

This compilation © Phoenix E-Books UK

THE BISHOP PADDOCK LECTURES, 1889.

DIABOLOGY.

THE
PERSON AND KINGDOM
OF
SATAN.

BY
REV. EDW. H. JEWETT, S. T. D.

PROFESSOR OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY IN THE GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
NEW YORK.

NEW YORK:
THOMAS WHITTAKER.
2 AND 3 BIBLE HOUSE.
1889.

THE
BISHOP PADDOCK LECTURES.

IN the summer of the year 1880, GEORGE A. JARVIS, of Brooklyn, N. Y., moved by his sense of the great good which might thereby accrue to the cause of CHRIST, and to the Church of which he was an ever-grateful member, gave to the General Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church certain securities, exceeding in value eleven thousand dollars, for the foundation and maintenance of a Lectureship in said seminary.

Out of love to a former pastor and enduring friend, the Right Rev. Benjamin Henry Paddock, D.D., Bishop of Massachusetts, he named the foundation "THE BISHOP PADDOCK LECTURESHIP."

The deed of trust declares that,—

"*The subjects of the lectures shall be such as appertain to the defence of the religion of JESUS CHRIST, as revealed in the Holy Bible, and illustrated in the Book of Common Prayer, against the varying errors of the day, whether materialistic, rationalistic, or professedly religious, and also to its defence and confirmation in respect of such central truths as the Trinity, the Atonement, Justification, and the Inspiration of the Word of God; and of such central facts as the Church's Divine Order*

and Sacraments, her historical *Reformation*, and her rights and powers as a pure and national Church. *And* other subjects may be chosen if unanimously approved by the Board of Appointment as being both timely and also within the true intent of this Lectureship."

Under the appointment of the board created by the trust, the Rev. Edward H. Jewett, S. T. D., delivered the Lectures for the year 1889, contained in this volume.

ANALYSIS.

LECTURE I.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTORY	I

Hostility to Creeds and Formulas of faith—Various assignable causes—Materialistic philosophy especially hostile to pneumatology—No legitimate *causus belli* between material science and Divine revelation—Resort to the theory of Accommodation—Its underlying fallacy—Materialism powerless in dealing with facts of pneumatology—Evils caused by the application of the theory—The subject demands a work of construction as well as of destruction—An *à priori* argument in favor of the existence of spiritual beings—Argument strengthened by the voice of religious instinct and sentiment—Still further strengthened by the requirements of God's moral attributes—God's word the highest, and ultimate authority.

LECTURE II.

MORAL PROBATION	31
---------------------------	----

The ever-abiding presence of moral evil—From what source did it originate?—Why was its existence or extension not prevented?—The overruling of evil for good does not justify its existence—A clew to the labyrinth of mystery to be found possibly, in the exercise of free moral agency—Applies to all conceivable forms of free moral agency—Character ethically considered cannot be created, but must be developed by free, self-directed action—Probation seemingly a necessity—It involves the possibility of

sinning—Views of the schoolmen—In what angelic probation consisted—How long it continued—Theories of Aquinas—Of S. Augustine—Of German theologians—The 19th Article of the Augsburg Confession—Under what circumstances did moral probation terminate in a fall?—Why were beings created under circumstances involving the necessity of a probation?—God's Omnipotence not limited by the impossibility of preventing free, moral defection—God's boundless wisdom, mercy, and justice ultimately manifested.

LECTURE III.

SATANIC PERSONALITY 65

A wide collapse of faith in a personal Satan—Ascribable in great measure to the working of reaction—Two antagonistic theories to be considered, *Dualism* and *Personification*—Dualism an element in all forms of natural religion—Its ground of failure as a philosophic speculation, or as a religious system—Personification as opposed to Dualism—Angels regarded as personifications of natural forces—Satan a mere symbol of evil principles, desires and gratifications—The arguments of Von Cölln, Schliermacher, Davenport, Drs. Bushnell and Parker—Argument from the assumed *negativity* of evil—The fallacy of the argument—Moral confounded with metaphysical good—Evil a positive power corrupting being, and debasing character—No assignable limit short of total depravity—No *à priori* improbability against the supposition of a powerful fallen angel having placed himself as head and leader of the hosts of darkness—As clearly defined personal characteristics ascribed to Satan in the Scriptures, as to the Holy Ghost.

LECTURE IV.

PARSEE AND HEBREW VIEWS COMPARED 98

Divine process of development within the sphere of the spiritual, as within that of the material—Mistakes resulting from failure in noting this—Assumption that the Jews obtained their view of

Satan and the hosts of darkness from the Persians—The theology of the Zoroastrians compared with that of the Jews, with regard to the existence and nature of God, of Satan, the work of Creation, and the Fall—Circumstances adverse to the assumption—The captivity in Babylonia, and not in Persia—The religion of the Babylonians a gross polytheism—The captivity a period of religious purification rather than of corruption—Equal if not greater probability that the Zoroastrians borrowed from the Jews, than the reverse—Subsequent intercourse at Alexandria—The collection of the Parsee Scriptures like that of the Hebrews cumulative, and extending through many centuries—Only in the later books of the Parsees is the claimed resemblance to be found—The main question one of ontology and not of nomenclature—Reasons why more definite statements were not made in the earlier scriptures—The Divine plan of development a necessity.

LECTURE V.

CHRIST'S TEACHING WITH REGARD TO EVIL AND THE EVIL ONE 133

God's revealed word the main and reliable ground of faith—Fullness of knowledge attained through various stages of development—In our Lord's experience and teaching especially, has truth been revealed—The personal conflict with Satan in the wilderness—Various views of the temptation—Christ not self-tempted—The *posse non peccare*, and the *non posse peccare*—The temptation in whatever form presented, must have been external—Christ's conceptions of Satanic personality and influence revealed in His subsequent teachings—Impossibility of understanding His statements on the theory of personification—His belief in Satanic personality further manifested by His speaking of him in connection with the powers of darkness—Further evidence in the cases of demoniac cure—The question of *Accommodation* considered—Its bearing upon the case repudiated—Neander's statement—The subsequent teaching of the Apostles in perfect harmony with those of Christ Himself.

LECTURE VI.

PAGE

THE SIXTH PETITION OF THE LORD'S PRAYER 167

Objections raised against the change of "evil" for the "Evil One"

—Such change could have been made only after careful examination, and under the influence of preponderating evidence—The Greek original seemingly demands the change from the abstract to the concrete—Various instances in which relevancy of connection and congruity of thought require the concrete—The revised rendering in perfect congruity with the whole prayer—Sustained by early exegesis—Primitive versions in its favor—The Peshito Syriac especially strong and unmistakable in its testimony—Early patristic statements, both Greek and Latin, support the concrete rendering—No exception to be found in the Ante-Nicene period—Statements of Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory Nyssen, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Tertullian and Cyprian—Concurrence of Primitive Liturgies—The concrete rendering in most perfect harmony with our Lord's general teaching on the subject.

PREFACE.

THESE lectures were written in the hope that they might contribute, in some degree at least, to the removal of error, and the firmer confirmation of faith in the important doctrines of which they treat. Assailed by materialistic philosophy on one hand, unnumbered attempts have been made to explain away by resorting to metaphor or personification, what heretofore had been accepted as actual truth; and overwhelmed on the other by sarcasm and ridicule, the whole subject of Diabolic personality has been summarily thrust aside as unworthy of serious consideration. Hence the attitude assumed by numbers, even of otherwise orthodox christians, is one of determined opposition. So intense, and unreasoning, this opposition has been in some instances, as to justify an application to them of the words of Goethe,

“They would not believe that it was the devil,
Even though he had them by the throat.”

Modern opposition traces its descent through the German rationalists to its origin in the Cartesian phi-

losophy. By Belthasar Bekker, a disciple of Des Cartes, the theory of accommodation was invented, and introduced into the German church by Semler, who also edited the "Letters on Demoniacs" by Hugh Farmer. Bekker and Semler had confined the theory of accommodation mainly to demonology; but Kant carried the principle to its logical conclusion, by maintaining that Satan himself was only a personification of evil, as did Erhard and others. The theologians of the English Church, accepting the doctrine of a personal Satan as a part of their Catholic inheritance, have given but little attention to its consideration and defence; while American writers who have touched on the subject, have been mainly echoes of the German Neologists.

A recent American author evidently ignorant of the actual facts in the case, says, "It is now commonly agreed, I think, that Satan as primarily conceived, is not the devil at all. He seems to be a Persian conception, and was adopted into Jewish thought, perhaps in the time of the captivity." Whatever may be "commonly agreed" upon by such as take their opinions second hand, the fact is, that the common *consensus* of a very large and increasing body of those most competent to form an opinion on the whole subject, is in favor of upholding the ancient faith with regard to the Person and Kingdom of Satan. One marked instance in proof of this may be found in the

action of the New Testament Revisers in their rendering of S. Matt. vi. 13, "Deliver us from the Evil One;" with the corresponding changes of the abstract for the concrete in S. John, xvii. 15; Eph. vi. 16; 2 Thess. iii. 3, etc. At least two-thirds of that learned body must have given their voice and vote in favor of the change. And no less worthy of consideration is the fact, that notwithstanding the genius of the earlier German rationalists, and the marvellous influence of Schliermacher, who sympathized with them on this point, the later, and leading theologians, have not followed in the same course. Hofmann, Kahnis, Lange, Martensen, Julius Müller, Rothe, Tholuck, Twisten, Van Oosterzee, Dorner and others, repudiate the theory of metaphor or personification, and sustain the position that the Scriptural statements bearing upon Satan and his Kingdom are to be literally understood.

Though not formally presented by the Church as an article of faith, the statements of Scripture with regard to Satan and the hosts of evil, are accepted as literal truth; as such they are embodied in solemn prayer and supplication, in catechetical instruction, and in formal doctrinal teaching. Many, doubtless, who have been influenced by the clamor and sarcasm of popular arguments, and who have never taken the pains to examine the matter thoroughly, put aside all sense of the incongruous by the convenient resort to

personification. And yet, in view of the sinfulness of sin, and the aboundings of iniquity, the usefulness of those statements is maintained. Schliermacher, although denying the personal existence of Satan, wished to have his name mentioned as heretofore by the Church. But there is neither honesty nor safety in this. The cause of truth and righteousness will gain no support by the application of such means. The underlying principle moreover, trenches too closely upon the "telling of lies in the name of the Lord"; for, though regarded by the learned and intelligent as a mere figure of speech, to the immature and ignorant, the word Satan will ever embody a dread, personal reality. And it is not necessary. If the doctrine is a myth, the terrors of the Law need no help from such an imaginary infernal police.

There *is*, or there is *not* a personal Satan. If there is *not*—if new light has been thrown upon the subject, and ancient modes of faith and expression are no longer tenable, the emergency should be met promptly and honestly. Such personal allusions as are likely to lead astray, should either be expunged from all prayers and offices of worship, or instruction be given, and when necessary repeated, that all such allusions, whether found in Holy Writ, or in formulas of Christian worship, are to be understood as mere figures of speech. If, however, the ancient faith embodies the truth—if there *is* a personal Satan, (and all human

philosophies are powerless to prove that there is not), then let the fact be openly and fearlessly acknowledged. Certainly, in the words of Dorner, "The possibility of a Devil *must* be conceded; to question the realization therefore, because it is of course a disagreeable reality, and out of tune, is not worthy of science, and decides nothing as to the thing itself. The wish that the devil did not exist, *does not slay him.*"

E. H. J.



DIABOLOGY.

LECTURE I.

INTRODUCTORY.

HOSTILITY to formulated doctrine, is at the present time, one of the most marked features of popular religious sentiment. Spring from what sources it may, there is a wide-spread tendency to looseness in defining, and to unwillingness in maintaining dogmatic truth. This is especially the case with doctrines which bear upon pneumatology in all its forms. Hence the antagonism that has grown up against received views of sin and retributive punishment, as connected in Christian teaching with the kingdom and prince of the powers of darkness. On all sides, even in lesser matters, may be seen a willingness to give up ancient views of truth at the demand of a supposed necessity for a readjustment with philosophic and scientific environments. And with this departure from the accepted faith and forms of thought, there has been as a natural result, a lowering of doctrinal standards and modes of teaching, even though the formulated letter has remained unchanged. That such is the case, no careful observer needs to be told.

