comfort the friend, not, as pity would, by presuming to know his palliative but by trying to discern what would best soothe his particular pain. These arguments also limit the scope of Nietzsche's claim that all pity is imitation, for there is no sense that one friend is merely simulating another's sadness; on the contrary, one's sadness moves the other in a real and powerful manner. This discrete, sensitive, respectful, and particularized pity contrasts markedly with the garrulous sympathy of the woman who "bears the sick man's bed into the public marketplace."⁷⁷ Yet so many of Nietzsche's readers are oblivious to the fact that while he castigates one form of pity, he not only allows for, but values highly, the possibility of this sort of individualized, responsive form of pity. They mistake Nietzsche's critique of the morality of pity for a rejection of any and all forms of pity.⁷⁸

Yet while pity between friends might be free of many of the characteristics of the religion of pity, Nietzsche suggests that even in such a best case scenario, suffering debases its victim while pity elevates its practitioner. Its emergence in even the most intimate of relationships creates hierarchy and discord.⁷⁹ And because even suffering shared between friends increases aggregate misery, it is vulnerable to the charge that pity compounds rather than transcends suffering. But rather than dispense with noble responses to suffering altogether, Nietzsche moots a more emancipatory alternative that retrieves the ancient practice of relieving suffering by offering it something creative and joyful. "In regard to the existence of

suffering the ancients sought forgetfulness or some way or other of converting their feelings into pleasurable ones: so that in this matter they sought palliatives.”⁸⁰ This is mirrored in the discussion of possible responses to one’s own suffering which recommends reflecting “on acts of kindness and consideration one might perform for friend and foe” as a way of diminishing one’s own pain.⁸¹ In keeping with Nietzsche’s advice that you help suffering friends “only in the manner in which you help yourself,”⁸² this response to suffering, which seeks to transcend rather than compound pain, can occur intersubjectively. When a friend is suffering, instead of pitying her, an attempt can be made to both soothe and inspire her beyond her misery, interrupting the cycle of suffering. Such an alternative to pity’s dissemination of gloom is intimated in Nietzsche’s claim that “in dark states of distress, sickness or debt we are glad when we perceive others still shining and they perceive in us the bright disk of the moon.”⁸³ It becomes more evident when he observes that “the question itself remains unanswered whether one is of more use to another by immediately leaping to his side and helping him—which help can in any case be only superficial where it does not become a tyrannical seizing and transforming—or by creating something out of oneself that the other can behold with pleasure: a beautiful, restful, self-enclosed garden perhaps, with high walls against storms and the dust of the roadway but also a hospitable gate.”⁸⁴ As this indicates, Nietzsche’s attack on pity need not have indifference to or even delight in the suffering of others as its corollary. He gestures toward an alternative response to the suffering of oneself or one’s friends, one that breaks the cycle of suffering and averts the increase in overall misery promoted by pity.⁸⁵

What emerges from a close reading of the middle period writings is that pity poses many and varied dangers. It typically brings pleasure through a feeling of superiority which smacks of unhealthy rivalry and comparison of the self with others. Pity enfeebles the strong and demonizes suffering. It too readily and wrongly assumes knowledge of another, can threaten self-development, and contributes to aggregate misery. But despite these risks, what also emerges is that the esteem in which Nietzsche holds any manifestation of fellow-feeling can only be discerned from its context. His major criterion for evaluating action is the stance actors take toward themselves, their action, and the world. As such, emotions and drives are not ruled out *a priori* nor whole categories of action condemned in a single bound. What matters is the individual’s demeanor, personal qualities, and relationship to others. This belief fits comfortably with Nietzsche’s view that what is nominally the same action can have very different sources, making it almost impossible to evaluate whole categories of actions.⁸⁶ It contributes too to the awareness of the complex-

ity of moral life that continually manifests itself in the works of the middle period. As a consequence, Nietzsche does not rule out a drive like pity; everything depends upon who is experiencing it, why and how, with whom and to what ends.

The Later Works

While the later works continue to criticize pity for some of the reasons advanced in the middle period, they typically do so in a shriller and more simplistic way. Pity becomes a byword for many of the perils Nietzsche identifies—the feminine, the Christian, the modern, and the Schopenhauerean—rather than a mystery of the psyche to be unraveled with care and delicacy. The religion of pity is a herd phenomenon which derives from the weak's fear of suffering and incapacity for individuality⁸⁷ and overcoming pity is one of the noble virtues. "Active sympathy [*das Mitleiden*] for the ill-constituted and weak" is "more harmful than any vice";⁸⁸ "pity [*das Mitleiden*] instantly smells of mob and is so like bad manners as to be mistaken for them."⁸⁹ Perhaps because of the greater mistrust and more intense elitism of the later works, the possibility of a diffuse good will to one's fellow humans, which the middle period called benevolence, disappears from them. There benevolence appears only as a herd virtue.⁹⁰ Indeed, Nietzsche denies the existence of the benevolent type of man and objects to the way goodness and benevolence have been overvalued.⁹¹ This stands in stark contrast to the middle period's complaint that they were, in their genuine expressions at least, overlooked and undervalued.

Nonetheless, there are in the later works some echoes of the more sensitive and nuanced portrayal of pity offered in the middle period.⁹² The difficulty of expunging pity is implied when the tests to which free spirits must subject themselves include the need "not to cleave to a feeling of pity, though it be for higher men into whose rare torment and helplessness chance allowed us to look."⁹³ The question of whether and how pity among higher types should manifest itself is taken up in Zarathustra's advice that "if you have a suffering friend, be a resting-place for his suffering. But a resting place like a hard-bed, a camp-bed: thus you will serve him best."⁹⁴ This more martial approach to relieving a friend's pain contrasts with the gentler, more aesthetic one mooted in the middle period which advises one to embody something that "the other can behold with pleasure: a beautiful, restful, self-enclosed garden perhaps, with high walls against storms and the dust of the roadway but also a hospitable gate."⁹⁵

In the works after Z, Nietzsche continues to concede that a higher type of pity is possible, although this is no longer associated with friendship. This is instead a generalized, God's-eye pity for the degraded state of humanity: "Our pity [*Unser Mitleiden*] is more elevated, more farsighted pity—we see how man is diminishing himself, how you are diminishing him!"⁹⁶ Of course, the dominance of the regular type of pity is one of the major causes of the diminution of the human stature; hence the reference to "Pity against pity."⁹⁷ Later in BGE, Nietzsche evokes again the possibility of a higher type of pity—the pity of a masterful human being—but does not elaborate on what pity as practiced by such an individual would look like.⁹⁸ However, as this concession that higher types can feel pity indicates, what matters in the evaluation of action is the actors' stance toward themselves, their action, and the world. As the later Nietzsche says, "the question is always who he is and who the other is."⁹⁹

Contrary to conventional wisdom, Nietzsche is not an implacable critic of forces like pity, empathy, sympathy, and benevolence. Indeed, the works of the middle period suggest that the true manifestation of some of these drives is the preserve of higher individuals. What matters for Nietzsche is the forum in which pity's positive characteristics manifest themselves and the stance the actors adopt toward themselves and one another. In this regard, friendship has special value in his eyes and can be a key variable in assessing the quality of action.

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Equal among Firsts

As the middle period's portrayal of pity reveals, friendship can be an arena governed by genuine knowledge of and sympathy for another, blurred boundaries of individuation, and the overcoming of egoism. In fact, Nietzsche's analysis of friendship in these works has all the variety and subtlety of his approaches to moral life and the psyche. Yet while he generalizes about friendship and contrasts its superior and inferior forms, he remains sensitive to its particularity. Nietzsche never adopts a wholly formulaic approach to this relationship, but recognizes that responsiveness to difference and particularity are among its central characteristics.

Characterizing Nietzsche as a theorist of friendship, however, seems odd if not misguided, for he is typically portrayed as a misanthropist who prizes solitude.¹ Once again, this illustrates how influential the later works have been in shaping the dominant impression of who Nietzsche is and what he stands for. Recognizing the importance that the middle period works attach to friendship among higher individuals requires some reconsideration of Nietzsche's putative individualism and of the belief that he holds great individuals to be utterly autonomous and indifferent to the judgments and opinions of others.

Jacques Derrida's observation that "the great canonical meditations

on friendship . . . belong to the experience of mourning, to the moment of loss—that of the friend or of friendship,”² could help to explain Nietzsche’s concern with friendship in the middle period, for his relationship with Wagner deteriorated and collapsed over this phase. The years 1878–79 also saw his break with an old friend Carl von Gersdorff and the death of Albert Brenner.³ However, Nietzsche was also sustained by many important friendships during this time; his relationships with Paul Rée, Franz Overbeck, and eventually Lou Salomé provide a more positive reason for his reflections on this bond. The powerful role friendship played in Nietzsche’s life is evident from his correspondence before and during the middle period. Both the existence and the content of his letters testify to friendship’s importance: he often writes to his friends about friendship. He invites his friend Erwin Rohde to “Think what life would be like without a friend. Could one, would one have borne it? *Dubito*.”⁴ Writing to Franz Overbeck, he describes being separated from his friends as “the darkest melancholy.”⁵ Friendship’s importance is further illustrated in a letter to Paul Rée where Nietzsche writes that “in my entire life I have not had as much pleasure as through our friendship during this year, not to speak of what I have learned from you. When I hear of your studies, my mouth waters with anticipation of your company; we have been created for an understanding of one another.”⁶ The vitality of these relationships must be considered alongside loss and mourning as forces inspiring Nietzsche’s reflections on friendship at this stage of his life.⁷

A further reason for Nietzsche’s interest in friendship can be inferred from the fact that in each of the middle period works he notes how important friendship was to the Greeks.⁸ The classical view of friendship was transvalued by Christianity into neighbor love,⁹ and just as Nietzsche attacks the value of neighbor love by exposing the damage it does to egoism and individual well-being and the base drives that often fuel it, so he seems to want to resurrect some of the qualities of Greek friendship.¹⁰ His claim that the Greeks “were the first, and so far the last, to whom the friend has appeared as a problem worth solving”¹¹ implies that in taking up the baton of friendship he is carrying on where they left off. Yet this depiction of the philosophical history of friendship is too sparse. As he later concedes, antiquity “almost buried friendship in its own grave,”¹² almost but not quite, for some of the writers Nietzsche discusses in the middle period, such as Montaigne, La Rochefoucauld, and Chamfort also belong to this tradition of reflecting on friendship.¹³

Nietzsche follows earlier writers on friendship by distinguishing its higher from its lower forms. He says, for example, that most people cannot keep their friends’ confidences¹⁴ and warns that idle people are not

good friends, having too much time to talk about and interfere in their friends' business.¹⁵ Most so-called friends cannot be relied upon in times of real danger; the support and protection they seem to offer is only apparent.¹⁶ He also warns that deliberate attempts to establish intimacy are not the mark of true friendship.¹⁷ Such characterizations of inferior friendships serve two, and possibly three, purposes. The first is to demonstrate that only higher types have the talent for true friendship. The second is to provide a foil for this sort of superior friendship, for a clearer sense of what it is emerges when its counterfeit forms are exposed.¹⁸ The third possible purpose is to alert readers to the features and dangers of these inferior friendships, for just as good friendships can nurture nobility of the spirit, so base ones can jeopardize it.

Friendship and Selfhood

The importance Nietzsche attributes to friendship manifests itself in obvious and in subtle ways throughout the works of the middle period. It manifests itself subtly when, among examples of "proud indifference to great losses," he lists indifference to "one's own existence and that of one's friends."¹⁹ Painting a picture of grief, he evokes the feelings "of the hero on the evening after a battle that has decided nothing but brought him wounds and the loss of his friend."²⁰ Friendship appears in a subtle but important way in the aphorism "collective spirit" which claims that "A good writer possesses not only his own spirit but also the spirit of his friends."²¹

Friendship's importance is more obvious in the longer passage entitled "The talent for friendship." Here Nietzsche's general point is that friends reflect one's personality. Individuals who "possess a particular gift for friendship" can be divided into one of two types: they are either like a ladder or like a circle. When like a ladder, "in a state of continual ascent,"²² individuals find new friends for each phase of their development. As a consequence, those who have been the individual's friends differ considerably from, and are unlikely to engage with, one another. The second sort of individual, the circle, takes different types of people as friends at the same time. The variety of this person's relationships is not diachronic but synchronic; it is a function of the breadth of personality rather than its serial metamorphoses. The various friends of this type of person can associate together even though they are quite different from one another. This is because sharing the nodal friend and being drawn to such a multifaceted individual provides some basis for attraction to and involvement

with one another. As Nietzsche says, "one can call such a man a *circle*, for in him this solidarity between such different natures and dispositions must in some way be prefigured."²³

This idea that friends reflect the self is echoed in Nietzsche's observation that "If we greatly transform ourselves, those friends of ours who have not been transformed become like ghosts of our past": these ghosts haunt us with the sound of how we once were, "younger, more severe, less mature."²⁴ The way that friends bear witness to self-development is also suggested by the depiction of "The friend we no longer desire." When a friend has expectations we cannot meet, estrangement is preferable to living with the reminder of our failure.²⁵ As Nietzsche later says, always being "taken for something higher than one is" is "the most painful feeling there is."²⁶

Another of Nietzsche's long reflections on friendship offers a realistic yet optimistic account of this bond. The passage opens by pointing out that myriad differences separate even the closest friends,²⁷ that friendship is a fragile achievement, and that each individual is ultimately alone. However, what begins as an apparent attack on illusions of solidarity and intimacy becomes an injunction to celebrate the reality of human relationships rather than lament their imperfections. A variation on Nietzsche's critique of free will, the passage argues that when it is seen that one's friends must be as they are, regret that they are not otherwise evaporates. Acceptance of others and their apparent limitations should also be the corollary of self-knowledge, for if we learn to see ourselves clearly and thus "despise ourself a little," tolerance of others grows. "It is true we have good reason to think little of each of our acquaintances, even the greatest of them; but equally good reason to direct this feeling back on to ourself."²⁸ Acquiring more realistic expectations about friendship in this way frees us to eventually celebrate it, despite its imperfections.

Nietzsche concedes that the survival of a friendship can require silence, discretion, or ignorance about some of the partner's characteristics. The passage "One is judged falsely" implies that friendship is incompatible with full knowledge of the other and that, to remain such, friends must misjudge one another to some extent. "Would they be our friends if they knew us well?"²⁹ The passage "Two friends" returns to this question of how much truth a friendship can bear when Nietzsche notes that some relationships founder when one of the friends feels too well known by the other. This suggests that perspicuity is not one of friendship's essential features.³⁰ However, this passage also acknowledges that friendship can falter when one friend feels insufficiently understood by the other, so that while delineating some of the defining features of

friendship, Nietzsche remains alive to the variety of forms it takes and emotions it accommodates.

The value of feeling understood by friends emerges again in the discussion of "Presumptuousness." Tallying the costs of the desire "to signify more than he is *or counts for*," Nietzsche warns that one should only display a proud demeanor when "one can be quite sure one will not be misunderstood and regarded as presumptuous, for example in the presence of friends and wives."³¹ The need to feel known and understood by one's friends recurs when he points to the value of an environment in which one is free either to remain silent or to communicate things of the utmost importance.³² Without this freedom, a dissatisfaction with one's self and the world develops that is anathema to individual well being. Nietzsche further claims that one can only learn to say strong things in a simple way when surrounded by those who believe in one's strength; such an environment "educates one to attain 'simplicity of style.'"³³ However, when the company is inadequate, one "will usually be a good letter-writer,"³⁴ illustrating again the importance Nietzsche attributes to communicating with, and being understood by, select others.

This question of how closely each partner in a friendship can and should know herself and her friend is taken up again in the passage "Self-observation." Rather than self-knowledge being a precondition of realistic friendship, honest friends become a prerequisite of self-knowledge. Because the pursuit of self-knowledge is hindered by the many barriers and defenses individuals erect against themselves, it is only through the observations of others that a more accurate view of the self can be attained. Friends (and enemies) can pierce this ignorance about the self.³⁵ In contrast with some of his previous claims, here Nietzsche concedes that friendship can be open and honest and thereby provide an invaluable service to the individual in quest of self-knowledge.

In fact, the desire for self-knowledge could be the variable resolving the apparent contradiction in Nietzsche's musings about how much knowledge of the other a friendship can endure. Individuals who really want to know themselves will value direct and open exchanges with others who point out their foibles, failures, and shortcomings. Among such individuals, perspicacity and honesty are not threats but fillips to friendship. Enumerating "The good four" virtues, Nietzsche again draws this connection between honesty, friendship, and self-knowledge, advocating that we be "*Honest* towards ourselves and whoever *else* is a friend to us."³⁶ This suggests that in being honest with oneself, one is being a friend to oneself.

Yet total frankness is not demanded of all friendships; this would be too formulaic an approach to an area in which Nietzsche is highly sensi-

tive to difference and particularity. As the passage "Attitude towards praise" indicates, other considerations can outweigh honesty; benevolent dissimulation is acceptable if it protects friends' feelings.³⁷ That individuals should be responded to differently appears in the claim that "in our relations with people who are bashful about their feelings, we must be capable of dissimulation."³⁸ As the passage goes on to relate, without such sensitivity to individuality, friendships can be destroyed. Although the need to conceal oneself in order to spare others' feelings or prevent harm to them is repeatedly acknowledged throughout the middle period,³⁹ this rationale for wearing masks and practicing dissimulation receives little attention in the literature on Nietzsche.

Higher Friendship

One aphorism defines friendship as "fellow rejoicing not fellow suffering,"⁴⁰ which points to another characteristic of higher friendship. Nietzsche depicts the ability to "imagine the joy of others and to rejoice at it" as a rare human quality.⁴¹ That the capacity for "rejoicing with" is the preserve of the noble personality is evident in his claim that in most social interaction, "if we let others see how happy and secure in ourselves we are in spite of suffering and deprivation, how malicious and envious we would make them!"⁴² As the friend's capacity to delight in another's joy signals, comparing oneself with the other as a way of bolstering the self is anathema to friendship. It is therefore impossible for "petty natures" to be true friends because "in order to maintain in themselves a sense of self-respect . . . [they] are obliged to disparage and diminish in their minds all the other people they know."⁴³ As this intimates, vanity imperils friendship, for the vain will not spare even their friends in striving to prove their superiority.⁴⁴ Conversely, when comparisons with others generate envy, friendship is also threatened. Yet just as the middle period practices a nonreductionist approach to psychology, so Nietzsche admits that some of those who experience envy from comparing themselves with others can also be "striving for higher things."⁴⁵ In such cases, envy of "the man of excellence" can mutate into love for him.

The association of generosity with higher types appears again when Nietzsche contrasts "the unpleasant character who is full of mistrust [and] consumed with envy" with one "who readily rejoices with his fellow men, wins friends everywhere, welcomes everything new and developing, takes pleasure in the honours and successes of others." The latter is "an anticipatory man striving towards a higher human culture."⁴⁶ As Nietzsche's equation of friendship with joying-with and his admiration

for such generosity indicate, the talent for true friendship is the mark of a higher human being. A strong statement of how noble and unusual this is comes in the conclusion of the passage entitled "The things people call love." After arguing that love and avarice are not opposites but different phases of the desire to have, Nietzsche evokes a different, unusual type of love. Its participants do not crave exclusive possession of one another but have a "*shared* higher thirst for an ideal above them." The right name for this rare love is friendship.⁴⁷

Nietzsche often suggests that acknowledging, tolerating, and even relishing difference is a vital characteristic of robust friendship, which prevents his idea of higher friendship from degenerating into advanced narcissism.⁴⁸ In the passage entitled "A different kind of neighbour-love" he describes the sort of relationship preferred by those capable of grand passion: "It is a kind different from that of the sociable and anxious to please: it is a gentle, reflective, relaxed friendliness; it is as though they were gazing out of the windows of their castle, which is their fortress and for that reason also their prison—to gaze into what is strange and free, into what is different, does them so much good!"⁴⁹

When one party to a friendship chooses a different path from the other's, this can nourish rather than undermine their relationship. Nietzsche calls such divergence "a high sign of humanity in closer association with others."⁵⁰ The passage "Of friends" shows the value of accepting then growing to celebrate friends' differences,⁵¹ and Nietzsche seems to privilege the circle model of friendship over the ladder model in discussing the talent for friendship.⁵²

Just as higher friendships are nourished by difference, base ones are destroyed by it.⁵³ Yet as the section entitled "Star friendship" acknowledges, radical divergence can destroy even higher friendships. But Nietzsche hopes that when a once strong relationship has been rent by differences, its erstwhile partners will not be bitter. A more elevated view is available: "That we have to become estranged is the law *above* us; by the same token we should also become more venerable for each other—and the memory of our former friendship more sacred."⁵⁴ In this context he again applies his analysis of the necessity of actions to friendship and concludes that, when action is seen as necessary rather than freely chosen, it becomes inappropriate to impute blame when the relationship falls apart.

Nietzsche's admiration for friendships that accommodate diversity suggests that while he acknowledges that friendship can transcend the boundaries of individuation, total assimilation into or identification with the other is not encouraged. The section on "A good friendship" cautions against becoming too close and confounding "I and Thou."⁵⁵ The

need to maintain a balance between connection and individuation is also apparent in Nietzsche's warning about the danger of living "together with another person too closely. . . . The soul of a human being too can finally become tattered by being handled continually. . . . One always loses by too familiar association with friends and women."⁵⁶ The importance of balancing connection and individuation is expressed in a more positive and elegant way in the aphorism "In parting" where Nietzsche says that "it is not in how one soul approaches another but in how it distances itself from it that I recognize their affinity and relatedness."⁵⁷ Its importance can also be inferred from his claim that those who depreciate intimacy and feign a severe reserve do so because they are ashamed of their strong feelings of "intimate trust." It is as if, because they are incapable of "warm and noble intimacy,"⁵⁸ they cannot strike this balance between connection with and individuation from others.

As the depiction of a different kind of neighbor love also indicates, higher individuals' attitude toward friendship differs from most: they choose friendship from a position of self-possession and sufficient self-love and do not need approval from others as imprimaturs to their choices and decisions. In contrast with the vain, when the noble personality seeks recognition, this is a choice rather than a need and is based on acknowledgment of the power of another's judgment. As Nietzsche says, "He who really possesses himself . . . henceforth regards it as his own privilege to punish himself, to pardon himself, to take pity on himself: he does not need to concede this to anyone else, but he can freely relinquish it to another, to a friend for example."⁵⁹

There are, moreover, times when Nietzsche goes beyond claiming that friendship's higher form is the preserve of noble personalities to suggest that these types require friendship to sustain and spur them on to greater heights. The value of kindred spirits for superior types emerges clearly in the discussion of "Seeking one's company": "Are we then seeking too much if we seek the company of men who have grown gentle, well-tasting and nutritious, like chestnuts which have been put on to the fire and taken from it again at the proper time? Who expect little from life, and would rather take this as a gift than as something they have earned."⁶⁰ The value of friendship to higher individuals is further explored in the passage "The tyrants of the spirit" which predicts that future cultural authority will emanate from "the *oligarchs of the spirit*." This new oligarchy will be a group of like-minded higher humans who, despite their "spatial and political division" will constitute a "close-knit society whose members *know* and *recognize* one another." These superior spirits need and nurture one another:

How could the individual keep himself aloft and, against every current, swim along his own course through life if he did not see here and there others of his own kind living under the same conditions and take them by the hand. . . . The oligarchs have need of one another, they have joy in one another, they understand the signs of one another—but each of them is nonetheless free, he fights and conquers in his *own* place, and would rather perish than submit.⁶¹

Their relationship evinces many of friendship's characteristics. It is a relationship among superior types who see one another as equals, who take joy in one another, who respect distance among themselves and provide support and intimacy without quashing individuality. Nietzsche's awareness that friends can be spurs to great things appears in the vignette of a relationship uniting one person who had great works with another who had great faith his works. The individual with the great works "depended wholly" on his companion.⁶² The description of this pair as "inseparable" provides another indication that Nietzsche sees blurring the boundaries of individuation as possible and sometimes desirable.

Yet few of Nietzsche's readers recognize friendship's importance for superior types. Even those who discuss his interest in agonial striving accord friendship little or no role in this, believing instead that Nietzsche internalizes the agonistic struggle, so that various parts of the self battle with each other.⁶³ However, the works of the middle period betray no necessary antagonism between agonism within and without. These can be complementary forces in self-making, so that friends can assist in the self's struggle against itself. Nietzsche offers no reason why working on the self must be conceived of as a solitary effort. Instead, friendship can be a spur to greatness.⁶⁴ It is true that the passage "In praise of Shakespeare" initially appears to deny this possibility, declaring that "Independence of the soul! . . . No sacrifice can be too great for that: one must be capable of sacrificing one's dearest friend for it, even if he should also be the most glorious human being, an ornament of the world, a genius without peer—if one loves freedom as the freedom of great souls and he threatens this kind of freedom."⁶⁵ But as the hypothetical final clause makes clear,⁶⁶ friendship and independence are only sometime rivals, and the middle period's many passages in praise of friendship testify to Nietzsche's belief that not all friendships jeopardize individuality.

Overall then in the middle period, friendship is not seen as antagonistic to self-development but can enhance this process through its perspicacity and alterity. Friendship is, however, a threat to the self when it compensates for self-development by allowing the friends to meld into,

instead of take strength from, each other.⁶⁷ Nietzsche values a respectful distance between individuals whereby intimacy does not preclude separation or boundaries but is nourished by a delicate balance of closeness and distance and in both cases the friend beholds in the other something that draws them out of the self.

The other hallmarks of friendship outlined in the middle period are fairly standard. One is attentiveness. Friends readily incline toward one another, so when one has to work at listening, friendship is on the wane.⁶⁸ Discretion is another, for the more friendship is talked about, the less likely it is to last.⁶⁹ More generally, Nietzsche is critical of the lack of delicacy and “gross obviousness” that characterizes so much of people’s dealing with their friends and other familiars when they wish to be honest with them.⁷⁰ The fact that he links this with the pace of modern life suggests that the frequency of inferior friendships is not just a function of the failures, foibles, and weaknesses of the individuals contracting them but that there are also wider social and cultural forces militating against individuals becoming good friends.

Friendship and Solitude

One of Nietzsche’s criticisms of contemporary education was that “no one learns, no one strives after, no one teaches—the *endurance of solitude*.”⁷¹ However, appreciating his attitude to friendship in the works of the middle period prompts a reappraisal of just what he means by solitude. Just as he prizes the sort of intimacy that maintains its strength and delicacy by leaving some room between its partners, so he implies that solitude need not exclude friendship. At one point he discusses the boredom that “a solitude without friends, books, duties or passions”⁷² can bring. While the idea of solitude encompassing the last three items is unremarkable, to suggest that it can embrace the friend is certainly unconventional. When being alone can include a friend, the normal boundaries of self and other have clearly been transgressed. The possibility that solitude can include friendship is also countenanced when, lamenting the contemporary obsession with work, Nietzsche predicts that “soon we may well reach the point where people can no longer give in to the desire for a *vita contemplativa* (that is taking a walk with ideas and friends).”⁷³ Given the traditional equation of contemplation with solitude,⁷⁴ Nietzsche once again upsets conventional boundaries between self and other. Yet if a friend can sometimes know me better than I know myself, the idea that being with oneself can include the company of friends becomes less paradoxical. Similarly, if noble intimacy keeps a

respectful distance, it is unlikely to be the sort of intrusion from which solitude is usually sought.

Nietzsche's other discussions of solitude do not adopt this inclusive stance but betray a more conventional understanding. "Society as enjoyment," for example, points out that time alone heightens enjoyment of "the society of men," because company becomes "a rare delicacy."⁷⁵ "From the land of the cannibals" poses a choice for the solitary person between consuming himself or being consumed by the crowd.⁷⁶ The imagery of comestibles recurs in the aphorism on "The socializer," depicting a person who loves company because they cannot love themselves: "Society's stomach is stronger than mine, it can digest me."⁷⁷ Yet while all these aphorisms associate solitude with isolation, none repudiates the inclusive variation sketched above because they repose upon the individual/society dichotomy and ignore the intermediate category of friendship. This also holds for much of the middle period's praise of solitude: it celebrates release from involvement in the wider world rather than from friendship.⁷⁸ However, the passage "Distant perspectives" does distinguish friendship from solitude and reiterates the earlier point that friendship cannot survive too much proximity between its partners.⁷⁹ Solitude also denotes removal from friends in other passages from this work.⁸⁰ Toward the end of this book, a form of solitude appears which includes friends, but these are dead friends—the great thinkers of the past.⁸¹ Nonetheless, the salient point to emerge from a survey of views of solitude in the middle period is that his praise of solitude need not preclude friendship. When the middle period writings do advocate solitude, it is usually as a release from wider social involvement rather than from all human communion.

Yet irrespective of whether it encompasses friends, Nietzsche does not always praise solitude in the works of the middle period. He suggests, for example, that the conceit of "the Winter of life" only has meaning if it refers to "those cold recurring seasons of solitude, hopefulness and unfruitfulness, our *periods of illness*."⁸² Solitude is associated with gloom and even carries risks in the passage "Gardener and garden": "Out of damp and gloomy days, out of solitude, out of loveless words directed at us, conclusions grow up in us like fungus . . . and they gaze upon us morose and grey."⁸³ Nietzsche again points to the dangers of solitude when he claims that "being alone implants presumptuousness." The sort of modesty he admires in the middle period is, by contrast, fostered in good company: "one unlearns arrogance when one knows one is always among deserving people."⁸⁴ Yet ever attuned to the complexities of the psyche, Nietzsche does allow that solitude can have the reverse effect, making some individuals undervalue themselves. Such people need others to re-

store their sense of self; "they have to be compelled to *acquire* again a good and just opinion of themselves from others."⁸⁵ This restored sense of self need not come from witnessing the inferiority of others; instead, Nietzsche allows that self-esteem can be fostered by others in a much more positive way.

Although Nietzsche looks to antiquity as an era when friendship was more fully appreciated, he maintains that true friendship is still possible, albeit rare. An important reason for this is that such friendship is only possible among equally superior types; it requires equality among firsts. The rarity of true friendship is therefore heightened by the fact that being such a friend not only requires exceptional qualities but one's friends must also be exceptional types. So notwithstanding Nietzsche's repeated attacks on the notion of equality, friendship is an arena where it is not only possible but necessary.⁸⁶ The infrequency of associations between equally superior individuals is illustrated in the aphorism "Lack of friends" where he points out that envy can kill friendships but concludes wryly that "Many owe their friends only to the fortunate circumstance that they have no occasion for envy."⁸⁷ Friendship's rarity need not, however, detract from its reality and importance.

In the works of the middle period, there is an intersubjective aspect to virtuosity, for friendship can be a fillip to greatness, be this in the quest for knowledge about the wider world or the self. Friends can assist one another in the quest for self-knowledge because in some ways a friend can know me better than I know myself. This possibility challenges the image so typically associated with Nietzsche's thought of the sovereign self who is clearly delimited from others. Yet while Nietzsche sometimes celebrates the compromising of the boundaries of individuation in this way, he also insists that they not be eliminated; friendship's closeness should be contained. He adduces an ideal of intimacy that is simultaneously lovingly close and respectfully distant.

The Later Works

A belief in the possibility and importance of friendship among higher types is still evident in *Z. Zarathustra* the creator seeks companions, "fellow-creators, those who inscribe new values on new tables."⁸⁸ Some of the characteristics of the middle period's depiction of friendship recur in this book. The intimacy and blurring of individual boundaries is suggested in Zarathustra's claim that "your friend's face is . . . your own face, in a rough and imperfect mirror."⁸⁹ The idea that friendship is essentially "joying with" and that friends can foster one another's greatness is im-

plicit in Zarathustra's wish, "May the friend be to you a festival of the earth and a foretaste of the Superman. . . . I teach you the friend in whom the world stands complete, a vessel of the good—the creative friend who always has a complete world to bestow. . . . in your friend you should love the Superman as your principle."⁹⁰

The promise of friendship is hinted at in an aphorism from BGE which states that "With hard men intimacy [*Innigkeit*] is a thing of shame—and something precious."⁹¹ The claim that "all company is bad company except the company of one's equals,"⁹² while hardly lavish praise for friendship, does allow that others can provide good company, in contrast to the later Nietzsche's more usual insistence on solitude for higher types. Similarly, one of the delineations of the ingredients of master morality includes "a refined conception of friendship." Concomitant with this is the need for enemies as the channels for the emotions that threaten friendship, such as "envy, quarrelsomeness [and] arrogance."⁹³ Enemies serve not to spur one to greatness but to facilitate one's being a good friend to someone else.

This limited acknowledgment that friendship can play a part in the life of the higher human being is reinforced by the fact that, as in the middle period, some of the praise of solitude contained in the later work emphasizes distance and freedom from the mass of ordinary humans, rather than from all others.⁹⁴ The possibility of superior types interacting among themselves rather than being confined to solitude returns in Nietzsche's image of the noble soul moving "among these its equals and equal-in-rights with the same sure modesty and tender reverence as it applies to itself. . . . it is in no doubt that the exchange of honours and rights, as the *essence* of social intercourse, is likewise part of the natural condition of things."⁹⁵

However, none of this amounts to the celebration of friendship offered in the middle period; after Z there are no images of blurred boundaries of individuation nor any sense that these equals can do anything but recognise greatness in one another; they do not seem capable of enhancing and promoting it.⁹⁶ In fact, most of the praise for friendship occurs in the first few of the later works; after BGE, it is rare to find friendship lauded in any way. This is evident in the contrast between its depiction of great types moving among their equals with modesty and tender reverence and GM's image of great individuals who have the strength of will to keep promises without the fear of punishment. While it is natural for this type of individual "to honour his strong and reliable peers, all those who promise like sovereigns,"⁹⁷ modesty, tenderness, or reverence is no longer associated with such interaction. Moreover, these works bristle with praise of the sort of solitude that does exclude all others.⁹⁸

In contrast with the middle period's images of great individuals spurring one another on, now the individual striving for greatness "regards everybody he meets on his way either as a means or as a delay and hindrance—or as a temporary resting-place. The lofty *goodness* towards his fellow men which is proper to him becomes possible only when he has reached his height and he rules."⁹⁹ Whereas the works of the middle period discussed the importance of feeling understood by one's friends, one's "good friends" are now indolent and disposable: "one can laugh at their expense;—or get rid of them altogether these good friends—and still laugh!"¹⁰⁰ The philosopher "hates to be disturbed by either enmities or friendships; he easily forgets or despises."¹⁰¹ Indeed, friends can even be dangerous to the development of free spirithood: even those who are well-loved must be released for "every person is a prison, also a nook and a corner."¹⁰² One of the reasons why friendship becomes unnecessary for those aspiring to greatness is that it is now enemies, not friends, who spur higher individuals on to yet greater heights.¹⁰³ However, Nietzsche's real concern here is diversity rather than relations with other people, for the concept of enmity has expanded to embrace the warring forces within the self. "One is *fruitful* only at the cost of being rich in contradictions."¹⁰⁴

Thus throughout the later works there is a gradual enervation of Nietzsche's depiction of friendship and its importance for higher human beings; indeed, the lively concern with the realm of intersubjective relationships in general atrophies in those works. Perhaps the attrition of friendship's importance can be partly explained by its diminishing presence in Nietzsche's own life.¹⁰⁵ But whatever its cause, the ability to trace the presence of an ideal of friendship, however weakened, in the later works is a legacy of studying the middle period. Without a knowledge of the importance and value these works attribute to friendship, it is impossible to see Nietzsche's position in the later works as an evolution within his thought and as a very active rejection of what he once took to be the benefits and pleasures of friendship.