The fact may be seen on all sides, and in various ways. In the literature of the day, both secular and sacred, the evidence furnished is unmistakable; and no less so, is that discoverable in social and religious intercourse.

All through the christian centuries there has been a spirit and love of change manifested, either towards loftier forms of thought and spirituality of conception and life; or in the opposite lines of rationalistic scepticism. But never was the spirit of the age more averse than now, from clean cut distinctions and formulated doctrines as authoritatively imposed. To accept dogmatic truth as crystallized in ancient creed or confession, and to hold it firmly and fearlessly, even though unobtrusively and in charity, is to expose one's self not infrequently, to the charge of fossilization *in statu*, and superstition, if not bigotry, *in spiritu*. In accordance with prevailing conceptions of freedom, each one claims for himself the right to hammer out on his own anvil such a body of faith as may commend itself to his own judgment, and by what is regarded as the highest form and manifestation of charity with many, the claim is conceded. Never in fact, did popular sentiment voice more clearly and aptly than at the present time, the fallacy of Pope's well-known couplet,

"For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight,
His can't be wrong, whose life is in the right."

One cause for this hostility to formulated doctrine may be ascribed doubtless, to a rebound from the overwrought activity in dogmatizing, and theological system making which marked the reformation period, and the remainder of the sixteenth century. For a

long time preceding, and following that century, in fact, leading minds were busily occupied with metaphysical, moral and theological questions; and, as an unavoidable result, intensity of interest therein begat affection for, with determination to support such views as were adopted. And as one extreme usually follows another, it is not surprising that a period which had been prolific in producing Christian Institutes, Articles of Religion, and Systems of Divinity, should be followed sooner or later, by another distinguished for laxity in upholding, and opposition in defending any special form of doctrinal truth. Certain it is, there has long been a growing *consensus* of endeavor throughout protestant christendom, to minimize as far as possible, alleged differences in denominational faith and practice; and even to pull down fences, and deface lines, which the makers and early supporters erected and drew with assiduous care.

It is an easily provable fact, that while the Reformation emancipated evangelical truth from the shackles of an iron-clad despotism, and the debasements of credulity fostered by a corrupt ecclesiasticism, it opened the door to a self-centring, self-asserting individualism, which, under protean forms, has become equally antagonistic to truth.

“We see,” remarks an able writer, “the great religious principles of man’s personal responsibility, though maintained by the reformers in the strictest subordination to the authority of the divine word, aiming more and more under humanistic and other influences, at unlimited self-assertion, and gradually emancipating itself from every form of authority, even upon fundamental articles of faith. . . . It was not till the

close of the seventeenth century, that free modes of thought began to show any sensible influence with the common people. Lifeless orthodoxy, dogma degenerating into scholastic subtleties, gave an impulse to unrestrained free thinking. Descartes, Spinoza, Bayle and others proceeded to unsettle all traditional religious convictions, and in some cases, to destroy their foundations; a popular philosophy of sound common sense (so called), began to develop an almost open hostility to the revealed doctrines of the church."—Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, p. 2.

Another cause may be found in the sensitiveness of modern civilization to all ideas of retributive suffering, with the attendant aversion from all thought of torment as inflicted in judicial punishment. And this sensitiveness arises doubtless in great measure also by way of rebound from the harmful exaggerations and descriptions of divine vindictiveness, made all the more dreadful by the long prevailing taste for materialistic ideas and modes of punishment inflicted upon the lost. How horrid these have been, is well known. And, strange as it may seem, the evil has never been confined to the ignorant and vulgar. Christian fathers, leading minds in the mediæval church, and prominent post-reformation divines, even to the present day, have seemingly delighted in harrowing the soul, and torturing the conscience by details of agony endured, enough to move a demon's heart, and to wring from his eyes fiery tears of compassion. Consequently, there has been a revulsion in thought, accompanied with a revulsion in feeling. Sentiment has taken its stand at the opposite extreme. Undue sternness has

given way to vapid sentimentality. God's fatherly love and compassion are exalted at the expense of His righteousness and holiness. The Judgeship is placed behind, as it were, and is overshadowed by the Fatherhood. Conceptions touching evil and guilt have moved on with the drift. Sin is viewed as a misfortune, rather than as a fault ; and its heinousness being thus minimized and practically lost sight of, the step is a short one to the supposition, that God will never be extreme to want what is done amiss. He is "too good," the prevailing sentiment is, to punish any offending sinner with severe, or long continued sufferings. Love in short, and not justice, must dictate both mode and measure of whatever chastisement may be administered.

A further cause may be found in the workings of rationalism, encouraged and supported by the materialistic tendency of modern philosophy and science. And in saying this, we are not forgetful of the influence still exerted by the scepticism and atheism of past generations. The dark shadows projected through the centuries by such men as Hume, Bolingbroke, Hobbs and Voltaire, rest with chilling and spiritually deadening power upon countless souls. Nor are we unmindful of the subtleties of a multiform pantheism, not inaptly called "Atheism in poetic vesture." But, we are dealing with forms of thought and sentiment antagonistic to christian truth, as developed by philosophies and materialistic hypotheses of the present time. And here likewise may be seen the working of a powerful reaction. Unsound views and exaggerations with regard to divine mysteries assuming irrational forms, and leading to the develop

ment of gross superstition in faith and worship, have occasioned a wide-spread distrust touching all religious mystery. Because faith as imposed by God must be a reasonable faith, the assumption is easily reached, that reason alone should suffice for the comprehension and elucidation of revealed truth. Hence the well-worn maxim and fallacy, "Religion ends where mystery begins," has become popularly adopted, not only as a working hypothesis, but as an absolute certainty dominating thought and practice. The most sacred truths and cherished beliefs, whether in dogmatic or institutional christianity, are thrown into the crucible to be tested and refined, by the discriminating fires of human judgment. Thus it comes that the foundation truths of the Catholic faith are so rudely assailed one after another, and the comfort of a reasonable, religious and holy hope is so often jeopardized, if not absolutely destroyed.

An additional and most powerful influence working in the interests of rationalism, is the supposed triumph obtained over religious dogma by the discoveries made in material science. During the past century and a half, the great laboratory of nature has been explored as never before, and countless secrets have been thrown open to view, and practically applied which have changed and benefitted all forms of national and individual life. This is especially true with Astronomy, Chemistry and Geology. Empiricism inspired by discoveries made and verified through the telescope, the hammer, and the retort, has wrought revolution, overturned systems, and formulated laws, which are seemingly expressions of the eternal mind of God. It is not surprising therefore, that scientists

should magnify their calling, and exult in their achievements. Looking at what has already been accomplished, and at what may rationally be anticipated in the future, it is only natural that the processes and results of inductive methods should be regarded as the only believable, because the only scientifically provable realities. They possess those characteristics, which ordinary minds ever appreciate. They are hard and tangible. They make no demands on the working of sentiment, or the apprehensions of faith. Whatever opposes therefore, whether in philosophic speculation, or in religious dogma, must, it is fearlessly asserted, go down before them—“*Magnæ sunt facta, et praevallebunt !*”

The blunders of theologians moreover, have intensified this rationalizing spirit, and helped forward the application of inductive methods beyond the spheres of their legitimate operation. In an evil hour, and yet as was natural under the circumstances, the church felt itself called upon to sustain the old Ptolemaic system of cosmogony. Natural science as yet in its infancy, had won no great and universally acknowledged victories; and there existed a widespread distrust with regard to its theories and methods. Such knowledge of the material universe as existed, was only what unaided natural ability by observation and reflection had acquired; while scientific thought, if it might be called such, necessarily found its expression in phenomenal language. And no one dreamed what revolutions and revelations the near future had in store. Some of the grandest minds of antiquity disputed the possibility of attaining to any thorough knowledge of the material uni-

verse.* The persecution and condemnation of Galileo, therefore, as viewed in the light of scientific discoveries which justified his teachings, have furnished a grand theme for an unceasing outcry against priestly ignorance and bigotry.

It scarcely needs to be said in this connection that there is no legitimate *causus belli* between material science and divine revelation. Christian theology stands in opposition to no clearly ascertained truth of science mental or material; and there is no ground for fear, that there ever will be any valid reason for antagonism between them. Hypotheses are not science. God is not engaged in contradicting Himself. The book of nature, and the book of revelation are equally from Him; and if at any time there is a seeming contradiction between them, it must be ascribed to a misinterpretation of one or the other. And if it be true, as it certainly is, that no religious theory or dogma can be maintained which conflicts with clearly demonstrated facts of science; so conversely, no mere scientific hypothesis can be accepted which militates against the well-grounded truths of moral and religious consciousness. For such truths transcend the sphere and the tests of the purely material. Where

* Socrates maintained that except in a few minor matters, there could be nothing but uncertainty on such subjects. He brought all knowledge within two categories: *a.* such as was attainable by human observation and speculation, and, *b.* such as was capable of being known only to the gods. In the latter he placed Physics and Astronomy, regarding all research therein as useless and impious. "I have not leisure for these things, and I will tell you the reason: I am not yet able according to the Delphic Inscription, to *know myself*; and it appears to me very ridiculous, while ignorant of myself, to inquire into what I am not concerned in."—*Phædrus*, p. 8.

their presence is manifested, and their characters are noted, the telescope of the astronomer, the retort of the chemist, and the hammer of the geologist cannot come. There is no cause for anxiety therefore, lest some discovery in the sphere of the natural should overthrow all ground for faith in the supernatural. And certainly, theologians should manifest no disposition to quarrel with scientists, so long as they confine themselves within the boundaries of their respective provinces. Much indeed goes under the name of science, which is but shallow empiricism—hypothesis in the clouds. But of that we are not speaking. We cheerfully recognize all scientists worthy of the name, as co-workers in the cause of knowledge; and gladly concede every claim which they can justly make.* Herbert Spencer affirms, that science has purified religion, and in some important respects, it is true. It is especially so in the elevating and ennobling influences exerted by astronomy and geology. The sweep of the telescope has brushed away all the cobwebs and dust of the Ptolemaic cosmogony with its concave *firmamentum*, its imaginary cycles, and epicycles, with its dwarfings of the universe, and belittlings of Omnipotence. Hence the grandeur and glory

* "The scientist is the apostle of natural order. Sometimes indeed, being a man of like passions with others, he is narrow, bigoted, and intolerant: Then he must be 'withstood to the face because he is to be blamed;' but sent forth on a noble mission, to lift the veil and penetrate to the inmost shrine of nature, to learn her divine secrets and to interpret them, 'his feet are beautiful upon the mountains, as he that bringeth good tidings' of the wisdom, power, and beneficence that underlie matter, force and law. . . . He should be hailed as an ally, and succored as a colleague,—for he too is doing the work of an evangelist."—Lorraine, *Sceptic's Creed*, p. 33.

of God now to be seen in the starry sky,—the conceptions to be formed of the infinitude of space, and of the majesty and might of Him who fills the whole! Instead of this world being as was formally supposed, the grandest object of creative skill, it is in comparison with the bodies revolving through space, but an insignificant bit of star dust. And in like manner what broadenings of thought have been attained, what upliftings of conception have come from the hammer and retort of the sister sciences. What ideas of permanency, of God's existence, of time's endurance bordering on eternity, are derived from the story volumes of the world's foundations!

I. In no respect have the above mentioned influences, especially that of materialistic scepticism, been more outspoken and denunciatory than on the subject of these lectures, which I have the honor to deliver before the faculty and students of this Institution of Sacred Learning. While the supernatural in every shape and bearing is to the materialist but a thing of nought,—a vagary of the past,—at best estate but the creation of a disordered imagination, and therefore to be frowned upon, and consigned to the realm of myths and dreams; there is a special *zest* in disputing, and *verve* in denouncing the doctrine of a diabolic kingdom of evil, and the personal existence of the Evil One.