We Children of the Enlightenment

The works of the middle period are sometimes labeled positivist, and one of their distinguishing features is the praise they contain for science. In stark contrast to the criticism leveled at science in the earlier works¹ and throughout the later ones, the works of the middle period, and especially those that became the two volumes of HH, repeatedly express admiration for science's methods and procedures² as well as for the values and characteristics of its practitioners. Appeals are made to "the man of knowledge" and "the man of science,"³ and science is contrasted favorably with philosophy, religion, and art because it is disinterested. Science offers the possibility of seeing the world as it is, without wishful thinking or need imputing false meanings; in practicing science, one "seeks knowledge and nothing further."⁴ Nietzsche sees scientific thinking as a source of social progress, having great faith in the power of enlightened ideas to shape the future: "our social order will slowly melt away, as all previous orders have done, as soon as the suns of novel opinions shine out over mankind with a new heat."⁵ His faith in the possibility of a better future that stems from his advocacy of science permeates these works, adding to their distinctive character.

Enlightened History

Nietzsche's hope for the spread of a scientific approach to knowledge is connected with a view of history that can be retrieved from the middle period writings. The master/slave and classical/Christian grids that inform his reading of the past in the later works are largely absent;⁶ instead, history is seen through the lens of enlightenment and the gradual accretion of scientific learning. Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and even Schopenhauer's metaphysics acquire their meaning according to their contribution or impediment to the *telos* of increasing enlightenment. As this suggests, however, instead of the smooth dissemination of enlightenment over time, this view of history sees the advancement of knowledge as a series of peaks and troughs. Scientific knowledge reached an apex during the eras of classical Greece, the Renaissance, and the European Enlightenment but was quelled by the rise of Christianity, its hegemony through the Middle Ages, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and the French Revolution. Nietzsche refers ebulliently to "those exceptional Greeks who created *science*! He who tells of them, tells the most heroic story in the history of the human spirit!"⁷ This historical narrative accords the Jews a special place as stewards of knowledge for

in the darkest periods of the Middle Ages, when the cloudbanks of Asia had settled low over Europe, it was the Jewish freethinkers, scholars and physicians who, under the harshest personal constraint, held firmly to the banner of enlightenment and intellectual independence and defended Europe against Asia; it is thanks not least to their efforts that a more natural, rational and in any event unmythical elucidation of the world could at last again obtain victory and the ring of culture that now unites us with the enlightenment of Graeco-Roman antiquity remain unbroken.⁸

The Renaissance's early spring was "almost snowed away again" because during the Reformation, "science was as yet unable to raise its head."⁹ As a consequence of the Reformation and the Catholic reaction, "the complete awakening and hegemony of the sciences" was delayed for two or three hundred years. Without these interruptions, "the Enlightenment perhaps [would] have dawned somewhat sooner than it did and with a fairer lustre than we can now even imagine."¹⁰ The French Revolution posed a more recent threat to Enlightenment's advance. In particular, the Rousseauian belief in innate human goodness being corrupted

by social institutions was the “spirit that has for a long time banished *the spirit of the Enlightenment and of progressive evolution*.”¹¹ In Nietzsche’s own century, Schopenhauer’s philosophy was proof that, despite the dismantling of Christianity, “the scientific spirit is not yet sufficiently strong.”¹²

When the middle period’s perspective on history is considered, the common belief that for Nietzsche the Greeks represent the paragon of humanity must be modified.¹³ Although full of praise for the heights attained by science in antiquity, Nietzsche claims that science was still then seen as secondary, and even as instrumental, to virtue.¹⁴ When history is construed according to the fortunes of scientific knowledge, pride of place goes to the Renaissance; scientific knowledge was more fully developed then precisely because the Renaissance built upon the achievements of Greek science. As Nietzsche enumerates the wonders of the Renaissance, we find it to be characterized by all the things he admires in the middle period: “liberation of thought, disrespect for authorities, victory of education over the arrogance of ancestry, enthusiasm for science and the scientific past of mankind, unfettering of the individual, a passion for truthfulness.”¹⁵

The harmful influence of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and Rousseau’s “superstition” about primeval human goodness¹⁶ conspire to make the present stage an interregnum in the history of science’s development.

To construct anew the laws of life and action—for this task our sciences of physiology, medicine, sociology and solitude are not sufficiently sure of themselves: and it is from them that the foundation-stones of new ideals (if not the new ideals themselves) must come. So it is that, according to our taste and talent, we live an existence which is either a *prelude* or a *postlude*, and the best we can do in this *interregnum* is to be as far as possible our own *reges* and found little *experimental states*. We are experiments: let us also want to be them!¹⁷

This impasse explains why “we of the present day are only just beginning to form the chain of a very powerful future feeling, link for link—we hardly know what we are doing.”¹⁸ However, Nietzsche does not just construct an account of history that revolves around the fortunes of scientific thinking, he also tries to influence the future. He hopes to turn the current impasse into a prelude to further scientific progress and appeals to his fellow children of the Enlightenment to join him in this.¹⁹ If the scientific spirit that he both represents and champions triumphs, the banner of the Enlightenment will be carried on and “a new Renaissance” will begin.²⁰

Heroism

Although clichéd, it is not inappropriate to consider Nietzsche's appeal to his fellow scientists as a call to intellectual arms. War provides a mobile army of metaphors with which he portrays the intellectual activity of the future: he anticipates "the (higher) age that will carry heroism into the search for knowledge and that will *wage wars* for the sake of ideas and their consequences."²¹ His way of thinking "requires a warlike soul,"²² and he refers to the cheerfulness of "brave soldiers of knowledge."²³

Along with this use of military metaphors to portray the struggle for knowledge comes the frequent association of knowledge with heroism. There must be an "heroic impulse in the heart of the free spirit," and reference is made to the heroism of one of the earliest free spirits: Socrates.²⁴ Truth's pursuit requires traditional heroic virtues like merit, courage, strength, stamina, fortitude, and the deferral of immediate ego and interest. The fact that Nietzsche's focus is the warrior's heroism rather than his violence is suggested by the fact that sometimes the requisite heroism resembles that of religious martyrs who rejoice in being persecuted for their truth; "in this way their teaching will be cut and burned into mankind."²⁵ The idea of being a martyr for knowledge resonates in Nietzsche's lament about his education: "If only we had been taught to *revere* these sciences, if only our souls had *even once* been made to tremble at the way in which the great men of the past had struggled and been defeated and had struggled anew, at the martyrdom which constitutes the history of *rigorous science*!"²⁶ Saintry features like modesty, humility, and forbearance, as well as "cheerfulness, patience, unpretentiousness"²⁷ are required by the free spirit who must have "the courage to allow himself and his work to be found boring."²⁸ This is because for the progress of scientific thinking, "now what is required is that perseverance in labour that does not weary of heaping stone upon stone, brick upon brick, what is required is the abstemious courage not to be ashamed of such modest labour and to defy every attempt to disparage it."²⁹

The denizens of the "republic of scientific men"³⁰ must therefore combine saintly qualities with some of the older warrior virtues. However, one of the ways in which they must resemble saints more than traditional warriors is that they cannot hope for the usual reward of heroism—glory. "The most difficult is demanded and the best is done without praise and decorations."³¹ Free spirits must practice heroic virtues and then be heroic about foregoing recognition: "There is in his way of living and thinking a *refined heroism* which disdains to offer itself to the veneration of the great masses . . . and tends to go silently through the world

and out of the world.”³² While some posthumous recognition is possible,³³ it cannot be guaranteed, and many seekers after truth will work their lives away assiduously only to remain in eternal obscurity. Thus the possibility of recognition cannot figure among their motivations: they must beaver away confident in the belief that their enterprise is “the mark of a higher culture”³⁴ even if their efforts be undervalued or even ridiculed.³⁵ Kepler and Spinoza exemplify such geniuses of knowledge who differ from artists in not being anxious for recognition and who bear their “sufferings and privations” stoically.³⁶ Nietzsche summarizes the circumstances and characteristics of those who seek knowledge thus: “Science requires *nobler* natures than does poetry: they have to be simpler, less ambitious, more abstemious, quieter, less concerned with posthumous fame, and able to lose themselves in contemplation of things few would consider worthy of such a sacrifice of the personality. . . . they *seem* less gifted because they glitter less, and will be accounted less than they are.”³⁷

The free spirit’s quest for truth thus requires an internalization and redirection of the virtues traditionally associated with heroism³⁸ along with indifference toward heroism’s traditional reward—glory. As Nietzsche claims, the motto “‘What do I matter!’—stands over the door of the thinker of the future.”³⁹ Yet his insistence on the modesty, humility, and self-effacement of the seeker after truth seems to violate his own premise about the ubiquity of egoism; it seems to require scientists to renounce any personal gratification from their work. Perhaps to mitigate this danger of self-contradiction, Nietzsche acknowledges that among the personal rewards of science are the joy of knowing and the usefulness of the knowledge.⁴⁰

Leisure

“‘Nobility and honour are attached solely to otium and bellum,’ that was the ancient prejudice.”⁴¹ Just as Nietzsche often uses military imagery to portray the quest for knowledge, so an insistence upon the value of leisure informs the middle period’s vision of the good life and its critique of industrial society and the work ethic. Distressed by the fact that “the active, that is to say the restless” currently count for more than they ever have, he fears that “from lack of repose our civilization is turning into a new barbarism.”⁴² Throughout the works of the middle period, Nietzsche conducts a sustained attack on the speed of modern life and the desperate need to be busy. In contrast to the traditional praise of leisure, now “one is ashamed of resting, and prolonged reflection almost gives people a bad conscience. One thinks with a watch in one’s hand. . . .

'Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture and good taste."⁴³

This danger is not, however, appreciated by most people. When the majority of people have free time, they have no idea what to do with it.⁴⁴ Many of those without leisure are happy slaves who see in free time only the occasion for boredom or indolence. So highly valued are speed and industry in the current cultural climate that even "scholars are ashamed of otium."⁴⁵ Yet without leisure there is no *vita contemplativa* and no time for sustained or independent thought—or indeed thought of any quality.⁴⁶ The baleful consequences of this are nowhere clearer than in Nietzsche's "Lamentation" on the present age: "work and industry . . . sometimes seem to rage like an epidemic. . . . time for thinking and quietness in thinking are lacking. . . . An independent and cautious attitude towards knowledge is disparaged almost as a kind of derangement, the free spirit is brought into disrepute."⁴⁷

In stark contrast to the norms of his age, Nietzsche insists that the opportunity and capacity to enjoy leisure are necessary conditions of a higher existence: "as at all times, so now too, men are divided into the slaves and the free; for he who does not have two-thirds of his day to himself is a slave, let him be what he may otherwise: statesman, businessman, official, scholar."⁴⁸ The free spirit "knows the weekdays of unfreedom, of dependence, of servitude. But from time to time he has to have a Sunday of freedom, or he will find life unendurable."⁴⁹ What the majority of people see as boredom is understood by "thinkers and all sensitive spirits . . . [as] that disagreeable 'windless calm' of the soul that precedes a happy voyage and cheerful winds. . . . Precisely this is what lesser natures cannot achieve by any means."⁵⁰

Numbering himself among "men of the *vita contemplativa*,"⁵¹ Nietzsche applies his genealogical method to the contemplative life, giving his analysis a reflexive turn. Like many valued things, the life of contemplation has some cause for *pudenda origo* because it emanated from those too weak and depleted to act. Thus "with an evil heart and often an anguished head, did contemplation first appear on earth."⁵² Consistent with his sensitivity to the multiple motivations that can give rise to what is identified as the same action, Nietzsche acknowledges that some are still driven to the solitude of the contemplative life by weakness and melancholy. However, his higher human beings choose reclusion from a position of strength and of knowledge of self and world; their preference for contemplation is therefore not renunciation but self-realization.⁵³ It is, however, difficult to generalize about those now living the contemplative life for this motley group comprises the religious, artists, philosophers, and scientists. Whereas the first three species have tended to oppose

and impede those of the active life, in the case of science, the action/contemplation dichotomy is breaking down. Science is now proving its utility and thus attracting those once attracted to the *vita activa*,⁵⁴ which could help to explain why Nietzsche thinks about the contemplative life in military terms.

Nietzsche also maintains that the modern mania for work fulfills the sort of function that morality traditionally has of subordinating the individual to the collective. Work tames individuals because their particular interests, needs, and potential, should they even be discovered, are sacrificed to the demand for incessant labor. Hence he claims that "work is the best policeman" for "it keeps everyone in bounds and can mightily hinder the development of reason, covetousness, desire for independence."⁵⁵

However, Nietzsche's attack on "industrial culture"⁵⁶ is broader than the way the pace of life it demands precludes time for reflection or the way it sacrifices the individual to the collectivity. He contends that the excessive enthusiasm for work robs "the organs of their subtlety."⁵⁷ Even the little time devoted to sensual pleasure is unfulfilling, for people have not cultivated their senses sufficiently to savor such pleasures. A degree of leisure is required for this sort of cultivation, so while hard work might bring wealth, the process of earning it erodes their capacity to enjoy the pleasures it can afford.⁵⁸

Nor are the organs the only things robbed of their subtlety in this "overworked century."⁵⁹ Nietzsche is sensitive to how the accent on work affects the conduct and quality of life in areas such as "sociability and the arts."⁶⁰ Its impact is felt in even the smallest things—from the way people write letters and converse to the "universal demand for *gross obviousness*"⁶¹ in personal interaction. The assumption is that delicacy in dealing with others consumes time that could be more usefully spent working. Life is lived without subtlety, grace, concern with form or ceremony, for all these things take time. The casualties of industrial culture are not just health, contemplation, and delicate sociability but also joy: "more and more, *work* enlists all good conscience on its side; the desire for joy . . . is beginning to be ashamed of itself."⁶² From this it is abundantly clear that one of the transvaluations of values that disturbs Nietzsche is the reversal of the traditional work/leisure hierarchy: in the past, work was deemed base and leisure prized whereas now the reverse holds.⁶³

A New Aristocracy

Nietzsche is also disturbed by this reversal because of his belief that a strong social division is necessary for the creation of a higher culture:

there must always be the workers and the leisured if a higher culture is to flourish. Although this seems to evoke a return to the ancient model of masters and slaves, at one point he gives an antique idea a new slant by contending that the modern separation between creative, leisured master of culture and perfunctory laboring slave should not be made on the fixed basis of birth but on spiritual merit instead, which would permit some fluidity between social groups: "If an exchange between these two castes should take place, moreover, so that more obtuse, less spiritual families and individuals are demoted from the higher to the lower caste and the more liberated in the latter obtain entry into the higher, then a state is attained beyond which there can be seen only the open sea of indeterminate desires.—Thus speaks to us the fading voice of ages past, but where are there still ears to hear it?"⁶⁴

This suggests that Nietzsche's vision of an enlightened future is not an especially egalitarian one, notwithstanding his early prediction that with the spread of manly science, "gradually not only the individual but all mankind will be raised to this manliness."⁶⁵ More often he anticipates and encourages the emergence of a new élite, a new aristocracy that will dominate the intellectual and cultural life of Europe. His faith in the emergence of a new élite is illustrated in the long section entitled "The tyrants of the spirit," which testifies to the need of noble personalities for friendships to sustain and spur them on to greater heights. This passage's obvious interest in social power and speculation about a new source for such power moves it beyond the realm of interpersonal relations and lends its reflections on friendship a wider social import. Nietzsche writes that "In the spheres of higher culture there will always have to be a sovereign authority . . . [but this] will hereafter lie in the hands of the *oligarchs of the spirit*."⁶⁶ The new élite will comprise an oligarchy rather than a collection of tyrants: whereas antique thinkers such as Parmenides, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaximander, and Plato were "warlike brutal *tyrant[s]*," the growth of skepticism makes this ambition to intellectual tyranny impossible.⁶⁷ There will also be some unity and cooperation among the members of the new oligarchy, in contrast with the ancients who "would have liked to have eaten one another raw."⁶⁸

This élite of the future will be based on superior intellectual and, more broadly, spiritual qualities; its members will possess and develop the seemingly contradictory characteristics necessary to usher in and preside over this new age. Because "political and economic affairs are not worthy of being the enforced concern of society's most gifted spirits,"⁶⁹ these individuals will exercise power through the dissemination of scientific knowledge, ideas, and values. To the free spirit falls the "task of commanding . . . the whole militia of scientific and learned men and showing them

the paths to and goals of culture.”⁷⁰ Nietzsche hopes that they will dominate the cultural and intellectual life of Europe with their enlightened outlook.⁷¹

That Nietzsche thinks of this new aristocracy primarily in cultural and intellectual terms is suggested in the passage “Future of the aristocracy” where he welcomes the entry of those with noble blood into “the orders of knowledge.” “The work of our free-spirits” has made it possible for members of the traditional nobility to “obtain more intellectual ordinations, learn higher knightly duties . . . and to raise their eyes to the ideal of *victorious wisdom* which no previous age has been free to erect for itself with so good a conscience as the age now about to arrive.”⁷² While he welcomes the traditional nobility’s involvement in the production of knowledge and ideas, this group is not coextensive with this new élite, for their admission has been made possible by the free spirits already working there. Nor is there any indication that those with noble blood will or should monopolize it; instead, it seems that the traditional nobility will infuse the realm of learning with old blood, uniting old strengths with new in the service of the unprecedented victorious wisdom imagined above.

As this indicates, one of the things that is new about the aristocracy of the future Nietzsche imagines in the works of the middle period is that aristocratic birth is not a prerequisite of membership. Discussion of an exchange between the two castes suggests that he advocates a degree of social mobility, allowing those of superior merit to achieve their potential irrespective of the circumstances of their birth. This suggests that for Nietzsche’s new aristocracy, conditions of birth can be of great instrumental value in providing leisure and a good education but do not determine élite status. They are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of greatness. The qualities of a person’s spirit are of paramount significance, as indicated by Nietzsche’s claim that for those lacking spiritual qualities, wealth and leisure will not create the good life: “Only he who has *spirit* ought to have *possessions*: otherwise possessions are a *public danger*. For the possessor who does not know how to make use of his free time which his possessions could purchase him will always *continue* to strive after possessions: this striving will constitute his entertainment, his strategy in his war against boredom.”⁷³ This avarice contrasts with “the moderate possessions that would suffice the man of spirit,” and Nietzsche concludes that while the enjoyment of culture “is to *some* extent a matter of money, it is *much more a matter of spirit*.”⁷⁴ Another reason why moderate wealth is optimal is that with too much wealth one is a slave to one’s possessions and caring for them erodes invaluable leisure time.⁷⁵

Thus Nietzsche sees that it is possible to possess wealth and power and be one of the ordinary many, just as those with meagre means can

belong to the superior few. This is clear in his depiction of "successful and money-hungry people" who delight in devaluing and ridiculing "nobility of mind." Much of this nobility is born of "good-naturedness and absence of distrust,"⁷⁶ illustrating again that quality of spirit and motivation are the major cleavage dividing the many from the few for Nietzsche in the middle period. He bemoans the way his age "squanders the most precious thing there is, the spirit [*den Geist*]."⁷⁷

So while an aristocratic pedigree might foster the spiritual characteristics necessary for membership of Nietzsche's new aristocracy of spirit, it cannot guarantee them. Nor does its absence doom those of lower birth to perpetual inferiority. However, Nietzsche is acutely aware of the struggle facing a person of superior spirit with ordinary origins in overcoming the disadvantages of birth, for money and the leisure that a good birth affords create conditions propitious to greatness. As he acknowledges, "a very poor man usually destroys himself through nobility of disposition, it takes him nowhere and gains him nothing, his race is not capable of life . . . to have less, as a boy to beg and abase oneself, is dreadful."⁷⁸

"Whence comes the energy, the inflexible strength, the endurance with which the individual thinks, in opposition to tradition, to attain to a wholly individual perception of the world?"⁷⁹ The works of the middle period reflect extensively upon the circumstances that produce and foster the spiritual superiority they value so highly. As Nietzsche observes, "an education that no longer believes in miracles will have to pay attention to . . . how much energy is inherited? . . . how much can new energy be ignited?"⁸⁰ In the works of the middle period, he puts a heavier accent on achieved than inherited greatness in comparison with the later works, which is consistent with his belief that those of ordinary birth can become part of his aristocracy of spirit. Consider his injunction not to "talk about giftedness, inborn [*angeborenen*] talents! One can name great men of all kinds who were very little gifted. They *acquired* greatness, [*sie bekamen Grösse*] became 'geniuses.'"⁸¹ That one can acquire qualities not supplied by birth is further suggested in the assertion that a cheerful disposition is necessary, whether this comes naturally or is "a *disposition made cheerful* by art and knowledge."⁸²

The relative insignificance of inherited as opposed to self-given qualities in forging higher human beings is apparent in the discussion of talent: "In as highly developed a humanity as ours now is everyone acquires from nature access to many talents. Everyone *possesses inborn* [*angeborenes*] *talent*, but few possess the degree of inborn and acquired [*anerzogen*] toughness, endurance and energy actually to become a talent, that is to say to *become* what he is."⁸³ The key variables in achieving nobility—

toughness, endurance, and energy—are both inborn and acquired, which again takes the burden off birth and lineage. Nietzsche also interrogates artistic talent in this way and concludes that it is the combination of inherited talent and acquired learning that made Goethe and Raphael great. The capacity for learning seems to be the crucial force here, for “he who learns *bestows talent upon himself*.”⁸⁴ This capacity is, in turn, contingent upon the absence of pride and envy. Being free of these psychological impediments enabled Goethe and Raphael to become great learners and not merely exploiters of “those veins of ore washed clean from the siftings of the history of their forefathers.”⁸⁵

Throughout the middle period works then, Nietzsche accords considerable importance to acquired characteristics. This emphasis emerges in his reflection on the forces that produce great spirits. These are “in the first place undiminishing energy, resolute application to individual goals, great personal courage, then the good fortune to receive an upbringing which offered in the early years the finest teachers, models and methods.”⁸⁶ In another passage he writes that what distinguishes the noble from the common character is that the former “chances not to have inherited or acquired” the habits and points of view of the latter.⁸⁷ Nietzsche’s belief that, unlike feelings, thoughts cannot be inherited⁸⁸ is also relevant to the discussion about the relative importance of inherited versus acquired qualities, for in the middle period it is the free spirit’s intellectual qualities that Nietzsche most prizes, although these must be accompanied by virtues like courage, tenacity, and modesty. As feelings can be inherited, the injunction to trust them requires ceding authority over the self to one’s ancestors. According to Nietzsche, this undervalues “the gods which are in *us*: our reason and our experience.”⁸⁹ This passage seems to valorize things that are acquired—reason and experience—over things that are inherited—feelings.

The constant acknowledgment throughout the middle period that crucial qualities of free spirithood can be acquired makes room for a more meritocratic conception of aristocracy than the traditional models of aristocracy from which Nietzsche draws many of his values. Yet because the term aristocracy “denotes, through its root, excellence or superiority elevated to a position of power,”⁹⁰ this configuration can still be called an aristocracy. This period’s more meritocratic conception of the aristocracy of the future is, in turn, connected with the historical schema latent in this period which revolves around enlightenment. In admitting to this new élite individuals without noble births, Nietzsche is moving away from the ancient model of aristocracy and, by his own account, revivifying the spirit and achievements of the Italian Renaissance. His compari-

son of "Renaissance and Reformation" observes that among the good things characterizing the Renaissance was the "victory of education over the arrogance of ancestry."⁹¹

Two models of aristocracy can be discerned in the middle period. A new, more meritocratic notion of an aristocracy of spirit jostles for position against an older understanding of the aristocracy of birth. As this suggests, Nietzsche does not adhere consistently to his more meritocratic conception of aristocracy in these writings. He sometimes recurs to more traditional models which focus on inherited qualities⁹² and sees a noble birth as a necessary condition for nobility of spirit. In a passage that draws parallels with the Greeks, and laments the loss of noble life in war, he refers to "the most highly cultivated, those who guarantee a good and abundant posterity."⁹³ The traditional model of aristocracy is invoked when he claims that "races that have become pure have always also become stronger and more beautiful. — The Greeks offer us the model of a race and culture that has become pure: and hopefully we shall one day also achieve a pure European race and culture."⁹⁴ In the later writings, the traditional notion of aristocracy of birth triumphs over the more meritocratic notion mooted in the middle period. From this it transpires that once again Nietzsche's move from the middle to the later writings is characterized not so much by the adoption of new ideas as the according of greater prominence to certain ideas already present in the middle period works. In this process other possibilities, like the aristocracy of spirit, are abandoned, indicating again the sort of theoretical choices Nietzsche made in becoming who he is. Without a knowledge of the middle period writings, we would be unaware of these.

Embodiment

Nietzsche's reflections on the qualities that make higher human beings great cannot proceed without attention to the fact of embodiment. As his reference to "a goodly inheritance of spiritual and bodily demeanour"⁹⁵ suggests, one of the things that the traditional aristocracy of birth model captures and that he wants to preserve is an awareness of the close connection between embodiment and qualities of spirit. For him there is an intimate but complicated connection between the psychic and the physical, making it impossible to reduce their interaction to a simple cause and effect relationship. His belief that thought affects the body is apparent in the observation that "when we think much and sagaciously not only our face but our body too assumes a sagacious appearance."⁹⁶ Moral values also have bodily consequences: "Our weak unmanly social concepts of

good and evil and their tremendous ascendancy over body and soul have finally weakened all bodies and *souls* and snapped the self-reliant, independent, unprejudiced men, the pillars of a strong civilization.”⁹⁷

However, just as ideas, thoughts, and beliefs shape bodies, so the physical affects the mental or spiritual dimensions of the self. Hence Nietzsche’s thesis that “wherever a deep discontent with existence becomes prevalent, it is the after effects of some great dietary mistake made by a whole people over a long period of time.”⁹⁸ The way embodiment affects thought and values emerges again when he explains that changes in opinion derive from changes in taste, and that changes in taste occur when a few individuals succeed in imposing their tastes on others. But where do their tastes come from? From “some oddity of their life style, nutrition, or digestion, perhaps a deficit or excess of inorganic salts in their blood and brain; in brief, in their *physis*. They have the courage to side with their *physis* and to heed its demands down to the subtlest nuances.”⁹⁹

Given this intimate connection between embodiment and taste, values and ideals, a noble birth would seem essential to spiritual greatness not just for the life of leisure and freedom it affords but also for the inheritance of a strong and beautiful physique. However, it is possible to incorporate the importance of embodiment for nobility without buying into the aristocracy of birth model by attending to the ethic of care of the self¹⁰⁰ that can be retrieved from Nietzsche’s middle period. Reading Nietzsche as an advocate of care of the self can displace the centrality of birth for the attainment of nobility while still respecting the close entwining of body and spirit.

Care of the Self

Just as Nietzsche’s immersion in scientific thinking alerts him to the importance of small, unpretentious truths, and his practice as a psychologist attunes him to the significance of the subtlest nuances of the self, so one of his criticisms of contemporary life is that, officially at least, the small, daily practices of care of the self are undervalued. He detects in contemporary culture “a feigned disrespect for all the things which men in fact take most seriously, *for all the things closest to them*. One says, for example, ‘one eats only in order to live’—which is a damned *lie*.”¹⁰¹ People do and should care about these small, worldly matters and are forced into hypocrisy when pretending they are trivial. In so devaluing them, the Christian and post-Christian sensibility puts people at war with themselves and also forbids a close study of which forms of care of the self would be most conducive to individual flourishing: “The closest things,

for example eating, housing, clothing, social intercourse, are not made the object of constant impartial and *general* reflection and reform: because these things are accounted degrading, they are deprived of serious intellectual and artistic consideration; . . . our continual offences against the most elementary laws of the body and the spirit reduce us all, young and old, to a disgraceful dependence and bondage."¹⁰² This theme is pursued in the next passage "Earthly frailty and its chief cause" where Nietzsche asserts that:

most people see the *closest things of all* very badly and very rarely pay heed to them . . . *almost all the physical and psychical frailties* of the individual derive from this lack: not knowing what is beneficial to us and what harmful in the institution of our mode of life, in the division of the day, in for how long and with whom we enjoy social intercourse, in profession and leisure, commanding and obeying, feeling for art and nature, eating, sleeping and reflecting; being *unknowledgeable in the smallest and most everyday things* and failing to keep an eye on them—this it is that transforms the earth for so many into a "vale of tears."¹⁰³

That this is a persistent rather than a passing concern of the middle period writings is evidenced by the many passages in which Nietzsche promotes care of the self and bemoans people's ignorance about this¹⁰⁴, or criticizes society's general inattention to such questions. He claims that society lacks what he calls physicians of practical morals: "The churches are not yet in possession of the promoters of health; neither our lower nor our higher schools yet teach care of the body or dietary theory."¹⁰⁵ His injunction "Do not perish unnoticed" points to how enervating and corrosive of the spirit such neglect of what are labeled trifles can be: "Our greatness and efficiency crumbles away not *all at once* but continually; . . . the everyday, hourly pitiable-ness of our environment which we constantly overlook, the thousand tendrils of this or that little, fainthearted sensation which grows up out of our neighbourhood, out of our job, our social life, out of the way we divide up the day. If we neglect to notice this little weed, we shall ourselves perish of it unnoticed!"¹⁰⁶ The magnitude of small things is revisited in the passage "Slow cures" which attributes most "chronic sicknesses of the soul" and body to "countless little unheeded instances of neglect." Hence Nietzsche's prescription that "he who wishes to cure his soul must also consider making changes to the very pettiest of his habits."¹⁰⁷

While Nietzsche deplores the absence of teachers of this sort of practical morality, he also suggests that what they should teach is that general prescriptions about how to live well are useless. "Freedom of opinion is

like health: both are individual, from neither can a universally valid concept be set up."¹⁰⁸ A key aspect of Nietzsche's ethic of care of the self is that it must care for the self in its specificity. Individuals must discover what is most propitious to their particular well-being. The necessary specificity of health and well being is expressed forcefully in a passage reiterating the tight interaction between body and spirit:

"*Your* virtue is the health of *your* soul." For there is no health as such and all attempts to define a thing that way have been wretched failures. Even the determination of what is healthy for your *body* depends on your goal, your horizon, your energies, your impulses, your errors, and above all on the ideals and phantasms of your soul. Thus there are innumerable healths of the body; and the more we allow the unique and incomparable to raise its head again, and the more we abjure the dogma of the "equality of men", the more must the concept of a *normal* health, along with a normal diet and the normal course of illness, be abandoned by medical men.¹⁰⁹

Self-knowledge is obviously a precondition of proper care of the self, for an understanding of the self in its specificity is essential if it is to be cared for in a proper, individualized way. However, as the Nietzschean self is protean, both in its desires and drives and its transformation through self-overcoming, the quest for self-knowledge must be continuous. Thus it is probably more accurate to conceive of the two processes of knowing and caring for the self as concurrent, complementary projects.

Devaluing the body and its needs is partially a legacy of the Christian ethos which subordinates corporeal and quotidian matters to those of the eternal soul, just as it preaches concern for others and castigates egoism. This sort of self-neglect is now also powered by secular forces, with people being inveighed to devote themselves to work, science, the state, the pursuit of status, wealth, or knowledge to the utter detriment of "the requirements of the individual, his great and small needs within the twenty-four hours of the day."¹¹⁰ In all of these cases, individuals are encouraged to sacrifice concern with the self for the good of the whole. However, Christianity is not wholly responsible for this sacrificing of individual well-being: Nietzsche detects a trend toward such subordination of quotidian, material life in ancient Greece and identifies Socrates as one of his forerunners in criticizing "this arrogant neglect of the human for the benefit of the human race."¹¹¹

However old this struggle is, Nietzsche contends that the need for an ethic of care of the self is especially urgent in the modern era, where the tempo of life is so rapid and the accent on working is to the disadvantage of all other pursuits and pleasures. As the passage "Leisure and idleness"

indicates, even when people practice some care for the self, it is only to make themselves more efficient: "Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretence and overreaching and anticipating others. Virtue has come to consist of doing something in less time than someone else. Hours in which honesty is *permitted* have become rare, and when they arrive one is tired."¹¹²

Fortunately, however, just as the need to care for the self is becoming more urgent, so Nietzsche suggests that the erosion of large-scale moral schemas is making its practice more possible. In this context, it is interesting to note that his interpretation of most moral doctrines as a form of collective dominance cramping individuality extends to care of the self: "Originally all education and care of health, marriage, cure of sickness, agriculture, war, speech and silence, traffic with one another and with the gods belonged within the domain of morality: they demanded one observe prescriptions *without thinking of oneself* as an individual. Originally, therefore, everything was custom."¹¹³ As skepticism grows and the grip of custom and collective dominance weaken, the space for attention to the self in its uniqueness grows. However, as intimated in the reference to Socrates, there have always been critics of this subordination of the individual to the community and its concomitant neglect of the self and the marginalized tradition they represent can now flower as collective moral schemas wane. This brings to light another of genealogy's practical interests, for in eroding faith in moral doctrines, it also expands the space for an ethic of care of the self to develop.