1. As voicing the sentiments of a very influential faction, we quote the following from an article on "Decay of Faith" in the "Westminster Review" for July, 1882.

"The satanic conception of the fifteenth century has become dim and obscure. Demons, angels,

spirits and ghosts are now quietly relegated to the past. We do not look for the advent of a divine personage, and regard all accounts of prophets and soothsayers with as much suspicion as those of magicians, astrologers, sorcerers and witches. We repudiate as false all miracles and miraculous effects associated with holy places, shrines, etc. We deny the inherent efficacy of sacraments, relics, signs, formulas and charms. We do not pray, if we pray at all, in the same sense as our forefathers did. We regard that act as a mere acknowledgment of dependence, and only anticipate a subjective effect; while the former confident hope of an objective answer to the most earnest appeals to the Deity, has quite passed away."

It will be well to notice in this specimen of rationalistic infidelity the adroitness with which the false and the true, the genuine and the spurious are intermixed. Because God's truth has had its counterpart in Satan's lies, it is illogically assumed that there has been no truth whatever in any of the particulars mentioned! As Christianity has unfortunately had its perversions, and been disfigured at times by foul excrescences, it must be rejected *in toto* as a vain and baneful superstition! As in dark ages, the popular imagination had conjured up the existence of witches, ghosts and hobgoblins, the words of revelation which speak of a spirit world, are unworthy of rational credence, and should be rejected as idle tales! As magicians and sorcerers have deluded their votaries, by cunning tricks and pretended revelations, Jehovah has never spoken by prophet or priest to declare His will, and to give light on the dark problems of existence! As superstition has revelled in multiplying

imaginary miracles by juggling trickeries, the well attested performances of Almighty wisdom, power and mercy—even the fundamental truth of the resurrection—must be repudiated as delusions and falsehoods! Such at least, is the logic of this new philosophy. The same writer also tells us with majestic complacency :—

“We have looked the spiritual world boldly in the face, and discovered that the terrors of our ancestors had their origin in their own morbid imaginations. Above all, we have reduced our observations of natural phenomena to order, and imposed a spirit of uniformity into our conceptions of the operations of nature. Under the influence of these opinions, the supernatural has gradually given way before the natural. The idea of the universal reign of law has now excluded all conceptions of personal interference with the order of natural events. The spiritual world has wholly disappeared, and materialism pure and simple, usurps its place.”

We are reminded by this bombastic self-complacency of the trite sarcasm, “Owls sometimes see where eagles are blind.” One must certainly possess peculiar powers of vision, who can “look the spiritual world boldly in the face,” and discover at the same time that “the spiritual world has wholly disappeared.”

2. The method mainly resorted to for disposing of the scriptural statements bearing upon spiritual existences, is to regard them as mere accommodation to popular conceptions. Some even do not hesitate to assert that angelology in all its forms, is only a mythical personification of natural forces. This is the

ground taken by De Wette.* Because the geocentric theory has been abandoned, and the Mosaic Account of Creation is no longer regarded as literal or scientific, it is argued that all descriptions of spiritual existences, whether good or evil, being no more trustworthy, should be analogously dealt with. As the Bible contains myths of the natural or material,† it is claimed that it also contains myths of the supernatural or immaterial—especially in all cases bearing upon angels or demons. And (as though *abusus tollit usum*) it is also argued, that as theologians have greatly erred by becoming responsible in great measure for the superstitious puerilities touching occult powers and performances, which disgraced the church at a time of unscientific thought, and intellectual darkness, they are equally in error, when grounding upon scriptural statements a belief in the existence of beings, which should be equally relegated to dreamland, or to the region of allegory and myth.

There is a great fallacy we do not hesitate to affirm, underlying this assumed analogy. Because the establishing of certain facts in material science has necessitated changes and readjustments in theological conceptions, and methods of instruction, it does not follow that the same process may or must be carried within the sphere of the immaterial. We are not satisfied to be told that as the Bible account of creation and the geocentric theory of the solar system, is unscientific and mythical, all its teachings about

* “Zu den mythischen Sinnbildern der Gotteserscheinungen und Gotteswirkungen gehören auch die Engel.”—De Wette, *Christian Dogma*, § 108.

† E. g. *Joshua* x. 12-14.

spiritual existencies, their natures and powers is equally so. When scientists take that position, they transcend their legitimate sphere, and dogmatize in matters of which they have no knowledge. As a little reflection will show, the cases are not analogous; for there is no common ground to base an analogy upon. In the former, facts as they appeared to the senses, had from necessity to be described in phenomenal language—the language of observation, of sight and sense. Scientific statements antedating scientific discoveries, and means of verification, would have furnished a perpetual stumbling-block, and in so far have defeated the object for which a revelation was given. *E. g.* Let it be supposed that in the instance recorded, *Joshua ix. 12*, instead of saying, “Sun stand thou still upon Gibeon,” Joshua had said, “Cease thou earth to revolve on thine axis!” and following generations had read in place of the “sun stood still,” “the earth ceased to revolve on its axis,” the language would have been utterly unintelligible, and the sacred writer would have been subjected to the charge of lunacy. Up to that time, and for over three thousand years afterwards, such words and statements could have had no justification in scientific knowledge. Indeed, in some respects, such may be the case even now, unless scientific formulas are expressions of absolute truth. And who may vouch with infallible certainty for that? Scientific hypotheses and assumptions are not endowed with immutability.*

* “The rate of change of scientific hypotheses is so rapid, that, as the late Professor Clarke Maxwell well points out, twenty years hence we may find a disagreement between her then verdict and her present one.”
—Footman, *Reassuring Hints*, p. 93.

What harm moreover has come from this use of phenomenal language? At first it is true, theologians were troubled, when the actual truth was scientifically demonstrated, and in panicky zeal they denounced the new system of cosmogony. But when the whole sphere of contest had been carefully examined, it was discovered that old, and demonstrably false theories might be given up without danger—that the Bible was not a scientific treatise; and that an adjustment could be made without any sacrifice of truth, or disturbing of confidence in divine revelation. And the same phenomenal language has continued in use to the present hour, and doubtless will so continue, so long as human eyes are attracted by appearances, and human tongues express thought in accordance with the testimony of the senses.

In the other case however, it is altogether different, both as regards circumstances and results. In so far as reason may determine, there never was any necessity, material, moral or religious for the biblical account of spiritual beings, whether good or bad, if none such existed. No phenomenon among physical agencies could have suggested the idea of their existence, which could have received the endorsement of God's informing spirit. As the creations of a disordered imagination, they could have had no valid use or efficacy. What rational explanation can be given of the Mosaic account of the fall of our first parents on such a supposition, as an authentic part of divine revelation? The introducing among the *dramatis personæ* of an unneeded actor (especially such an one as is there described), would inevitably mar the simplicity of the narrative, and lead to confusions and

baneful misunderstandings. And such, viewing the matter from the ground of this mythical theory, has been the case. Through ignorance and perversity it has occasioned unnumbered superstitions, and engendered monstrosities of the imagination, which, to the present time have perplexed reason, darkened judgment, and marred the fair outlines of truth. But for it, many of the darkest pages of human history would never have been written. The wretched materializings of religious truth, with the woeful conceptions and dogmatizings about retributive punishment, have been founded upon, and have drawn their inspiration therefrom. Equally so have the horrid fables and exaggerations of occult agencies and powers, which have disgraced religion, excited suspicion with regard to the actuality of spiritual existences, and called out the scoffing sneers of infidel contempt.

Now, as perversions of truth, these baneful exaggerations and inventions of an undisciplined imagination, are explainable, although in no way justifiable. And it may rightly be argued, that truth in this respect, as in others, cannot justly be held responsible for the perversions and absurdities which have been fastened upon it. But, on the supposition that there was no ground or substratum of fact whatever for the stated presence and agency of a personal tempter, it is impossible to conceive, why, in a revelation of divine truth, designed for human enlightenment, such a prolific source of darkness and error should have been allowed to find place. No possible necessity of time or circumstance can be pointed to in justification. In fact, the biblical narrative if purely mythical, has in

this important matter, not only been barren of good, but has been most prolific with harm.

3. And the matter intensifies in interest with the elucidations of divine purpose, and the developments of truth. If the asserted analogy between myths of natural phenomena and of supernatural existences, is real, it must be so in all the main parts and connections. Not only should a valid reason be given in the one case as in the other, for the origin of the myth, but also should the evidence be furnished which necessitates its abandonment. No such evidence however, has as yet been furnished. Materialism is powerless in dealing with the facts of pneumatology. It can furnish no proof of the non-existence of angel or devil. All its arguments employed for that purpose, can be as legitimately used to disprove the existence of God.* Indeed, instead of the mythical character of the temptation in the garden of Eden having been demonstrated, and religious doctrines connected therewith having been abandoned through the advancement in knowledge, we find the reverse to have been the case. Later and further illuminings of divine revelation have cast no dark shadow over that earlier record. And surely He who was the Way, the Truth, and the Life—He who was the true Light which lighteneth every one that cometh into the

* "Angelology attaches itself to the doctrine of the kingdom of God, as demonology to that of sin: but, with natural science neither the one nor the other has directly to do. Astronomy as such knows absolutely nothing of the spiritual life in the universe, to give to it the right of confirming or denying on this point. He who combats the doctrine of angels thus, must also if consistent, say farewell to a heaven, a personal God, a particular revelation."—Van Oosterzee, *Dogmat. I.*, p. 312.

world, would have made some advances, if any were needed, in this matter. That He should have made no counter statements with regard to natural phenomena, and popular modes of description, is not surprising, for reasons already given. But, those, or corresponding ones, have no application in the matter before us. Explanations He did make of important questions; but in the case under consideration, He not only left the shackles of the supposed misbelief and superstition unremoved, but He bound them faster than they had been before. And as we shall hope to show on another occasion, His teachings with reference to temptation and the tempter are too clear and emphatic to be brought under any category of accommodation to existing views, clothed in the garb of myth or allegory. That His disciples understood Him as speaking literally, is evident from their own subsequent teachings. And if it should be claimed that they merely followed Him in the same mythical course, the great body of the church ever since has been deceived and led astray thereby, to the incalculable scandal of religion, and the perversion of all rational faith. Can such a course, it may be justly asked, be regarded as consistent with the wisdom and loving-kindness of an omniscient Lord? Could the lips of Him who was the embodiment of truth reaffirm fetid fables, and give sanction to the vagaries of disordered imaginations, for which there was no legitimate cause, and which must unavoidably occasion perpetual misunderstandings and falsehoods? As Archbishop Trench truly and forcibly says:

“The allegiance we owe to Christ as the King of truth, who came, not to fall in with men’s errors, but

to deliver men out of their errors, compels us to believe that He would never have used language which would have upheld and confirmed so great an error in the minds of men as the supposition of Satanic influences, which did not in truth exist. For this error, if it was an error, was so little an innocuous one, that might have been safely left to drop naturally away, was, on the contrary, one which reached so far in its consequences, entwined its roots so deeply among the very ground-truths of religion, that it could never have been suffered to remain at the hazard of all the misgrowths which it must needs have occasioned." *

4. But this, bad as it has been and still is on the supposition we are combating, is only one part of the evil. The mind has not only been deluded, and the conscience harrowed in vain by stories of imaginary creatures, and descriptions of horrid tortures inflicted by them, but the account given of a cunning, triumphant tempter, has helped to dull materially the sense of personal responsibility, by making men feel that they are in great measure the victims of unavoidable circumstances: in other words, that subjection to sin is as much their misfortune as their fault. Constituted as the human mind is, being ever ready to invent excuses, and to shift when possible, upon others the burden of responsibility, the heinousness of sin as a deliberate transgression of Divine law, is rarely felt in all its enormity. This in fact is what underlies in no small degree, the vapid imaginings, and crude sentimentalities of the present day on the whole sub-

* *Miracles*, p. 126.

ject of sin and retributive punishment. From it flows that stream of misplaced sympathy with law-breakers—the petting and pampering of even notorious criminals with exotics and delicacies, which shocks the moral sense, and disgusts the reflecting and sober minded.