A passage toward the end of D summarizes and states quite explicitly the centrality of an ethic of care of the self in Nietzsche's middle period. Drawing together several of the salient points of an ethic of care of the self—concern for quotidian minutiae, attention to individualized goods, and awareness of the close connection between psyche and physique—"By circuitous paths" asks:

Whither does this whole philosophy, with all its circuitous paths, want to go? Does it do more than translate as it were into reason a strong and constant drive, a drive for gentle sunlight, bright and buoyant air, southerly vegetation, the breath of the sea, fleeting meals of flesh, fruit and eggs, hot water to drink, daylong silent wanderings, little talking, infrequent and cautious reading, dwelling alone, clean, simple and almost soldierly habits, in short for all those things which taste best and are most endurable precisely to me? A philosophy which is at bottom the instinct for a personal diet? An instinct which seeks my own air, my own heights, my own kind of health and weather, by the circuitous path of my head?¹¹⁴

Tracing the lineaments of a Nietzschean ethic of care of the self in the works of the middle period shows not just what importance Nietzsche attributes to this ethic but also that attention to embodiment can be incorporated into his concern with aristocracy without recurring to an insistence on ancestry. No matter what lineage one inherits, neglecting the self and its small, everyday needs can enfeeble the body just as, conversely, practicing care of the self can ennoble it.

Care of the self is not, however, just a supplement or alternative to good inheritance; it is its precondition. The passage "Origin of the 'pessimists'" attributes good inheritance to well-nourished forebears and poor inheritance to hungry ones, suggesting that wealth and the care of the self it facilitates are the primary issues here rather than genes: "The culture of the Greeks is a culture of the wealthy, and of the wealthy from old moreover: for a couple of centuries they lived *better* than we (better in every sense, especially on much simpler food and drink): as a result their brains at length became at once so full and delicate, the blood flowed so rapidly through them like a joyful and sparkling wine, that the good and best things they could do emerged from them."¹¹⁵ In the sort of society Nietzsche seems to advocate in the middle period, where wealth is more widely and evenly distributed,¹¹⁶ care of the self becomes a possibility for people from a range of backgrounds, not just the wealthy. As he repeatedly suggests, the needs of spiritual aristocrats are modest, what matters is their sensitive administration and this requires time. Thus it seems that lack of leisure and knowledge of the appropriate ways of individuals caring for themselves, rather than absence of wealth or good birth, pose the real threats to greatness of spirit.

The Later Works

In contrast with the more meritocratic approach to greatness available in the works of the middle period, the later works accord birth a more central role in shaping human character, and Nietzsche regrets the demise of the older techniques of breeding élites that were discredited by Christianity.¹¹⁷ The belief that inheritance is a powerful determinant of an individual's achievement reflects not just the greater elitism of these works but also their increasing closure.¹¹⁸ Nietzsche now holds that if a great individual acts badly, this is a sign of declining life, making his claim about the importance of birth and lineage for greatness nonfalsifiable. Consider the discussion of the young man who "grows prematurely pale and faded." While his friends attribute his decline to illness, Nietzsche attributes his illness to decline: "*that* he became ill, *that* he failed to resist the

illness, was already the consequence of an impoverished life, an hereditary exhaustion."¹¹⁹ This is a circular approach to action and identity. Bad or degenerate action is a sign of declining life; it indicates that either one's inheritance was inferior to begin with or has become impoverished, while beautiful action is a function of a good, thriving inheritance. How uninformative an approach to identity and action this is becomes apparent when Nietzsche applies it reflexively, describing the illness that forced him to resign his professorship at Basel as "that *bad* inheritance from my father's side."¹²⁰ If higher types falter or fail, it must be due to something faulty in their inheritance.

This charge of unfalsifiability also applies to the later works' faith in instinct. It becomes impossible for a person with healthy instincts to act badly because base action signifies base or debased instincts. "The strong man [is] mighty in the instincts of a powerful health. . . he is led by a faultless and severe instinct into doing nothing that disagrees with him, just as he eats nothing he does not enjoy."¹²¹ The belief that a superior individual can do no wrong recurs in the claim that "even the *blunders* of life—the temporary sidepaths and wrong turnings, the delays, the 'modesties,' the seriousness squandered on tasks which lie outside *the* task—have their own meaning and value. They are an expression of a great sagacity, even the supreme sagacity."¹²² With the assurance that even the things that seem wrong or foolish are right, it becomes, contra Nietzsche's suggestion, easy to adopt the attitude of *amor fati*.¹²³ Yet nothing can be explained by this closed, circular, a priori approach to identity: "A being who is typically morbid cannot become healthy, still less can he make himself healthy; conversely, for one who is typically healthy being sick can even be an energetic *stimulant* to life, to more life."¹²⁴ Once again, the later Nietzsche is wise 'before the event'; the more open and critical inquiry of the middle period is replaced by a series of psychological claims which are made in the service of larger themes and cannot be disputed.

The later Nietzsche's faith in superior instincts and concern with breeding are related to his continuing insistence on the centrality of embodiment and condemnation of the "despisers of the body."¹²⁵ The works of the middle period, while sharing this awareness, allow that the body might be ennobled by sensitive care for the self. In the later works, this concession is eclipsed by Nietzsche's faith that correct breeding will get things right, which seems to entail that well-bred individuals, whose instincts can be relied upon, will automatically care properly for themselves. This is evident in his discussion of himself: "in combating my sick conditions I always instinctively choose the *right* means: while the *decadent* as such always chooses the means harmful to him." A little further on he

generalizes this to claim that the well turned out human being "has a taste only for what is beneficial to him; his pleasure, his joy ceases where the measure of what is beneficial is overstepped."¹²⁶

However, there is some evidence that the middle period's ethic of care of the self has only been eclipsed, rather than eradicated, in the later works. Nietzsche contends, for example, that Cornaro's régime of meagre consumption is not appropriate for all,¹²⁷ which is in keeping with this ethic's insistence upon individualized care. It is most obviously present as he draws attention to the importance of finding the nutrition, place, climate, and form of recreation most conducive to one's peculiar well-being.¹²⁸ Here Nietzsche restates the middle period's insistence that "all these little things which according to the traditional judgement are matters of indifference" are of paramount importance. Thus "it is precisely here that one has to begin to *learn anew*."¹²⁹ However, those who look to Nietzsche for some articulation of the ethic of care of the self must go to the works of the middle period to find its fullest elaboration.¹³⁰

In the later works, Nietzsche continues to hope that a new élite will develop, one that will create new values to save European culture from its descent into absolute nihilism.¹³¹ However, concomitant with his changed attitude toward science, these works do not see this new élite as comprising men of science. On the contrary, the lure of science poses a threat to the full development of these free spirits.¹³² The middle period's historical narrative which privileges scientific learning is, moreover, obscured in the later works by one which, while identifying some of the same historical peaks and troughs, employs a different criterion of identification. According to the later schema, antiquity, the Renaissance, and seventeenth-century France all represent highpoints which were defeated by Christianity, the Reformation, and the French Revolution, respectively.¹³³ However, an epoch now qualifies as a peak or trough of history according to the presence of the classical spirit rather than the state of scientific learning. Compare the middle period's praise of the Renaissance for its liberation of thought, victory of education, enthusiasm for science, passion for truthfulness, and aversion to appearance¹³⁴ with the later claim that the Renaissance "so prodigal and so fateful, appears as the last *great* age, and we, we moderns with our . . . virtues of work, of unpretentiousness, of fair play, of scientificity [*Wissenschaftlichkeit*] . . . appear as a *weak* age."¹³⁵ The most recent manifestation of the classical spirit has been Napoleon; thanks to him "we now confront a succession of a few warlike centuries that have no parallel in history."¹³⁶

The traditional aristocratic motifs of *bellum* and *otium* persist in the later works. Nietzsche continues to mobilize martial metaphors to discuss the agonistic struggle of ideas, ideals, and values.¹³⁷ His criticism of

the speed of modern life and insistence on the importance of leisure appear in the later works. However, while he continues to criticize the ignobility of industrial society because of its emphasis on relentless industry and activity,¹³⁸ his growing elitism is evident in the suggestion that the constant mechanical work demanded by industrial society is a way of alleviating the suffering of the many. For the majority of inferior types, continuous labor is a blessing because the routine of work dulls the pain that necessarily attends their inferiority.¹³⁹ Furthermore, Nietzsche's argument about the higher type's need for leisure acquires a new dimension in the later works; free time is now needed to read and understand his writings.¹⁴⁰



One Cannot Be Too Kind about Women

If in the works of the middle period Nietzsche does envisage and seek to catalyze the formation of a new intellectual élite, if there is room for a more meritocratic approach to this élite, and if he takes a less deterministic approach to birth than usual, the question arises whether women can form part of this élite. Can females acquire the virtues of spirit and intellect necessary for free spirithood? Nietzsche's views on women are often read in a way that can be considered neo-Aristotelian, casting women in an inherently inferior role to men and as incapable of the higher goods. However, another reading is available in the works of the middle period which brings Nietzsche closer to Plato (in *The Republic*, at least) on the question of gender, for he seems to allow that some women can become part of the truth-seeking élite he envisages and seeks to mobilize.

Contrary to the common classification of Nietzsche as a misogynist, the works of the middle period do not entirely denigrate or dismiss women. Consistent with the greater openness and other qualities of the middle period writings that have been noted throughout this work, Nietzsche's views on women were at this time more nuanced and less vitriolic than they became.¹ The works of the middle period repeatedly measure

women by the values constitutive of free spirithood, such as autonomy, intellectual strength, desire and ability to pursue the sort of scientific knowledge Nietzsche prizes so dearly, capacity for cruelty, and the skills of dialogue. This suggests that women can be considered as candidates for free spirithood, even if Nietzsche assumes that most females, like most males, fail to meet its requirements. Thus the typical depiction of Nietzsche as antifeminist is not entirely accurate, illustrating again the error of using the term 'Nietzsche' as if it stood for a single thing or unchanging position.

Although it does not automatically absolve him from misogyny, Nietzsche identifies and tries to explain hatred of women. The passage "Misogynists" contends that demonizing women is born of "an immoderate drive which hates not only itself but its means of satisfaction as well."² Men who proclaim hatred of women are actually overwhelmed with desire for them but detest the desire and the women who inspire it. Misogyny thus projects self-loathing and the middle period's accent on the nobility of self-love as well as its praise of moderation makes such a drive the preserve of lower beings. This echoes an earlier depiction of men who eschew women because they desire them but flagellate themselves for this desire.³ Moreover, Nietzsche calls Aeschylus an "ancient misogynist" with no hint that this is a term of endearment.⁴

An obvious and sometimes warranted complaint about Nietzsche's depiction of women is the essentialist way in which he presents them, denying females the possibility of self-making enjoyed by (some) men and so celebrated by Nietzsche.⁵ However, in his middle period, Nietzsche's attitude toward women, whether they have an essence and what this comprises, shifts, so that he cannot be charged with simply perpetuating traditional essentialism. Sometimes he does reproduce this, imputing characteristics such as sentiment, embodiedness, intuition, and reverence for tradition to women and making these inferior to male traits like reason, mind, calculation, prescience, and courage for change. At other times, he essentializes the genders but reverses the hierarchy, so that typically female characteristics are valorized; at yet others, he imputes different essential characteristics to women and men but continues to hold male ones superior. There are also occasions when Nietzsche rejects essentialism, adopting an historicist and aesthetic approach to identity—both male and female.

However, when Nietzsche does hypostatize identity, women are not his only targets. That whole slice of humanity constituting the class of fettered spirits is also sometimes essentialized and denied the capacity for change and self-overcoming. Thus, while Nietzsche might essentialize women, the majority of men are also sometimes treated in this way, indi-

cating that essentialism is not tied exclusively to women. But, as indicated, Nietzsche does not always essentialize all women. The works of the middle period sometimes allow that women have become what they are via historical rather than ontological forces and that this can be changed. Nietzsche's essentializing gestures are not, therefore, directed only at, nor at all, women. Rather, the middle period sometimes treats women in the same way as men—the superior are distinguished from the inferior, and this latter group tends to be hypostatized. Thus the key issue in his depiction of women is not whether there are essentialist accounts of them but whether the goods Nietzsche values are within women's reach. Can some women become part of the new 'aristocracy of spirit' he imagines and champions? Or does his description of the Enlightenment as "the progressive masculinization of man"⁶ betray the gendered nature of this vision?

In the middle period, Nietzsche's interest in gender is most obvious in, but not confined to, HH's brief seventh book of "Woman and Child." A potpourri, this book typifies the conflicting perspectives on gender that pervade this period. Its opening aphorism depicts "the perfect woman" as "a higher type of human being than the perfect man: also something much rarer."⁷ To the concession that there can be higher types of women, Nietzsche adds that their struggle for ascendancy is greater than men's, and the "natural science of animals" is invoked to demonstrate "the truth of this proposition." This could suggest an essentialist position were it not for the fact that naturalism pervades Nietzsche's genealogical perspective. His belief that many human characteristics are shared with, and have evolved from, the animal world suggests that he is not singling out, let alone demeaning, women in making this sort of claim. However, a different sort of explanation of the difficulties women face in becoming higher beings that does not recur to nature can be reconstructed from the middle period's various remarks about women. And on the basis of the reconstruction essayed here, the typical charge that women are innately ineligible for the Nietzschean higher life demands qualification.

This seemingly obvious distinction between superior and inferior manifestations of a thing, which also operates in Nietzsche's discussions of friendship and pity, is vital for understanding his views on the issues surrounding gender. Failure to grasp this difference generates the sort of misunderstandings that plague so much commentary in this domain. The opening aphorism about superior women and their rarity indicates that even when the middle period criticizes women unmodified, not all women are thereby condemned but only those that fail to meet Nietzsche's delineation of the higher form. And this is to be expected of one

who makes such discriminations in every other aspect of life. Indeed, were Nietzsche not to apply such tests to gender questions but exempt them from the critical scrutiny cast across everything else, this would be his real criticism of women, not the fact that some or many do not meet his standards. This puts another spin on his dictum that "one cannot be too kind about women"⁸ for being too kind would patronize, shielding women from the standards by which all else is measured.

Becoming a Woman

Some clue as to why superior women are fewer than men comes in the next aphorism devoted to women *qua* women, rather than as partners or parents. The passage "Error of noble women" suggests that overrefinement and delicacy hamper their quest for truth, leading them to "think that a thing does not exist if it is not possible to speak about it in company."⁹ While all nobles were constrained by rules about acceptable conversation matter, Nietzsche suggests that women were more limited by this than were men. This points to a social constraint on women's pursuit of fuller knowledge, which is a central facet of Nietzsche's higher human being. Women's constriction by society is evident in the next aphorism to address them *qua* women. "Boredom" argues that women are most likely to suffer this, having "never learned to work properly."¹⁰ Again, there is no suggestion that incompetence or indolence are intrinsic to the female nature; instead, society discourages women's industry, subjecting them to easy boredom. A similar idea emerges in the warning against "clever women . . . whom fate has confined to a petty, dull environment, and who grow old there."¹¹ That women's characters are formed by their circumstances rather than anatomy or some eternal feminine spirit is also apparent in the discussion of why some women, along with some men, need art to "scare away their discontent, boredom and uneasy conscience."¹² The sorts of people who need the distraction of art are those unfulfilled by their daily lives, such as "the girl who does not know how to create for herself a satisfying circle of duties" and "the woman who has tied herself to a frivolous or mischievous marriage and knows she is not tied to it tightly enough."¹³

Nietzsche's attention to the power of circumstances to shape women's personalities reappears when the passage "Echoes of primal conditions in speech" claims that women "speak like creatures who have for millennia sat at the loom, or plied the needle, or been childish with children."¹⁴ Yet there is no suggestion that women's only home is the domestic realm. Moreover, the passage begins by analyzing male speech, explaining this as

a relic of past, more martial eras, so that modern men wield ideas with the aggression of weapons. The tacit critique of their conversational style illustrates that while fond of military metaphors in portraying intellectual activity, Nietzsche does not ipso facto endorse an assertive, combative approach to conversation. Typically female passivity and typically male pugnacity are both chastised, but attributing them to mutable social functions implies that both can be overcome.

That this passive mode of speaking is typically but not ineluctably female becomes apparent in Nietzsche's discussion of the adverse impression "intelligent women" make when they speak in public. Public speaking robs such a woman of "all intellectual amiability and throws a harsh light only on her conscious concern with herself, her tactics and her objective of a public victory."¹⁵ However, what underpins this critique is not an attack on the very idea of women exercising a public voice but Nietzsche's conversational ideal. This holds that "the dialogue is the perfect conversation, because everything one of the parties says acquires its particular colour, its sound, its accompanying gestures *strictly with reference to the other* to whom he is speaking. . . . In a dialogue there is only a single refraction of the thought: this is produced by the partner in the dialogue, as the mirror in which we desire to see our thoughts reflected as perfectly as possible."¹⁶ Nietzsche contends that when several people converse this harmony, subtlety and sensitivity are lost. Whether women or men, the interlocutors become bellicose and shrill. When addressing a public gathering, all individuals become assertive and indifferent to the other: "This is what I am, this is what I say, you can make of it what you will!" Only when the conversation returns to a tête-à-tête does it become "one of the pleasantest things in the world"¹⁷ and only in such intimacy can the charm and intelligence of another, man or woman, be known.

Similar criticism of conversational style appears when Nietzsche complains that people do not know how to participate in or benefit from conversation. They are too preoccupied with their own position to really engage with their interlocutor and too concerned with "what they themselves intend to say in response" to really attend to what the other is saying. Hence Nietzsche's claim that "in the normal conversation each thinks he is leading the way, as if two ships sailing side by side and now and then gently bumping into one another each faithfully believed the neighbouring ship was following or even being pulled along by it." This usual behavior contrasts markedly with Nietzsche's depiction of the possible benefits of conversation: "The true *listener* often contents himself with a brief answer, plus a little for politeness' sake, by way of *speech*, while . . . bearing away in his retentive memory all the other has said."¹⁸ In fact, although it is a little-noted feature of his thought, Nietzsche's interest in

the norms and dynamics of conversation is evident throughout the middle period.¹⁹ However, nothing suggests that the virtues of the good conversationalist are gender specific; they are androgynous in the sense that either gender can acquire and practice them.

Not only does Nietzsche sometimes present women's condition as socially rather than biologically conditioned but on occasion he accords women agency in this. Rather than their role being shaped entirely by men, "A judgement of Hesiod's confirmed" argues that women have contrived a life free of labor for themselves. Their shrewdness has led to social arrangements making men responsible for them. Reversing essentialism, it suspects that women carved out a niche for themselves rearing children so as to avoid "work as much as possible."²⁰ The passage's general point is that "women have known how through subordination to secure for themselves the preponderant advantage, even indeed the dominion"—although Nietzsche does concede that vanity is one of the reasons why men yielded to "this female shrewdness," so women are not the only ones being chided here. The claim that women willfully turn weakness to their advantage is reiterated in the assertion that "all women are subtle in exaggerating their weaknesses. . . . Thus they defend themselves against the strong and 'the law of the jungle.'"²¹ Combining these passages suggests that vanity is a male domain, for its key characteristic is self-aggrandizement in order to impress or intimidate another, whereas exaggerating one's weakness in order to be protected and cared for does the opposite.

While Nietzsche's claims about women's contrived dependence might be empirically ungrounded and oblivious to the many sites of women's labor, and while its overt devaluation of housekeeping and child-rearing betokens a bias in favor of waged or public labor, its rejection of essentialism is unmistakable. And its attribution of agency to women in shaping their situation, even though this is deemed a Pyrrhic victory, presents them as actors rather than ornaments in social life. That Nietzsche thinks that women's achievement of dependency on men is an artificial victory is evident from "The parasite"'s contention that "it indicates a complete lack of nobility of disposition when someone prefers to live in dependency, at the expense of others, merely so as not to have to work and usually with a secret animosity towards those he is dependent on. Such a disposition is much more frequent among women than among men, also much more excusable (for historical reasons)."²² While reaching similar conclusions to the Hesiod passage, this section offers them more sympathetically and does not attribute this outcome to feminine wile. The historical factors explaining it are left unspecified—although it could be that cunning is the cause that is not elaborated until the later Hesiod pas-

sage. But the fact that the cause lies in history indicates that Nietzsche does not see the outcome as irrevocable. A further feature of this argument is the way it assesses women's position by the criterion of autonomy which is central to the Nietzschean notion of nobility. He values autonomy in thought, action, and care of the self, for "to satisfy one's necessary requirements as completely as possible oneself, even if imperfectly, is the road *to freedom of spirit and person*. To let others satisfy many of one's requirements, even superfluous ones . . . is a training in *unfreedom*."²³ This again suggests some gender-neutrality in application (if not constitution) of the virtues advocated by the middle period, for if independence were a male prerogative, women's lack would be unnoteworthy or insurmountable.

This issue of female agency is further debated in the section on "Will and willingness" where a sage says that women do not corrupt but are corrupted by men—man wills and woman responds willingly.²⁴ Women's ductility leads him to wonder "Who could have oil and kindness enough for them?" However, the next passage "Capacity for revenge" implicitly rebuts this, claiming that woman could not enthrall men if they were so malleable, willing, and will-less. To really intrigue, women must be capable of revenge and cruelty—toward others or themselves.²⁵ This further suggests that women have the potential to realize higher values for, as the analysis of pity shows, the ability to act cruelly and eschew pity is sometimes valued by Nietzsche. More evidence that women can realize some of the same virtues as men comes in one of Nietzsche's discussions of the power of ruling and being ruled in turn. Although this capacity has traditionally been seen as a male virtue, Nietzsche allows it to be gender neutral: "That in which men and women of the nobility excel others and which gives them an undoubted right to be rated higher consists in two arts ever more enhanced through inheritance: the art of commanding and the art of proud obedience."²⁶ This stands in marked contrast to the traditional essentialist view, which Nietzsche sometimes espouses, that the excellence of male virtue is to command and female to obey.

Women's Knowledge

That females are contained by social conditioning rather than inherent limitations is also illustrated in Nietzsche's reflection on girls' education. He advocates that they not go to grammar school, not because they are unequal to it but because this would subject them to a procrustean training. Unschooled girls are "spirited, knowledge-thirsty, passionate young people," and Nietzsche fears that giving them a conventional education

would sap their spirit and strength, reducing them to “images of their teachers!”²⁷ That fact that Nietzsche lays it down as “the supreme principle of all education that one should offer food only to him *who hungers for it!*”²⁸ further suggests that the quality of the education, rather than its female consumers, is deficient here. That he is not critical of females being educated is again evident when he notes that “with us all higher education was for a long time introduced to women only through love-affairs and marriage”²⁹ without advocating a return to this mode of female education. These reflections on female education further support the argument that the middle period sees Nietzsche thinking about the possibility of some women becoming part of his intellectual aristocracy.³⁰

This description of unschooled girls longing for knowledge seems, however, to clash with that shortly after of the female aversion to disengaged, impartial knowledge. Preferring to personalize issues and things, women are ill-suited to pursuits like politics or sciences like history. Rare is she who really knows what science is, and even then she is likely to harbor “a secret contempt for it.”³¹ Indeed, women’s hostility to the scientific approach to knowledge recurs throughout these writings, and in this they resemble youths, artists, and the religious—all criticized in Nietzsche’s middle period.³² And because the middle period so lauds science’s free and impartial pursuit of truth, women’s constitutional incapacity for it would be a serious obstacle in their ascent to free spiritdom.³³

However, Nietzsche’s depiction of knowledge-thirsty girls suggests that women’s incapacity for science is not inborn but caused by their education, which is consonant with his other suggestions about social conditioning. Two further considerations prevent the passage in “On the emancipation of women”³⁴ from mounting a determinist reading of women as inherently inferior to men when it comes to a pursuit Nietzsche values. The first is its implication that women, or at least those in a position to, freely reject the scientific approach to knowledge, feeling superior to it. (This is later undercut though when women’s dislike of science is attributed to a mixture of “envy and sentimentality”³⁵ for Nietzsche usually attributes envy to incapacity and inferiority.) The second point that frees this position from determinism, and which is presumably a corollary of the idea of choice, is the concession that this might not be permanent: “Perhaps all this may change.”³⁶

The next passage, “Inspiration in female judgement,”³⁷ picks up on this point about women forming quick and partial assessments. Instead of going on to criticize them, it attacks the men who praise female perspicacity and intuition. Even then though, Nietzsche’s criticism stems not from the fact that women are wrong to think like this; rather the error lies in taking this to be the sole or highest form of knowledge. Because any-

thing can be approached from several perspectives, such rapid judgments are bound to contain some truth but only some, so women's knowledge should know itself to be partial in both senses of the term. Thus, what begins as an apparent condemnation of a typically female approach to knowledge ends as a qualified endorsement of it by becoming a statement about perspectivism. Compare the section on "The female intellect" which explains the admiration men have for women's temperament. While this argument essentializes men as well as women, it reverses the traditional view of men as intrinsically cool and detached reasoners, for it is the female intellect that has "complete control and presence of mind and the utilization of every advantage. . . . women possess reason, men temperament and passion."³⁸ However, the male intellect is still deemed superior, for men's profound and powerful impulses are said to drive their reason, allowing them to exploit it more effectively.

Continuing his analysis of the female intellect, Nietzsche portrays women as able to accommodate "tendencies that logically contradict one another."³⁹ Although their failure to synthesize their various ideas and acknowledge any contradictions is chastized, when read after the endorsement of perspectivism, the capacity to entertain conflicting ideas becomes a strength.⁴⁰ Yet in AOM, Nietzsche suggests that women cannot manage contradiction for "reverence on ten points and silent disapprobation on ten others seems to them impossible at the same time, because they possess wholesale souls."⁴¹ However, he suggests that this tendency to adopt ideas wholesale is a function of a lack of training in scientific thinking. The idea that women are destined to think in this way is challenged by the recommendation that while everyone should be trained in at least one science, women in particular must be tutored in rigorous thinking because "they are at present the helpless victims of every hypothesis that appears."⁴² By contrast, the passage entitled "Disgust at truth" declares that "Women are so constituted" that they loathe the truth and resent attempts to impose it on them.⁴³ While the forces so constituting women are not spelled out, this does gesture toward an essentialist notion of female nature. However, as part of a litany of sins against the truth, Nietzsche denounces talking "of compliments to women who are later to become mothers and not of the truth,"⁴⁴ implying that women are insufficiently exposed to truth. This could explain how they come to abhor it, again intimating criticism of their education and socialization rather than intrinsic nature, for were women inherently unequal to the truth, their insulation from it could not be condemned.⁴⁵

What these conflicting views on how women think and how mutable this is ultimately suggest is that when it comes to the depiction of women's way of knowing, Nietzsche's text is itself "a woman's head,"⁴⁶ for myriad

contradictory ideas coexist there and little attempt is made to purge tensions and paradoxes.

The possibility that women's way of knowing is socially constructed rather than an intrinsic part of their gender and that the current limitations on their modes of thinking can be overcome is developed in "Storm-and-stress period of women." In this passage, Nietzsche predicts that "in the three of four civilized countries of Europe women can through a few centuries of education be made into anything, even into men: not in the sexual sense, to be sure, but in every other sense. Under such a regimen they will one day have acquired all the male strengths and virtues, though they will also of course have had to accept all their weaknesses and vices into the bargain."⁴⁷ Not only does this furnish further evidence of the middle period's historicist readings of gender, but it indicates female potential for spiritual aristocracy, for an important component of this is intellectual strength and daring. This passage depicts a struggle within women between their "primeval properties" and their "newly learned and acquired" ones, but allows that the latter may triumph. Although it goes on to lament "the intermediate stage" when this struggle plays itself out and women's involvement in social affairs increases babble in philosophy, partisanship in politics, and dilettantism in the arts,⁴⁸ interregnum is a leitmotif of the middle period. This is closely connected with Nietzsche's views on the history and future of scientific thinking, so this picture of present uncertainty and confusion is consistent with his wider view rather than being a swingeing critique of women. This image of women acquiring male traits and acknowledgment that if women are educated they will lose their power base "in morality and custom"⁴⁹ further suggests that Nietzsche's portrayal of them as "custodians of the ancient"⁵⁰ does not capture the insuperable female self. Thus, although Nietzsche typically portrays science with traditionally masculine imagery, this does not mean that he relegates its pursuit to men only.

Appearances and Deception

Further criticism of women's approach to knowledge comes in the passage "Employment of novelties" where Nietzsche claims that women use new knowledge to adorn themselves: they do not value learning in itself, but only in so far as it ornaments them. While men also have an instrumental view of knowledge, they use it for practical rather than aesthetic ends: "as a ploughshare, perhaps also as a weapon."⁵¹ However this impression of women as preoccupied with, if not exhausted by, appearance and embellishment does not dominate the middle period. The ob-

servation that, "generally speaking, the more beautiful a woman is the more modest she is"⁵² seems to be made without irony and suggests that most physically beautiful women do not exploit this power. Women who beautify themselves to attract a husband are dismissed as refined courtesans.⁵³ The idea that woman's highest virtue is beauty is rejected when Nietzsche dismisses "the beautiful face of a mindless woman" as "mask-like" and worth little.⁵⁴ This idea returns in Book Seven, where obsession with appearance makes some women all surface and no substance, "almost spectral, necessarily unsatisfied beings."⁵⁵ While Nietzsche can appreciate the appeal of such women because the search for their soul is endless, the men desiring them earn his commiseration.⁵⁶

A related point about women and appearance is made as part of a Nietzsche's wider argument about the way dress reveals something about the sort of identity one wishes to project. As the spread of modernity and Europeanization replaces national costume with fashionable clothes, the male fashion statement differs from the female. The clothes of fashionable men signify not only that they have transcended the parochialism of national dress and sentiment, but that they are hardworking, practical, and aspire to "the more learned and intellectual callings." Fashionable women's clothes send different signals. Although they too have transcended national costume, they are attracted to clothes that mark them as members of a certain class (irrespective of whether they are or just aspire to be) and of a certain generation. "Above all . . . the young woman refuses to wear anything the older woman wears, because she believes her value will fall if she is thought to be older than she is: the older woman, conversely, would like to deceive as long as she can through more youthful looking costume."⁵⁷ However, Nietzsche predicts that this desire to appear youthful will wane as women mature: "The *more* women grow inwardly, however, and cease among themselves to give precedence to the immature as they have done hitherto, the smaller these variations in their costume and the simpler their adornment will become."⁵⁸

However, much separates this anticipation of women's inward maturation from Nietzsche's portrait of "The female mind in contemporary society" where women present themselves to attract men on the assumption that intelligence deters suitors. Sensuality is accentuated and intellect downplayed.⁵⁹ Women who downplay their intellect are simply trying to fashion themselves as the sort of women they think men want. So as well as being a criticism of women, this passage prefigures the sage's claim in GS that "it is man who creates for himself the image of woman, and woman forms herself according to this image."⁶⁰ In fact, the aphorism "Danger in beauty" suggests that Nietzsche is critical of the belief that beauty can be a substitute for intellect: "This woman is beautiful and

clever [*klug*], but how much cleverer she would have become if she were not beautiful!"⁶¹ If prizing women's beauty to the detriment of their intellectual development were acceptable or natural, beauty would pose women no danger.

A Woman's Head

My argument that the works of Nietzsche's middle period offer a non-essentialist, sympathetic reading of the female condition captures only one of their dimensions, for there are passages to support the claim that women are *untermenschen* for Nietzsche, even in this period. The credibility of my claim that he holds the highest virtues to be accessible to some women is threatened by passages pointing to the impossibility of female free spirits. "Disharmony of concords" exemplifies this with its assertion that "women want to serve and in that they discover their happiness: and the free spirit wants not to be served and in that he discovers his happiness."⁶² That the categories of women and free spirits are mutually exclusive is echoed in his observation that women "attach themselves . . . to the wheels of a free-spirited, independent endeavour as a brake on them."⁶³ This belief that consorting with women imperils the free spirit is reiterated in "Pleasing adversary"'s claim that

The natural tendency of women towards a quiet, calm, happy, harmonious existence, the way they pour soothing oil on the sea of life, unwittingly works against the heroic impulse in the heart of the free spirit. Without realizing it, women behave as one would do who removed the stones from the path of the wandering mineralogist so that his foot should not strike against them—whereas he has gone forth so that his foot *shall* strike against them.⁶⁴

However, this supposedly natural female tendency toward happiness and contentment is elsewhere attributed to "women who lack a soul-fulfilling occupation"⁶⁵ and thus connects with the earlier point about society discouraging female occupation and self-development. Moreover, Nietzsche later dismisses this image of women as harmonious, peace-loving, and soothing as idealized, for "even on the most beautiful sailboat there is a lot of noise, and unfortunately much small and petty noise."⁶⁶ This leaves unclear exactly what, if any, is "woman's natural tendency."⁶⁷

Nietzsche's vacillation over the possibility of female admission to free spiritdom is captured in microcosm in "Women who master the masters." Describing the way voices in the theater can evoke new possibilities, he

writes that: "All at once we believe that somewhere in the world there could be women with lofty, heroic, and royal souls, capable of and ready for grandiose responses, resolutions, and sacrifices, capable of and ready for rule over men because in them the best elements of man apart from his sex have become an incarnate ideal."⁶⁸ However, the passage ends by undermining the possibility it so vividly scripts, so that what it gives to the cause of female nobility with one hand, it takes away with the other. Its attunement to voice is, however, echoed in "Laughter as treason" which claims that how and when a woman laughs discloses her culture, while the sound of her laugh betrays her nature. In highly refined women, laughter may reveal "the last inextinguishable remnants of her nature."⁶⁹ That women are here singled out for vocal analysis picks up two of the above points—their tendency to be more heavily socialized than men and, related to this, that their appearance need not be a window to their soul.