On the supposition that there was no personal tempter,—that our first parents were self-tempted, the moral effect upon the whole race would have been vastly more healthy and beneficial, as we view the matter, if God had been described as charging the whole guilt directly upon them. They would have made no attempt to transfer the blame, or any part of it, upon some one else. There could have been no thought of doing so. Self-condemnation in all its crushing weight would have fallen upon the heart, as the conscience realized the sinfulness of the sin, and the justice of the condemnation. So would it be with mankind now. If, setting aside such influence as may be ascribed to inherited tendencies and social environment, each one was made to feel that he was his own tempter, and the only author of his transgressions; that sooner or later, he must come forth into the clear, white light of God's holiness and judicial righteousness; that no account will be taken of mitigating circumstances, or diminutions of responsibility ascribable to Satanic influences; that upon his own head must justly fall all the guilt of his wrong-doing, the sense of personal responsibility would be realized in the highest possible degree, and the guilt of sin would have a vividness and terror, rarely, if ever experienced.

Shall we suppose then, as we must, on the theory

we are combating, that God has been fighting against Himself and the spiritual interests of His creatures, by this introduction of an imaginary and unneeded actor in the great drama of the Fall? Such must have been the case if there was no personal tempter. For, certainly the scriptural teaching about the serpent which beguiled Eve, has tended all through the ages, to weaken, rather than to strengthen the sense of individual responsibility and culpability.

As looked at then from these different points of view, it is evident that scriptural statements with regard to spiritual existences—especially the tempter Satan—rest upon an entirely different ground, from those which bear upon cosmological science. The one has a clearly assignable *raison d'être*, the other, none whatever. In the former case, the use of phenomenal language was natural, harmless, serving for a time a necessary purpose like those organs in certain forms of the animal kingdom, which have a functional use during the process of development, and are cast aside thereafter as useless excrescences. In the latter case however, the statements made are revelations of positive truth, forming an integral part of Hebrew and Christian dogma, which, like the name of Phidias inwrought within the shield of Pallas, as described in classic fable, cannot be removed without the disruption of the whole.

II. But we must not forget that our subject demands a work of construction, as well as of destruction. Indeed the latter may be viewed in the light of a clearing of the ground, preparatory to laying the deep, solid foundations of truth's great edifice in this important matter. And although for the believer, the

court of final appeal is the word of God ; yet, as that word possesses little authority with some, and none whatever with others, it may be well in advance of a future and special consideration of its testimony, to see how far the deductions of reason are in harmony therewith.

1. There is an *à priori* probability in favor of the existence of spiritual beings. Analogy suggests, and reason endorses the suggestion, that there may be a spiritual world, in which rational beings exist in countless ascending orders, even to a far greater extent, than is the case with the inhabitants of this material world. The myriad fold forms of life existing here, present one of the commonest facts of our present knowledge, and furnish a perpetual source of astonishment and admiration to the thoughtful observer. From the lowest grade of physical existence up to man, the steps of advancement in form, intelligence, and usefulness are all but innumerable. Even this globe itself is comparatively an atom in the material universe. And can we reasonably suppose that all possible forms of life are confined to it?—that throughout those countless orbs revolving in space, there is naught but chaos and death?—that man is the *summum opus* of creative wisdom and power, and between him and Deity there is nothing? If so, why so? Because creative conception and skill could no longer plan and work? At the lowest step of physical existence moreover, there are forms which seemingly belong to both the animal and vegetable kingdoms ; or, in which the animal is so slightly developed above the vegetable as to cause uncertainty to the unskilled observer with regard to its true nature. These may

be regarded as connecting links between the vegetable and the animal. So at the highest step, by his dual constitution, man belongs to two spheres, or orders of existence, as distinct as the vegetable is from the animal: and may we not reason, that he may be analogously a connecting link between the material and the spiritual?

This further consideration greatly strengthens the supposition as thus furnished. Throughout the material universe with which we are acquainted, there is a grand and complicated system of coördinate forces and mutual adaptations, which wonderfully enhance its perfection, and the glory of its Creator. This may be seen in those sparkling orbs of liquid fire flaming through space. Central suns lightening, warming and controlling the motions of their planets, which in turn add variety and beauty, and perform their part in contributing to the order and stability of the whole. In the animal and vegetable kingdoms likewise, the same thing may be seen in countless forms and ways. There is in fact, what Paley would call, "Unity of purpose under variety of expedients." Certain species of carnivorous animals, birds and fishes, prey upon other species, which have been created to be wonderfully prolific, and which are thus kept from over multiplication to the injury or destruction of other races. In the insect world different races, as the ants and the aphides, perform mutual offices for mutual benefits. Others lay their eggs in places, through the guidance of a mysterious instinct, where alone the necessary food of the larvæ can be found at the time when it is needed. All question with regard to the origin of this instinct, is aside from our purpose;—the

fact of the adaptation being that with which we are concerned.

So analogously reason suggests it may be in the being and activities of higher, and spiritual forms of existence. There is not only a rationally conceivable place in the economy of the universe for them, but a varied and beneficent sphere of power assignable to them.* They can be supposed to possess, and exercise, the capacities of important relationships, both Godward and manward. Taking revelation at this point as a guide, they are God's attendants and messengers; and to us they are ministering spirits, helpers in our necessities, and participators in our joys.

Analogy we are aware is not demonstration: but, assuming the existence of God as an Omnipotent Being, of boundless wisdom, infallible in judgment, fertile in expedients, exercising His capacities in producing the highest forms of perfection within the material and spiritual universe, the mind refuses to be content with the idea, that above the highest form of this mundane existence, there is nothing. As the progress upwards from the lowest type of molusca to man is by a long series of diverse orders, the natural presumption is, that it would continue, even though in ways and forms undreamt of, and incomprehensible. Certainly the conception is both rational and vastly

* Viewed in this light the angelic economy cannot be regarded as marking a distinction between Deity and humanity which is merely *quantitative*. It presents a spiritual and moral aspect in which are manifested not only the existence of rational and beatified spirits outside of, and separate from humanity; but that united therewith in common interests and anticipations, they equally unite in Him who is the Head of both angels and men.

grander, that there is a higher domain—a spirit world, with a corresponding system of coördinate forces and mutual adaptations, than that there is progress from the inanimate to the animate, and thenceforward through instinct to reason—through the material to the spiritual as conjoined in man, where all progress terminates. Such a conception presents the universe like a truncated cone, truncated near the base; rather than a grand column towering upwards beyond the reach of human vision or conception, even to the high throne of the Eternal!

2. In connection with this argument from analogy, we may also call attention to the evidence suggested by the religious instincts and sentiments of mankind. Among all nations of which history has given any record, there has been a belief in one form or another, not only in the existence of God, but also in that of inferior beings possessing superhuman intelligence and power, whose office under the direction and control of the higher powers, has been to reward or punish mankind. Of this nature were the lesser deities of the Hindoos, the Izeds, Defs, and Amshaspands of Persia, and the Dii Minores of the Greeks, and Romans. Their existence formed part of the universal faith; which, although grossly perverted, rests upon the legitimate and indestructible basis of spiritual conception and sentiment.* The fact of such an universal sentiment and faith was regarded by some of the wisest of the ancient philosophers as an outspeaking of nature itself, and hence to be rested upon as a

* The origin may possibly be ascribable to some early manifestation or revelation.

reliable truth. Cicero uses this argument in his first *Tusculan Question*, as a proof both of the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul. After stating that it would appear to be a firm basis for faith in the existence of God, that there was no nation so barbarous, or individual so brutal, in whose mind the idea and conviction of such existence was not to be found; he proceeds to show, that this did not arise from any conference or agreement of men, nor was it confirmed merely by institutions and laws, but that such general consent must be regarded as a law of nature itself. *Consensus Omnium Naturæ vox est* Lib. I. Cap. xiii. And again, Cap. xv. when applying the force of this universal consent to the soul's immortality, he reasons that if the consent of all is the voice of nature, they had ground for faith in that truth, because all men, wherever they were, acknowledged that there was something which still belonged to them after the end of this life. *

That such innate conviction of the soul as developed by religious sentiment and feeling, may not be a mere *ignis fatuus* of the imagination is acknowledged even by leading scientists of the present day. Prof. Tyndall has stated that "Religious feeling is as much a verity, as any part of human consciousness, and against it, on its subjective side the waves of science beat in vain." Yes, and how shall we be justified in assuming that there is no *objective* side?—that God has endowed man with feelings, sentiments, aspirations,

* "Quod si omnium consensus, naturæ vox est: omnesque, qui ubique sunt, consentiunt esse aliquid, quod ad eos pertineat, qui vita cesserunt: nobis quoque idem existimandum est."—*De Contemnenda Morte*, Chap. XV.

which are pure illusions ; created him to form anticipations, for which there is to be no satisfaction, and to entertain hopes for which there is to be no fruition? Thus, honest conviction will sometimes speak out, where, as in the case of Balaam, interest and inclination lie in the opposite direction. Certainly, the intuitions and cravings of heart and soul existed long before carnal philosophies had blinded judgment, and deadened conscience, and there was then as now an outstretching of hands towards the Unseen and the Eternal. For from age to age it is undeniably true—*“Cor humanum inquietum est, donec requiescat in Deo!”*

3. As the due exercise moreover of God's moral attributes demands the existence of free, rational and responsible existences, reason suggests, that, as in the material universe, His wisdom and power would have their fullest manifestation in a variety of orders, each one above man ascending and conforming more and more closely to His own intellectual and moral likeness. He could indeed exercise His omnipotence and omniscience, and display His boundless wisdom within the sphere of the purely material. But without the existence of moral beings capable of knowing, loving and adoring Him in all the varied attitudes and degrees of religious sentiment and fervor of which they are capable, there could have been no sphere for the display of reciprocal knowledge and affection. In a certain degree doubtless, those attributes are displayed by God in His dealings with the lower order of existence. But, there can be no appreciation thereof, or gratitude therefor, welling forth in adoration, thanksgiving and praise, where there is no capacity for moral conception,—no reason, judgment and con-

science testifying to limitless wisdom and loving-kindness. It would be a universe of stocks and stones, of dead unconscious matter, of insensible vegetation and unappreciating animality.

“A creation merely material, or even animal, had been a continual reflection on the Wisdom of the Creator. Manifestations of mere power, mere beauty, mere harmony had ever suggested the question, which they could not have answered, ‘For what purpose?’ ‘To what end?’ Themselves unconscious, ignorant, they must have required some addition, in order to complete their sense, to give them a meaning, and without this they must have been an empty parade, a purposeless ostentation. Like an unfinished sentence, they must ever have dishonored Him, who, having spoken so much, had yet not spoken more. . . . So far as created mind, affection, susceptibility were concerned, immensity had still been a solitude. One eye alone there had been to take in the sense of beauty and grandeur, one heart alone to experience whatever delight was capable of being originated from this source, the eye, the heart of the Creator Himself, and for Him and Him only, as a merely personal gratification. . . . No reciprocity, no recognition, no intelligent appreciation, no thankfulness, no love.”—Young, *Evil not from God*, pp. 201–202.