One certain thing to come out of this survey of the middle period's views on women is just what a *mélange* of rival ideas it represents. Laying out Nietzsche's different views might create some sense of where their burden lies or it could be that in the final analysis no resolution nor even summation of his position is possible. However, even if the latter holds, the mere recognition of their contradictory nature, of just what "a woman's head" his ideas on gender are, is a gain, for when read literally, Nietzsche is too readily dismissed as a misogynist. As per the above passage on perspectivism, while such a "womanly," quick and partial assessment of his work might convey some of the truth, it is only some.

There are times in the middle period when Nietzsche does gesture toward an essentialist reading of women, but this is always complicated by other factors and should not be extracted from his writing as expressing his definitive position. At times he advances an historicist reading of women's condition, making their situation and characteristics mutable. He often accords women a degree of agency even if he does not always approve of the way women have exercised this. Although Nietzsche judges women by the standards men are measured by and finds most wanting, he sometimes allows some women to be candidates for free spirithood. Elite men and women are able to attain the higher virtues even though they have hitherto been the province of one gender, be it the heroic virtues or those of politeness, grace, and good conversation.

The Salomé Factor

One factor that has been advanced in connection with Nietzsche's shifting views on women is his relationship with Lou Salomé.⁷⁰ It has been

claimed that during his friendship with Salomé, Nietzsche was much more receptive to women's possibilities and their potential for greatness. However, when their relationship is made the independent variable in Nietzsche's attitude toward women, it becomes impossible to account for the many positive references to women in the works preceding their meeting—HH, AOM, WS, and D. This approach also undervalues the impact of other women on Nietzsche's thinking about what females can aspire to. Women he admired such as Ida Overbeck and Malwida von Meysenbug probably also shaped his perceptions on this question. Conversely, while it may be that Nietzsche's schism with Salomé so embittered him that he became more thoroughly vituperative toward women, an explanation for the insulting and demeaning things he wrote about women before the rupture still needs to be found. However such an explanation might also account for those written after.

The Later Works

In contrast to the middle period's concessions that elite men and women can aspire to a range of common virtues, the later works repeatedly rank women according to different criteria from men. Free spirithood is attainable only by some men, and Nietzsche offers a cluster of different qualities to which an élite of women can aspire. These include cleverness, modesty, taste, fear of man and God:⁷¹ indeed, feminine virtue can be defined in opposition to masculine virtue. Concomitant with this is the fact that the later works contain a much more consistent account of the essential or eternal feminine than do the middle period works, and this essence represents a standard of excellence that individual women can aspire or fail to meet. It is therefore essence in the evaluative rather than the explanatory sense; it is not an essence in the sense that all women embody these characteristics; rather it represents the paradigmatic virtues and characteristics that Nietzsche thinks superior women should exemplify.

However, Nietzsche's fear that women acquiring the masculine virtues will dilute these strengths in men⁷² indicates that neither masculine nor feminine virtues exist in a fixed relationship of opposition. Therefore, instead of seeing the later Nietzsche's views on gender difference as simply the depiction of gendered essences, it makes more sense to relate his insistence upon gender difference and disdain for the prospect of women moving into traditional male domains to his agonism. When society is viewed as a theater of contest, difference becomes vital to the contest being sustained; if everyone were the same, there would be nothing to com-

pete with or about. Agonism is, for example, unthinkable among the last men of Z's prologue. Gender provides a major source of difference in society. If women become more like men, the increase in conformity, uniformity, and similarity this will bring must threaten that fecund diversity Nietzsche so values, and the future of the social agon would thus be imperiled. This agonistic perspective on the virtues of gender difference emerges when he decries the masculinization of women:

To lose her sense for the ground on which she is most sure of victory; to neglect to practise the use of her own proper weapons; to let herself go before the man . . . where formerly she kept herself in check and in subtle cunning humility; to seek with virtuous assurance to destroy man's belief that a fundamentally different ideal is *wrapped up* in woman . . . what does all this mean if not a crumbling of the feminine instinct, a defeminizing?⁷³

Masculine virtue is, moreover, associated with martial qualities, and without struggle or adversaries, this virtue has less to thrive on and must diminish. As Zarathustra says, "this is how I would have man and woman: the one fit for war, the other fit for bearing children, but both fit for dancing with head and heels."⁷⁴ This agonistic outlook could also help to explain why the later Nietzsche contends that women had more real power before the push for their emancipation, for their power derived from their difference from men. Hence his argument, in stark contrast to the position of the middle period, that women should not be educated, for "the world's most powerful and influential women (most recently the mother of Napoleon) owed their power and ascendancy over men precisely to the force of their will—and not to schoolmasters!"⁷⁵ It comes as no surprise, therefore, that in his later works Nietzsche is seriously disturbed by the rise of feminism, seeing it as both a symptom and a source of socio-cultural decline and decay. Like pity, the term feminism becomes a shorthand for all the forces of decadence besetting modern Europe,⁷⁶ and, as with all campaigns for equality, Nietzsche sees the push for female equality as driven by the *ressentiment* and self-interest of the inferior.⁷⁷

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The Soul-Friendship of Two People of Differing Sex

Nietzsche presents himself as resurrecting the Greek habit of reflecting on friendship, yet the Greeks celebrated male friendship and accorded a lower value to marriage and male-female relations generally. Characterizing the culture of the classical era as masculine, Nietzsche draws attention to Greek men's relative indifference and instrumental attitude toward women: "Less [regard] was paid to commerce with woman: considerations of child-begetting and sensual pleasure—that was all that counted here; there was no spiritual commerce, not even an actual love-affair."¹ In the passage "Friendship," he draws attention to the modern reversal of this, whereby sexual love is valued over same-sex friendship. He wonders if "our trees fail to grow as high on account of the ivy and the vines that cling to them."² These remarks could suggest that Nietzsche perpetuates the antique approach to friendship and gender relations.³ Yet there are times in the works of the middle period when he departs from the Greeks by accepting that higher friendship is possible between the genders and, more generally, by holding love and marriage in very high esteem. Indeed, sometimes he even models marriage on friendship. He does say some damning things about love and marriage, but as with his views on women, his critical comments must be considered along

with his more positive ones for a clearer, albeit more complex, appreciation of his stance to emerge.

Examining the variety of the middle period's views on love and marriage and unearthing Nietzsche's many positive reflections on gender relations also challenges the belief that he rules out the possibility of positive relations between men and women.⁴ Such assessments prove to be too one-sided to do justice to the works of Nietzsche's middle period on the question of love and marriage.

Love and Egoism

Characteristic of his practice as a genealogist of morals, Nietzsche presents a brief history of romantic love and concludes that the forgotten origins of this idolized emotion lie in women's quest for power: romance was "an invention of their shrewdness" to exercise power over men.⁵ However, he sees this victory as Pyrrhic, for women are now more ensnared in and beguiled by love than men are, and he believes that more intelligent, imaginative women are bound to realize and suffer from this deception. From this it could be inferred that Nietzsche's many disabusing remarks about romantic love are addressed to women as well as men.

Just as "the idolization of love"⁶ began as a way for women to exercise power over men, Nietzsche maintains that many marriages are still driven by women's need, illusion, ambition, vanity, or some combination of these forces. Marriage allows some women to realize their "Sacrificial disposition,"⁷ and wives of famous men can do this on a grand scale by enduring the anger that should be directed at their husbands and becoming public scapegoats.⁸ Yet this sort of martyrdom satisfies some women's "ambition"; it is not born of altruism. Instead, a woman fulfils some function for her husband to meet her own needs, rather than through egoless love.⁹ Similarly, some women feed their interest in glory via their spouses.¹⁰ While these comments could smack of misogyny, they also show Nietzsche acknowledging that women have such drives to power and share some of men's appetites but are prevented by social constraints from directing them as men do.

Women are not, moreover, alone in using marriage as an instrument for their own purposes, as "Marriage with stability" shows: "A marriage in which each of the parties seeks to achieve an individual goal through the other will stand up well: for example when the wife seeks to become famous through the husband, the husband liked through the wife."¹¹ Such motives are only culpable from a standpoint where egoism and utility are deemed base, the sort of position Nietzsche describes when he

observes that “engaged people who have been brought together by convenience often strive to *become* loved, so as to do away with the reproach of acting out of cold, calculating utility.”¹² However, his genealogies reveal such reputedly base, all too human motives to underpin many social values, practices, and institutions. Rather than condemning marriages forged from utility, interest, or calculation, he seems more interested in viewing them honestly, without the gloss of altruism or romance. One of his general remarks on love bears this out: “This one is hollow and wants to be full, that one is overfull and wants to be emptied—both go in search of an individual who will serve their purpose. And this process, understood in its highest sense, is in both cases called by the same word: love—what? is love supposed to be something unegoistic?”¹³ When marriage is viewed from this angle, it illustrates Nietzsche’s wider argument about egoism’s ubiquity and, as with his analysis of pity, allows him to unmask seemingly self-denying action as self-seeking.

Nietzsche’s analysis of marriage does not, however, end with his exposure of its egoistic origins. In the passage “Of the spirit of women” he takes a different approach, one which suggests some emancipatory potential in marriage. In allowing a woman to participate in masculine virtue, marriage opens new possibilities, spurring her to self-overcoming. This passage again construes marriage as a form of female self-sacrifice but shows the woman “then, despite this sacrifice, immediately evolving a *new spirit* within the new domain, originally alien to her nature, to which the man’s disposition impels her.”¹⁴ Again, Nietzsche points to the fluidity of seemingly gender-specific traits, suggesting that women’s characters are shaped by opportunities and experiences rather than by their essence. A similar dynamic appears in his discussion of the different ways men and women react to love. Women, “who normally feel themselves the weak and devoted sex, acquire in the *exceptional* state of passion their pride and their feeling of power—which asks: who is worthy of *me*?”¹⁵ The qualification that this applies to whole women and men echoes the distinction between superior and inferior women and implies a distinction between higher and lower types of relationships. As these passages indicate, love and marriage can enhance some women’s self-worth in ways other than simply providing a social role or outlet for existing drives: they can strengthen and educate their spirit.

Women are not, however, the only ones to be elevated and educated via marriage. Although the passage discussing the usual consequences of marriage suggests that women gain and men lose from union,¹⁶ an earlier passage shows that women can also nourish men’s spirits: “For the male sickness of self-contempt the surest cure is to be loved by a clever woman.”¹⁷ This remedy could, of course, be intended to demean women,

for seeing how base even a clever woman is might make any man feel better about himself. However, my reading of it as sincere is supported by Nietzsche's other claims about the link between love and self-love which are explored below.

Nietzsche's genealogies of morality also reveal that some of those things that begin in egoism and self-assertion or the quest for power can have quite different and unintended outcomes. One of his analyses of the romancing of marriage provides a good example. He contends that founding an institution like marriage on something as evanescent as romantic love creates the expectation of its durability and thereby anoints this passion with a certain dignity; "marriage has bestowed upon love a higher nobility."¹⁸ Even though the premise that romance is an appropriate foundation for marriage is flawed and ushers "a very great deal of hypocrisy and lying into the world," romancing marriage also forges "a new *superhuman* concept which elevates mankind."¹⁹

So despite his declaration that the idolization of love originated in a quest for power by women, Nietzsche is not wholly cynical about love. There are even times when he writes about romantic love in an interesting and original manner, as the passage seeking "The source of great love" attests:

Whence is the origin of the sudden passion—the passion of the profound and inward kind—that a man feels for a woman? Least of all from sensuality alone: but when a man encounters weakness and need of assistance and at the same time high spirits together in the same being, then something takes place in him like the sensation of his soul wanting to gush over: he is at the same moment moved and offended. At this point there arises the source of great love.²⁰

But whichever way he looks at it, Nietzsche sees romantic love as necessarily ephemeral and an unsatisfactory basis for an enduring relationship like marriage. Therefore, while the foundation of marriage on romantic love might have ennobled this passion, it also creates the problem of constancy. Vowing eternal love is difficult because emotions are "involuntary" and not easily controlled by will or obligation. What those "without self-deception" really promise in their vows of continuing affection is action compatible with affection, "the continuation of the appearance of love."²¹ But how much easier to even appear affectionate when one has an interesting partner, as the passage "How often! How unforeseen" suggests: "How many married men there are who have experienced the morning when it has dawned on them that their young wife is tedious and believes the opposite."²²

The importance of solid foundations for marriage explains Nietzsche's condemnation of "so-called love-matches" which have "error for their father and need for their mother."²³ They also explain his recommendation that "we ought not to be permitted to come to a decision affecting our life while we are in the condition of being in love, nor to determine once and for all the character of the company we keep on the basis of a violent whim."²⁴ He warns that "Sometimes it requires only a stronger pair of spectacles to cure the lover,"²⁵ and his claim that those who could imagine their lover's face in twenty years might be less in love now, contrasts with the importance he imputes to conversation in marriage. Appreciating this leads one to wonder if "you are going to enjoy talking with this woman up into your old age."²⁶

Marriage as Friendship

"One ought to take marriage enormously more seriously! so that in precisely those cases in which marriages have taken place they would henceforth usually not take place!"²⁷ Because romantic love is too flimsy and irrational a basis for marriage, marriage is one of the areas in which "we must invent new ideals."²⁸ This need helps to explain Nietzsche's interest in the feminist model for marriage reform. In the passage "From the future of marriage," he discusses "the higher conception of marriage as the soul-friendship of two people of differing sex" that has been advocated by certain "noble, free-thinking women who set themselves the task of the education and elevation of the female sex."²⁹ As its context gives no reason for reading this as anything but sincere, this passage illustrates that, contrary to the dominant view, Nietzsche did not always take women to be inferior to men. He concedes that some women can be noble-minded and freethinking,³⁰ features which are virtually synonymous in the middle period. Those hoping to reform marriage are chided for being too idealistic, but this criticism is not labored. Instead it prompts the more general observation that "all human institutions . . . permit only a moderate degree of practical idealization"³¹ which could be Nietzsche's reminder to himself as much as to the feminist reformers.

Nietzsche's more substantive criticism of the feminist model for reforming marriage is that it underestimates male sexuality by assuming that sex is only for procreation. He fears that this will not satisfy men's needs, because "the health of the husband"³² requires more frequent sex. Monogamy cannot accommodate this new, higher ideal of marriage while also sating men's sexual appetites, for this would place excessive burdens on women: "A good wife who is supposed to be a friend, assis-

tant, mother, family head and housekeeper, and may indeed have to run her own business or job quite apart from that of her husband—such a wife cannot at the same time be a concubine: it would be too much to demand of her.”³³ Thus a century before its becoming common currency in the Western world, Nietzsche saw the problem of the superwoman! An obvious solution to this dilemma is for women to limit their activities outside the home and leave more time to satisfy their husbands’ sexual needs. Alternatively, Nietzsche could advocate a return to Greek arrangements, where the “head and heart-satisfying companionship such as only the charm and intellectual flexibility of women can create”³⁴ was sought outside marriage, with marriage remaining primarily a forum for reproduction. Yet, he does not require women to devote themselves to fulfilling their husbands’ needs nor endorse the Greek model. Rather, he reverses this model by proposing that marriage be based on friendship and that men find other women to satisfy their sexual drives. This solution has, of course, its own problems, predicated as it is upon a traditional division of women into wives and mistresses. This distinction also illustrates Nietzsche’s inability to fully incorporate sexuality into his model of friendly marriage.³⁵ But its problems notwithstanding, this solution reveals something about the importance he attributes to marriage as a relationship rather than just a social institution.³⁶

As this suggests, the ideal of marriage gestured toward in the works of the middle period retains an important feature of the feminist model, for Nietzsche often associates marriage with friendship. Not only does he see friendship as possible between the genders³⁷ but he views some marriages as elaborations of friendship. One aphorism, for example, predicts that “The best friend will probably acquire the best wife, because a good marriage is founded on the talent for friendship.”³⁸ That marriage can offer some of friendship’s mutual understanding is suggested in the claim that “one can be quite sure one will not be misunderstood . . . in the presence of friends and wives.”³⁹ Further indication of how friendly marriage can be comes in the counsel that spouses be selected on the basis of conversation because marriage is ultimately an ongoing dialogue. “Everything else in marriage is transitory, but most of the time you are together will be devoted to conversation.”⁴⁰ Given the importance attached to dialogue in the works of the middle period, characterizing “Marriage as a long conversation”⁴¹ indicates great regard for this relationship, at least when properly founded.

Thus despite the classification of marriage as “the third greatest banality” in the tragi-comedy of human life after death and birth, Nietzsche is not relentlessly critical of marriage. Just as each marriage retains value

and interest for its actors and their audience,⁴² so the cast is of great importance in his estimation of marriage. As the capacity for friendship is a mark of higher humans, so it seems that his image of marriage as friendship describes a superior class of relationship.

A further reason for Nietzsche's interest in love and marriage is the connection he draws between loving others and self-love. One aphorism posits that if we lose the ability to love others, we lose it for ourselves,⁴³ suggesting a symbiotic relation rather than inverse correlation between love and self-love.⁴⁴ Those who cannot love others in their otherness but who must make them over in their own image and likeness are described as "ingenious" but "limited,"⁴⁵ and this contrasts markedly with Nietzsche's claim in "Love and duality" that love loves difference: "What is love but understanding and rejoicing at the fact that another lives, feels and acts in a way different from and opposite to ours? If love is to bridge these antitheses through joy it may not deny or seek to abolish them.—Even self-love presupposes an unblendable duality (or multiplicity) in one person."⁴⁶ From this it emerges again that egoism can be transcended in a healthy way and that Nietzsche's notion of individuality need not require isolation from others.

For Nietzsche, love of all things must be learned—of the self, of others, of music—and education in one thing affects love and knowledge of others.⁴⁷ Of course, romantic love is not love's only possible school—indeed it is probably the least pedagogically sound. The love of friendship is clearly superior, but Nietzsche follows the feminist reformers in holding that marriage can be a form of friendship. Marriage can therefore be an important school for love, and the sort of love known in marriage can affect self-love, which provides further reason for Nietzsche's condemnation of bad marriages. Ultimately then, he allows that love of others can and should cooperate with love of self. Once again it appears that self-love is a traditional value that undergoes transvaluation by Nietzsche rather than just being set in a different context or given a new rationale. Making and maintaining a good, friendly marriage is a way of caring for the self, and it is noteworthy that Nietzsche poses his query about the dialectic between marriage and friendship in a passage about care of the self.⁴⁸ Conversely, great individuals who marry badly damage themselves through this, as a vignette of such a marriage indicates: "when one sees how he takes the legacy and inheritance of this struggle and victory, the laurel-wreath of his humanity, and hangs it up at the first decent place where a little woman can get at it and pluck it to pieces . . . one sees how well he knows how to gain but how ill to preserve."⁴⁹

Sexuality

As his caveat to the feminist reformers about male desire indicates, while Nietzsche admires the idea of marriage as friendship, he is alive to the role of sexuality in marriage. Moreover, he assumes that sexuality varies with gender and so considers this from a female, as well as male, viewpoint. His addendum to the feminist model of marriage reform presumes that women's libido is intrinsically weaker than men's, for it is men, not women, who suffer from infrequent sex.⁵⁰ This idea is developed in the passage "Sexual elevation and degradation" where Nietzsche reverses his earlier claim that marriage raises women but lowers men.⁵¹ This later passage claims that men can sometimes transcend sexual desire to reach "a height where all desire ceases"⁵² and where love rather than will reigns. For women, the opposite occurs. Dwelling more permanently on the plane of love, they must "descend from true love down to desire." They see this as entailing some self-degradation, but their willingness to accept this "is among the most heart-moving things that can accompany the idea of a good marriage."⁵³

Nietzsche's interest in women's sexual experience is also evident in "On female chastity" where he points to the conflicting demands marriage makes on women, especially upper-class ones. Because they are kept ignorant about sex and educated to believe that it is evil, such women see sex as degrading. With marriage they are inducted into this iniquity by their husband, the person they are supposed to love, honor, and respect. "Thus a psychic knot has been tied that may have no equal. . . . Afterward, the same deep silence as before. Often a silence directed at herself, too. She closes her eyes to herself."⁵⁴ The amazing sympathy Nietzsche evinces here is accompanied by recognition of the limits of empathy; he acknowledges the difficulty of imagining how each woman comes to terms with this dilemma "and what dreadful, far-reaching suspicions must stir in her poor, unhinged soul."⁵⁵ Against this background, women see childbearing as an "apology or atonement" for their fall. This challenges Schopenhauer's detection of pride in pregnant women, for Nietzsche discerns discomfort in young women whose pregnancy implicates them publicly in what they had believed was depredation.⁵⁶

Despite his acknowledgments that women are taught to see sex as evil, Nietzsche does not suggest that they could be reschooled to celebrate their sexuality, reinforcing the impression that he holds women to be inherently less sexual than men. This can be partly accounted for by his era, for it is anachronistic to expect awareness of the dimensions of female sexuality that really only became widely known a century later. Moreover, he seems to have had little intimate knowledge of women, so lacked any

experience from which to challenge the regnant view of female sexuality.⁵⁷ However by this logic, innovation in thought is impossible, and it is especially tenuous when applied to Nietzsche who was usually so concerned to challenge the dominant beliefs. After all, "he is called a free spirit who thinks differently from what, on the basis of his origin, environment, his class and profession, or on the basis of the dominant views of his age, would have been expected of him."⁵⁸

Nietzsche's apparent acceptance of women's limited sexual appetite is also striking in light of the fact that, as the discussion of care of the self indicates, one of the aims of his work is to rehabilitate the body, sensuality, and the passions from their debasement by Christianity.⁵⁹ As he asks, "is it not dreadful to make necessary and regularly recurring sensations into a source of inner misery, and in this way to make inner misery a necessary and regularly recurring phenomenon *in every human being!*"⁶⁰ Whereas the Greeks "loved, elevated, gilded, and deified" the passions so that in experiencing them, they experienced themselves as "happier, . . . purer and more divine,"⁶¹ Christianity debases the passions and aims for purity through their annihilation. Yet in a proto-Freudian argument, Nietzsche notes that when demonized, sexuality becomes immensely interesting, acquiring a fascination far beyond its desert. "Thanks to the dark secretiveness of the church in all things erotic, the 'devil' Eros gradually becomes more interesting to all mankind than all the saints and angels put together."⁶² He supposes that sexual appetites do not grow by what they feed on; rather "sensual fantasy is moderated, indeed almost suppressed, by regularity in sexual intercourse, while it is . . . unfettered and dissolute when such intercourse is disorderly or does not take place at all."⁶³ He argues against the demonizing of sexuality not just because it is counterproductive, but more positively because sexual relations represent one of those benevolent, harmonious arrangements so rare in nature, where one's pursuit of pleasure brings pleasure to another.⁶⁴ Yet most of the evidence of the middle period suggests that Nietzsche expects the emancipation of sexuality to release and legitimate the drives of men more than those of women.

A striking exception to this assumption that women's sexual desire is inherently more limited than men's appears in "Danger in innocence" where, to illustrate such danger, Nietzsche writes of "innocent, that is to say ignorant young wives [who] become accustomed to the frequent enjoyment of sex and miss it very greatly if their husbands become ill or prematurely feeble; it is precisely this innocent and credulous idea that frequent intercourse is thoroughly right and proper that produces in them a need which later exposes them to the most violent temptations and worse."⁶⁵ That he paints such a grim scenario of sexual liberation for

women who have escaped, rather than overcome, their socialization and can approach sex with unconstrained appetite should not be interpreted as him chastizing it. On the contrary, females' ignorance of sex exemplifies Christianity's promotion of ignorance, and Nietzsche's complaint is that being kept ignorant on any subject renders people incapable of measure, moderation, and "keeping themselves in check in good time."⁶⁶ However, that some young women have vigorous sexual drives to regulate goes against the middle period's general portrayal of female sexuality.

Rational Marriage

"He who protests against marriage, in the way Catholic priests do, will try to think of it in its lowest and most vulgar form."⁶⁷ Such thinking is not difficult though, for many marriages fall far below Nietzsche's ideal and warrant much criticism. But as his own adumbration of a higher type of marriage suggests, these criticisms need not apply to marriage *per se*, but to the individuals contracting it and the values and norms it reflects. Indeed, although he is sometimes flippant or cynical about marriage,⁶⁸ Nietzsche deems this a very important institution, which explains his harsh criticism of its corrupt forms as well as his praise of the rationality of Jewish "marriages and marriage customs."⁶⁹ As such praise of rational marriage indicates, he takes the same approach to marriage as he does to other major institutions and values in the middle period: he strives for a rational account of them. Free spirits require reasons for social orderings,⁷⁰ whereas when you "oblige a fettered spirit to present his reasons for opposing bigamy, . . . you will discover whether his holy zeal for monogamy rests on reasons or on acquired habit."⁷¹

Nietzsche can, therefore, be understood as trying to free himself from what he sees as the customary prejudice in favor of monogamy to speculate about the most rational marriage arrangements. At one point he advocates serial monogamy based on age: A young man should "marry a girl older than him who is intellectually and morally his superior and who can lead him through the perils of the twenties (ambition, hatred, self-contempt, passions of all kinds)."⁷² A decade later the recipient of education becomes its donor, marrying and educating a young woman. Although this might be an overly rational way of approaching marriage, the assumptions and intuitions behind it are not all offensive. It assumes that marriage should have an educative function in the broadest sense and that men and women can develop one another's personalities. With its developmental view of the self and relationships, it assumes that people have different needs at different stages of their lives, a point that con-

nects with Nietzsche's critique of the doctrine of fixed character and with his emphasis on the need to care for the self in its specificity and changeability. As he says, "for the enrichment of knowledge it may be of more value not to reduce oneself to uniformity . . . but to listen instead to the gentle voice of each of life's different situations; these will suggest the attitude of mind appropriate to them. Through thus ceasing to treat oneself as a *single* rigid and unchanging individuum one takes an intelligent interest in the life and being of many others."⁷³ Thus, the inclusion of marriage among the institutions based on faith not reason is, by Nietzsche's own account, exaggerated; it is "chance in marriage [that] makes a grand rational progress of mankind impossible."⁷⁴ Marriage can be built on reason even if most are not; if rational marriage were impossible, Nietzsche's hypothetical "benevolent god"⁷⁵ would not grow so impatient at its rarity.

Notwithstanding his many flippant remarks on the subject, Nietzsche accords great importance to marriage and is scathing of relationships with unsound foundations. His views about good marriages are closer to those of his feminist contemporaries than those of his traditional sources, as indicated by the ideal of marriage as a form of friendship providing the vantage point from which he views other marriages. Rather than condemn marriage altogether, he discriminates between its higher and lower forms, making his reflections on marriage continuous with much of his other social commentary in the middle period.

Free Spirits

That free, rational, friendly marriages are, by Nietzsche's own admission, possible problematizes his claims that male free spirits will not or should not marry,⁷⁶ especially given that several of the arguments marshaled against their marriage rely on assumptions he challenges elsewhere. One of the first reasons proffered for free spirits' unsuitability for "A happy marriage" is that "all habituation and rules, everything enduring and definitive" is anathema to them,⁷⁷ and they must constantly rend themselves from the lure of comfort and security. However, if a good marriage is like a good friendship and a good conversation, there is no reason for it to be static. Although "love dreads change more than it does destruction,"⁷⁸ its attempts to stall change are vain, for "there is no standstill in any kind of love."⁷⁹ Nor is there any reason why love cannot emulate friendship and celebrate the partners' differences from one another. Love's attempt to fabricate similarity between the lover and the loved "which in reality does not exist"⁸⁰ is based on the assumption

that alterity affronts love. Yet, as we have seen, in "Love and duality" Nietzsche defines love as rejoicing in diversity.⁸¹

Another argument against marriage for free spirits is that too much proximity to another corrodes the soul: "One always loses by too familiar association with friends and women; and sometimes what one loses is the pearl of one's life."⁸² However, as Nietzsche likens marriage to friendship, there is no reason why marrieds cannot maintain that distance that simultaneously holds friends together and keeps them respectfully apart, for his depiction of noble friendship illustrates that not all intimacy is tyranny. Of course, sexual relations may make the intimacy of marriage more intense than that of friendship, but as his suggestion about taking a concubine indicates, Nietzsche does not privilege the sexual bond between married partners.

A further reason for the free spirit to renounce women is their tendency to mother and smother men.⁸³ Women's conservatism, their preference for comfort over adventure and inquiry, their inability to see their loved ones suffer,⁸⁴ and their respect for custom and established power⁸⁵ are all bound to interfere with and impede men who strive to meet the demands of freedom. However, in certain moods Nietzsche accepts that some women can overcome these impediments to free spiritedness and acknowledges that women's reproductive role need not determine the personality and potential of all women forever. His conflicting attitudes toward marriage appear when the general characterization of marriage as offering "the unfreedom of the golden cradle" where man "is waited on and spoiled like an infant"⁸⁶ is undercut a few passages later by the account of Socrates' marriage. Rather than being coddled and domesticated by Xantippe, Socrates was driven into the street and forced further into freedom.⁸⁷

Juxtaposing Nietzsche's views in this way suggests that his claims about free spirits being marred and mired by marriage are sometimes caught in their own cross fire.⁸⁸ This, combined with his advice that "men who are too intellectual have great need of marriage, though they resist it as they would a foul-tasting medicine,"⁸⁹ makes one suspect that there is something of the "Trick of renouncers" at play in his denunciations of marriage, for as Nietzsche says, "He who protests against marriage, in the way Catholic priests do, will try to think of it in its lowest and most vulgar form."⁹⁰

Nietzsche's belief that the best way to moderate the sexual drive is to indulge it raises interesting questions about the sexuality of free spirits. Several passages recommend their bachelorhood but no outlet for their sexual drive is mooted. It seems, however, that sexual desire is not a powerful force in such individuals: "The meagre fruitfulness of the highest

and most cultivated spirits and the classes that pertain to them, the circumstance that they are frequently unmarried and are sexually cool in general, is essential to the economy of mankind."⁹¹ The man of knowledge neither condemns nor submits to carnal desire but accepts it with effortless detachment, disengaging not because it demeans but because knowledge is his dominant passion: "He will no longer want to decry the desires as heretical and to exterminate them; but the only goal which completely dominates him, at all times *to know* as fully as possible, will make him cool and soothe everything savage in his disposition."⁹² Elsewhere Nietzsche suggests that free spirits sublimate their desires, which presumably includes sexual desires. He writes that the person "who has overcome his passions has entered into the possession of the most fertile ground. . . . To *sow* the seeds of good spiritual works in the soil of the subdued passions is then the immediate urgent task."⁹³ But whether their sexual desires are sublimated or feeble in the first place, Nietzsche clearly thinks that sexual drives will not be powerful motives in the free spirit's actions.

Reproduction

Looking back at Greek culture, Nietzsche observes that "the women had no other task than to bring forth handsome, powerful bodies in which the character of the father lived on as uninterruptedly as possible."⁹⁴ One way in which he seems to recur to Greek ideas is by seeing males as the prime movers in reproduction.⁹⁵ That he imputes a primary role to males in reproduction is suggested by the way his discussion of pride in ancestry traces or disputes nobility via the paternal rather than the distaff route.⁹⁶ It is further suggested when he reflects that "in the maturity of his life and understanding a man is overcome by the feeling that his father was wrong to beget him."⁹⁷

When it comes to discussions of family life, however, women no longer occupy a secondary role; Nietzsche often associates motherhood with omnipresence or return and fatherhood with absence or negation. Fathers are missing when needed,⁹⁸ and paternal love is not a natural phenomenon.⁹⁹ Consider too his injunction that "if one does not have a good father one should furnish oneself with one."¹⁰⁰ Here, the father's importance is undercut by his possible absence and the suggestion that he can be replaced or constructed. It is also noteworthy that book seven of HH is entitled "Women and child" rather than "Men and child" or "Parent and child." In this book Nietzsche asserts that one's mother provides the template for all one's images of women.¹⁰¹ The obverse of see-

ing one's mother in all women comes in a later claim that there is something motherly in all women's love.¹⁰² In another passage he moves rapidly from the discussion of motherly to wifely love.¹⁰³ As maternal love is typically held to be the paradigm of selflessness, Nietzsche's contention about the ubiquity of egoism requires him to show that, as per wifely love, a mother's love is egoistic, and this he does in a brace of aphorisms evincing women's interest in seeing themselves reflected in their children.¹⁰⁴

Nietzsche's suggestion that great types will not reproduce¹⁰⁵ is incompatible with the traditional model of aristocracy with its idea of inherited nobility, for if an aristocracy of birth is to survive, transmission of noble genes and therefore marriage and reproduction are imperative.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the passage "Tragedy of childhood" attests that "it is no rare occurrence [for] noble-minded and aspiring people" to be born to "low-minded" fathers or "childish and irritable" mothers,¹⁰⁷ and such parents are obstacles to, not preconditions of, nobility. Yet this does not mean that marriage is irrelevant to the generation of the sort of aristocracy of spirit sketched in the middle period. When determined by chance rather than reason, marriage produces children with a "remote" likelihood of "being properly educated."¹⁰⁸ The importance of marriage is also illustrated in the "Continuance of the parents" where disharmony between parents manifests itself in their child's "inner sufferings." The divided child is the outcome of a union with "unresolved dissonances between the characters and dispositions of the parents."¹⁰⁹ Marriage is therefore crucial in Nietzsche's new, more meritocratic notion of aristocracy but for different reasons than it is in the traditional model.

Several surprising things emerge from this survey of Nietzsche's views on love, marriage, and reproduction in the works of the middle period. He retains marriage as the primary site of love and companionship between men and women and thus departs from his Greek predecessors. At times he even suggests friendship as a model for higher marriages. He sees no necessary competition between self-love and love for another; he even suggests that love of another can nourish self-love. This furnishes yet another explanation for the importance of marriage in his work, for a good, friendly marriage can be a mode of caring for the self, and such care is a crucial component of his new notion of aristocracy.