It is most rational therefore, and in harmony with the loftiest apprehensions of the soul, and the deepest, purest emotions of the heart, to suppose that God takes pleasure in the appreciative acknowledgment, and adoring gratitude of His moral creatures. Even in the material universe we cannot doubt but that He takes delight. In the animal and vegetable kingdoms

—the latter especially, how wondrously He has provided for the gratification of pure, æsthetic susceptibilities, under the prompting of what has been termed the “*play-impulse*” of the Almighty. What an infinite variety of conception, and wealth of beauty, both in color and form have been called into existence! The *utile cum dulce* are conjoined even in the biblical description of God’s creative work, with a precedence in order of the *dulce*. He made all things that were “pleasant to the eyes, and good for food.” And can any one doubt but that He who created the myriad-fold forms of beauty, takes delight in them? In the depth of ocean, and amid desert wilds are countless forms of exquisite loveliness, upon which no mortal eye ever looks. Can God have created them, and expended such wealth of loveliness upon them without object or reason? Even admitting (of which however there is no proof) that the angels see, and delight in them, is it reasonable to suppose that finite beings, whether they be angels or men, find pleasure in that to which the Creator and sustainer Himself is indifferent, or which He is incapable of appreciating?

Now, shall we, can we, ought we to stop here? As God has made this lower world, which, in the words of the Psalmist, is His “*foot-stool*,” so full of beauty and blessedness; we surely may legitimately carry our thought forward, not only to the possibility, but to the probability,—may we not say, the absolute certainty,—that there is an upper spirit world, where His eternal throne is placed, and His special presence is manifested, which has been made by Him inconceivably more full of beauty and blessedness? We may

be told by those who would lay the icy touch of a heartless, soulless materialism upon the glow of religious emotion and sentiment, that all description of angels and archangels, cherubim and seraphim surrounding in countless numbers, and worshipping in an eternal melody of praise and thanksgiving, Him who sitteth upon the throne, and the Lamb, is mere fancy and poetic fervor. And our answer will be, it is fancy and fervor which have both reason and revelation behind and beneath them. The question is not one to be decided by carnal judgment, or materialistic philosophy. For the believer there is a higher law and evidence, because there is a *higher authority* than both.

God's Word, as we shall hope to be able to show on another occasion, when rationally and honestly investigated, settles the question beyond peradventure. Therefrom we learn not only that there is a spirit world, a world of light and love, and alas ! one also of darkness and hatred ; but that notwithstanding the inbreakings and blightings of sin, Satan and death, there is a grand system of beneficent powers, and restoring agencies, testifying to the boundless wisdom, mercy and goodness of God, and enhancing the eternal glory of His majesty.

LECTURE II.

MORAL PROBATION.

THE dark shadow of evil rests upon every heart. From whence it came, why its continued existence is permitted in a world created and governed by a just, merciful, and holy God, are problems which the thoughtful mind has ever striven to solve. Reflecting upon His omnipotence and holiness, reason demands why its conception even should have been possible. His boundless foreknowledge must have presented the inevitable disorder and ruin which would flow therefrom, within both the material and moral worlds. Its presence could never be anything but an abhorrence, and a disaster; while as the Author and Sustainer of the finite, His power could certainly have prevented its existence.

Even supposing that under peculiar circumstances, and for reasons undiscoverable by human wisdom, in some one part of the universe, the entrance of evil had not been prevented; why, reason again demands, was it not confined there? Some signal of warning might have been displayed to keep off from its danger the susceptible and inexperienced. Why was the contagion allowed to spread, and involve other orders in ruin? And in view of existing facts, how can a rational and satisfactory theodicy be constructed? If

the origin of evil be ascribed in any way or degree to the direct action, or indirect approval of God, consequences are thereby involved which are utterly irreconcilable with all true conceptions of His moral attributes and divine character; and if intellectual beings have their destiny marked out for them by His foreordination directly or indirectly, their conduct, no matter how accordant with their own desires and volitions, merely expresses the determinations of His purpose and will. We are thus in a labyrinth of perplexities. Waving aside metaphysical and theological subtleties, common sense fails to see, under such circumstances, any true self-direction or moral freedom; and consequently is unable to find a genuine basis of moral character, and ground of responsibility. To speak of praise, or blame, is meaningless. To reward is an absurdity, and to punish an injustice.

When we look upon the material universe, the mind is attracted and astonished at the evidences of divine wisdom, power and benevolence observable in myriad-fold forms. There are intricate and multiform arrangements and adaptations mutually dependent and subservient, performing their allotted tasks with unbroken constancy, and in a sublime harmony: light alternating with darkness, the orderly recurrence of the seasons, the ebb and flow of the ocean's wave, and the silent marching of the stars,—all speaking to the soul of providential oversight and unswerving care. But, when we look upon the moral universe, the contrast is most startling and painful. On all sides, there is spiritual darkness and woe; a chaos of derangements and disorders, mental antagonisms, physical

sufferings, sin's dark catalogue of lies, injustice, violence and death !

It may be objected, it is true, that this contrast is overdrawn,—that in the material universe there are also disturbances and derangements, with physical sufferings and agony, which make even death at times a coveted boon. Material forces produce convulsions, physical diseases, famine, pestilence and woe ; and within the sphere of human life, there are discomforts and sufferings endured which flow from disordered relations, carnal iniquity and violence.

“ Man's inhumanity to man
Makes countless thousands mourn.”

This is so manifest, especially to men of pessimistic temperament, as to inspire them with a hatred of existence. Schopenhauer unhesitatingly affirms that the “ world is the worst of all possible worlds ,” and Hartmann in like manner declares, that “ existence is in itself an evil.” In a corresponding spirit John Stuart Mill brings a most fearful indictment against nature when he says,

“ Nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's every-day performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognized by human laws, Nature does once to every being that lives ; and in a large proportion of cases, after protracted tortures such as only the greatest monsters whom we read of ever purposely inflicted on their living fellow creatures. . . . Nature impales men, breaks them as on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones, like the first Christian martyr,

starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed. . . . Nature does this too on the largest scale, and with the most callous indifference. A single hurricane destroys the hope of a season; a flight of locusts, or an inundation, desolates a district, a trifling chemical change in an edible root starves a million of people. . . . Everything in short, which the worst men commit either against life or property, is perpetrated on a larger scale by natural agents." *

On the contrary however, it may be answered, that material disturbances are incidental to present conditions, and in many cases are substantial advancements of the natural world. Every convulsion is a movement in some line of progress. The mighty cataclysms in geologic ages, were movements preparatory to rendering the earth inhabitable by man; while the lesser disturbances, the earthquake, the avalanche, and the thundercrash are nature's efforts after renewed harmony and stability. So in like manner physical suffering although in itself an undoubted evil, and its existence hard to reconcile with absolute justice, mercy, and benevolence, is nevertheless not an *unmixed* evil. Bright lights gleam through the deepest darkness. The woof of good, as a general rule, has been so dexterously interwoven with the warp of evil, as at times almost to conceal it. Exceptional cases set aside, it may be asserted that life's blessings out-

* *Three Essays on Religion*, pp. 28, 29.

number its curses, and its enjoyments in the main, far overbalance its discomforts and sufferings. Alleviations exist moreover, side by side with the disorders; and although suffering be incidental to many forms of preserving existence, there is no proof that it was designed as an end in itself. The economy of existence, because not fully comprehended, may perplex reason, and as in the case of Mill, call forth charges of "clumsiness" unworthy of an all-wise and benevolent Creator. But even he, while arraigning nature, and denying the essential wisdom and loving-kindness of its Author, has recorded the admission, that "there is no indication of any contrivance in nature to produce pain." *

Direct benefits and blessings moreover may be shown to flow from this source of life's pains and discomforts. Boundless benevolence brings light out of darkness, and makes material evil prolific with good. Physically considered, it is ever a warning voice telling of disordered relations, and a prompter to the use of alleviations and restoratives. And that is only a part—the smallest part. Its influence extends to the sphere of the mental and moral. In accordance with christian philosophy, it is divinely employed as a means of discipline and spiritual advancement. "No chastening for the present, seemeth to be joyous but

* "Even in cases where pain results, like pleasure, from the machinery itself, the appearances do not indicate that contrivance was brought into play purposely to produce pain; what is indicated is rather a clumsiness in the contrivance employed for some other purpose. The author of the machinery is no doubt accountable for having made it susceptible of pain; but this may have been a necessary condition of its susceptibility to pleasure."—*Essays on Religion*, p. 191.

grievous: nevertheless, afterwards, it yieldeth the placable fruits of righteousness unto them that are exercised thereby." "Character is strengthened and advanced by suffering. It presents new occasions, even new motives for exercising and invigorating virtuous principles. It draws forth a higher kind of excellence than had otherwise been possible, and in fact, gives birth to an entire class of virtues, without which its exercise could not have been known."—Young, *Evil not from God*, p. 96.

Mystery nevertheless, deep and unfathomable, remains. The overruling of evil for good does not justify its existence. The thought will recur to the mind, Was there no other way in which character could be strengthened and advanced? Would not a world in which pains and sufferings had no existence, be infinitely preferable to the one in which we live, and more in accordance with all rational ideas of Divine Wisdom and love? And as we turn to moral evil, the darkness deepens. Spiritual wickedness in high places and in low, envelops and presses upon the moral world as a blighting and destroying pestilence.

The clew to this labyrinth can be found only in the fact of finite free moral agency. Such at least to our judgment appears to be the case. To ascribe the physical and moral disorders mentioned, either to the direct purpose and foreordination of God, or to His indirect contrivance and approval as a means of greater good, does violence to all true conceptions of His

* "By whatever reasonings such positions are upheld, they are inexpressibly horrible, they destroy the foundation and soul of virtue, and they are fatal to the honor, the moral character, and the very being of the Most High."—Young, *Evil not from God*, p. 190.

boundless justice, wisdom and benevolence.* Only as consequences flowing from misdirected powers on the part of moral beings themselves in the exercise of freedom, and under a condition of probation necessary for the development and confirmation of character, can a satisfactory reason for their existence be found, and a consistent theodicy be established.

It is not intended, we may here say, to discuss at length, this question, either as it bears upon human freedom, or the origin of evil. All that can be attempted, and indeed all that is necessary for our immediate object, will be a brief reference to some main points, and the laying down of certain principles which commend themselves to unsophisticated reason or common sense.

I. Assuming as a fact, for reasons given in our former lecture, that there are various orders of rational existences including our own, which have been created in God's moral likeness, it is rational to conclude, not only that they have been endowed with specific capacities and functions, but have been placed within a sphere of duties and responsibilities. They differ essentially from the material, unconscious universe on the one side, and from the irrational, irresponsible brute creation on the other. The possession of reason elevated in degree according to their position and sphere of activity, has been conferred upon them, and also the power of comprehending moral law, of forming moral judgments, and of expressing determinations with regard to the character of principles and conduct. They possess also in addition to an exalted capacity of spiritual apprehension, and affection, the power of self-determination,—a will, free and capable

of deciding under all supposable circumstances, what course should be taken; thus rendering them capable of independent action, and thereby furnishing a valid and sure ground of responsibility.

In all this the inherent *differentia* of moral beings consists. Within the material part of the universe, nothing changes or moves, except as it is acted upon from without. And in the brute creation all activity flows from inherent instinct and passion. But moral beings, are, within divinely constituted limits, centres of independent moral forces. They are capable of planning and working in opposite lines as reason dictates, and in accordance with the untrammelled determinations of volition. As such they differ also from the purely material and animal in capacity of moral advancement, or retrogression. They do not revolve in an uniform circle as controlled either by material law, or the impulsions of animality. Lions and tigers, sheep and oxen remain essentially the same throughout a thousand generations, in condition and aptitude. But a different destiny has been marked out for moral agents. With them permanent stagnation is impossible. Both with nations and individuals, there is ever intellectual and spiritual uplifting or depressing,—a going forward or backward. As beings under the rule of a moral governor moreover, they possess not only the ability, but lie under the obligation of exercising their powers in accordance with the highest laws of their existence. Capacity calls not for stagnation, but for advancement. As in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, so here there is a process of growth—an advancement to perfection demanded; and this is attainable only under the discipline of moral exercises,

resistances and conquests. It is not as the placing layer upon layer of adipose matter in the animal constitution, through the blind operation of physical law, but the rational and conscientious formation of character under the promptings of duty and the exercise of moral freedom.