The Later Works

As with friendship, there seems to be some continuation of the middle period's views on marriage into *Z. Zarathustra's* contempt for what the

"many-too-many" prize as marriage echoes the middle period's condemnations of most marriages and testifies to the importance Nietzsche attaches to this institution.¹¹⁰ Zarathustra expresses concern about the damage a bad marriage can do to those with superior qualities: "That man used to be reserved in his dealings and fastidious in his choice. But all at once he spoils his company once and for all: he calls it his marriage."¹¹¹ The possibility of a higher form of marriage is sketched when he says that "you should propagate yourself not only forward, but upward. May the garden of marriage help you to do it!"¹¹²

As the importance of friendship, conversation, and reason decline in the later works, it is interesting to track the route Nietzsche's views about marriage take. His discussion of the home remedy of patience, of going to sleep unnoticed, that is "amply tested in marriage and friendship and praised as indispensable,"¹¹³ does not augur well for a continuation of the middle period's views. The association of marriage with friendship and conversation appears in a negative sense when Nietzsche observes that the realization that one's friend or lover is not giving words the same connotations leads to the relationship's demise. "(Fear of the 'eternal misunderstanding': that is the benevolent genius who so often keeps persons of differing sex from over-hasty attachments to which senses and heart prompt them—and *not* some Schopenhauerean 'genius of the species!')"¹¹⁴ For the most part, the later works are dubious at best about the possibility of men and women ever achieving the sort of meaningful exchange characteristic of friendship. This is, of course, connected with the agonistic perspective on gender that underpins these works, for the gender difference that is vital to the ongoing social contest is bound to plague communication between men and women. These differences are compounded by the fact that each member of a couple projects the characteristics of their own gender onto the other and is destined to disappoint and misunderstand the other.¹¹⁵

Although the ideal of marriage as friendship drops out of the later works, they do continue the middle period's practice of taking marriage as an institution very seriously. These works contrast modern marriage with old aristocratic codes that once regulated and controlled it.¹¹⁶ The romancing of marriage eased these traditional restrictions and gave it a new function. Whereas in the middle period this changed understanding of marriage was seen having some benefits by ennobling sensual love, now Nietzsche voices only criticisms of this change.¹¹⁷ Romancing marriage bases it on something transient, accidental, and idiosyncratic, and these are not the grounds for any sort of institution, let alone one so central to society: "Marriage as an institution already includes in itself the

affirmation of the largest, the most enduring form of organisation: if society as a whole cannot stand security for itself to the most distant generations, then marriage has really no meaning."¹¹⁸

Another continuing theme from the middle period is Nietzsche's condemnation of Christianity's treatment of sexuality. Zarathustra's attitude that sensual pleasure is "innocent and free to free hearts, the earth's garden-joy, an overflowing of thanks to the present from all the future"¹¹⁹ echoes the middle period's insistence upon the innocence of sexual desire. Nietzsche continues to castigate Christianity for the fact that sexual desire engenders guilt, and he traces its doctrine that the passions must be extirpated to a fear that they are uncontrollable. The Christian denigration of sexual passion¹²⁰ stands in stark contrast to the Law-Book of Manu which affirms life by revering all those things Christianity deems base; in particular women, marriage, and procreation.¹²¹ In a complete repudiation of the Christian stance, Nietzsche declares that "the preaching of chastity [*der Keuschheit*] is a public incitement to anti-nature. Every expression of contempt for the sexual life, every befouling of it through the concept 'impure,' is *the* crime against life—is the intrinsic sin against the holy spirit of life."¹²²

Yet Nietzsche describes as "the chastest [*züchtigste*] expression he has ever heard" the assertion that "In true love it is the soul that envelops the body."¹²³ This approach to sensuality explains his later claim that "there is no inherent contradiction between chastity and sensual pleasure: every good marriage, every real love affair transcends these opposites."¹²⁴ So it is not the notion of chastity he rejects; rather, he attacks its wellsprings in the Christian worldview where chastity is good because sexuality, the body, and the instincts are wicked. As Zarathustra says, "with some, chastity [*die Keuschheit*] is a virtue, but with many it is almost a vice."¹²⁵ Chastity is vicious when practiced by those who find it difficult, who cannot control their desires through any other means than self-denial and attempted extirpation of the desires.¹²⁶

Officially then, it cannot be disgust at the female body or sexuality in general that leads Nietzsche to conclude that the philosopher must have no truck with women and should avoid them like those other shiny, loud things—fame and princes.¹²⁷ An alternative explanation is the pragmatic one; as it is woman's "first and last profession . . . to bear strong children,"¹²⁸ consorting with a proper woman will issue offspring, yet the burden of dependents would impinge mightily upon the philosopher's freedom. Nietzsche's agonistic approach to gender is also relevant in explaining why higher men should have no commerce with women, for the philosopher is already a feminized man. Pregnant with great works, he has "maternal instincts" and "a secret love for what is growing in him."¹²⁹

A higher woman, who must be fruitful, is redundant for him who is fruitful in himself. Nor, obviously, could a higher man be complemented by a barren "abortive" who wants to become like a man because she has failed as a woman.¹³⁰ The maternal male philosopher embodies in himself the highest and most spiritual aspects of both genders and thus is self-sufficient. However, this gender synthesis is not available to women, indicating again the way the later works exclude all women from the possibilities available to some men.

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The Invention of Invention

Nietzsche is typically seen as a radical critic of the Western philosophical tradition, a thinker whose unprecedented interrogations of metaphysics, epistemology, ontology, and psychology upset a range of important philosophical presuppositions. This image of Nietzsche as a radical critic of the Western philosophical tradition pervades the literature dedicated to his thought. He is often depicted as a *sui generis* thinker whose thoughts evolve out of his peculiar genius.¹ Yet this image of Nietzsche as an autonomous and wholly individual thinker is accepted partly because we are held captive by the picture he draws of himself, for in his later works Nietzsche repeatedly invents himself as inventor rather than legatee. He presents his ideas as being minimally dependent on his philosophical forebears and very much the product of his own autonomous thought. As he announces in EH: “no one before me has ever known the right path.”²

Only with a knowledge of the works of the middle period is it possible to see how Nietzsche has constructed this image of himself as the radical critic, independent of tradition. By contrast with the later works, the works of the middle period disclose a thinker who presents himself as productively engaged with the Western intellectual tradition, as contin-

uing some of its ideas, expanding some of its possibilities, and repudiating other of its claims. These works are peppered with expressions of interest in, admiration for, and productive exchange with earlier writers. They consistently show Nietzsche's willingness to present himself as engaged with the wider European philosophical-cum-literary tradition and as having much to learn from some of its protagonists, even if these lessons are sometimes negative. The Nietzsche of the middle period does not adopt a primarily adversarial stance toward this heritage nor invent himself as a *sui generis* thinker. Rather, he portrays himself as one who both descends and dissents from this tradition.³ This change in his self-presentation is only illuminated when the works of the middle period are compared with the later ones.

Independence

It is widely accepted among Nietzsche's readers that in moving into the middle period and sloughing off Wagner and Schopenhauer, he freed himself of all debts to intellectual ancestors beyond antiquity, with the exception of Goethe.⁴ This is just the impression Nietzsche strives to create in the later works, including the parts appended to the works of the middle period.⁵ He refers, for example, in the preface to AOM to "my first and only educator, the *great* Arthur Schopenhauer."⁶ He retrospectively portrays HH as an almost single-handed struggle against his "great teacher Schopenhauer."⁷

In light of my claim that Nietzsche's accent on his independence and solitariness as a thinker is a feature of the later works rather than of his oeuvre as a whole, it is interesting to note that in the preface to HH, he acknowledges that were times when he did not feel himself to be so alone. He once believed that he "was *not* thus isolated, not alone in *seeing* as I did—an enchanted surmising of relatedness and identity in eye and desires, a reposing in a trust of friendship, a blindness in concert with another without suspicion or question-marks." However, he dismisses this as an illusion necessary for his "cure and self-restoration."⁸ He continues to construct an image of himself as unique, utterly autonomous, and unprecedented in the preface to D: "I tunnelled into the foundations, I commenced an investigation and digging out of an ancient *faith*, one upon which we philosophers have for a couple of millennia been accustomed to build as if upon the firmest of foundations. . . . I commenced to undermine our *faith* in *morality*."⁹

To compound this impression of intellectual independence and au-

togenesis, the later Nietzsche emphasizes his originality, his heroic overcoming of tradition, his navigation of new seas. This is evident when book 5 of GS opens with the declaration that "all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea."¹⁰ His insistence on being unprecedented reaches its climax in EH's final chapter where he asserts that "it is my fate to have to be the first *decent* human being, to know myself in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia. . . . I was the first to *discover* the truth. . . . I contradict as has never been contradicted. . . . I am a *bringer of good tidings* such as there has never been."¹¹ This could be dismissed as hyperbole were it not for the fact that this insistence upon his novelty permeates the later works as a whole.¹²

Constructive Engagement

Given Nietzsche's adurance about his own originality, Robert Solomon's claims that he "was not easily given to praise" and usually reserved his commendations for those "who had been dead for centuries"¹³ come as no surprise. It is true that when the later Nietzsche discusses postclassical philosophers, it is more often to denounce than to celebrate them.¹⁴ Yet this stands in marked contrast to the repeated testimony from the middle period that earlier writers have contributed positively to his intellectual development. The belief that Nietzsche is parsimonious with his praise reveals the limitations of generalizing from the later works only, for an examination of the middle period works reveals the relative frequency with which other authors are cited and endorsed.

As well as the gaggle of Greek and Roman thinkers and artists referred to in the works of the middle period, some of those honored or cited in support or illustration of its arguments are Descartes,¹⁵ Diderot, Byron, Montaigne, Pascal, and Swift.¹⁶ Ancient writers who might be criticized in the later works enjoy some praise or credit in these writings; thus Plato¹⁷ and Aristotle¹⁸ appear in a favorable light. Even when Nietzsche is critical of earlier writers, or some aspect of their thought, he is not as dismissive as he becomes in the later works, showing again that in the middle period he is willing to depict himself as fruitfully engaged with a host of intellectual predecessors.

Further evidence of Nietzsche's engagement with the Western tradition comes when he nominates Epicurus and Montaigne, Goethe and Spinoza, Plato and Rousseau, and Pascal and Schopenhauer as important and influential pairs of interlocutors: "With these I have had to come to

terms when I have wandered long alone, from them will I accept judgement, to them will I listen when in doing so they judge one another. Whatever I say, resolve, cogitate for myself and others: upon these eight I fix my eyes and see theirs fixed upon me."¹⁹ The presence of Rousseau and Spinoza among his influences seems surprising, for he is usually seen as reviling these thinkers.²⁰ Yet this illustrates what a limited role the works of the middle period play in forming our image of what is typically Nietzschean.

Nietzsche's readiness to claim and honor his postclassical predecessors in the middle period is also apparent in the long "European Books" passage which implodes with praise for a cluster of French writers:

When reading Montaigne, Laroche-foucauld, La Bruyère, Fontenelle (especially the *Dialogues des Morts*), Vauvenargues and Chamfort we are closer to antiquity than in the case of any other group of six authors of any other nation. Through these six the spirit of the final centuries of the old era has risen again—together they constitute an important link in the great, still continuing chain of the Renaissance. Their books . . . contain more real ideas than all the books of German philosophers put together: ideas of the kind that produce ideas and which—I am at a loss to finish the definition; it is enough that they seem to me authors who have written neither for children nor for dreamers, neither for young ladies nor for Christians, neither for Germans nor for—I am again at a loss to complete my list. . . . what clarity and delicate precision those Frenchmen possess! Even the most acute-eared of the Greeks must have approved of this art, and one thing they would even have admired and adored, the French wittiness of expression: they loved such things very much without themselves being especially gifted in them.²¹

Although he often complains about the limitations of language,²² Nietzsche is rarely at a loss for words, yet could not find terms sufficient to convey his regard for these French thinkers. His inarticulacy would seem to be stronger testimony to his respect for their work than all his expressed praise.

The later Nietzsche's reluctance to acknowledge anything but classical influences and sources is illustrated well by the change in his treatment of Voltaire. Whereas the works of the middle period bristle with praise for Voltaire,²³ when the later Nietzsche begins to praise the Frenchman, he ends by praising himself: "Voltaire is . . . a *grandseigneur* of the spirit: precisely what I am too."²⁴

Psychology

Despite the fact that he portrays himself and his generation as “incompetent novices” in the understanding of “inner experience” for “they knew more about these infamous refinements of self-enjoyment 4,000 years ago,”²⁵ in the works of the middle period Nietzsche is full of praise for his more recent predecessors in the study of psychology. A newcomer to this field, he expresses admiration for “Larochefoucauld and the other French masters of psychical examination . . . [they] are like skillful marksmen who again and again hit the bullseye—but it is the bullseye of human nature. Their skill evokes amazement.”²⁶ He is disturbed that their work is so little read and even less appreciated.²⁷ At times he even identifies with the moralist tradition, referring to “we moralists.” The fate of those who “dissect morality,” which is to be “upbraided as immoralists,” is also something he experiences.²⁸

In stark contrast to such praise for the penetration of the French masters of psychological examination, the later Nietzsche typically depicts most previous psychological inquiry as infested with traditional prejudices and therefore useless for his purposes.²⁹ With the notable exceptions of Stendhal³⁰ and Dostoyevsky,³¹ earlier or contemporary moralists and moral philosophers are held to be ignorant about the true nature of morality.³² This repudiation of predecessors culminates in EH where he insists that being an immoralist sets him off “against the whole of humanity. No one has yet felt Christian morality as beneath him: that requires . . . a hitherto altogether unheard-of psychological profundity and abysmalness. . . . Before me there was no psychology.”³³

The way Nietzsche remakes himself as an autarkic thinker is encapsulated in his depiction of his relationship with Paul Rée. As the author of *Psychological Observations*, Rée is honored by being associated with the perspicacious French psychologists Nietzsche so admires in the middle period.³⁴ Nietzsche describes his friend as “one of the boldest and coldest of thinkers” who offers “incisive and penetrating analyses of human action.”³⁵ He cites Rée’s work *On the Origin [Ueber den Ursprung] of the Moral Sensations* approvingly³⁶ and even gives HH’s second book a similar title—“On the History [Zur Geschichte] of the Moral Sensations.”

In a dramatic turnaround, the later Nietzsche writes as if his abundant praise of Rée came from someone else. He complains that “up to now morality was no problem at all. . . . I see nobody who ventured a *critique* of moral valuations; I miss even the slightest attempts of scientific curiosity, of the refined, experimental imagination of psychologists and historians that readily anticipates a problem and catches it in flight. . . . I have

scarcely detected a few meagre preliminary efforts to explore the *history of the origins* of these feelings and valuations. . . . In one particular case I have done everything to encourage a sympathy and talent for this type of history—in vain, as it seems to me today.”³⁷ As Walter Kaufmann’s commentary on the text suggests, this is probably a reference to Rée given its similarity to Nietzsche’s denial of Rée’s significance for his thought in anything but a negative way.³⁸ The later Nietzsche claims that he dissented thoroughly from Rée’s ideas and sought to correct them.³⁹ Moreover, he goes beyond denying what he has learned from his former friend but even turns himself into Rée’s educator when it seems that, initially at least, the reverse was true. Rée’s importance is also denied in the later Nietzsche’s reflections on HH where he is anxious to correct the impression that this is a work of “higher ‘rééalism’” by noting that it departs from several of Rée’s beliefs. This anxiety drives Nietzsche to make himself the thinker praised for his coldness and boldness and even to become the author of Rée’s book: “(*lisez*: Nietzsche, the first *immoralist*).”⁴⁰ Rée is written out of the story of Nietzsche’s intellectual development once more when, in the preface to AOM, Nietzsche suggests that after rejecting Wagner, he found himself utterly alone.⁴¹

Style

The invention of independence that can be traced from Nietzsche’s middle to later works is also apparent when it comes to the question of style. Many commentators contend that knowing Rée and reading the French moralists stimulated Nietzsche’s experiments with the aphoristic style of writing which begin with HH.⁴² Indeed, Nietzsche invites some comparisons between his thought and the moralist tradition with his discussion of “Larochefoucauld or those related to him in style and spirit” which moves quickly into a reflection on the effort required to perfect maxims.⁴³ Given Nietzsche’s admiration for and emulation of their writing style, the French moralists are probably among those alluded to when “A vanished preparation for art” asserts that to learn to “write well in a modern language . . . one is compelled to send oneself to school with the older French writers.”⁴⁴

In the later works, by contrast, Nietzsche typically denies the importance of anything but ancient writings for his development. He willingly acknowledges his debts to ancients such as Heraclitus and Thucydides and claims that “it is really only quite a small number of books of antiquity which count for anything in my life; the most famous are not among them.”⁴⁵ In a bald denial of the middle period’s many acknowledgments

of the thinkers from whom one can learn to write, he declares that an ancient writer was his only teacher: "My sense of . . . the epigram as style, was awoken almost instantaneously on coming into contact with Sallust."⁴⁶

Whereas in the later works Nietzsche engages in what I have called the invention of invention, the middle period writings can be considered as Nietzsche's "dialogues with the dead."⁴⁷ In these writings, he not only develops, but presents himself as developing, his thoughts through imagined exchanges with earlier thinkers. What the phrase "dialogues with the dead" captures is the idea that these thinkers appear in Nietzsche's texts as touchstones for his own ideas and arguments. And through this we witness an important part of the process through which he becomes who he is.

This further suggests that what the middle period writings convey is the way that reading is a resource for becoming who one is. The process of making oneself as a thinker draws not only on internal resources but occurs in contest and cooperation with other thinkers via reading. The process of reading, borrowing and discarding is a form of literary self-making where the raw materials are not just the thinker's immediate self but also the traditions available to them. Nietzsche's own comments are a propos here: "The imagination of a good artist or thinker is productive continually, of good, bad and mediocre things, but his *power of judgement*, sharpened and practised to the highest degree, rejects, selects, knots together. . . . All the great artists have been great workers, inexhaustible not only in invention but also in rejecting, sifting, transforming, ordering."⁴⁸ While this process becomes transparent through a study of the middle period writings, it is largely obscured in Nietzsche's later works.

In the works of the middle period, Nietzsche reflects on what originality is and concludes that it is not seeing something new, but seeing existing things as if they were new or providing names for them.⁴⁹ He also contrasts "the modern rage for originality" unfavorably with the Greeks and their respect for convention.⁵⁰ He also depicts himself as continuing a tradition of free spirited thinking, suggesting that one is unworthy of the "free spirit" epithet unless one is willing to "pay homage in his own way to those men to whom this name has been applied as an *insult*."⁵¹ Yet this sense of belonging to and perpetuating a tradition of free spirited thought disappears with the advent of *Z*. The reason is clear enough; *Z* is not an overtly scholarly work, and its poetic, lyrical quality would be threatened by direct discussions of other writers. For the works that follow, however, this explanation does not hold.

What could account for this change in Nietzsche's self-presentation, from the way he depicts himself as productively engaged with the West-

ern tradition to his invention of invention? Solomon's references to Nietzsche's "rage against his solitude and suffering" and his "intellectual loneliness" are salient here.⁵² This loneliness was not a chronic feature of Nietzsche's life. During the years of his middle period, he enjoyed the intellectual companionship of Rée, Franz and Ida Overbeck, and later Lou Salomé. By the time he was writing *Z*, although he maintained a network of friends, often through correspondence, he had broken with Rée and Salomé, losing two of the most important friendships of his life.⁵³ His insistence on solitude and independence as marks of the higher individual occur much more frequently after this break, so perhaps Nietzsche is making a virtue of necessity; turning this particular "thus it was" into "thus I willed it."⁵⁴ Along with the loss of these friends was his decline in popularity with the reading public. The works after *BT* were greeted with deafening silence and according to Ida Overbeck, Nietzsche "suffered very much . . . because he was so little known and read."⁵⁵ Nietzsche himself acknowledges his lack of recognition in *EH*: "I have been neither heard nor even so much as seen."⁵⁶ Although he attributes this to the inadequacy of his readers compared to the magnitude of his task, his self-depiction as a lone intellectual pioneer could also help Nietzsche explain to himself why his works were so little read: he was so ahead of his time and so removed from the past that few contemporaries could appreciate him.

Another possible explanation for the change in Nietzsche's self-presentation is that the death of God was so cataclysmic an event that it necessitated a fundamental break with postclassical writers. Anything written during the Christian era lost its value with the realization that its fundamental premise—the existence of God—was false. As one of the sections enunciating God's death observes, "how much must collapse now that this faith has been undermined because it was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it; for example, the whole of our European morality."⁵⁷ One problem with this explanation, however, is that while the writings of the middle period accept that God is dead,⁵⁸ they demonstrate repeatedly Nietzsche's willingness to present himself as productively engaged with a range of thinkers from the past, not just pre-Christian ones. A further difficulty arises from the fact that the later Nietzsche is willing to use past thinkers when it suits him, suggesting that the death of God does not discredit all previous claims about the moral life. Consider, for example, the way he enlists Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld, and Kant as fellow critics of pity.⁵⁹

Yet another possible reason for Nietzsche's invention of invention is a broader cultural one. Carl Pletsch's discussion of the myth of genius may help to explain the later Nietzsche's dramatization of the solitude of

scholarship, for Pletsch points out that part of the social construction of the genius as it emerged in eighteenth-century Europe was of the lonely, outcast quester after truth.⁶⁰ The idea of wholly spontaneous creation, independent of external influences, is an important feature of the social construction of genius. As such, this ethos did not permit cooperation with others in the growth of genius.⁶¹ While the works of the middle period continually reflect on what constitutes and conduces to genius,⁶² there is little to suggest that Nietzsche considers himself in these terms. His interest in genius is probably as a consequence of his study of Schopenhauer and relationship with Wagner. From Z onward, however, Nietzsche is much more willing to portray himself in accordance with the myth of genius by emphasizing his originality, independence, and innovation. In EH for example, he suggests that he has never had to struggle for his achievements, let alone learn from anyone else: "I have at no time had the remotest idea what was growing within me . . . all my abilities one day *leapt forth* suddenly ripe, in their final perfection. I cannot remember ever having taken any trouble—no trace of *struggle* can be discovered in my life."⁶³ As such, his depiction of "the aged sage" in the middle period can be seen as prophetic: "When in earlier years he compared himself with other, older thinkers, it was so as seriously to measure his weakness against their strength and to grow colder and freer towards himself: now he does it only so as to intoxicate himself in his own delusions."⁶⁴

Finally, the later Nietzsche's invention of invention could be illuminated by one of his own aphorisms, for one warns that "He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster."⁶⁵ Despite this caveat, Nietzsche falls into the trap of the traditional philosophy he wrestles with so relentlessly, for both believe that "everything of the first rank must be *causa sui*. Origin in something else counts as an objection, as casting a doubt on value."⁶⁶

Whatever its cause or causes, it is only by studying the works of the middle period that this shift in Nietzsche's self-presentation, his invention of invention, comes to light. Only then is it possible to see that he did not always present himself as a radical critic of the Western tradition whose own thought was unprecedented and whose development owed little to postclassical philosophers.

Ad hominem

Another consequence of the neglect of the works of the middle period is that many critics construct a single, unchanging Nietzsche by imputing to him views and attitudes that are actually peculiar to one of his periods.

This attribution of views to Nietzsche unmodified can involve exaggeration and misrepresentation. Solomon, for example, has drawn attention to Nietzsche's redemption of the ad hominem argument. While this approach has traditionally been deemed illogical because it attacks the person not the argument, Solomon sees it as a corollary of Nietzsche's interest in psychology and belief in the close connection between an individual's personality and philosophy or morality. The ad hominem strategy does not ignore the argument altogether but contends that no position can be evaluated on its intellectual merits alone; the psyche of its author, advocates, and adherents must be considered for its fuller appreciation. What motivates an argument or morality, its psychological or physiological wellsprings, is thus seen as central to its evaluation for Nietzsche.⁶⁷

Most of Solomon's illustrations of Nietzsche's use of the ad hominem strategy come from the later works. In the works of the middle period, the ad hominem strategy is not a central part of Nietzsche's intellectual repertoire. Notwithstanding his lively interest in psychology and motivation in these works, he does not typically appraise ideas by reference to the motives, drives, or personality of their authors or advocates.⁶⁸ Solomon points to Nietzsche's claim from the middle period that "every philosophy is a philosophy of a certain stage of life"⁶⁹ to illustrate the ad hominem approach. Here Nietzsche does adopt the ad hominem approach by considering the personality of philosophers as crucial for explaining their teachings and suggests a tight connection between ideas and temperament. Some other passages from the middle period that illustrate the ad hominem device relate to Christianity. Nietzsche claims to explain ideas and beliefs by reference to motivation of their authors or adherents when he appeals to the vanity of St. Paul and Calvin to explain their belief in eternal damnation for many,⁷⁰ and when he claims that Christianity attracts those whose life is "empty and monotonous."⁷¹

For Solomon, "the virtue of an ad hominem argument is that it displays not only an author's manifest intentions but the *deeper, usually unpublished secrets* that explain those intentions."⁷² The presumption of omniscience that seems to accompany the ad hominem approach could help to explain its relative absence from the works of Nietzsche's middle period. A fundamental premise of the ad hominem strategy appears to be that its practitioner has the requisite understanding of the inner life of others to explain their espousal of or adherence to a particular position.⁷³ If Nietzsche is the ad hominem's master practitioner, he must both aspire to and achieve a "God's eye view" of the motivation and psyche and even physical condition of all those upon whom he comments and passes judgment.⁷⁴ Yet such intellectual audacity is not typical of the works of

the middle period. On the contrary, these works tend to stress the mystery and complexity of the psyche. Moreover, at one point Nietzsche admits that “to know the strength of a man’s moral nature one has to know the best and the worst he is capable of in thought and deed. But to learn that is impossible.”⁷⁵ While he might not always adhere to the epistemological diffidence such outlooks encourage,⁷⁶ his pretensions to full insight into the psyches of others are much more muted in the middle period.

For Solomon, it is Nietzsche’s analysis of motivation that contributes to his criticism (and occasional praise) of particular perspectives; however, in the absence of evidence that Nietzsche has met the monumental task of really understanding the intentions and their sources of all those arguments he evaluates, the reverse explanation seems more plausible: that he imputes ignoble motives to arguments he dislikes and noble ones to those that please him.

Any argument about the centrality of the ad hominem strategy to Nietzsche’s work encounters further problems when confronted with the books of the middle period, for not only do they contain little evidence of this approach, but several passages counsel *against* the sort of reading the ad hominem approach requires. Nietzsche suggests, for example, that a defendant only resorts to “casting suspicion on the motives behind his [our opponent’s] objections” when unable to mount a rational intellectual reply.⁷⁷ In contrast to the attempt to discredit philosophical adversaries by ad hominem means, Nietzsche makes respecting one’s enemies rather than caricaturing them a measure of intellectual quality. He advances as the “natural measure of every intellect” the way thinkers “interpret and reproduce the opinions of their opponents. . . . the perfect sage, without even knowing it elevates his opponent into the ideal and purifies his contradictory opinion of every blemish and adventitiousness.”⁷⁸ This contrasts markedly with his later justification of the ad hominem approach: “Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures—at least in imagination—and, as it were, to starve them. . . . Among immoralists it is the moralist: Plato, for example, becomes a caricature in my hands.”⁷⁹

Nietzsche addresses the more general issue of evaluating a work with reference to its writer in the “Writings of acquaintances and their readers.” He observes that when readers encounter the work of someone they know, they scan the text for signs of the writer’s personality and history as well as trying to evaluate its argument. Yet “these two kinds of reading and evaluating disturb one another.” His preference for the second type of reading “which seeks to determine what his work is worth in itself, what evaluation it deserves apart from its author, what enrichment of knowledge it brings with it” is implied when he goes on to say that

even a conversation is better when its participants forget their friendship and become absorbed in the matter under discussion.⁸⁰ Despite the immediate relationships this passage discusses, it can be extended to reading in general, to the interpretation of writers one has never met. This suggests that instead of looking for eruptions of the author's identity in a text, readers should focus on the quality of its argument.

Similar criticism of looking for the personal element in writing appears with Nietzsche's declaration that "the worst readers of maxims are the friends of their author when they are exercised to trace the general observation back to the particular event to which the maxim owes its origin: for through this prying they render all the author's efforts null and void, so that, instead of philosophical instruction, all they receive (and all they deserve to receive) is the satisfaction of a vulgar curiosity."⁸¹ The importance of separating authors from their work is evident again in the claim that it harms a good book's reception if "its living author is celebrated and much is known about him: for all the world is accustomed to confound the author with his work."⁸² The risk of confusing work and author is addressed when Nietzsche discusses the dangerous custom of inscribing the title page of a book with its author's name, for "the reader at once dilutes the quintessence again with the personality, indeed with what is most personal, and thus thwarts the object of the book."⁸³ Nietzsche's resistance to the idea of a work being evaluated by reference to the psyche and motivations of its author appears again in the maxim that "when his work opens its mouth, the author has to shut his."⁸⁴

Nietzsche's suspicion of the *ad hominem* approach to interpretation can be linked to the middle period's admiration and emulation of scientific virtues.⁸⁵ However, there is also a particular approach to writing and to selfhood that accompanies these hermeneutic questions. The strategy of reading texts symptomatically, which accompanies the *ad hominem* approach to hermeneutics, makes sense when writing is seen as an expression of the author's character. In BGE, for example, Nietzsche claims that "every great philosophy has hitherto been a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir."⁸⁶ However, just as he is wary of symptomatic readings in the middle period, so there is a suggestion that some writing can transcend the sort of self-expression that the symptomatic approach to interpretation presupposes. Nietzsche contrasts the genius of Plato, Spinoza, and Goethe with that of Schopenhauer. His erstwhile educator was one of those who "could *never get free* from their temperament [but] knew how to endow it with the most spiritual, expansive, universal, indeed sometimes cosmic expression." Geniuses of his sort are "unable to fly above and beyond themselves, but they believed that wherever they flew they would discover and

rediscover *themselves*.” While he concedes that this is a form of greatness, it is inferior to the greatness of those whose vision “seems not to have grown out of their temperament and character, but, free from these and usually in mild opposition to them, looks down on the world as on a god and loves this god.”⁸⁷

Any suspicion of symptomatic readings disappears from Nietzsche’s later writings. In dramatic contrast to the middle period’s caveats against looking for the personal element in a writer’s work, Nietzsche insists that “in the philosopher . . . there is nothing whatever impersonal; and, above all, his morality bears decided and decisive testimony to *who he is*.”⁸⁸ In the fifth book of GS, he notes that “once one has trained one’s eyes to recognize in a scholarly treatise the scholar’s intellectual *idiosyncrasy*—every scholar has one—and to catch it in the act, one will almost always behold behind this the scholar’s ‘prehistory,’ his family, and especially their occupations and crafts.”⁸⁹ He is confident that “cramped intestines betray themselves. . . . Every scholarly book also mirrors a soul that has become crooked.”⁹⁰ This approach is again evident in the claim that Spinoza privileged the will to self-preservation because he was consumptive. More generally, the prevalent belief that self-preservation is the central drive can be explained by the fact that most natural scientists are descended from “poor and undistinguished people who knew the difficulties of survival only too well.”⁹¹ This change in attitude to symptomatic reading shows that Nietzsche’s praise of the ad hominem approach, just as his practice of it, is much more muted in the works of the middle period. When this is combined with the realization that the invention of invention is characteristic of the later works only, the dangers of generalizing about Nietzsche without taking the middle period works into account are revealed again.

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Conclusion

In his seminal work on Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann dismisses as “untenable dogma” the idea that the writings of the so-called middle period represent a distinct stage in Nietzsche’s oeuvre. Kaufmann contends instead that there is continuity between these writings and Nietzsche’s earlier and later works.¹ Lest one dogma replace another, I have argued throughout this book that while there are some elements of continuity across Nietzsche’s writings, there are also some distinctive characteristics of the middle period writings.

One way of summarizing some of these differences is to say that an interest in and openness to the dialogical aspect of life and selfhood, to the parts that relations with others play in how we are constituted, pervade these writings. For example, when vanity dominates the psyche, individuals are powerfully concerned with the image they believe others have of them. Yet this sort of personality engages only with an imagined or self-made other; there is no real exchange with another self. In friendship and the higher pity that it alone makes possible, the opposite obtains: there is a real knowledge of and engagement with the other and a blurring of boundaries between self and other. Friendship and dialogue emerge as major features of Nietzsche’s image of higher marriages in the

works of the middle period. The motif of dialogue also plays an important role at a metatheoretical level in these works, for they reveal a Nietzsche willing to show himself as constructively engaged with myriad writers from the Western tradition.

Even those readers who find this argument unconvincing or unappealing should accept that one of the valuable things to emerge from a close study of the middle period writings is the insight we get into the processes whereby the later Nietzsche came into being. Studying these works allow us to see which ideas and ideals permeate his writings and which are characteristic of one of his periods. Only through the sort of genealogical inquiry made possible by a study of the middle period writings can we see what theoretical and normative choices Nietzsche made across the course of his writing career. Looking at the possibilities he jettisons as he moves from the middle to the later writings heightens an appreciation of how he gives himself a distinctive identity. He makes himself as a thinker through the approaches he adopts, as well as through the possibilities he discards. My readings suggest that in several cases Nietzsche's move from the middle period to the later writings represents not so much the adoption of wholly new ideas as the preference for one of the possibilities available in the middle period and the rejection of another. His discussions of state formation, of aristocracy, and of gender illustrate this trend.

I have also advanced the more contentious claim that in some cases the possibilities left behind are more valuable than those preferred. This is the case when the topic is women, marriage, friendship, and pity. More generally, I have argued that Nietzsche's practice as a psychologist in the middle period is superior to that of the later works, largely because of the middle period's fascination with the mystery, motility, and complexity of the psyche. My judgments about the superior worth of the middle period writings are not made solely on the basis of subjective preferences. In many ways, the middle writings realize more fully some of Nietzsche's own values such as self-reflexive criticism, antidogmatism, openness to possibilities and a willingness to be surprised by one's findings, and the unmasking of becoming in what had seemed to be being, of the made in the given, and of contingency in necessity.

Yet many readers will, no doubt, disagree with aspects of my interpretation of Nietzsche's middle period. But if this drives them to, or back to, these writings, my point about their undue neglect might become obsolete and some of this book's purpose will have been realized. In closing, I want to address a more fundamental objection that might arise, irrespective of how convincing readers find my particular claims or more general arguments. This has to do with the question of Nietzsche's style.