Such all created intelligences may be supposed to have been in nature and capacity when first formed. Their subsequent activity and development, however, whereby the moral quality of their conduct would be decided, must of necessity flow from self-determination, and the due exercise of their own faculties and powers. And, in so far as reason can judge, the possession and exercise of moral freedom necessarily involves a condition of probation,—a state of submission to some test of choice between opposing principles and powers. This, as daily experiences show, is necessary, because only thereby can moral character be formed and confirmed. If we conceive of a being fresh from the Creator's fingers, however highly endowed with intellectual and moral capacities, he could not as yet be regarded as possessing a character of his own forming. Like other objects of creative wisdom and power, he might be pronounced to be "very good." But the distinction between natural and ethical goodness, must not be overlooked. Such goodness could be viewed only as constitutional,—as the result of omnipotent wisdom and activity in his formation and endowment. Character in its ordinary and ethical sense of a personal quality, must originate in, and be confirmed by the exercise of self-direction,—by a deliberate choice made under the guidance of reason, the dictates of conscience, and the

unrestrained power of volition. Motives may be presented, but they can never necessitate decision. If necessitated to any degree in the exercise of volition, in a corresponding degree personal responsibility ceases. Enforced action under all circumstances, in so far as the individual is concerned, is as lacking in moral character as the roar of the ocean's wave, or the plunging of an engine's piston. If on the other hand, there be a surrounding by influences, and a protecting against the assaults of temptation, so as to effect practically a deliverance from their pressure, and to cut off all necessity for special self-determination and activity, a like result will follow. Virtue thus shielded as a tender exotic from contact with trying and testing elements, would be virtue only in name. In a word, for conduct to possess character,—to be virtuous, or vicious, it must be the outcome of free, rational and deliberate volition.*

2. This reasoning applies to all conceivable forms of finite, free moral agency. Angels and archangels equally with men, if they are to possess character as thus ethically considered, must pass at some time, and in some way, through a probation in which reason, conscience, and volition may be called into exercise, and thereby conformity with, or deflection from the will of the Almighty be determined. That such test or trial may differ under varying circumstances, it is

* "Character is certainly a *principle* of individual determinations of will, but originally regarded it is itself again the *result* of determinations of will; character is never innate, but always acquired by development, and its development is conditioned therefore by self-decisions of the relatively, not yet completely characterized will."—Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, II. 51.

reasonable to suppose. As neither virtue nor vice, depravity nor holiness however, ethically considered can be created, but must be developed by free, self-directed action ; for all existing moral beings, whether angelic or human, there must have been some time at which, and some sphere in which, this testing can have taken place.

Now, that such a passing through probation involves the *possibility* of sinning is most certain. A condition of trial in which a preponderating influence in either direction occasioned a lapse, or enforced obedience, would be moral probation only in name. But no *necessity* of sinning is thereby existent. It would be a denial of freedom, and lead to pure fatalism to maintain that every one subjected to temptation *must* fall. In opposition to this a well-known writer affirms:

“ The natural and rational inference from the fact that moral evil was realized in both of the existing orders of created intelligence, is, that it must also have been certainly realized in any other possible order of created intelligence. Angels and men cannot be looked upon as exceptions: they are examples of moral being, and what happens to them must certainly have happened to any other order, to all possible orders of creatures. Created intelligence is *necessarily* fallible. It has in fact fallen.—Young, *Evil not from God*, p. 253.

To this it may be answered: It is indeed true that created intelligence is fallible; but, that does not prove that all created intelligences have fallen, or must necessarily fall. Whatever may have happened to other orders, if such there be besides angels and men,

we have no means of knowing. But, while admitting as a fact that the great multitude of the heavenly host have been subjected to some form of probation, there is no necessity in reason, or statement in Scripture, to compel the inference that they have fallen. We read (S. Jude 6) of angels which "kept not their first estate," and as an inference conclude that the rest maintained their integrity. If such be not the case, then we are driven to the supposition that some atonement has also in some way been made for their redemption. And if for them, why not for the rest of the fallen angels? Had such been the case, it is difficult to explain the absolute silence with regard to such an occurrence in the Word of God; or, why so clear a line is drawn between those multitudes who ever wait upon the Almighty, rejoicing to do His will, and those lost spirits for whom is reserved "the blackness of darkness forever." *

Of what avail moreover, on such a supposition would be the power of free volition, and a proffered choice between life and death, if do what we may, and will what we may, the balance of antagonistic influences is against us; and though preferring life, we are necessitated to undergo death? The idea of a freedom of choice implies the possibility at least of securing what reason and conscience elect as best, and volition determines to secure. It would be a mockery to place moral beings in a condition such as the Bible

* Bushnell seems to have held, *ex hypothesi* at least, the fall and redemption of the good angels. "They [the Scriptures] do affirm the existence of good angels, who, for aught that appears, have all been passed through and brought up out of a fall, as the redeemed of mankind will be."—*Nature and the Supernatural*, p. 129.

states our first parents to have been placed in, if by a rational choice and a conscientious perseverance in obedience, they could not have maintained their integrity. The punishment threatened was to follow only upon disobedience, and that the result of their own deliberate choice and action. And what can be made of God's expressed indignation and condemnation, occasioned by what was evidently regarded by Him as a deliberate violation of a positive command? If we regard what they did as done in consequence of an impelling necessity, the rebuke administered becomes an absurdity, and the punishment inflicted an injustice.

It is not irrational then to conceive that self-restraint and unfaltering obedience on the part of unfallen beings, may beget a disposition, and confirm a habit of moral conformity, such as will be a perpetual safeguard against the power of future temptation.* Especially may this be conceived to be the case, if in addition to natural innocence, they enjoy the super-added grace of the Holy Spirit presence and favor,—the “*accessio donorum supernaturalium*,” which, according to the general belief of the Catholic fathers, our first parents enjoyed before the Fall.† To a cer-

* “If we give due weight to the conception of freedom in the extra temporal sphere, we shall be led to the belief which may be found in the religion of almost every nation, that a portion of the Spirit World has by original self-decision formed for itself a moral existence undisturbed in harmony with God, and thus develops its created innocence into free holiness.”—Müller, Vol. II. p. 367.

† In proof that in addition to perfect natural and moral powers, our first parents were endowed with supernatural grace and ability by the Holy Ghost, Bp. Bull reasons, “If therefore our first parents had been designed only to a natural, i. e. earthly felicity, a supernatural gift

tain extent experience shows such to be the case even now. The powers of enticement decrease in proportion to the resistance made under the influence of grace, and the triumph obtained; and the longer such resistance is continued, the more confirmed becomes the habit of moral conformity. Certain it is that our Lord IN OUR NATURE, though uncontaminated by sin, fought the battle of life, underwent temptation, willed resistance to all spiritual and physical enticements, and through the imparted grace of the Spirit secured the victory. And from God's word we learn moreover, that after the battlings of this life are passed, the redeemed will have their eternal reward under conditions of absolute exemption from further trial and danger. Into the New Jerusalem, their everlasting abode, there shall in no wise enter "anything that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination or maketh a lie." (Rev. xxi. 27.)

Among the schoolmen of the middle ages this whole subject was frequently discussed, in its bearing upon the case of the angels. Aquinas for example, while elevating the original condition of the angels to such a degree as almost to preclude the possibility of a moral lapse, yet argues in favor of their endowment with supernatural, sustaining grace. In his (*Summa*. x. qu. 62. art. 3.)—" *Utrum Angeli sint creati in gratia*," he maintains the affirmative,—"*Statim a*

would have been useless, or at least unnecessary to them; for, a means of a superior order is in vain required for the attaining of an inferior end. And so on the contrary, if the protoplasts be supposed to have been designed to a supernatural, i. e. celestial bliss, it necessarily follows that they were furnished with powers suited to the obtaining of such an end; that is, the supernatural."—Bp. Bull, *Discourse V*.

principio sunt Angeli creati in gratia." And yet, to show that this possession was not an absolute safeguard against falling, in answer to the objection, that if the angels were created in grace, there would have been no fallen angels, *Nullus angelus fuisset a Deo aversus*, he states that the inclination of grace imposes no necessity, as one possessing it may fail to use it, and sin :—" *Inclinatio gratiæ non imponit necessitatem ; sed habens gratiam potest ea non uti, et peccare.*" S. Augustine still earlier, when dwelling upon the question whether the angels in addition to their being receive also their good-will through the grace of the Holy Ghost, says, "Who made this will, but He who created them with a good-will, or with that chaste love by which they cleaved to Him, in one and the same act, creating their nature, and endowing it with grace.* We must therefore acknowledge, with the praise due to the Creator, that not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels, it can be said that the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto them."

3. In what angelic probation consisted, and how long it continued cannot be known. That it terminated however, only when stability of character was attained, and volition was confirmed in allegiance and harmony with the divine will, it is reasonable to suppose. And judging from what is revealed with regard to the redeemed of mankind, those who have passed through the trial unharmed, are now secured by grace from further testings and possibilities of falling. In

* *Bonam voluntatem quis fecit in Angelis nisi Ille qui eos cum sua voluntate, idest cum amore casto, quo Illi adherent, creavit, simul in eis condens naturam, et largiens gratiam.*—S. Augustine, *Civitas Dei*, xii. 9.

opposition to this however, it is argued that angelic probation is perpetual.

“There is a supreme authority to which they are under deep and immovable obligations, to whom they are ever accountable. Their state is necessarily and ceaselessly a state of probation. No expressed purpose or act of the Creator to this effect is required, for the thing is involved in the nature of the beings themselves, and in the relation in which they stand to the Eternal Guardian of righteousness and truth. He who formed them takes, and cannot but take, account of them, and knows and marks whether they are faithful to the laws of their being, to the immutable principles of right.”—Young, *Evil not from God*, p. 257.

But this stands in opposition to the general teaching of the church from the beginning, and is manifestly in contradiction to our Lord's own words (S. Luke xx. 36), in which the assurance is given to believers, that as children of the resurrection, their final state shall be one of equality with that of the angels. That human probation will at that time be ended, the passage above quoted from the Revelations, as well as the words “neither shall they die any more,” abundantly prove. S. Augustine (*De Continentia*, 16), when arguing that it was not from lack of ability that God had not formed man incapable of sinning, having preferred to leave him to the exercise of his own moral freedom, states, that at last both saints and angels, as a reward will be exempt from the possibility of sinning. “For such also at the last will He make His saints so as to be without all power to sin. Such forsooth now hath He His angels, whom in Him we

so love, as to have no fear for any of them, lest by sinning he become a devil."* S. Basil also (Ps. xliv.), when contrasting the condition of angels with that of mankind says, "The angels do not suffer change, for among them there is no boy, no youth, no aged, but they remain in the same condition in which they were created, the same simple and immutable substance of their proper nature being preserved."† And this immutable and immortal condition he ascribed to the power of the Holy Ghost." "Moreover sanctification which is not in their substance adds perfection to them through the communication of the Holy Ghost. They preserve, moreover, dignity by perseverance in good, possessing free will in choice, and never falling from communion with Him who is truly good." . . . "How moreover do thrones, and dominions, principalities and powers spend that blessed life, except they always behold the face of the

* This must be regarded as a moral rather than a metaphysical impossibility. Their elevation of state cannot be regarded as having annihilated their moral freedom. The entrance upon the *status gloriæ* under the aids of grace has been attained only after a deliberate choice of God and holiness, and confirmation thereof. But once attained it is perpetuated. In the enjoyment of God's immediate presence,—beholding the glory which the Son had with the Father before the world was,—all carnal passion and appetite removed, and temptation forever excluded, the highest liberty must be realized in choosing with perpetual gladness and enjoyment, that fruition of the soul's hope. "*Perfectissima libertas est non posse peccare, qua perfectione in summo gradu eminet Deus in agendo liberimus.*"—Hollaz, *De Angelis*, I. c.

Qui Deum summum bonum clare intuetur, non potest non perpetuo Ipsius amore flagare, cum nihil nisi bonum et amabile in eo cernatur; qui autem perpetuo Deum amat, non posse peccare.—Hollaz, *De Angelis*, Qu. 12.