In forging this interpretation of Nietzsche's middle writings, I have proceeded on the assumption that it is possible to retrieve recurrent themes and concerns from works that are often referred to as aphoristic.² Some readers will find this imposition of order on what seems to be chaos, of unity on what seems to be diversity, unpersuasive, illegitimate, and perhaps even objectionable.

In contrast to my approach, many commentators impute a realist dimension to Nietzsche's use of the aphorism and his discontinuous style in general, implying that he uses style to represent as accurately as possible something about the world or his perspective on it. Nietzsche's use of the aphorism can be explained by the way it subverts systematization and the belief in unity, identity, univocal meaning, and discrete cause. Alexander Nehamas claims that aphorisms "are not systematic, not discursive and not argumentative"³ and sees their adoption as part of Nietzsche's use of style to attack traditional philosophy. For Sarah Kofman, the aphorism evades definitive interpretation and fosters instead an unending plurality of interpretations. In so doing it conveys a vision of perpetual motion.⁴

Yet the congruence between form and content presupposed by such approaches is questioned by one of Nietzsche's own aphorisms: "Do you think this work must be fragmentary because I give it to you (and have to give it to you) in fragments?"⁵ There are also several sections where, despite the writing being broken into aphorisms or paragraphs, continuity is obvious. The opening of book 2 of HH is a good illustration of this. Section 35 is subtitled "Advantages of psychological observation," section 36 is "Objection," while section 37 is entitled "Nevertheless."⁶ Elsewhere, Nietzsche writes that "to him who has thought a great deal every new thought he hears or reads at once appears in the form of a link in a chain."⁷ This further challenges the idea that he uses the aphorism to convey discontinuous thinking. Looking back on HH in later life, he claims moreover that "from the very beginning they [the ideas] were not isolated thoughts, nor random or sporadic ones, but sprang from a common thought, from a primary desire for knowledge, legislating from deep down in increasingly precise terms, increasingly precise demands."⁸ In interpreting the middle period writings, I have followed the suggestion of passages like these by focusing on what I see as the central themes of these works, on their recurrent concerns and on what unites them, rather than on their centrifugal tendencies.⁹

The questions Nietzsche poses about the relationship between form and content, either explicitly or tacitly through the way he organizes his text, are not the only justification for the hermeneutical approach adopted here. What marks the middle period writings is not so much the

use of the aphorism as Nietzsche's stylistic diversity. These works often use paragraphs of varying lengths along with *caractères*, anecdotes and *petits dialogues philosophiques*. Thus the maxim or aphorism is not the only element of style employed in the middle period, and it would be unwise to infer too much about Nietzsche's meaning from its use.¹⁰

The aphorism is well suited to fine-grained analyses of personality and to the communication of specificity, which are prominent features of Nietzsche's explorations of the psyche in the work of the middle period. However, this is only one aspect of his analysis. The aphorism's ability to animate the other qualities he values and strives to realize in examining moral life is not so great. It is singularly unsuitable for the times when his analysis takes a broad trajectory in moral observation and speculation. Born of a limited arena—the salon—the aphorism cannot bear the historical breadth that attracts Nietzsche. His purview often requires lengthier argument and illustration (or allusion and assertion) than the aphorism can offer which explains why, when he wants to emphasize the history of moral designations or exemplify an alternative ethic, he reverts to the longer paragraph form, which can occupy two or more pages and which might be better called an essayette or Reflection than an aphorism.¹¹ Moreover, as this book repeatedly illustrates, there are many topics which Nietzsche approaches via a multitude of styles: he will discuss them in an aphorism and a paragraph and a longer passage. Those who classify the middle period works as aphoristic and who reject the idea of interpreting them in the sort of unifying way I have, seem therefore to neglect that “most manifold art of style”¹² that characterizes Nietzsche's middle period.

Notes

Introduction

1. The prefaces of HH, D, and GS do not belong to the same period as the works they introduce, each being added in 1886. Book 5 of GS, "We Fearless Ones," was written in 1887, after *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), which puts it, too, beyond the purview of the middle period.

2. Cf. Richard Schacht's claim in his introduction to HH (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xiii. Consider several recent major studies of Nietzsche: Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche and Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Peter J. Burgard, *Nietzsche and the Feminine* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), and Peter Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). All pay scant attention to the middle period. Even studies that do discuss its works, such as Maudemarie Clark's *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) accord its works less attention than the later ones. Julian Young's *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) is an exception, devoting a chapter to both HH and GS. Peter Heller's work *Von den ersten und letzten Dingen* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972) must be noted in this context; it analyzes sections 1–34 of HH in great detail. However, some of the key concepts explored in this book, such as vanity, friendship, and marriage are not discussed by Heller.

3. According to Michael Tanner, D is the most neglected of Nietzsche's works. See his introduction to D (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), xi. He makes a similar claim in *Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 26. This view is echoed by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter in their introduction to D (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), vii.

4. Her *Friedrich Nietzsche in Seinen Werke* was published in 1894. It has been republished as *Nietzsche*, ed. S. Mandel (Connecticut: Black Swan Books, 1988).

5. One problem with Salomé's classification is that Nietzsche's last period seems to be a residual category, embracing everything written after book 4 of GS. Classifying Z with works like GM and TI seems insensitive to the peculiarities of

the former. At one point Salomé acknowledges the distinctive nature of Z (Salomé, *Nietzsche*, 123), but this does not alter her classification. I try to avoid this trap when dealing with the later works, for sometimes the comparisons between them and the middle period works vary according to which part of the later works is being considered.

6. Nietzsche's discussion of the Dionysian is a major example of such return (Salomé, *Nietzsche*, 40–41). Michael Gillespie has recently noted that two of what he takes to be the most important features of Nietzsche's thought—the notion of the Dionysian and the role of music—recede in the middle period. See his *Nilism Before Nietzsche* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 215–16, 234. Thomas Heilke also comments on the absence of the Dionysian in the middle period in *Nietzsche's Tragic Regime* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), 176, 203.

7. Cf. W. D. Williams, *Nietzsche and the French* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), xi, 6–7, 92–93, and Brendan Donnellan, *Nietzsche and the French Moralists* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1982), xii, 3, 29.

8. These works became volume two of HH in 1886.

9. HH 1. Cf. 5. Graham Parkes suggests that the publication of HH signaled “a new phase of Nietzsche's work.” *Composing the Soul* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 121. Ronald Hayman calls the first of his chapters to deal with this phase of Nietzsche's life “*Volte Face*” in *Nietzsche: A Critical Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 190–220. Cf. Carl Pletsch, *Young Nietzsche* (New York: Macmillan, 1991), 202.

10. The back cover of the first edition of GS and its English translation are reproduced on pages 28 and 30, respectively, of the Kaufmann edition of GS used here.

11. See EH, Z, 6 and foreword, 4. The tripartite periodization deployed here has not, however, gone unchallenged. Young argues that when Nietzsche's views about art become the focus of inquiry, four periods can be discerned (*Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art*, 1). But Young's fourfold division of Nietzsche's oeuvre poses no threat to the tripartite scheme employed here because he concludes that the “important transitions within this period” notwithstanding, “there are sound reasons for regarding Nietzsche's works between 1876 (after UM) and 1882 as a unity, as together constituting a “positivistic” or “middle period,” 73. (Cf. 146.) William Schaberg shares Young's view that Nietzsche's corpus falls into four parts but contends that what is called the middle period is the second of those parts. For him these three works are united by their message of “insightful observations and scientific psychological scepticism.” See his *Nietzsche's Publication History As an Insight into the Philosopher and His Works* (Connecticut: Uebermensch Press 1995), 1.

12. Cf. Schacht's introduction to HH xix. For opposing views on the status of these works, see Werner Dannhauser, *Nietzsche's View of Socrates* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 158; Donnellan, *Nietzsche and the French Moralists*, xii; Adrian Del Caro, *Nietzsche Contra Nietzsche: Creativity and the Anti-Romantic* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 158–59, 161–62, and Tanner, *Nietzsche*, 36, 44.

13. As Schacht says of Nietzsche's achievement in HH: “Even if he had died without publishing another thing . . . it would have earned him an important place in

the intellectual history of the past several centuries—even if a somewhat different place than the one he has come to have.” HH introduction, xiv.

14. D, 133. Compare HH’s claim that “the richer a man feels within himself, the more polyphonic his subjectivity is” (111). According to Salomé, Nietzsche “willingly relinquishes personal unity—the more polyphonic the subject, the more it pleases him” (*Nietzsche*, 20). For Parkes, “the whole point of Nietzsche’s psychology is . . . to hear the polyphony behind the apparent univocality of the first person singular” (*Composing the Soul*, 310). As Ansell-Pearson says in *An Introduction to Nietzsche As a Political Thinker*, “the important thing . . . is to ensure that the *question of Nietzsche*—of who he is . . . is kept open,” 3.

15. Pref. ii. [*dass sie reifer, heller, stärker, vollkommener geworden sind*]

16. GM pref. viii. Of course, Nietzsche could be referring here to all the works published before GM, but the ones he has named are HH, WS, and D.

17. GM pref. iv.

18. In their recent introduction to D, Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter conclude that the book’s importance “may lie primarily in its ability to show that his later genealogy of morality did not emerge from thin air nor spring full-blown from Nietzsche’s head, but was the product of a serious and sustained effort to understand what morality is and how it could have arisen on the assumption that it is a purely natural phenomenon” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xxxiv.

19. Parkes, *Composing the Soul*, 2 and Robert Solomon “Nietzsche *Ad Hominem*: Perspectivism, Personality, and *Ressentiment* Revisited” in *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 180.

20. BGE 23, 45; HH pref. 8; EH, Excellent, 5, 6.

21. GM pref. iii. [*ein angeborener wählerischer Sinn in Hinsicht auf psychologische Fragen überhaupt*]

22. As the coming chapters illustrate, Schacht’s claim about HH applies to the other middle period works. HH shows “Nietzsche as a psychologist both under development and at work, inventing a kind of psychologizing for which he found a wealth of applications around him.” (HH intro. xiv.)

23. BGE 260; GM 1: xvi; A 45.

24. BGE 201.

25. BGE 215; TI “MA” 32.

26. BGE 31.

27. See WS 249, D 370; HH pref. 1; GM 3: xxiv; WP 446. Introducing D, Tanner says that “Nietzsche was then at his least dogmatically-minded,” xi.

28. I am drawing here on Charles Taylor’s notion of “the dialogical self” as summarized in “The Politics of Recognition” in *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 230–31. His argument appears in a fuller form in “The Dialogical Self” in *The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture*, ed. D. Hiley et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 304–14.

29. Introducing HH, Schacht attributes this general neglect of the middle period works partly to the influence of Walter Kaufmann.

30. As Schacht says, when read from the perspective of the later works, the

books of the middle period “are generally found to pale by comparison, both rhetorically and philosophically.” HH intro. xix.

31. *Nihilism Before Nietzsche*, xxiii.

Chapter One

1. GM pref ii. As Thomas Heilke says, *Human, All Too Human* would be Nietzsche’s first attempt “to present a history of the moral sensations (what he would come to call a psychology) and the insights it gives into the human soul.” *Nietzsche’s Tragic Regime* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), 167. Michel Foucault frequently draws upon the works of the middle period in his discussion of genealogy in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 76–100.

2. HH 1. Cf. 37.

3. WS 3. Cf. D 44.

4. D 42. Cf. 102, HH 249, 252.

5. HH 92. Cf. 96, 99, 246; WS 40, 285; D 26, 49, 102, 248; GS 49.

6. HH 34. Cf. 56, 107.

7. HH 2. Cf. 16, 27, 42, 101, 107, 443; AOM 223; WS 43. As Alexander Nehamas puts it, “having an origin is being part of history, and this implies that it is at least possible also to have an end.” *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 33.

8. D 38, 131, 157, 195; GS 116, 152.

9. HH 95.

10. GS 117.

11. GS 335.

12. HH 134.

13. Immanuel Kant claims that the thought of duty and the moral law “has by way of reason alone . . . an influence on the human heart . . . so much more powerful than all the further impulsions capable of being called up from the field of experience that in the consciousness of its own dignity reason despises these impulsions and is gradually able to become their master.” *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), 78–79.

14. Raymond Geuss, “Nietzsche and Genealogy,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 2, no. 3 (Dec. 1994): 274–92. This article contains no references to HH, AOM, or WS and all those to GS come from book 5. One of the two references to D illustrates Nietzsche’s critique of free will (D 112). The other is to D 44. While Geuss is justified in invoking it to illustrate Nietzsche’s claim that the origins of a morality can be very different from its current values, Nietzsche is challenging the tendency to glorify the origin here, rather than saying that ‘base’ origins need not discredit lofty values.

15. Geuss, “Nietzsche and Genealogy,” 287.

16. HH 34; GS 21.

17. Thus Kant contrasts moral action, which is inspired by reverence for the moral law, with action based on interest, inclination, or need. He warns against “the slack, or indeed ignoble, attitude which seeks for the moral principle among empiri-

cal motives and laws.” *Groundwork*, 93; cf. 65, 81, 122. A paper by Fredrick Appel has helped my thinking about this with its comparison between Kant’s and Nietzsche’s approaches to ethics. “Natural Affinities? The Concept of Nature in J. S. Mill & Nietzsche,” presented at the 92nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 30 August 1996. Cited with author’s permission.

18. The validity of Geuss’s claim is also threatened by Nietzsche’s later critique of George Eliot: “When one gives up Christian belief one thereby deprives oneself of the *right* to Christian morality. . . . Christianity is a system, a consistently thought out and *complete* view of things. If one breaks out of it a fundamental idea, the belief in God, one thereby breaks the whole thing to pieces. . . . Christian morality . . . stands or falls with the belief in God.” TI EUM 5.

19. Cf. Paul Redding in “Child of the English Genealogists: Nietzsche’s affiliation with the critical historical mode of the Enlightenment” in *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*, ed. Paul Patton (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 216. Nietzsche’s distinction between active and passive nihilism (WP 22) is deployed by Michael Gillespie. He contends that while passive nihilism feels despair and resignation at the erosion of value, active nihilism deliberately seeks to destroy values. Although it does not aspire to replace them with anything, it has an instrumental value for the creation of new values. By clearing the ground it prepares the way for the possibility of the creation of higher values by some other affirmative force. *Nihilism Before Nietzsche* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 179–80.

20. WS 19.

21. GS 58.

22. HH 34.

23. WS 327.

24. GS 115.

25. D 147. Cf. 261.

26. D 26. Cf. 31. As Graham Parkes says, “Nietzsche takes delight in bringing us back down to earth and emphasizing our kinship with the animals.” *Composing the Soul* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 213.

27. D 241, 312.

28. D 26. Cf. 212.

29. D 26.

30. WS 183.

31. WS 350.

32. AOM 62.

33. GS 3.

34. This interpretation would be contested by Richard Schacht, who finds in HH a naturalism that is “tough-minded” and “coldly and severely analytical.” See his editor’s introduction to HH (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xv, xviii. Cf. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter in their introduction to D (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xii.

35. AOM 220.

36. On this point, see also Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 11; Bonnie Honig, *Political*

Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 46; Peter Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 3; and Fredrick Appel, *Nietzsche Contra Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

37. WS 212.

38. D 103.

39. The aesthetic side is touched on below but elaborated upon in the next chapter's account of Nietzsche's critique of free will.

40. WS 86.

41. WS 45.

42. GS 2. Cf. 29, 319, 335; HH 227; AOM 43; WS 48; D 149, 196. Werner Dannhauser traces the shifts in the depiction of Socrates across Nietzsche's career, offering this as a microcosm for the wider changes and continuities in his thought. He notes that "during the second stage of his development Nietzsche is most favourably disposed to Socrates." *Nietzsche's View of Socrates* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 20.

43. WS 185. A variation on this position appears in "Of Voluntary Death" in book 1 of Z although the accent on rationality has been replaced by aesthetic and organic imagery.

44. GS 328.

45. HH 96. Cf. AOM 89, D 9, 19, 34, 132.

46. HH 97, 99; WS 114. Kantian morality is, however, an exception to this, never allowing the sense of duty to become customary, easy, or familiar. Hence Nietzsche's conclusion that it contains a concealed "remnant of ascetic cruelty." D 339.

47. GS 116. Cf. HH 95, 224; AOM 89; WS 28, 34, 40, 44; D 18, 132, 173; GS 1, 21, 117, 296, 328.

48. WS 57.

49. D 9. Cf. 98, 496; AOM 90; GS 4.

50. WS 40.

51. D 230.

52. HH 224. Cf. GS 1, 4.

53. HH 632. Cf. GS 19.

54. HH 99. In part 1, chapter 8 of *Leviathan*, Hobbes writes that, "To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. . . . Justice and injustice . . . are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude" (London: Collins, 1974). See Heilke, *Nietzsche's Tragic Regime*, 144–45, for other comparisons of Hobbes and Nietzsche.

55. "If there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men." Hobbes, *Leviathan*, part 2, chapter 7.

56. HH 99.

57. HH 452.

58. HH 452.

59. BGE 259.

60. 247. Nietzsche even says that humans do this in an attempt to eliminate “the crudest forms of the *bellum omnium contra omnes*” (247).

61. WS 31. Cf. 22.

62. WS 31.

63. WS 31.

64. WS 31.

65. GM 2: xvii.

66. BGE 13; GS 349.

67. HH 224.

68. WS 44.

69. GS 1.

70. GS 116.

71. TI FGE 2; WP 430. This is clear in the portrayal of Socrates as one who “all his life long . . . laugh[ed] at the clumsy incapacity of his noble Athenians, who were men of instinct, like all noble men, and were never able to supply adequate information about the reasons for their actions” (BGE 191). By TI, Nietzsche’s major explanation for the rise and the success of Socrates and Plato is that Athenian society was in decay (PS 2, 5, 9; WOA 3. Cf. EH, Wise, 1; BT 1, 2). The belief that holding rational self-reflection in high esteem is a symptom of decline continues with the argument that Christianity built upon this Socratic quest for knowledge and practice of self-interrogation (TI PS 11).

Chapter Two

1. HH 36. Cf. D 115. As Michael Gillespie observes, “Nietzsche’s studies during this period focus on the individual, on his passions and drives, his self-deception, his subordination to his own illusions.” *Nilism Before Nietzsche* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 216. Cf. 234, 249. Cf. Graham Parkes, *Composing the Soul* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 4 and W. D. Williams, *Nietzsche and the French* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), 49.

2. HH 1, 8, 38; AOM 13; GS 335.

3. HH 37. Cf. 1, 16, 38. Following Parkes (*Composing the Soul*, 385, note 9), I have changed Hollingdale’s translation of “*des psychologischen Secirtisches*” from “of the moral” to “of the psychological” dissecting table.

4. Peter Berkowitz says that Nietzsche’s genealogies reduce “the whole complex and multifarious moral past of mankind to two competing moralities” and that “his genealogy is painted in black and white.” *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 68. Robert Pippin claims that a “basic, somewhat crude contrast” between self-assertion and weakness underpins Nietzsche’s view of modernity. “Nietzsche’s Alleged Farewell: The Premodern, Modern and Postmodern Nietzsche” in *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 269. Paul Redding calls Nietzsche “nothing if not extreme” in “Child of the English Genealogists: Nietzsche’s Affiliation with the Critical Historical Mode of the Enlightenment,” in

Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory, ed. Paul Patton (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 220. “Characteristic overstatement” is found in him by Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason* (London: Methuen, 1984), 1. Tendencies “to extremes and exaggeration of expression” are noted by Michael Tanner in *Nietzsche* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4.

5. WS 285. Cf. HH 56, 107.

6. WS 20.

7. HH 63. Cf. 225–27.

8. HH 4, 627.

9. HH 366

10. AOM 158; D 323.

11. GS 1, 23, 50, 116, 117, 149, 174, 195, 296, 328.

12. GS 2, 3, 40, 301.

13. BGE 30.

14. EH WC 4. Cf. BGE 263.

15. [*die Viel-zu-Vielen*] from Z 1:20. Cf. 3:8. However, the middle period cannot be treated homogeneously in this regard, for just as the herd epithet emerges in GS, so this work’s discussion of “The pride of classical antiquity” (GS 18) represents an early rumination on what becomes Nietzsche’s ‘pathos of distance’ argument (BGE 257; GM 3: xiv; TI EUM 37; A 43). Yet rather than argue that the reinstitution of rigid social distinctions is necessary for true nobility to prosper as the later works do, this passage only reflects that modern society is devoid of such distinctions: “not even metaphorically does the word “slave” possess its full power for us” (GS 18).

16. See, for example, my reviews of Bonnie Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* and Paul Patton, ed., *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory in The Australian Journal of Political Science* 29, no. 1 (March 1994). Fredrick Appel’s *Nietzsche contra Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) offers a fuller discussion of this tendency.

17. WS 173.

18. HH 49.

19. EH D 1.

20. D 33.

21. HH 49. Aspects of the unclouded suspicion of the works of the middle period are sometimes noted in the secondary literature. Peter Heller, for example, draws attention to the “more restrained and more complex statements which characterize the scepticism of *Human, All too Human*” in *Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition*, ed. James O’Flaherty et al. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 133. Arthur Danto notes in a chapter on D that Nietzsche had “not yet acquired the strident conviction of a prophet unheeded” in *Reading Nietzsche*, ed. Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 190.

22. HH 36.

23. WS 285.

24. WS 20.

25. D 357.

26. See Robert Solomon, “Nietzsche *Ad Hominem*: Perspectivism, Personality, and *Ressentiment* Revisited” in *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 207 and Parkes, *Composing the Soul*, 2, respectively, for these remarks. Donnellan also detects reductionism in this period, writing of Nietzsche’s “method of psychological analysis at this new stage of his work, reducing every aspect of human behaviour to a basic motive often disturbingly at variance with the conscious one.” *Nietzsche and the French Moralists* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1982), xi. Cf. 70. He associates this with “La Rochefoucauld and his school” (xi) and writes that “nowhere is the influence of the French on Nietzsche’s middle period more apparent than in his adoption of La Rochefoucauld’s reductionist methods of moral analysis” (70). However, just as Nietzsche’s analyzes are not reductionist, I also argue that while La Rochefoucauld does attribute most things to *amour-propre*, the variety of its manifestations frees his analysis from the predicability and monochromism of most reductionism. See Ruth Abbey, “Descent and Dissent: Nietzsche’s Reading of Two French Moralists” (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1994), for a fuller discussion of this.

27. GS 7.

28. See HH 314, 346, 367; AOM 44, 236, 326; WS 70, 346; D 97, 362, 375, 395; GS 49.

29. D 525.

30. D 133, 277, GS 97, 263.

31. HH 595, AOM 56, 80, 14.

32. HH 14. As Parkes says, “It is a main trait of the genealogical method to take what appears to be a unitary phenomenon and disclose its multiple origins, showing it to be generated by a plurality of drives.” *Composing the Soul*, 277. Cf. Raymond Geuss, “Nietzsche and Genealogy,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 2, no. 3 (Dec. 1994), 276.

33. HH 596, 607; WS 33; D 116, 385.

34. For references to these impediments, see, respectively, D 119, 129; GS 333; HH 32, 222, 618; AOM 17; HH 68; D 302; AOM 37; and AOM 387; WS 316.

35. GS 335. Cf. 9.

36. AOM 366. Cf. D 119.

37. D 343.

38. GS 15.

39. AOM 296.

40. WS 37.

41. AOM 37.

42. GS 319.

43. D 48. Cf. GS 112, 246.

44. AOM 223.

45. D 163.

46. BGE 281; GM Pref. i.

47. GS 354. Cf. TI EUM 26. This is a more emphatic expression of a point made in the middle period. In D 115, Nietzsche notes that words only express our more extreme emotional states, yet the most personal parts of ourselves lie in the milder, mid-

dle, and lower degrees of emotions. “Language and the prejudices upon which language is based” pose “a manifold hindrance” to the understanding of inner drives and processes. Yet this does not stop the Nietzsche of the middle period from attempting the sort of highly nuanced accounts of the psyche that language discourages.

48. BGE 32.

49. GS 350.

50. BGE 260; TI FGE 2.

51. AOM 51. Cf. GS 110, 127, 117.

52. WS 23. Cf. HH 99; WS 68.

53. AOM 50; WS 12, 50; D 128.

54. WS 11.

55. HH 18.

56. D 78.

57. WS 9.

58. HH 54, 70, 72; WS 28; D 326, 336.

59. AOM 36.

60. WS 12; GS 117.

61. HH 91. Nietzsche also concedes that despite its erroneous premise, holding individuals responsible for their actions has some social utility, for punishing those who damage the community deters others from the same, just as rewarding useful acts encourages their emulation (HH 105; WS 323). According to Donnellan, Nietzsche picked up this idea about deterrence and emulation from Rée (“Friedrich Nietzsche and Paul Rée: Cooperation and Conflict,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 43 [1982]: 604). But it seems he did not thoroughly consider its consistency with his wider attack on free will. If action is not the product of free will, notions of deterrence and encouragement must lose their purchase. This is because these notions assume that people choose to act or not in a particular way, that individuals calculate the rewards or punishments of certain courses of action and pursue or reject them on that basis. Yet this does not seem to be Nietzsche’s final position on the utility of deterrence, for he later mounts a critique of the practice of punishing some in order to dissuade others (WS 186). He reiterates his point that individuals are not responsible for their actions, but this does not lead him to question the impact deterrence could have on potential miscreants. His focus here is the criminal. He claims that punishing a wrongdoer to deter others reduces the punished individual to a means to social ends and thus applies the Kantian belief that individuals should be treated as ends-in-themselves to the practice of deterrence. In short, it is hard to extract a coherent position on the deterrent effects of the belief in free will from Nietzsche’s middle period writings.

62. HH 144.

63. AOM 33. Cf. 50.

64. HH 39. Cf. 43, 106, 107; WS 61, 286; D 13, 130, 208.

65. HH 102. Cf. 34.

66. HH 107. Cf. 133; D 3, 468, 499.

67. HH 34, 107.

68. D 56.

69. AOM 51, 336. Nietzsche's plea that the positive consequences of unintentional action be recognized is even extended to writing. WS includes a vow "never again to read an author of whom it is apparent that he wanted to produce a book: but only those whose thoughts unintentionally became a book." WS 121

70. HH 227, 313; D 360; GS 3.

71. HH 225. For other references to free spirits or free spiritedness in the middle period, see HH 30, 231; AOM 11, 21, 113, 211; WS 330; D 146; GS 180.

72. HH 483, 629–33, 637; WS 317. Nietzsche's critique of convictions persists into the later works. Consider A's broadside against convictions [*Ueberzeugungen*]: They "are prisons. . . Freedom from convictions of any kind, the *capacity* for an unconstrained view, *pertains* to strength. . . The man of faith, the 'believer' of every sort is necessarily a dependent man" (54; cf. GS 347). As Leslie Paul Thiele writes, the Nietzschean hero is characterized "by the willingness to attack his own convictions and prejudices." "The Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault's Thought," *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (1990): 911.

73. For discussions of these points, see, respectively, D 9, GS 297; AOM 20, 295; WS 333; D 56, 297, 370, 573; WS 182, D 58, 89, 91.

74. HH 225; cf. 226, 230; GS 2. Indeed, Nietzsche goes so far as to present superstition as a form of freethinking. Compared with the religious person, the superstitious one is a "second-order free spirit" because s/he is not adhering to the dominant religious orthodoxy. The prevalence of superstition in a society therefore "always appears as *progress* and as a sign that the intellect is becoming more independent and demands its rights" (GS 23; cf. 143).

75. HH 427. Cf. AOM 211; GS 297.

76. HH 225.

77. HH 286.

78. HH 3; AOM 211; GS 50, 51, 283.

79. D 550.

80. D 456. Cf. GS 335.

81. HH 288.

82. AOM 211.

83. GS 35.

84. GS 319.

85. [*mit Willen vollziehbarer Act*] WS 236. Cf. 297.

86. D 509.

87. GS 107. The importance of avoiding shame appears most powerfully in GS's confessions, for three of these have shame as their subject. "Those who always want to put to shame" are bad (273), sparing someone shame is "most humane" (274), and to the question "What is the seal of liberation?" comes the reply "No longer being ashamed in front of oneself" (275).

88. D 148. Cf. 53; HH 27, 133, 141; AOM 329; D 563; GS 130.

89. GS 294.

90. HH 124.

91. HH 595.

92. D 516.

93. GS 290. Cf. 305; D 517, 538.

94. HH 56.

95. AOM 220.

96. GS 122.

97. This discussion of free will shows that some of the concerns that animate Nietzsche's discussion of the Dionysian appear here without being labeled as such. Gillespie says, for example, that "from the Dionysian perspective, the individual does not have a free will and thus is not responsible for his actions" and that Dionysus "liberates human beings not merely from guilt but also from shame." *Nihilism Before Nietzsche*, 222.

98. It is perhaps for this reason that as the later Nietzsche further elaborates his aesthetic approach to the self, he restores a notion of responsibility to the noble personality. A detailed discussion of this notion appears in the chapter on Nietzsche in Honig's *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*. For a discussion of noble responsibility in a political context, see Ruth Abbey and Fredrick Appel, "Nietzsche and the Will to Politics," *Review of Politics* 60, no. 1 (1998): 99–101.

99. HH 56.

100. GS 47.

101. GS 290. Cf. HH 617; D 218.

102. GS 290.

103. [*dass uns diess frei steht?*] D 560.

104. D 548.

105. AOM 366.

106. Cf. one of his later reflections on HH: "The expression 'free spirit' should here be understood in no other sense: a spirit that has *become free*, that has again seized possession of itself" EH, HH 1. Honig's comments on Nietzsche's critique of free will are apposite here. She writes that "when Nietzsche talks about the *myth* of free will, he does not do so from a position of simple determinism. He means to denaturalize the will, not to deny its existence. Similarly, he does not deny its freedoms, but he does want to point to the will's always conditioned character." *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*, 224, note 34.

Chapter Three

1. HH 292.

2. D 79.

3. HH 101. As Brendan Donnellan notes, "egoism represents for him neither 'sin' . . . nor even 'vice' in the traditional moralistic sense, but simply an inescapable condition of existence of the human organism." *Nietzsche and the French Moralists* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1982), 72. Illustrations of the way these terms usually bear negative connotations appear in HH 133; AOM 91, 385; D 79, 143, 215, 516; GS 328.

4. D 148.

5. WS 60.

6. Here my reading differs from Donnellan's. He claims that Nietzsche "uses the term 'vanity' [*die Eitelkeit*] to designate a broader range of meaning than is normally

associated with it; it appears to contain the ideas of egoism and self-interest.” *Nietzsche and the French Moralists*, 76.

7. WS 285. Cf. HH 133; D 148. Asceticism poses a threat to this premise about the ubiquity of egoism, because it seems to deny and efface the self. However, Nietzsche goes to considerable lengths to expose asceticism as disguised egoism or vanity. See HH 141 and D 113.

8. HH 104.

9. HH 252.

10. HH 95.

11. GS 49.

12. HH 85.

13. AOM 91; D 529.

14. HH 99. Cf. 104.

15. HH 103.

16. HH 107. Just as Nietzsche likens the understanding of moral life to that of nature and art, so his depiction of the innocence of egoism in moral life has parallels in aesthetics. He praises “*innocent music* . . . which thinks wholly and solely of itself, believes in itself, and has forgotten the world in contemplation of itself.” D 255. Later he claims that “what is distinctively Wagnerian in Wagner’s heroes . . . [is] the innocence of the highest selfishness” [*die Unschuld der höchsten Selbstsucht*]. GS 99. I have altered Kaufmann’s translation here from utmost to highest.

17. D 38.

18. D 210. Cf. HH 28, 141.

19. HH 134.

20. HH 144.

21. HH 124.

22. HH 95.

23. Compare Donnellan’s claim that “The theme of vanity seems to play an almost disproportionate role in Nietzsche’s aphoristic works. It is analysed . . . much more frequently than the wider concept of egoism itself. The frequency and the variety of forms in which it occurs suggest that the characteristic occupied a central role in Nietzsche’s view of human psychology.” *Nietzsche and the French Moralists*, 76. Nietzsche’s interest in vanity could reflect Paul Rée’s influence, for Rée’s first work, which was never published, was *On Vanity*. Lou Salomé in *Conversations with Nietzsche*, ed. Sander L. Gilman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 117.

24. AOM 46.

25. HH 107. Nietzsche’s question in WS 285, “Without vanity and egoism—what are the human virtues?” also suggests that they are interchangeable. However, the German nouns are *Eitelkeit* and *Selbstsucht*, vanity and selfishness or self-seeking, not egoism which suggests that this passage is a variation on Nietzsche’s claim that many things deemed evil by current moralities actually make those moralities possible.

26. From the beginning of WS.

27. HH 79.

28. D 159.

29. The aphorism in HH 82, “Skin of the soul,” for example, does not castigate

vanity. Likening vanity to a part of the body gives some indication that it is not to be condemned. Nor should it be assumed that because vanity conceals the passions it is culpable, for Nietzsche maintains that although self-transparency and some measure of self-revelation are generally good, the latter is not an unmitigated good. Some self-concealment and dissimulation can be not only necessary but desirable.

30. WS 60. Contrast Donnellan again, who argues that “vanity and self-interest, traditionally associated with emptiness and worthlessness, are admitted by Nietzsche as necessary, if often unattractive, ingredients in confident behaviour.” *Nietzsche and the French Moralists*, 79.

31. AOM 50; WS 12; D 130.

32. HH 89.

33. GS 263.

34. HH 89. Cf. D 385.

35. HH 545.

36. WS 50.

37. HH 158.

38. HH 89.

39. D 291.

40. HH 373. Cf. D 291.

41. HH 137.

42. HH 89.

43. HH 527.

44. HH 313.

45. AOM 38. Cf. HH 545.

46. AOM 234.

47. HH 170.

48. HH 338, 401; AOM 263; WS 40; D 394.

49. D 558.

50. HH 546.

51. HH 583.

52. AOM 393.

53. HH 63. In D 357, Nietzsche extends this analysis to the practice of psychology, criticizing those moralists who lack a love of knowledge but are driven instead by “the pleasure of causing pain” as cruel [*grausames*] and pathetic [*jämmerliches*].

54. D 517.

55. GS 290.

56. HH 329. Cf. 588. Paul Patton takes up this point that only the weak seek to hurt others in “Politics and the concept of power in Hobbes and Nietzsche,” in *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*, ed. Paul Patton (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 157. He uses it to support his wider claim that Nietzsche adduces a notion of power that need not entail domination (145). However, this ignores Nietzsche’s acceptance that superior types can damage others inadvertently, which indicates that minimizing such damage and domination is not of primary concern to Nietzsche.

57. GS 13.

58. WS 263; GS 120. In a young Marxian moment in HH 300, however, Nietzsche distinguishes between “Two kinds of equality.” One seeks to reduce everyone to the lowest common denominator and the other to raise all up. Compare Marx’s distinction between crude and positive communism in the “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844” in *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, intro. Lucio Colletti (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), 346. While clearly preferring the equality that elevates, Nietzsche does not, in contrast to Marx, advocate it. In the light of his general views, this passage must be seen as evaluating the ways the “thirst for equality” can satisfy itself rather than prescribing its satiation.

59. HH 360.

60. Cf. WS 344. “The good victory must put the conquered into a joyful mood, it must possess something divine that does not *put to shame*.”

61. GS 283.

62. D 371.

63. WS 181.

64. While Nietzsche writes throughout his works of the will to and spirit of revenge, by my reckoning, the term *ressentiment* does not appear until after BGE. See GM 1: x, xiv; TI PS 7; WOA 4; A 40, 43; WP 167, 172, 179, 373, 579, 864, 1021. In stark contrast to the link between vanity and *ressentiment* posited here, Donnellan detects “a clear line of development in Nietzsche’s thought from the numerous analyses of pettier aspects of vanity in HH to the self-sufficient narcissism of the superman.” “Friedrich Nietzsche and Paul Rée: Cooperation and Conflict,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 43 (1982): 599.

65. GM 1: x.

66. BGE 287.

67. HH 144.

68. A 40.

69. TI PS 8.

70. GM 1: x.

71. Ibid.

72. GM 3: xv.

73. HH 137.

74. WP 765.

75. HH 105.

76. AOM 64.

77. WS 34.

78. GS 267.

79. HH 92.

80. D 112. The importance of this discussion is suggested by the fact that GM’s preface refers readers to it (iv).

81. HH 93.

82. WS 39.

83. HH 457. Although he evaluates it differently from Nietzsche, this claim is borne out in Charles Taylor’s discussion of “The Politics of Recognition” in *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). Taylor claims

that one of the social changes that has led to the “modern preoccupation with identity and recognition” (226) is the collapse of old social hierarchies and the notion of honor that went with them. This has been superseded by an idea of human dignity premised upon some sense of fundamental human equality. He concludes that “forms of equal recognition have been essential to democratic culture” (227), manifesting themselves in demands for equal recognition of different races, genders, and ethnicities (232).

84. HH 81.

85. HH 101.

86. HH 101. Cf. 601.

87. WS 57.

88. HH 104.

89. D 118.

90. HH 101.

91. Ibid.

92. GS 289. Cf. HH 452, 473.

93. D 112. This insistence on the need for practical wisdom in negotiating just outcomes, combined with the rejection of universal human equality, suggests that Nietzsche's new notion of justice is really an old one recycled, for his thinking about justice is close to Aristotle's. Aristotle's claim that it is as unfair to treat unequals equally as it is to treat equals unequally captures one of Nietzsche's major grievances against modern theories of society and politics. In *The Politics* (III, ix, 1280a7), Aristotle writes that “it is thought that justice is equality; and so it is, but not for all persons, only for those who are equal. Inequality is also thought to be just; and so it is, but not for all, only for the unequal. We make bad mistakes if we neglect this ‘for whom’ when we are deciding what is just.” (Trans. T. A. Sinclair [London: Penguin, 1981], 195). The later Nietzsche reiterates this Aristotelian approach: “‘Equality for equals, inequality for unequals’—*that* would be the true voice of justice: and, what follows from it, ‘Never make equal what is unequal.’” TI EUM 48.

94. BGE 143, 176, 222; GS 346, 360; TI MAN 3; A 14, 43.

95. TI EUM 48. Cf. BGE 222.

96. Z 2: 21.

97. BGE 261.

98. BGE 261.

99. HH 546, 583.

100. HH 74.

101. See Z 3: 5.2; BGE 199, 206.

102. AOM 230.

103. WS 212. Cf. AOM 288.

104. HH 139.

105. HH 464. Cf. 38.

106. AOM 326

107. AOM 77.

108. AOM 365.

109. HH 631.

- 110. GS 99.
- 111. HH 463.
- 112. HH 114.

Chapter Four

- 1. GM pref. v.
- 2. GS 271.
- 3. AOM 385.
- 4. Werner Dannhauser's Nietzsche "deprecates pity" (*Nietzsche's View of Socrates*, [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974], 21) while Peter Berkowitz concludes that pity "is definitely a catastrophe for the higher types" in *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 105. Cf. 214. Graham Little sees Nietzsche as suspicious of pity. *Friendship: Being Ourselves with Others* (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1993), 43. Cf. Nehamas in *Reading Nietzsche*, ed. Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 53. Ellen Kennedy holds that pity is one of the virtues Nietzsche transvalues because of its feminine and life-denying nature. "Women as *Untermensch*" in *Women in Western Political Philosophy*, ed. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), 18. Charles Taylor claims that Nietzsche "declared benevolence the ultimate obstacle to self-affirmation" in *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 343. Cf. 518. As such it must be repudiated by those aspiring to "higher fulfilment." [*Sources*, 423; cf. 455, 499, 516.]
- 5. Cf. Leslie Paul Thiele's position in "The Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault's Thought," *American Political Science Review* 84 no. 3 (Sept. 1990): 907–25.
- 6. D 133. Cf. HH 103.
- 7. WS 50. Cf. D 131, 134, 135.
- 8. D 137, 174.
- 9. GS 338.
- 10. This possibility is rejected by Randall Havas in his detailed analysis of Nietzsche's view of pity. Discussing D, he concludes that "when pity moves one to act . . . it is always one's own suffering that one is trying to diminish." *Nietzsche's Genealogy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 220 note 76.
- 11. HH 103, 299; D 80, 136; GS 188. Even Rousseau, who praises pity, acknowledges its selfish component. In book 4 of *Emile*, he writes that "pity is sweet, because, when we put ourselves in the place of one who suffers, we are aware, nevertheless, of the pleasure of not suffering like him." Trans. Barbara Foxley (London: Dent, 1966), 182.
- 12. HH 50.
- 13. HH 321.
- 14. D 224.
- 15. D 133.
- 16. Ibid.
- 17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. D 172.

21. HH 50.

22. This enlistment of La Rochefoucauld as a fellow critic of pity continues in the later works. In GM the moralist and Plato are again twinned as critics of pity and are joined by Spinoza and Kant (pref. v). However, contrary to Nietzsche's portrayal, pity is not really chief among the moralist's concerns. One of La Rochefoucauld's long maxims does expose pity as a form of *amour propre*, for what moves people in the suffering of others is the imagining of themselves suffering in the same way, rather than any genuine feeling for the other. One helps those in distress in the expectation that they will reciprocate in the event of one's own misfortunes, so that "the services we render them are, properly speaking, good that we do for ourselves in advance." *Maximes et Réflexions Diverses*, intro. Jacques Truchet (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1977), 264. However, the moralist has little else to say on this subject in the *Maximes* or the *Réflexions Diverses*. His most extended discussion of pity comes in his Self-Portrait, but even there it only occupies one paragraph among four pages.

23. HH 50.

24. This is not to suggest that in this period Nietzsche sees rational capacity as irrelevant to morality. He declares that morality is closely "tied to the quality of the intellect" for acting in accordance with morality can require a good memory or powerful imagination (HH 59). But this could be ironic, especially given his earlier claim that lying also requires a good memory (HH 54). Nietzsche describes rare types as combining moral and intellectual genius (HH 157) and as capable of the broadest empathy and suffering, which again suggests that quality of mind is closely tied to ethical sensibility. However, the ambiguity of his ensuing skepticism toward such types makes it unclear whether he genuinely mistrusts them or is voicing the response of the mass of ordinary humans. It would seem that for Nietzsche a powerful intellect is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the higher ethical life he admires, and that lower types cleave to common, debasing moralities because they lack not reason but other personal qualities. Indeed, if his analyses are accurate, they require a good deal of cunning and calculation to execute their acts against others.

25. GS 13.

26. Consider the later Nietzsche's willingness to see Socrates' dialectical inquiries as a new form of agonistic striving. TI PS 8; WP 432.

27. WS 50.

28. D 380.

29. D 80.

30. HH 321.

31. GS 338.

32. AOM 62.

33. GS 338.

34. AOM 187; GS 48.

35. WS 62.

36. D 134. Cf. 137.

37. GS 338. Cf. 302.

38. D 174. Cf. 133; HH 50.

39. GS 325.

40. D 146. Cf. 467, 562.

41. GS 338.

42. D 91; GS 226.

43. A passage from Nietzsche's correspondence reinforces this reading. To Peter Gast he writes "even now the whole of my philosophy totters after one hour's sympathetic intercourse with total strangers. It seems to me so foolish to insist on being in the right at the expense of love." (20.8.1880 in *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. Oscar Levy [New York: Doubleday Page, 1921], 130–31.) Nietzsche's attack on pity is also probably associated with his fear of being an object of pity himself, given the chronic illnesses he suffered. Leslie Chamberlain claims that he "campaign[ed] against the whole of Christian and humanist moral philosophy . . . because of the forces which threatened to destroy him personally: pity and sickness." *Nietzsche in Turin* (London: Quartet Books, 1997), 156.

44. GS 32.

45. D 133, 142; GS 99. Surely Nietzsche's "endless compassion" [*so weiss ich . . . des Erbarmens kein Ende*] for Schopenhauer because of his "frivolous and worthless rubbish," his faith in the unifying power of pity (D 142) is ironic.

46. D 133. According to Brendan Donnellan, Rée believed in the possibility of genuinely disinterested pity. See "Friedrich Nietzsche and Paul Rée: Cooperation and Conflict," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 43: 602. So it could be that Nietzsche is also trying to dissuade his friend in arguing so hard against this.

47. D 142.

48. Ibid.

49. D 142.

50. HH 363.

51. AOM 68.

52. GS 338.

53. HH 33.

54. Ibid.

55. GS 337.

56. Ibid. This passage also seems to be an early formulation of the affirmation of life in its fullness that accompanies Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return.

57. HH 49.

58. HH 48, 589.

59. HH 50. Cf. D 351.

60. HH 225.

61. HH 50.

62. GS 13.

63. HH 49.

64. WS 40.

65. [*aus Mitleid und Güte*] WS 175. As this illustrates, *das Mitleid* does not always bear negative connotations in the middle period. Cf. HH 45, 46.

66. AOM 196.

67. GS 338. This important qualification to Nietzsche's criticism of pity is ignored by Havas. Citing this very passage, he concludes that Nietzsche's attack on the morality of pity "turns on his rejection of the idea that compassion lifts the pitier out of himself and places him in a more intimate relationship to the sufferer than he normally enjoys . . . it is precisely the idea that the emotion of pity allows the pitier as it were to *inhabit* the sufferer that . . . prevents the pitier from listening to him in the right way." *Nietzsche's Genealogy*, 220. Cf. 221. While this is one aspect of Nietzsche's attack on the morality of pity, it ignores his concession that pity can be genuine when expressed in a particular way among friends. Indeed, in contrast to the reading offered here, Havas contends that what animates Nietzsche's various analyses of pity is the desire "to emphasise the sufferer's *solitude*—his or her unavailability to the pitier." *Ibid.*

68. HH 46.

69. *Ibid.*

70. Her paper "Collective Responsibility and Collective Imagination" was presented at the Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy and Agency conference at the Australian National University, 28–30 June 1996. Cited with the author's permission.

71. Cf. Joel Feinberg, *Doing and Deserving* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 231.

72. Cf. *Ibid.* 250.

73. "Collective Responsibility and Collective Imagination," 7. As the title suggests, Lloyd is interested in the operations of wider collective responsibility too and considers the ways in which white Australians might take responsibility for the injustices done to the indigenous inhabitants despite the fact that individually and collectively this generation did not cause the suffering. But one of her illustrations is a more intimate one; Jacques Derrida's friendship with Paul De Man and his response to the posthumous charges about De Man's collaboration with Nazism. *Ibid.* 7–9.

74. *Doing and Deserving*, 236.

75. *Ibid.* 237. In his analysis, which seems to capture what Nietzsche is describing when he discusses sympathy between friends, Feinberg invokes H. D. Lewis's notion of "sympathetic identification."

76. D 138.

77. AOM 282. Against this sort of pity, Nietzsche's higher sort of pity has, ironically, many parallels with the ethic of care outlined by Carole Gilligan in *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 17, 58–59. But he clearly does not share her presumption of equality. *Ibid.* 63.

78. According to Havas, for example, Nietzsche condemns pity because it is presumptuous; it presupposes knowledge of things that are actually mysterious, such as the other's particular suffering, how best to relieve this and how to bridge the gap between sufferer and pitier. Hence, his claim that for Nietzsche pity is "insufficiently sceptical toward the sufferer." *Nietzsche's Genealogy*, 221. Cf. 222, 224. He also claims that pity strives to eliminate rather than to acknowledge suffering. *Ibid.*

79. D 138.

80. AOM 187.

81. WS 174.

82. GS 338.

83. AOM 61.

84. D 174.

85. This more emancipatory alternative is denied by Havas who concludes that although the notion of compassion might “be thought to provide a handy way of referring to the later attitude [simply to *listen* to the sufferer], Nietzsche himself scandalously recommends contempt as the healthy alternative to pity. But this . . . cannot properly be understood from the slavish point of view.” *Nietzsche’s Genealogy*, 222.

86. This is not to suggest that any kind of action can be engaged in nobly for Nietzsche. His adoption of certain classical beliefs makes things like manual labour (D 206) and moneymaking (GS 21) incompatible with nobility. Leisure is also such a vital part of the Nietzschean good life (GS 42) that it would be hard to be noble and always occupied with some necessary task. Nor is it to suggest that disposition alone determines greatness; while stance and motivation are crucial, deeds are also important, for *becoming* what one *is* requires discharging one’s talents “in works and actions.” (HH 263; cf. D 22.)

87. Z 4: 7; BGE 199, 202, 222, 260; GM pref v; TI EUM 37; A 7.

88. A 2.

89. EH, Wise, 4.

90. BGE 199.

91. EH, Destiny, 4.

92. TI MAN 3.

93. BGE 41.

94. Z 2: 3.

95. D 174.

96. BGE 225. Cf. Zarathustra’s claim that “God has died of his pity for man.” Z 2: 3

97. [*Mitleid also gegen Mitleid*] BGE 225.

98. BGE 293.

99. BGE 221. Cf. 287; Z 3: 6, 11; TI EUM 33; A 57.

Chapter Five

1. Judith Shklar identifies Nietzsche as a misanthropist, defining misanthropy as “the absence of friendship.” *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 194–95, 222–23, 198–99. Discussing the middle period, Tarmo Kunnas refers to Nietzsche’s cynicism about friendship and belief that it can never be sincere. *Nietzsche on l’esprit de contradiction* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1980), 203. Alan Bloom reduces the differences between Nietzsche and Socrates to “that most ultimate form of human community, mutual understanding. . . . Socrates talks of his good friends, Nietzsche of his best enemies.” *Love and Friendship* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 542–43. Cf. Bonnie Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 41. On the importance of solitude for Nietzsche, see Werner Dannhauser, *Nietzsche’s View of Socrates* (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1974), 163; Brendan Donnellan, *Nietzsche and the French Moralists* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1982), 13; Ted Sadler's "The Postmodern Politicization of Nietzsche" in *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*, ed. Paul Patton (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1993) 226, 232; and Peter Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 171–73, 303 note 21. Exceptions to this consensus about Nietzsche's views on friendship can be found in Walter Kaufmann's, Introduction to GS, 6 and Michael Tanner's, Introduction to D ix. For discussions of friendship in the later works, see Graham Little, *Friendship: Being Ourselves with Others* (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1993), 24–26, 260; Fredrick Appel, *Nietzsche Contra Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); and John C. Coker, "Spectres of Friends and Friendship: A Reading of 'From High Mountains. Aftersong,'" *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 16 (Fall 1998): 1–32. Jacques Derrida discusses friendship in HH and Z in "Politics of Friendship," *American Imago* 50: 3 (1993): 353, 363–64 and *Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997).

2. "Politics of Friendship," 385.

3. Graham Parkes, *Composing the Soul* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 286.

4. From a letter dated 12.12.1870 in *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Doubleday Page, 1921), 97.

5. From a letter dated 28.2.1883 in *Nietzsche: Unpublished Letters*, ed. Karl F. Leidecker (London: Peter Owen, 1960), 103.

6. From a letter dated 19.11.1877 in Lou Salomé, *Nietzsche* (Connecticut: Black Swan Books, 1988), 61. Parkes identifies Rée as a "major stimulus" to Nietzsche's interest in psychology and their relationship as "crucial" to Nietzsche's development. *Composing the Soul*, 3–4.

7. Attention to the role of Nietzsche's friends in stimulating his thought provides a useful complement to Carl Pletsch's emphasis on mentor or father figures like Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Ritschl. With people like Rée, Salomé and the Overbecks, Nietzsche enjoyed a relationship that fostered his intellectual formation but was more equal and cooperative than most of the relationships Pletsch explores in *Young Nietzsche* (New York: Macmillan, 1991).

8. HH 354; D 503; GS 61.

9. Derrida, "Politics of Friendship," 359. This change is illustrated by Philippa Maddern's study of friendship in medieval England. She finds that "friendship was conceptually connected with a homely sense of close neighbourhood. Proverbial fifteenth-century wisdom was to 'let your neighbour feel your friendship' and to 'love your neighbour' whatever might betide . . . 'strangeness' was friendship's opposite pole." "'Best Trusted Friends': Concepts and Practices of Friendship among Fifteenth-Century Norfolk Gentry," *England in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Nicholas Rogers (Stanford: Paul Watkins, 1994), 105. Cf. 110, 115.

10. Contrast Thomas Heilke's claim that "Nietzsche's 'recovery' of the Greeks for pedagogical purposes does not necessarily imply a recovery of specific Greek notions of friendship, justice, temperance, courage, and so forth." *Nietzsche's Tragic Regime* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), 149.

11. HH 354.

12. D 503.

13. On Nietzsche's relationship with Montaigne, see Donnellan, *Nietzsche and the French Moralists*, 18–37, 134–36; Charles Andler, *Nietzsche, Sa Vie et Sa Pensée* (Paris: Editions Brossard, 1920), and W. D. Williams, *Nietzsche and the French* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952). For comparisons and contrasts of his views on friendship with those of La Rochefoucauld and Chamfort, see Ruth Abbey, "Descent and Dissent: Nietzsche's Reading of Two French Moralists" (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1994).

14. HH 327.

15. AOM 260.

16. HH 600.

17. HH 304.

18. D 471.

19. HH 477.

20. GS 337.

21. HH 180.

22. HH 368.

23. HH 368.

24. AOM 242.

25. D 313.

26. AOM 344.

27. HH 376. Cf. 32.

28. HH 376.

29. HH 352.

30. D 287. Dannhauser picks up on this dimension of Nietzsche's view of friendship, but fails to acknowledge that it is only one. *Nietzsche's View of Socrates*, 163.

31. HH 373.

32. D 364. Nietzsche depicts Schopenhauer as one of those types who wanted loved and needed "companions before whom they can venture to be as simple and open as they are before themselves and in whose presence they can cease to suffer the torment of silence and dissimulation" (SE 3: 140). An excerpt from one of his letters to Elisabeth suggests that he is also of this type: "It is precisely we solitary ones that require love and companions in whose presence we may be open and simple, and the eternal struggle of silence and dissimulation can cease. Yes, I am glad that I can be myself, openly and honestly with you, for you are such a good friend and companion." 22.1.1875 in Levy, *Selected Letters*, 101–2.

33. GS 226.

34. HH 319. This obviously applies to Nietzsche himself; as Leslie Chamberlain notes, "his friendships depended on correspondence." *Nietzsche in Turin* (London: Quartet Books, 1997), 14. Fritz Stern attributes considerable importance to Nietzsche's letters: "How magnificent, how revelatory, that correspondence is. . . . To his friends Nietzsche confides so much." "The Trouble with Publishers," *London Review of Books*, 19 Sept. 1996, p. 8. Nietzsche's "solicitous affection for his friends, and his compassion for them" (9) strikes Stern powerfully and leads him to contrast the public, published Nietzsche with the private correspondent. Characterizing the public figure, he attends to the "harshness and stridency, the verbal violence, the indiffer-

ence to or indeed exaltation of, suffering, the brutal outbursts and the contempt for 'the botched and the bungled.'" The letters, by contrast, deliver a Nietzsche who "craves and extends love, lives by gratitude and generosity." Yet as with so many of the interpretations of Nietzsche, this stark contrast between the published and the private writer can only be made in ignorance or neglect of the Nietzsche of the middle period. The Nietzsche to emerge from this study of his published writings is much closer to the personal Nietzsche Stern finds only in his letters.

35. HH 491.

36. D 556.

37. HH 360.

38. GS 16.

39. HH 253, 293; AOM 246, 393; WS 175.

40. HH 499.

41. AOM 62.

42. AOM 334.

43. HH 63.

44. AOM 263.

45. AOM 351.

46. HH 614. Cf. 497; GS 55.

47. GS 14.

48. The belief that difference can nourish friendship surfaces in Nietzsche's correspondence too. Of Ritschl and his wife, he says that "they have quite an incredible love and esteem for me. . . . They really are extremely liberal people with a great deal of strength of their own. They permit whatever they differ with to exist cheerfully and without bias, thus doing honour to themselves." Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 55. Compare his remark to Overbeck in September 1882 about his relationship with Salomé: "Our intelligence and our tastes are of one kin deep down. But apart from that the contrasts are so many that we constitute mutually the most instructive objects and subjects of instruction." Ibid. 92.

49. D 471.

50. AOM 231.

51. HH 376.

52. HH 368. This preference seems to shift over the course of the middle period. In GS 295, for example, preferring short to enduring habits, Nietzsche numbers "human beings" among the former and "constant association with the same people" among the latter, which seems to valorize the ladder model of friendship.

53. D 484, 489.

54. GS 279.

55. AOM 241.

56. HH 428.

57. AOM 251.

58. D 288 [*die edle herzliche Vertraulichkeit*].

59. D 437.

60. D 482.

61. HH 261. The idea that superior individuals need one another is a variation on

Nietzsche's earlier argument that "in the natural order of things there are always several geniuses who spur each other to action, even as they hold each other within the limits of measure. This is the core of the Hellenic notion of contest: it abominates the rule of one and fears its dangers; it desires, as a *protection* against the genius, another genius." HC 36–37. The parallels with HC also emerge when he observes that "the most fortunate thing that can happen in the evolution of an art is that several geniuses appear together and keep one another in bounds; in the course of this struggle the weaker and tenderer natures too will usually be granted light and air." HH 158. This imagery reappears in Nietzsche's later works; see BGE 258, 262; GS 371. It contains echoes of Immanuel Kant's idea of "unsocial sociability." *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. T. Humphrey (Indiana: Hackett, 1983), 32.

62. WS 234.

63. Honig sees Nietzsche as internalizing the struggle, so that various parts of the self battle with one another. *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*, 8–9. Cf. Peter Bergmann, *Nietzsche, "The Last Antipolitical German"* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 108. Leslie Paul Thiele insists upon the importance of agonism in Nietzsche's thought and portrays this as an inner struggle. "The Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault's Thought," *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 909–10, 913. He does note that Nietzsche wants his friends "to be his fiercest opponents" (910), but the view that prizes friends as ersatz enemies is more characteristic of the later than the middle writings. Moreover, Thiele's account passes imperceptibly from friends as enemies to the enemy within.

64. Contrast Donnellan's claim that while Nietzsche valued friendship during the middle period, he ranked the claims of individuality ahead of it because friendship is a static relationship that should not be allowed to impede individual growth. *Nietzsche and the French Moralists*, 84–85. Indeed, Nietzsche seems to have experienced friendship's spur himself. Writing to Paul Deussen in October 1868, he describes how he flourishes "in the circle of ambitious friends and associates and only regret that I do not have around me the excellent Paul Deussen." Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 49.

65. GS 98. That Nietzsche is thinking of his relationship with Wagner is suggested by his letter to Reinhart von Seydlitz dated 11.6.1878. "His and my endeavours are widely apart. This hurts me sufficiently, but in the service of truth one must be prepared to bring any sacrifice." Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 75.

66. [wenn man nämlich die Freiheit als die Freiheit grosser Seelen liebt, und durch ihn dieser Freiheit Gefahr droht]

67. The importance of friends taking strength from one another was a persistent theme of Nietzsche's correspondence with Rohde. In a letter dated 31.12.1873, he writes, "If I had not my friends, I wonder whether I should not myself begin to believe that I am demented. As it is, however, by my adherence to you I adhere to myself, and if we stand security for each other, something must ultimately result from our way of thinking—a possibility which until now the whole world had doubted." Levy, *Selected Letters*, 91–92. The following year he reflects on "how very lucky I have been during the last seven years and how little I can gauge how rich I am in my friends. Truth to tell, I live through you, I advance by leaning on your shoulders, for my self-esteem is wretchedly weak and you have to assure me of my own value again

and again.” Ibid. 98. Some years later (24.3.1881), he writes that “friends like yourself must help to sustain me in my belief in myself and this you do when you confide in me about your highest aims and hopes.” Ibid. 135.

68. AOM 247, 259.

69. AOM 252.

70. GS 329.

71. D 443.

72. WS 200. [*Eine Ensamkeit ohne Freunde, Bücher, Pflichten, Leidenschaften*]

73. GS 329.

74. Consider Aristotle’s discussion of contemplation in book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The accent is on self-sufficiency; both in contemplation being an end-in-itself and in the suggestion that this highest source of human happiness is a solitary pursuit (1178bff).

75. AOM 333.

76. AOM 348.

77. WS 235. D 482 and GS 167 also describe human relationships with the imagery of comestibles. Cf. BGE 282 and GS 364 in the later writings. Nietzsche’s use of this imagery is not unprecedented: Chamfort makes eating a metaphor for social relations. *Maximes et pensées, caractères et anecdotes*, pref. Jean Dagen (Paris: Garnier-Flammmarion, 1968), 1032. So does Francis Bacon. Little, *Friendship*, 21. One reason for this could be that so much social life has traditionally revolved around eating. Moreover, eating breaks down the boundaries of inside and outside, self and other in the way that close human relationships can.

78. D 323, 440, 473, 491, 499; GS 50.

79. D 485.

80. D 479, 531.

81. D 566. It is interesting to compare this with a remark of Nietzsche’s to Overbeck. On 30.7.1881, he writes of his discovery that many of his ideas had already been expressed by Spinoza. “My solitude . . . has at least for the time being become the solitude of two.” Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 83.

82. WS 269.

83. D 382. That Nietzsche did not always celebrate solitude also emerges in his correspondence. In a letter dated 10.6.1882 to Salomé, he wrote that “not only health, but still more *The Gay Science* drives me into solitude. I want to put an end to it.” Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 86. The following month he told her that “from now on when *you* will be my guide, I shall be *well* advised and need not be afraid. . . . I do not want to be lonely any longer and desire to learn how to become human.” Ibid. 87–88. To her and Rée in mid-December of that year, he wrote “I am touched in the head, half ready to be confined to the lunatic asylum, totally confused by my long loneliness.” Ibid. 96.

84. HH 316.

85. HH 625.

86. To his sister Elisabeth, he writes on 8.7.1886 that “perfect friendship is only possible *inter pares*! *Inter pares* an intoxicating word; it contains so much hope, savour and blessedness for him who is necessarily always alone; for him who is ‘different.’”

Levy, *Selected Letters*, 182. Those who conclude with Berkowitz that Nietzsche “denounced the belief in human equality as a calamitous conceit” fail to take account of the place of friendship in his thought. *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist*, 1.

87. HH 559.

88. Z Prologue.

89. Z 1: 14.

90. Z 1: 16.

91. BGE 167.

92. BGE 26.

93. BGE 260.

94. Z 1: 11, 22, 2: 6, 3: 6; BGE 26, 284; EH, Clever, 10.

95. BGE 265.

96. Although Nietzsche’s remarks about what an inspiration Napoleon was for Goethe (BGE 244; TI WGL 4, EUM 49), suggest that while this possibility is not given much theoretical attention, it has not been wholly eradicated from the later works.

97. GM 2: ii.

98. See, for example, EH, Wise, 8 and TI MA 3.

99. BGE 273.

100. BGE 27.

101. GM 3: viii.

102. BGE 41.

103. EH, Wise, 7.

104. TI MAN 3.

105. In the later period he bemoaned his lack of friends to Elisabeth; “my poor soul is so sensitive to injury and so full of longing for good friends, for people ‘who are my life.’ Get me a small circle of men who will listen to me and understand me—and then I shall be cured!” 8.7.1886 in Levy, *Selected Letters*, 183.

Chapter Six

1. See SE vi for example.

2. HH 635.

3. HH 107; AOM 31; D 550.

4. HH 6. Cf. 3, 10, 18, 13, 38, 108, 110, 135, 136, 146, 147, 148, 157, 159, 220, 245, 264, 272, 279; AOM 12, 30, 32, 206; WS 16.

5. HH 443.

6. An early formulation of the master/slave approach to morality does appear in the middle period. In one early passage, Nietzsche argues that the concept of goodness derives from those with the power to requite themselves, while those who are powerless are deemed bad. The good are a group ‘for themselves,’ while the bad are only so ‘in themselves’—they feel no sense of connection with one another. “Good and bad is for a long time the same thing as noble and base, master and slave.” HH 45. Presumably this is the passage to which Nietzsche refers readers. GM pref. iv. From this we see again that Nietzsche’s development does not always involve the

acquisition of new ideas; sometimes he simply gives greater prominence to existing ones or elaborates those embryonic in the middle period. We also get some insight into the theoretical choices he made.

7. AOM 221.

8. HH 475.

9. HH 26.

10. HH 237.

11. HH 463.

12. HH 26.

13. See, for example, Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 41. Thomas Heilke also claims that “the Greeks became for Nietzsche the source of a model of life and health.” *Nietzsche's Tragic Regime* (Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb, 1998), 59.

14. GS 123.

15. HH 237

16. HH 463.

17. D 453. Cf. HH 23, 248, 250; WS 63; D 171.

18. GS 337.

19. HH 55. Cf. 463; WS 221; D 197.

20. HH 244. Cf. 26; D 197.

21. GS 283. Cf. 92.

22. GS 32. Cf. 324.

23. D 567.

24. HH 431 and 433, respectively. Cf. Leslie Paul Thiele, “The Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault's Thought,” *American Political Science Review*, 84, no. 3 (Sept. 1990): 910, 912.

25. HH 595. Cf. D 45, 459, 501.

26. D 195.

27. GS 283.

28. AOM 25.

29. HH 37. Cf. 264, 609; D 41.

30. AOM 98.

31. GS 293.

32. HH 291.

33. AOM 98.

34. HH 3.

35. D 41.

36. HH 157.

37. AOM 206.

38. There are parallels here with Charles Taylor's discussion of Descartes' internalization of heroic ethos: “Strength, firmness, resolution, control, these are the crucial qualities, a subset of the warrior-aristocratic virtues, but now internalized. They are not deployed in great deeds of military valour in public space, but rather in the inner domination of passion by thought.” *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 153. Cf. 152–54.

39. D 547.

40. AOM 98.

41. GS 329.

42. HH 285.

43. GS 329. This concern with the speed of modern life does not, however, begin with the middle period. Describing the philosopher's perspective in SE, Nietzsche writes that when he thinks of "the haste and hurry now universal, of the increasing velocity of life, of the cessation of all contemplativeness and simplicity, he almost thinks that what he is seeing are the symptoms of a total extermination and uprooting of culture." (iv, 148)

44. AOM 47.

45. HH 284. Cf. GS 6.

46. WS 203.

47. HH 282. Cf. GS 329.

48. HH 283.

49. HH 291.

50. GS 42.

51. D 41.

52. D 42.

53. D 440.

54. D 41. Cf. 201.

55. D 173. Cf. GS 21.

56. GS 40.

57. GS 21.

58. There are some surprising parallels with the young Marx's attack on industrialization and capitalism for deforming the senses. In his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx claims that under capitalism "all the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the simple estrangement of *all* these senses—the sense of *having*." *Early Writings*, intro. Lucio Colletti, trans. Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), 352. Communism will remove this form of alienation and see "the complete *emancipation* of all human senses and attributes" (352). His claim that "*sense* which is a prisoner of crude practical need has only a *restricted* sense" (353) is especially close to Nietzsche's point about how incessant work destroys sensitivity.

59. D 178.

60. GS 329.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. GS 18, 188, 329.

64. HH 439.

65. HH 3. [*Allmählich wird nicht nur der Einzelne, sondern die gesamte Menschheit zu dieser Männlichkeit emporgehoben werden*]

66. HH 261. D 547 is also entitled "*Die Tyrannen des Geistes*." For other passages in the middle period where members of an elite recognize one another's superiority, see AOM 318 and D 96.

67. Ibid. Cf. HH 633.

68. HH 261.

69. D 179. Cf. 201. HH 438; GS 31.

70. HH 282.

71. WS 87. Nietzsche defines Europe as comprising “much more territory than geographical Europe, that little peninsula of Asia: America, especially, belongs to it. . . . On the other hand, the cultural concept ‘Europe’ does not include all of geographical Europe; it includes only those nations and ethnic minorities who possess a common past in Greece, Rome, Judaism, and Christianity.” WS 215.

72. D 201.

73. AOM 310. Why Nietzsche sees this as constituting a public danger seems to be explained in a later passage. He argues that “if property is henceforth to inspire more confidence and become more moral, we must keep open all paths to the accumulation of *moderate* wealth [*zum kleinen Vermögen*] through work, but prevent the sudden or unearned acquisition of riches; we must remove from the hands of private individuals and companies all those branches of trade and transportation favourable to the accumulation of *great* wealth, thus especially the trade in money—and regard those who possess too much as being as great a danger to society as those who possess nothing.” WS 285.