† *Non enim mutationem admittunt angeli. Nullus enim inter illos puer est, nullus adolescens, etc.*—In Psalmum xliv.

Father who is in heaven. But the vision is not without the spirit." *

Aquinas in like manner, is very full and clear in his denial of the possibility of good angels falling into sin. He regards them as having passed through the *status gratiæ* to the *status gloriæ*, in which they enjoy forever the beatific vision of God—*Visione Dei beatifica fruuntur*. Thus (*Quæst. lxii. Art. VIII.*), in answer to the question whether the blessed angel is capable of sinning—*Utrum Angelus beatus peccare possit*, he maintains that such is not the case; and as a reason he says, that their blessedness consists in seeing God. † And after showing that the Being or Essence of God is itself the essence of goodness, he reasons that it is impossible for any of them to wish, or do anything except what pertains to good; and therefore concludes that they are incapable of sinning. ‡

4. With regard to the nature and duration of angelic probation, there has been great diversity of opinion. § And this has resulted from differing views

* *Sed Sanctificatio, quæ est extra substantiam illorum perfectionem illis affert per communionem Spiritus, etc.—De Spiritu Sancto, Cap. xvi.*

† *Cujus ratio est, quia eorum beatitudo in hoc consistit quod per essentiam Deum vident. . . . Angelus igitur beatus non potest velle, ve laggere, nisi attendens ad Deum: sic autem volens vel agens non potest peccare.—Aquinas, Quæst. lxii. Art. VIII.*

‡ *Essentia autem Dei est ipsa essentia bonitatis. . . . Impossibile est autem, quod aliquis quicquam velit, vel operetur, nisi attendens ad bonum. . . . Unde angelus beatus nullo modo peccare potest.—Id.*

§ It would be tedious and unprofitable to follow the Scholastics in their subtle questionings and reasonings about the nature, capacities, conditions of existence, etc. of the angels. But, curious as they were, they were surpassed by those of the Jews contained in the Talmud.—See Eisenmenger's *Entdecktes Judenthum*, Theil, II.

respecting the original condition and continuance of the *status gratiæ*. To some the original condition of the angels was regarded as almost destitute of moral character and tendency. They possessed free will, but unassisted by grace, they were supposed to be unable to attain the reward of life.* Others on the contrary, describe their original condition in such a way as practically to set aside the fact of a *status viatorum*, or state of probation, and to leave scarcely the semblance of a moral lapse as rationally conceivable. Thus Aquinas under (*Quæst. lxii. Art. I.*), Whether the angels were beatified at their creation,—*Utrum Angeli fuerint in sua creatione beati*, in reply to the objection that the angels were not confirmed in good immediately upon their creation as is proved by the fall of some of them, argues, that under the term beatitude is understood the final perfection of the rational or intellectual nature, which is naturally desired

* When discussing the nature and condition of angels as created, P. Lombard states that they were just in the sense of being innocent, and perfect in a certain manner, i. e. in constitution, etc.; but as contrasted with absolute Being imperfect, and their confirmation in blessedness was dependent upon their own acceptance of it. "*Boni scilicet, et non mali; justi, id est, innocentes et perfecti quodam modo*, etc. *Dist. IV. 6.* That they possessed free will in the fullest and widest sense he shows in various ways, evidently regarding their *status originalis* as a *status viatorum*, and in so far analogous to our human state of probation. Ethically as well as metaphysically considered, he also regarded their *status originalis* as good, *ex necessitate creationis*, and as a *status gratiæ*. "It is firmly to be held," he states, "that the angels were created good, not indeed by the exercise of their free will, but by the privilege of creation." —*Non quidem per usum liberi arbitrii, sed per creationis beneficium*. Nevertheless he maintained they possessed the ability to sin or not as they pleased.—*Tales quippe facti sunt, ut peccare possent, et non peccare, si vellent.*—*Expos. ad. Psalmos*, p. 153.

and which moreover is twofold. One kind is that which can be attained by nature, and which may in a certain sense be called blessedness or felicity.* But beyond this there is a felicity which consists in the beatific vision, or the *status gloriæ*. Therefore, he concludes that as regards the first kind of beatitude, the angels were blessed originally, or while in the *status gratiæ*. But the final blessedness which exceeds the capacity of nature, the angels do not possess immediately upon their creation.

The interval however, if such it can be called, between the realization of the former and the latter kind of blessedness, is inappreciable as measured by time; for, according to Aquinas, the angels are not subject to the conditions of time. This is the case both as regards the *status gratiæ*, and its immediately connected *status gloriæ*. He maintains that what they are in constitution and character, they became at once and forever. Thus under (*Quæst. lviii. Art. III.*), Whether angels acquire knowledge discursively—“*Utrum Angelus cognoscat discurrendo*,” he argues, that angels have the same grade among spiritual substances that celestial bodies have among corporeal substances. But there is this difference between celestial bodies and bodies terrestrial, that the latter attain their final perfection through motion and change; while celestial bodies obtain their final perfection instantly from their own nature. In like manner inferior intellects as those of mankind attain perfection

* *Ultima autem perfectio rationalis, seu intellectualis naturæ est duplex, etc. . . . Sed ultimam beatitudinem quæ facultatem naturæ excedit, angeli non statim in principio suæ creationis habuerunt.*—*Quæst. lxii. Art. I.*

in the knowledge of truth, through a discursive movement of intellectual operation, as they pass from the knowledge of one thing to that of another.* But with the angels this is not the case, as they obtain at once all the knowledge which naturally it is possible for them to possess.† Using this as a basis of an analogy, he maintains (*Quæst. lxii. Art. I.*), that the blessedness of the *status gratiæ*, is, in like manner not attained as in the case of men by any discursive movement, but instantly and fully.‡ So analogously is it also with the *status gloriæ*. While it is attained by merit under the operation of free will, the attainment is instantaneous. Thus, in reply to the question (*ibid. Art. V.*), Whether an angel obtains blessedness immediately after one act of merit,—“*Utrum Angelus statim post unum actum meriti beatitudinem habuerit*,” he asserts that immediately after the first act of love in which an angel has merited blessedness, he obtains it.§

On the other hand, and from logical consistency, the same reasoning applies to the fallen angels. By one act of demerit performed at the same instant in which they were created, they were eternally ruined,

* *Angeli illum gradum tenent in substantiis spiritualibus quem corpora cælestia in substantiis corporiis, est autem hæc differentia inter cælestia et terrena corpora quod terrena corpora per mutationem et motum adipiscuntur suam ultimam perfectionem, etc.*—*Quæst. lviii. Art. III.*

† *Et hoc est in angelis, quia statim in illis, quæ primo naturaliter cognascunt, inspiciunt omnia, quæcumque in eis cognosci possunt.*

‡ *Quia perfectionem hujusmodi Angelus non acquirit per aliquem motum discursivum, sicut homo; sed statim ei adest propter suæ naturæ dignitatem.*

§ *Angelus post primum actum caritatis, quo beatitudinem meruit, statim beatus fuit.*—*Quæst. lxii. Art. I.; Art. V.*

and became confirmed in obduracy. Thus, under (*Quæst. lxiv. Art. II.*), Whether the will of demons is fixed in evil—" *Utrum voluntas dæmonorum sit obstinata in malo,*" Aquinas reasons that it must be held firmly according to the Catholic faith, that both the will of good angels is confirmed in good, and that of demons fixed in evil.* In the previous question (*Art. V.*), Whether the devil was evil in the first instant of his creation through the fault of his own will,— "*Utrum diabolus fuerit malus in primo instanti suæ creationis per culpam propriæ voluntatis,*" he argues the matter more at length, and decides in the affirmative. Alluding to an opposite opinion as held by some, viz., that when two operations follow each other, it is impossible for both to terminate at the same instant; and consequently, as the sinning of the devil was subsequent to the act of his creation, it is impossible that at the same instant in which he commenced to exist he became evil; he contends, that the argument applies only to temporal movements which transpire successively.† But with instantaneous movements the same instant may terminate a second as well as a first movement, which he illustrates by the instantaneous reflection of the sun's light by the moon. In proof that the operation of free will was instantaneous with angels upon their creation, he further illustrates

* " *Tenendum est firmiter secundum fidem catholicam, quod et voluntas bonorum angelorum confirmata est in bono, et voluntas dæmonum obstinata est in malo.*"

† *Manifestum est autem quod creatio est instantanea, et similiter motus liberi arbitrii in angelis. . unde nihil prohibet simul et in eodem instanti esse terminum creationis, et terminum liberi arbitrii.*—*Quæst. lxiii. Art. V.*

by the rising of flames of fire at the moment of ignition.* And he concludes that as creation was instantaneous, and also the movement of free will in angels, there was nothing to prevent both from terminating in the same instant.

These are metaphysical questions, which to the ordinary mind appear to be visionary and contrary to all rational and practical conceptions of a moral probation. While it may be admitted that angelic existence is probably governed by laws unknown to mortal experience, it is rational to suppose, that although under different conditions, the main elements of angelic probation were analogous to those under which mankind was placed. That the angels are unconditioned by the laws of temporal existence, is pure assumption. They are, even as men, finite beings, having commenced to exist, and possessing no eternally independent existence. It is admitted that they stood or fell by the free exercise of volition, or self-determination. That is, there was a point in time, or, if it be preferred in eternity *a parte ante*, in which the test of integrity took place,—in which probation began and ended, and in so far they were conditioned by time. But that that point was the same instant in which they were called into being, is by ordinary laws of thought inconceivable.† Moral probation, whether angelic or human, implies free and

* *Sed si sunt mutationes instantaneæ, simul et in eodem instanti in quo illuminatur Luna a Sole illuminatur aer a Luna," etc.*

† That there was an interval between the creative act and the exercise of free will or self-determination, was maintained by P. Lombard—*Moram aliquam etiam inter creationem et lapsum, fuisse fideliter creditur.*—Dist. iv. 6.

deliberate choice; and that involves reflection, comparison, selection and determination previous to action. And all this is assumed to have taken place in the very same moment in which the creative fiat went forth!

S. Augustine in his philosophizings did not go so far as this. While regarding the fall of Satan and of the hosts of darkness as having taken place immediately upon their creation, he does not place it in the same instant with their creation. Thus (*Civit. Dei*, B. xi. *Chap.* 15), when considering the statement that "the devil sinneth from the beginning," and illustrating by a reference to *Isai. xiv. 12*, and *Ezek. xxviii. 13*, he says, "where it is meant that he was sometime without sin."* To the mind of Augustine there was evidently the conception of a space long enough for the exercise of reason, and the operation of motive under self-determination. And this is further evident, as he goes on to say, "If these passages cannot well be otherwise interpreted, we must understand by this one also, 'he abode not in the truth,' that he was once in the truth, but did not remain in it. And from this passage, 'The devil sinneth from the beginning,' it is not to be supposed that he sinned from the beginning of his created existence, but from the beginning of his sin, when by his pride he had commenced to sin."† Viewed moreover with scientific accuracy, whatever may be thought of the metaphysics of Aquinas the physical illustration of the impinging

* *Ubi intelligitur fuisse aliquando sine peccato.*

† "*Et illud quod ab initio diabolus peccat, non ab initio in quo creatus est peccare putandus est; sed ab initio peccati, quod ab ipsius superbia coeperit esse peccatum.*"

and reflecting of light adduced, is most faulty. Light travels with a velocity of nearly 186,000 miles per second; but, there is an appreciable space of time between the moment of the impact and the reflection. Though to ordinary observation, therefore, the direct and reflected light of the sun impinging upon an opaque body, may be seemingly simultaneous, in reality, such is not the case. The question of instantaneousness, moreover must be considered with reference to the distance of the beholder. To one located upon the earth, the impact of the sun's rays upon the moon, and their reflection as observed, would be apparently, although not actually simultaneous; but to a beholder located upon Jupiter, between the impact of the ray and its reflection upon the retina, there would be an interval of about thirty-six minutes.