74. AOM 310.

75. AOM 317.

76. HH 493.

77. D 179. Cf. 186; GS 3.

78. HH 479.

79. HH 230.

80. HH 242.

81. HH 163. Cf. 521.

82. HH 486.

83. HH 263. This is the first expression in the middle period of the idea of “becoming who one is,” which Nietzsche takes as the subtitle of EH. The idea re-emerges in GS 270 and 335.

84. D 540.

85. Ibid.

86. HH 164.

87. D 267.

88. D 30.

89. D 35.

90. Domna Stanton, *The Aristocrat as Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 1–2.

91. HH 237.

92. D 247, 310.

93. HH 442.

94. D 272.

95. D 205.

96. HH 543.

97. D 163.

98. GS 134.

99. GS 39.

100. This is elaborated in “The Ethic of Care for the Self As a Practice of Freedom,” interview with Raul Fornet-Betancourt et al. in *The Final Foucault*, ed. J. Bernauer and D. Rasmussen (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1988). Foucault does not nominate Nietzsche as a source for this ethic, focusing almost exclusively on writers of antiquity (who also influenced Nietzsche). It seems that for Foucault, Nietzsche’s major legacies are epistemological and methodological, concerning issues like perspectivism, genealogy, and the connection between knowledge and power. See “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984). In an interview given while studying techniques of the self in antiquity, Foucault said that “what I owe to Nietzsche, derives mostly from the texts around 1880, where the question of truth, the history of truth and the will to truth were central to his work.” He adds that “it is years since I have read Nietzsche.” “Structuralism and Poststructuralism: Interview with Gérard Raulet,” *Telos* 55 (Spring): 204. Both these remarks make it possible that he forgot about or never noticed Nietzsche’s concerns with what he comes to call care of the self.

101. WS 5.

102. Ibid.

103. WS 6.

104. D 143.

105. D 202. Cf. 203; GS 7.

106. D 435.

107. D 462.

108. HH 286. The same point is made about happiness in D 108.

109. GS 120.

110. WS 6.

111. WS 6. Cf. D 9.

112. GS 329.

113. D 9.

114. D 553.

115. WS 184. Cf. HH 479.

116. WS 285.

117. BGE 213, 264; GS 348, 349; TI PS 3, TIM 4, EUM 47; A 3; EH BT 4; WP 898, 942.

118. Thiele sees Nietzsche’s belief in the inheritance of greatness as betokening self-aggrandizement, decadence, and tiredness. It also betrays his intellectual integrity and skeptical probity. “The Agony of Politics,” 104–5.

119. TI FGE 2.

120. EH HH 4.

121. WP 906.

122. EH, Clever, 9.

123. EH, Clever, 10. Cf. 9.

124. EH, Wise, 2.

125. Z 1: 4; TI EUM 47; A 51.

126. EH, Wise, 2.

127. TI FGE 1.

128. EH, Clever, 1–3.

129. EH, Clever, 10.

130. Jane Bennett claims that using Foucault's techniques of the self to understand Nietzsche's idea of political education "entails taking Nietzschean steps that Nietzsche himself had only begun to take." Review of *Nietzsche's Tragic Regime* by Thomas Heilke, *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 2 (June 1999): 436. Reading only the later works might give this impression, but this possibility pervades the middle period writings.

131. Z 1:22.2, 3; 12.11–12; BGE 42, 44, 211, 251; HH pref 2; GM 2: xxiv.

132. BGE 205, 211.

133. A 61; EH WC 2; WP 94, 98. The middle period's view does, however, echo more clearly in Nietzsche's lamentation for the loss of Greek and Roman culture in A 59.

134. HH 237.

135. TI EUM 37. Cf. A 2, 4, 61; EH WC 2.

136. GS 362.

137. Z 1:10; A 13; EH, Wise, 7.

138. BGE 189; WP 943.

139. GM 3: xviii.

140. HH pref 8; D pref 5; EH fwd 4.

Chapter Seven

Parts of this argument appear in "Beyond Misogyny and Metaphor: Women in Nietzsche's Middle Period," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 34, no. 2 (1996): 67–90. In this article, I also compare Nietzsche's views on women with those of the French moralist, La Rochefoucauld.

1. My argument challenges Ellen Kennedy's claim that "the outline of Nietzsche's view of women appeared first in *Human, All Too Human* and remained constant throughout his other works. Bits and pieces were added, but the melody remained the same." "Nietzsche: Women as *Untermensch*," in *Women in Western Political Philosophy*, ed. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), 185. Nietzsche's different attitude to women in this period also manifests itself in some of his correspondence. That women could achieve autonomy is suggested in a declaration to Mathilde Maier: "Followers I do not want. May each man, or woman, be only *his* or *her* true disciple!" [*Möge jeder [und jede] nur sein einiger wirklicher Anhänger sein!*] Letter dated 15.7.1878 in *Nietzsche. Unpublished Letters*, trans. and ed., Karl F. Leidecker (London: Peter Owen, 1960), 77. The idea that certain virtues are gender neutral reappears when Nietzsche compares himself to Malwida von Meysenbug. He writes to her that "our characters have many similarities. For instance, we both are courageous, and neither adversity nor disdain can divert us from the course which we have recognized as the right one. Then, too, both of us have experienced within and

without many a thing whose radiance few of our contemporaries have beheld. We are full of hope for mankind and offer ourselves as modest sacrifices,—is that not your opinion also?” Letter dated 14.1.1880 in Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 78. In a letter to his sister in September 1882, he likens himself to Lou Salomé: “We have such an identity of gifts and motives.” Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 89.

2. D 346.

3. D 294.

4. D 193.

5. See Rosalyn Diprose, “Nietzsche and the Pathos of Distance,” in *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*, ed. Paul Patton (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 32.

6. HH 147. Graham Parkes claims that, imagery notwithstanding, for Nietzsche “penetrating insight, hard-driving argument, seminal ideas are all independent of differences in gender.” *Composing the Soul* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 208.

7. HH 377.

8. GS’s sensitive discussion of female chastity concludes that “in sum, one cannot be too kind to women” (71), disclosing a Nietzsche far removed from the usual image of him demeaning or dismissing women.

9. HH 383

10. HH 391.

11. D 227.

12. AOM 169.

13. AOM 169. Cf. 173.

14. HH 342.

15. HH 374.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. WS 241.

19. HH 197, 333, 334, 369; WS 236. I argue elsewhere that this is part of his legacy from the French moralists, particularly La Rochefoucauld. See Ruth Abbey, “Descent and Dissent: Nietzsche’s Reading of ‘Two French Moralists’” (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1994). This interest in the norms of dialogue fades from the later works, illustrating again the diminution of Nietzsche’s concern with intersubjectivity. The aphorism portraying one partner in dialogue as a midwife to another pregnant with thoughts (BGE 136) is a notable exception to this trend, however.

20. HH 412.

21. GS 66.

22. HH 356.

23. WS 318.

24. GS 68.

25. GS 69.

26. HH 440. While this passage could be implying that women are confined to commanding and obeying in the private sphere, the classical association of ruling and being ruled in turn with the public realm suggests not. Nor do I infer it to mean

that the art of commanding is for men and that of obeying for women. If this had been Nietzsche's point, he could have found a clearer way of expressing it. Also, the fact that he goes on to talk about those who currently command in society as lacking "nobility in obedience" suggests that it is the twin arts to which he is referring here.

27. HH 409.

28. D 195.

29. HH 259.

30. A rarely noted detail of his biography is interesting here. Peter Bergmann reports that while Nietzsche was at Basel, the question of admitting women to the university was debated and "on the controversial issue of admitting female students he had already pointedly sided with the defeated minority favouring admission." *Nietzsche, "The Last Antipolitical German"* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 105.

31. HH 416.

32. See AOM 173; D 544; GS 293, for example.

33. This passage is cited by Kennedy ("Women as *Untermensch*," 192) in her argument that women are *untermenschen* in Nietzsche's estimation. However, the following passages which suggest qualifications to this reading are not considered by her.

34. HH 416.

35. AOM 265.

36. HH 416.

37. HH 417.

38. HH 411.

39. HH 419.

40. Cf. D 432; GS 333.

41. AOM 284.

42. HH 635.

43. AOM 286.

44. D 196.

45. Contrast Carole Diethe's conclusions in "Nietzsche and the Woman Question," *History of European Ideas* 11, no. 1 (1989). She claims that Nietzsche sees rationality as "directly harmful" to women (865) and that he believes "that women should not try to deepen their knowledge, but should remain on the level of instinctive sexual proclivity" (868). She also refers to "the particularly strong abhorrence Nietzsche felt towards any kind of scholarly pursuit in a woman" (869; cf. 870). These comments neglect the full picture of women drawn in the middle period and so cannot be imputed to Nietzsche unqualified.

46. HH 419. The title of this passage is "Contradictions in female heads."

47. HH 425.

48. Ibid.

49. HH 425.

50. HH 64. Cf. D 25. My reading of Nietzsche's views on women's education challenges the interpretations of Kennedy and Christine Allen. Kennedy interprets the interregnum from the "Storm and stress" passage as Nietzsche's prediction of the result of women being educated, rather than as a transitional phase. "Women as *Untermensch*," 193. She uses it as evidence for her conclusion that he "was one of the

most bitter opponents of women's emancipation" (189; cf. 190). Allen shares the view that Nietzsche attacks feminists seeking access for women to education (123). One reason is that "education will inevitably turn women into men" (129; cf. 130), although how this can be reconciled with her claim that Nietzsche assumes the necessity of "a false sex-polarity" (123; cf. 128) is unclear. All quotations are from "Nietzsche's ambivalence about women" in *The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche*, ed. Lorenn Clark and Lynda Lange (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).

51. AOM 290.

52. HH 398.

53. HH 404.

54. HH 218.

55. HH 405.

56. Ibid.

57. WS 215.

58. Ibid.

59. WS 270.

60. GS 68. Cf. HH 400, 408.

61. D 282. The foregoing discussion suggests that Keith Ansell-Pearson's claim that "woman's primary role for Nietzsche is one of adornment" has little purchase on the works of this period. "Nietzsche, Woman and Political Theory" in *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*, ed. Patton, 31.

62. HH 432.

63. HH 435.

64. HH 431.

65. AOM 173.

66. GS 60.

67. Cf. Penelope Deutscher, "Woman, Femininity: Distancing Nietzsche from Rousseau," in *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*, ed. Patton, 170, and Lynne Tirrell "Sexual Dualism and Women's Self-Creation," in *Nietzsche and the Feminine*, ed. Peter Burgard (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), 172. For a very different interpretation of GS 60, see Diprose "Nietzsche and the Pathos of Distance" in *Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory*, ed. Patton, 15–16.

68. GS 70.

69. AOM 276.

70. See Allen, "Nietzsche's Ambivalence about Women" 126–27, 131, and Eugene Victor Wolfenstein, "Whips, Quips, and 'Woman as Such': The Internalization of the Feminine in Nietzsche's Philosophy" presented at the 92nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 29 August 1996. Cited with author's permission. Kennedy believes that "the humiliation of this failure in love certainly contributed to Nietzsche's views on women" ("Women as *untermensch*," 199, note 12) but how this can be reconciled with her forementioned claim that Nietzsche's attitude to women is basically the same from HH onward is unclear.

71. BGE 239.

72. Z 3:5.2.

73. BGE 239.

74. Z 3:12.23.

75. BGE 239. Cf. EH, Excellent, 5.

76. Z 4:13.3; BGE 239; D pref. 4; WP 864. As he says in a letter to his sister, "All those who rave about 'the emancipation of women' have slowly, ever so slowly, come to realise that I am their 'bad animal.'" Letter from Venice, April 1885. Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 116.

77. Z 2: 7; WP 349; EH, Excellent, 5.

Chapter Eight

1. HH 259.

2. D 503.

3. My argument challenges Carole Diethe's claim that he "looked back to ancient Greece for his model. . . . He convinced himself that the wonders of Greek culture . . . [were] a direct result of the Greek woman's cloistered life." "Nietzsche and the Woman Question," *History of European Ideas* 11, no. 1 (1989): 73. Christine Allen also notes his admiration of Greek reproductive arrangements and leaves us to infer that he favors a return to these. "Nietzsche's Ambivalence about Women" in *The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche*, ed. Lorenn Clark and Lynda Lange (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 121.

4. Ellen Kennedy identifies love as one of the feminine values that Nietzsche wants to transvalue. "Nietzsche: Women as *Untermensch*," in *Women in Western Political Philosophy*, ed. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), 183. Brendan Donnellan declares that he regards romantic love with "consistent ironic detachment" (83) and "has little good to say about the personal emotion of sexual love, the significance of which as a dimension of human experience he apparently denies" (118) in *Nietzsche and the French Moralists* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1982). Ofeilia Schutte claims that he excludes "the possibility of love between the sexes and among human beings in general" in *Beyond Nihilism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 180; and Peter Berkowitz argues that Nietzsche's philosophers see romantic love, like friendship, in purely instrumental terms. *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 169–70. Allen even contends that he advocated the "forced repression of women in marriage." Clark and Lange, *The Sexism of Social and Political Theory*, 130.

5. HH 415.

6. HH 415.

7. WS 272.

8. HH 430.

9. GS 119.

10. HH 410.

11. HH 399.

12. HH 396.

13. D 145. Cf. AOM 37; GS 14.

14. AOM 272.

15. D 403.

16. HH 394.

17. HH 384. Donnellan's claim that "Nietzsche considers women intellectually and spiritually inferior to man, and a dangerous drain on his creative endeavour" (*Nietzsche and the French Moralists*, 84) captures but one side of the story.

18. D 27.

19. Ibid. Whereas Hollingdale translates *übermenschlicher* as suprahuman, I have reverted to the more conventional translation of this term.

20. AOM 287.

21. HH 58. Cf. 629.

22. D 276.

23. HH 389.

24. D 151.

25. HH 413.

26. HH 406.

27. D 151.

28. D 151.

29. HH 424. [*Seelenfreundschaft zweier Menschen verschiedenen Geschlechts*]

30. [*Jene edlen, freigesinnten Frauen*] Nietzsche seems to have witnessed some good marriages. To Franz Overbeck he writes: "Dear Friend, you and your revered and intelligent wife—you are nearly the last strip of safe ground I have." (Letter dated 25.12.1882 in *Nietzsche: Unpublished Letters*, trans. and ed. Karl F. Leidecker (London: Peter Owen, 1960), 98.

31. HH 424.

32. HH 424.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. I have argued elsewhere that Nietzsche is not the only proponent of the ideal of marriage as friendship who has difficulty incorporating robust and ongoing sexual love into marriage. See Ruth Abbey, "Odd Bedfellows: Nietzsche and Mill on Marriage," *History of European Ideas* 23 (1997) and "Back to the Future: Marriage as Friendship in the Thought of Mary Wollstonecraft," *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy* 14, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 78–95.

36. It is useful to note here that at this stage Nietzsche was still considering marriage for himself. He considered proposing to Bertha Rohr in 1874. He later issued a written proposal to Mathilde Trampedach, asking "would you please walk with me as one who strives lustily for freedom and betterment on all paths of life and thought?" (Letter dated 11.4.1876 in Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 67.) He also considered proposing to Lou Salomé. However, after the end of this period, he had ruled this out as a possibility. He wrote to his sister "Long live independence! That is my daily thought. Have nothing to do with getting married!" (Letter dated 22.10.1884 in Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 111.)

37. HH 390. Against this, Donnellan claims that he praises only male friendship (*Nietzsche and the French Moralists*, 84), and Jacques Derrida holds that Nietzsche excludes women from friendship "Politics of Friendship," *American Imago* 50, no. 3 (1993): 384.

38. HH 378.

39. HH 373.

40. HH 406.

41. Ibid.

42. WS 58.

43. D 401.

44. A belief in their symbiotic relationship appears in Nietzsche's correspondence too. From Marienbad he writes to Peter Gast that "One ceases to love oneself properly when one ceases to exercise one's capacity for love towards other people; which means that the latter (ceasing to love) is highly inadvisable." Letter dated 18.7.1880 in Ronald Hayman, *Nietzsche: A Critical Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 227.

45. D 412.

46. AOM 75.

47. HH 601; GS 334.

48. GS 7.

49. D 150.

50. HH 424.

51. HH 394.

52. AOM 273.

53. Ibid.

54. GS 71.

55. Ibid. A shorter and less sensitive discussion of this appears in BGE 114.

56. WS 17. In the light of such passages, Allen's view that Nietzsche "closely define[s] women's identity with the biological function of motherhood" (Clark and Lange, *The Sexism of Social and Political Theory*, 125) and Diethe's claim that he "regard[s] woman as completely defined by the reproductive urge" ("Nietzsche and the Woman Question," 867) demand qualification.

57. Graham Parkes's comments apply a fortiori to female sexuality: "Nietzsche's experience of relationships with women (very few of which would appear to have been carnal) . . . is hardly sufficient to qualify him as such an expert in feminine psychology." *Composing the Soul* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 210.

58. HH 225. Cf. 230. Although, as Diethe notes, the fact that Nietzsche does not see female sexuality as bad in itself is unusual for his time. "Nietzsche and the Woman Question," 865. Her observation challenges Kennedy's claim that he simply recycles the typical views of his age and gender about women. "Nietzsche: Women as *Untermensch*," 193–94.

59. D 86.

60. D 76. Cf. GS 294.

61. GS 139.

62. D 76.

63. HH 141.

64. D 76.

65. D 321.

66. D 321.

67. HH 598.

68. HH 388, 393; D 387.

69. D 205. Berkowitz contrasts this passage with Zarathustra's "fanatical view" of marriage, but rather than considering that Nietzsche's views might have changed, he uses the difference to caution against taking Zarathustra for Nietzsche's mouth-piece. *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist*, note 22, 297.

70. HH 225.

71. HH 226. Cf. 227; D 359.

72. HH 421.

73. HH 618. Cf. 610.

74. D 150.

75. Ibid.

76. HH 426.

77. HH 427.

78. AOM 280.

79. HH 397.

80. D 532.

81. D 279.

82. HH 428.

83. HH 392, 429.

84. HH 434.

85. HH 435; D 25.

86. HH 429.

87. HH 433.

88. As Ida von Miaskowski, who knew Nietzsche at Basel, observes, "there are so many beautiful, indeed sublime words about women and marriage in his works, with which the philosopher, as it were, refutes himself." *Conversations with Nietzsche*, ed. Sander L. Gilman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 52.

89. HH 394.

90. HH 598.

91. WS 197.

92. HH 56. Cf. 291.

93. WS 53. Cf. 88.

94. HH 259.

95. As Genevieve Lloyd notes "the traditional Greek understanding of sexual reproduction . . . saw the father as providing the formative principle, the real causal force of generation, whilst the mother provided only the matter which received form or determination, and nourished what had been produced by the father." *The Man of Reason* (London: Methuen, 1984), 3.

96. HH 456.

97. HH 386. Cf. 382.

98. HH 600.

99. GS 72.

100. HH 381. There could be biographical sources for this outlook as when Nietzsche was approaching the age of five his father died and he grew up in a household dominated by women.

101. HH 380.

102. HH 392.

103. HH 434.

104. HH 385, 387. Cf. 57. As with pity, Nietzsche could again be challenging Rée who believed in the existence of genuinely disinterested maternal love. Brendan Donnellan, "Friedrich Nietzsche and Paul Rée: Cooperation and Conflict," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 43: 602.

105. HH 436; WS 197.

106. See, for example, book 7, chapter 16 of Aristotle's *Politics*. As Ellen Wood and Neal Wood note, "The problems of marriage, of maintaining and strengthening the proper connections of good birth and wealth, are crucial considerations for the continuation of the aristocratic line and way of life." *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 230.

107. HH 422.

108. HH 424.

109. HH 379.

110. Cf. Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist*, 170.

111. Z 1:20

112. Z 1:20. Cf. 3:12.24.

113. GS 364.

114. BGE 268.

115. BGE 131. Cf. 85.

116. BGE 262; TI EUM 39.

117. TI EUM 39.

118. TI EUM 39. Cf. BGE 120.

119. 3:10.2.

120. Z 1:9, EH, *Destiny*, 7.

121. A 56.

122. EH, *Excellent*, 5.

123. BGE 142.

124. GM 3: ii.

125. Z 1:13.

126. Z 1:13; TI MAN 1, 2.

127. GM 3: viii.

128. BGE 239.

129. GM 3: viii. Cf. Z 2:4. The idea of "male mothers" also appears in the middle period: see GS 72.

130. EH, *Excellent*, 5.

Chapter Nine

1. Introducing *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins write of the way he "looks at our past and vivisections our common cultural heritage at its roots. . . . Nietzsche seems to be shattering the foundations of past theories as one demolishes false idols" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),

3. According to Michel Haar, “Nietzsche develops, in direct opposition to the tradition and its language, a language of his own . . . designed for the purpose of subversion” in *The New Nietzsche*, ed. David Allison (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), 6. Fritz Stern claims that “as far as thinking is concerned, he stands entirely on his own . . . he attacks every tradition of the West” in *The Great Philosophers*, ed. Bryan Magee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 249. In “Nietzsche: Women as Untermensch” Ellen Kennedy refers to Nietzsche’s “criticism of western philosophy since Socrates” in *Women in Western Political Philosophy*, ed. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), 188. In a review of *Composing the Soul* by Graham Parkes, Alexander Nehamas calls Nietzsche a self-made man (*Philosophy and Literature* 20, no. 2 [October 1996]), and Adrian del Caro contends that “what Nietzsche did more energetically and consistently than all thinkers before him . . . was to reject the past. The alternative to the past is . . . a condition in the present in which constant polemic and ongoing rejection of the past is its own reward.” *Nietzsche Contra Nietzsche: Creativity and the Anti-Romantic* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 181.

2. EH TI 2. According to Peter Berkowitz, this consensus that Nietzsche is an innovator par excellence is part of the “new orthodoxy” in Nietzsche studies which “credits Nietzsche with overcoming morality, breaking free of traditional modes of thought, and founding new forms of life.” Berkowitz contends that this approach mistakes Nietzsche’s ambitions for his achievements and is purblind to the powerful traditional elements that shape his thought. *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 5.

3. Harold Bloom’s comments are apposite here. “We need to stop thinking of any poet as an autonomous ego, however solipsistic the strongest poets may be. Every poet is a being caught up in a dialectical relationship (transference, repetition, error, communication) with another poet or poets.” *The Anxiety of Influence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 91. Bloom finds in Nietzsche a writer who “did not feel the chill of being darkened by a precursor’s shadow” (50). While this serves as a description of the works of the middle period, his later works do betray the “anxiety of influence.”

4. See, for example, Carl Pletsch, *Young Nietzsche* (New York: Macmillan, 1991), 13, 94, 209. An exception to this is Peter Heller, who says of HH that “it is as if Nietzsche wanted to exchange at one point his earlier paternal model, Schopenhauer, by honouring Voltaire—an author frequently quoted by Schopenhauer—as his father’s true father, and thus as his own grandfather.” *Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition*, ed. James O’Flaherty et al. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 113.

5. The prefaces of HH, D, and GS do not belong to the same period as the works they introduce, each being added in 1886. Book five of GS, “We Fearless Ones,” was written in 1887, which puts it beyond the purview of the middle period too.

6. AOM pref. 1.

7. GM pref v. However even if Schopenhauer were no longer Nietzsche’s educator, he remained an imagined interlocutor which is, after all, a nontutelar form of education. Julian Young claims that Schopenhauer’s “essential spirit, his pessimism,

lives as strongly in Nietzsche's final works as in his first" but suggests that Nietzsche attempts to conceal this indebtedness. *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3. Michael Gillespie makes a similar case for the centrality of Schopenhauer (181) and points to the way Nietzsche "takes great pains to distance himself from Schopenhauer in ways that disguise his continued dependence on Schopenhauer. . . . Nietzsche attacks Schopenhauer so vehemently precisely because Schopenhauer is so close to him" (183). He leaves open the question of some of Nietzsche's other debts—to Romanticism (241) and to German idealism (246–47), allowing that Nietzsche either concealed or was ignorant of them. *Nihilism Before Nietzsche* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

8. HH pref. I.

9. D. pref. 2.

10. GS 343.

11. EH, Destiny, 1. Cf. Excellent, 3.

12. See, for example, GS 377, 382; A foreward.

13. "Nietzsche *Ad Hominem*: Perspectivism, Personality and Ressentiment" in *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 214. Cf. 182.

14. TI EUM.

15. D 550. As Erich Heller points out, the first edition of HH quoted a passage from Descartes' *Meditations* on the back of its cover page (HH intro, x).

16. See AOM 113; HH 109; D 46; HH 282; D 46, 63, 64, 68; and HH 44, 54, respectively.

17. HH 50, 212, 628; D 544, 550.

18. HH 264; D 424, 550; GS 80.

19. AOM 408.

20. D 481 also depicts Rousseau in a positive light. Jacques Derrida recalls how when barely an adolescent he read Nietzsche and Rousseau and wondered how it would be possible "to reconcile these two admirations and these two identifications since the one spoke so ill of the other." *Memoires for Paul de Man* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 128. Discussing a reference to Rousseau in HH (617), Graham Parkes observes that "while Nietzsche's remarks on Rousseau are often unduly harsh, this one is surely a compliment." *Composing the Soul* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 185. Both seem to be generalizing about Nietzsche on the basis of the later works where criticism of Rousseau abounds. For another of Nietzsche's favorable references to Spinoza, see D 550. Something he wrote to Franz Overbeck during the middle period is also revealing: "I am absolutely astonished and quite enraptured! I have a precursor, and what a herald he is! I was practically ignorant of Spinoza. . . . Not only is his overall objective like mine—to raise knowledge to the mightiest effect—but, in five of the main points of his doctrine I find myself. . . . My solitude . . . has at least for the time being become the solitude of two.—Stranger!" (30.7.1881 in *Nietzsche: Unpublished Letters*, ed. Karl F. Leidecker [London: Peter Owen, 1960], 83).

21. WS 214. Cf. 216; GS 82, 83.

22. AOM 105; D 47, 115, 120, 133, 257, 277; GS 58, 244, 298.

23. HH 26, 221, 240, 438, 463; AOM 4; WS 237; GS 101.
24. EH HH 1.
25. D 113.
26. HH 36.
27. HH 35.
28. WS 60, 19. According to Ida Overbeck, at that time Nietzsche “counted himself among those aristocratic moralists.” *Conversations with Nietzsche*, ed. Sander L. Gilman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 112.
29. BGE 23, 45.
30. BGE 254. Cf. EH, *Clever*, 3.
31. TI EUM 45.
32. BGE 186, 228, GM pref. vii. An exception to this comes in his praise for La Rochefoucauld; however, its purpose is to attack Germany’s lack of a psychological tradition rather than to claim the moralist as one of his educators. EH WC 3.
33. *Destiny*, 6.
34. HH 36.
35. HH 37.
36. HH 37, 133.
37. GS 345.
38. GM pref. iv, vii.
39. GM pref. iv.
40. EH HH 6.
41. AOM pref. 3–4.
42. See Georg Brandes, *Friedrich Nietzsche* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), 55; W. D. Williams, *Nietzsche and the French* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), 31, 38, 43–44, 47–48, 53, 61, 180–81; Ronald Hayman, *Nietzsche: A Critical Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 197; Brendan Donnellan, *Nietzsche and the French Moralists* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1982), x–xi, 8–9; Peter Bergmann, *Nietzsche, “The Last Antipolitical German”* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 110–11; and Lou Salomé, *Nietzsche* (Connecticut: Black Swan Books, 1988), 62.
43. HH 35. Cf. Williams, *Nietzsche and the French*, 61.
44. HH 203. Cf. WS 94.
45. See TI RP 2, WOA, 3 and 1, respectively.
46. TI WOA 1.
47. As noted in the long quotation above, Nietzsche had been reading Fontenelle’s *Dialogues des Morts*.
48. HH 155.
49. AOM 200; GS 261.
50. WS 122. Cf. 127.
51. AOM 211.
52. “Nietzsche *Ad Hominem*,” 215.
53. Compare Salomé’s reference to “the loneliness through which Nietzsche’s inner life must be understood—a steadily growing self-isolation and preoccupation with himself.” *Nietzsche*, 10. In a letter to Carl von Gersdorff dated 20.12.1887, Nietzsche describes his solitude: “the emptiness around me is tremendous. I really stand

only those who are total strangers and whose acquaintance I make accidentally, in addition, of course, to those who belong to me from olden times and from childhood. All the rest have crumbled away or have been cast off (there was much that was violent and painful while that was going on)." Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 127. In fact, evidence of Nietzsche's invention of invention can be traced in his correspondence. In a letter to Malwida von Meysenbug in August 1883, he claims that "it is a long drawn out misfortune that this R., a liar and sneaky slanderer at heart has crossed my path." Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 102. To Franz Overbeck in April of the next year, he writes "It is highly probable that I am at present *the most independent* man in Europe" (ibid. 107) and to his sister in April of the following year, 1885, "there is no one among my acquaintances for whom this stuff is suitable" (ibid. 115).

54. Z 2:20, 3:12.3.

55. Gilman, *Conversations with Nietzsche*, 112.

56. Foreward 1.

57. GS 343. Cf. EH, *Destiny*, 8.

58. GS 108, 125.

59. GM pref. v.

60. Pletsch, *Young Nietzsche*, 86.

61. Ibid. 5, 213, 248.

62. HH 231, 233, 234; AOM 155, 185, 193, 378, 407; WS 151; D 263, 298, 497, 542, 548; GS 24.

63. Clever, 9. In a letter to Malwida von Meysenbug dated 18.10.1888, Nietzsche contrasts Wagner's sort of genius with his own; the composer was "a genius of the lie" whereas he is "a genius of truth," Leidecker, *Unpublished Letters*, 143. Nehamas claims that Nietzsche was suspicious of the idea of absolute originality, just as he suspected the Romantic ideal of genius. He refers readers to Pletsch's work for a discussion of Nietzsche's views on genius without noting that this work is about the young Nietzsche only. "Nietzsche, Modernity, Aestheticism" in *Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Magnus and Higgins, 247, note 20.

64. D 542.

65. BGE 146.

66. TI RP 4. Cf. BGE 21.

67. "Nietzsche *Ad Hominem*," 184–85, 189, 207, 213, 216–17. Berkowitz also points out that Nietzsche "is not primarily interested in refuting philosophical doctrines, but rather in discovering the moral and immoral intentions that support them." *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist*, 232.

68. It is telling how little of Solomon's evidence is drawn from these three works. Of the fifty-two footnotes citing Nietzsche, only seven invoke works from the middle period. Moreover, some of his references to the middle period do not illustrate Nietzsche's use of the ad hominem strategy. The only way the passage from WS 86 could be considered ambiguous is by ignoring the middle period's admiration for Socrates (WS 6; D 544; GS 340) and juxtaposing it with the criticisms of him in the early and later works. "Nietzsche *Ad Hominem*," notes 10, 19, 28, 29, 36, 37 and 56.

69. AOM 271

70. WS 85.

71. HH 115.

72. "Nietzsche *Ad Hominem*," 212, emphasis added.

73. It is unclear why Solomon associates the *ad hominem* approach with perspectivism and the concomitant rejection of any "perspective-free, global viewpoint, no God's eye view." Ibid. 195.

74. Solomon cites, for example, Nietzsche's reference to "the intestinal morbidity and neurasthenia" of priests from GM 1: vi.

75. AOM 35.

76. Consider his assertion that "Herder is none of the things he induced others to suppose he was (and which he himself wished to suppose he was). . . . No doubt he was aware of this at times but certainly did not want to believe it, ambitious priest that he was" (WS 118). Passages 136–143 in HH contain many assertions about the inner lives of saints, yet Nietzsche tempers his certainty by concluding that "this depiction of the saint, which is sketched after the average profile of the whole species, can be countered by many depictions which might evoke more pleasant feelings." HH 144.

77. AOM 39.

78. D 431.

79. WP 374.

80. HH 197.

81. AOM 129.

82. AOM 153.

83. AOM 156.

84. AOM 140.

85. This association is strengthened by the fact that Thomas Heilke detects the *ad hominem* approach in Nietzsche's earlier writings. *Nietzsche's Tragic Regime* (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), 84.

86. BGE 6.

87. D 497.

88. BGE 6.

89. GS 348.

90. GS 366.

91. GS 349.

Conclusion

1. *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), 342–43.

2. In this Nietzsche's readers are following his lead, for he calls HH "a collection of aphorisms" [*Aphorismen-Sammlung*]. GM pref. ii.

3. *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 14.

4. *Nietzsche et la métaphore* (Paris: Payot, 1972), 163–64, 168.

5. AOM 128.

6. For other examples of continuity of theme or concern across discrete passages, see HH 45–51; AOM 127–29; WS 87–113, 149–69; D 131–48.

7. AOM 376.

8. GM pref. ii.

9. As Robert Solomon says, "some of his seemingly aphoristic sentences are nevertheless an intrinsic and inseparable part of some larger argument or structure." Editor's introduction to *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 7.

10. Cf. Solomon, *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays*, 7-8; Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 77. As Nehamas points out, much of the secondary literature is purblind to Nietzsche's stylistic diversity. *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, 18, 22. For my argument that this diversity can be traced to the French moralists, rather than seeing them as only sources of the aphorism in the way that other commentators do, see "Descent and Dissent: Nietzsche's Reading of Two French Moralists" (Ph. D. diss., McGill University, 1994).

11. While the secondary literature is replete with explanations of the appeal of the aphorism to Nietzsche, few consider its limitations. Kaufmann is an exception to this. *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 78. W. D. Williams is another. He writes that "Nietzsche's favourite form is the short paragraph, from one to four or five pages, in which a salient thought is stated, investigated, and summed up." *Nietzsche and the French* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), 48-49. Cf. 53, 180. Yet Williams rejects the possibility that in writing "essayettes," Nietzsche is following La Rochefoucauld's example, but it is the example of the "Réflexion" rather than the maxim. Williams nominates Pascal as the source of this (180). While Williams is aware of Nietzsche's stylistic diversity, he is either oblivious to this same trait or sees it as of negligible significance in the writings of La Rochefoucauld.

12. EH, Excellent, 4.

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