This idea that the fall of the angels occurred at the time of the creation, did not originate, as already intimated, with Aquinas, and it has been held by many since his day, especially by some of the continental Reformers and their successors. In the nineteenth article of the Augsburg Confession, this opinion is distinctly expressed. The Latin form of the article is indefinite,—*Non adjuvante Deo, avertet se a Deo*; but in the original German it is stated that as soon as God withdrew His hand the devil turned from God to Malice.* Such has been the view held by the great body of the Lutheran divines. They have regarded angelic existence, as not being conditioned by time, or the laws of temporal life, but by the condi-

* "Welcher alsbald, so Gott die Hand abgethan, sich von Gott zum Argen Gewant hat."

tions of what Twesten calls the “*intelligible*” or spiritual world. He states with regard to his ministerial brethren, that while this “has not been clearly expressed by them, yet it is everywhere presupposed, as though dimly floating before their minds.” He also states, “As little as our older theologians allow of any lapse of time, or any valid distinction between the state of the natural powers with which the angels were endued at their creation, and the state of upholding grace by which they were made capable of attaining their destination ; so little could we assume a difference in the order of time, in respect of the good angels, between their receiving this capacity and the actual attainment of the end by means of their free self-determination ; or between the grace which gives them the capacity (*gratia gratos faciens*), and the grace which bestows the reward (*gratia in bono confirmans*). Thus, too, in regard to the evil spirits, the first moment of their existence with the powers and capacities received from God, must be conceived of as the same with their choice of evil.” *Biblio. Sac.*, Vol. I. p. 781. One great advantage of this view is, as Twesten strangely states, “we are relieved of the difficulty to which the idea of the intelligible or spiritual world is exposed, in the endeavor to explain the possibility of a transition out of one state into an entirely opposite state.”

In writing this Twesten has seemingly overlooked the fact, that if there was no transition from one state to its opposite—from a condition of sinlessness to one of guiltiness, Satan experienced no fall, and he abides as he was created, ὁ διάβολος. If he exercised free will, it must have been under the influence of reason, and

the stimulus of purpose. Supposing the impelling power to have been pride, envy, or any other ungodly passion, how, and from whence did it come? It cannot be conceived of as embodied in the act of creation, without involving the Creator in its origin. And if, as we believe, it flowed from his own choice and abuse of moral freedom,—mysterious as the supposition is—such choice and abuse postulate *a perfection of being previous thereto*. Even though the choice with its causes and consequences, was crowded as within the duration of the lightning's flash, there was a passing from a primitive condition of moral perfection to one of moral ruin,—from a state of sinlessness to one of iniquity. Reason in fact, forbids the supposition, either that Satan had not perfection of being before his exercise of choice, or that primarily like all the other objects of creative wisdom and power, that he was not “very good.” Such perfection of being and goodness was his *state*, or condition, from which he by transgression fell. If at some point of time in his past existence he had not been “*in the truth*,” our Lord's statement that he “abode not in the truth,” lacks the pith of sense. Incomprehensible as the fact of such a transition is, and far beyond the power of human philosophy to explain, it is a fact nevertheless, which rests upon the authority of God's word; and it makes no difference whether his primitive sinless condition continued but the fraction of a moment, or a million years, the transition was no less actual and disastrous. Certainly the mystery of sin's origin is in no way removed, or even lessened by these metaphysical fancies.

5. Where then, and under what circumstances, did

moral probation originally terminate in a fall? How did evil commence its existence? What was the *nidus* in which the sin germ found its origin, and from which it entered upon its course of development? As it must have been within the sphere of the intellectual and spiritual, did it spring up in one mind, or in a number of minds simultaneously? Reason sustained by analogy, suggests the former. In all mundane rebellions and revolutions, there is usually one leading mind and prompter to action. The cause may be wide reaching in its power of exciting sympathy and coöperation, but the underlying ideas and sentiments remain practically unvoiced, until, as the magnetic spark communicated to the mine, one daring spirit stands forth, and by giving expression to the sentiments of the rest, starts the current of sympathy and coöperation. What the precise form was which the first act of rebellion assumed, human reason is powerless to discover. The spontaneous outspringing of moral darkness from celestial light,—the passing over of innocence into iniquity, love into hatred, obedience into rebellion, on the part of one morally upright is inconceivable. All that can be known with certainty must be derived from revelation, and therein are not only intimations that within the breast of one of the highest intelligences, pride was in some way engendered, from which sprung the first transgression; but, there are the positive declarations of our Lord Himself, that Satan, the author of human transgression, was of himself the originator of falsehood and iniquity. “He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar, and the father of it.”

If at this point the question be asked, Why were beings created under circumstances involving this necessity of probation, with the possibility of falling into sin, and of causing results so dreadful to contemplate? the general answer may be given, God is a law unto Himself, and He ever plans and performs in boundless wisdom, righteousness and truth. The vessel may not say to Him who formed it from the clay, What hast thou done? Though "clouds and darkness are round about Him, righteousness and judgment are the habitation of His seat." If God would have in His universe rational and moral beings, created in His own moral likeness, such consequences, in so far as human reason can determine, are unavoidable. To be moral, they must be free; and freedom, as already shown, postulates the power of choice,—of unrestrained, self-determination in all possible forms and ways; and hence, the possibility of choosing darkness rather than light, and of saying to evil, "Be thou my good!" In His own wisdom, and impelled by His own reasons, God saw fit to call into existence beings who could love, worship, and praise Him, as well as have intercourse in its varied forms of mutual service, affection and benefit with each other; whereby moreover the sphere of His own activity was infinitely enlarged, His government extended and His glory increased. The endowments which made such service possible, or commendable, necessarily involved elements of danger,—possibilities of assuming an opposite attitude and course.* And reason can

* "God wills the good unconditionally; but only the good voluntarily wrought because without that it does not deserve the name of moral good. Where now freedom of choice is given, the possibility of resist-

point to no alternative. *Tertium quid non datur.* "To be, or not to be," in a sense not intended by the dramatist, was the question. Such beings could not exist in, and yet not in God's moral likeness at the same time. He could have refrained from creating them; but, having created them under such conditions, they could not be interfered with by any overpowering restraint. Motives, or moral influences might be presented to reason and conscience; but volition must be free, if responsibility exist, and conduct possess moral character. In a word, God cannot make a free agent who is not free. Had He preferred a universe merely of material forces grinding out results through the operation of unconscious, unintelligent laws; or one peopled only with creatures impelled by the promptings of innate animality, unable even to recognize His existence, or regard Him as the Source of their being, such a state of things and consequences would not have existed. As Dr. Bushnell truly and forcibly states,

"God preferred to have powers and not things only; because He loves character, and apart from this cares not for all the mere things that can be piled in the infinitude of space itself, even though they be diamonds; because in bestowing on a creature the perilous capacity of character, He bestows the highest

ance is also granted. We may for this reason speak in a very sound sense of God's self-limitation by the creation of rational and moral beings, provided we never forget that this self-limitation is a relative and voluntary one; and in the end conducive to a higher self-manifestation. . . . He did not desire automata, because he wished to found a moral kingdom; but this freedom conceded to a finite being, brings in of itself the possibility of an abuse of freedom, which He at most can only endure but never enjoin.—Van Oosterzee, *Dog.* I. 324.

nobility of being and well-being; a capacity to know, to love, to enjoy, to be consciously great and blessed in the participation of His own divinity and character. For if all the orbs of heaven were so many solid Kohinoors glittering eternally in the sun, what were they, either to themselves or to Him; or, if they should roll eternally undisturbed in the balance of their attractions, what were they to each other? Is it any impeachment of God that he did not care to reign over an empire of stones?"

Nor does the position thus taken involve any supposed contradiction of limiting the unlimited,—of denying the possession of power to the Omnipotent. The question is not one of mere force. By supposable mechanical appliances, and a $\pi\theta\upsilon\sigma\tau\tilde{\omega}$, a child could upset the world; but with mere physical agencies there is no $\pi\theta\upsilon\sigma\tau\tilde{\omega}$ whereby to move the self-poised soul. In dealing with mind, reason, conscience and will, moral and not mechanical or physical agencies, must be employed. To argue therefore from God's omnipotence in such a connection, is to obliterate the distinction between physical and moral powers. It would in fact, be equally legitimate to argue that the force of gravity cannot solve a problem in Euclid, or an earthquake topple over the doctrine of the Trinity. As Creator and Lord of all things, God can do all that lies within the sphere of omnipotent possibility. It is no limitation of Omnipotence however, to maintain that He cannot perform impossibilities,—contradict Himself and the essential laws of existence. It would be placing no bounds to His power to say that God cannot make two parallel lines

meet, or one part of a thing to be equal to the whole. The supposition itself in these, and in all such cases, is an absurdity,—a *contradictio in adjecto*. In the nature of things, a part of any substance can never be equal to the whole of it; and two parallel lines can never meet without ceasing to be parallel. Analogously, a free will can never be subjected to compulsion, without ceasing to be free; and hence, in dealing with existences whom He has endowed with the power and responsibility of moral freedom, He can use no compulsion without contradicting and defeating His own eternal purposes.

In the existence then of a moral universe, lies the foundation of moral probation. And thereon rests from necessity the fact of temptation, and the discipline of trial, with the possibilities and actualities of self-determination and choice of obedience, or rebellion. That the present universe could have existed except under those conditions, is, to human judgment inconceivable; while the results in whatever form they appear, are ascribable only to the self-directed, free agency of the creature. There has been on the part of God no overbearing pressure enforcing violation of law, or such violation could not be sin; nor has there been any overmastering restraint withholding from such violation, or it would not be virtue. Whatever darkness and mystery envelop the origin of evil, and the grounds of its permitted existence, it can never have received the sanction of Him who hates it, and to whose very nature it is an eternal abhorrence. He could not have willed its existence as some have maintained, in order thereby to mani-

fest His mercy and grace ; * nor could He have permitted its extension and continued existence as a means of some prospective good.† Instinctively the soul untrammelled by metaphysical assumptions, and philosophic subtleties, repudiates with abhorrence all such ideas and theories which ascribe directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely the existence of evil to God. That He created the beings among whom it originated, and from whose misdirected self-determination it flowed, is an undeniable truth ; and that its continuance is permitted, and yet fought against is certain. But He holds the reins of all conforming and adverse powers, within His own hands ; and, unfathomable as are His purposes and judgments, He will eternally display His loving-kindness and mercy, and justify all His dealings with both angels and men. And though present disorders and iniquities abound, in His own time and way, He will bring light out of

* "The full exercise of the divine attributes demands the existence of moral evil in the universe. It was necessary to the exercise of His grace, mercy and long-suffering, that He should so direct the course of events as to bring about the fall of some among His rational creatures from a state of innocence and rectitude, and the recovery of some from the fallen to holiness and heaven."—Ward's *Discourses*, pp. 37, 43.

† "God does not will sin as sin, or for the sake of anything evil ; though it be *His pleasure so to order things*, that *He permitting, sin will come to pass* for the sake of the great good, that by His disposal shall be the consequence. His willing to order things *so that evil shall come to pass*, for the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that He does not hate evil as evil."—Edwards' *Wisdom of the Will*, IV. 9.

This is only reaching the same point from another direction--arranging for the existence of evil that good may come. Supposing that it had *not* been "*His pleasure so to order things*," the consequent evil would not have existed. The cunning fowler arranges his snare. His own hand does not tighten the noose : the bird is caught nevertheless !

the darkness, order out of the confusion, and make even the wrath of man to praise Him. In the clear effulgence of the eternal day His wisdom even in that which to finite judgment, is now unwisdom, will be manifested; His power in the whole sphere of its operations, will be justified, and His praises eternally proclaimed.

LECTURE III.

SATANIC PERSONALITY.

A WIDE-SPREAD collapse of faith in the supernatural, has been a marked result of the prevailing rationalism. Especially has this been the case with the ancient, and almost universally accepted doctrine of Diabolic personality. That such should have been the case, however, is by no means surprising, when we consider the undue prominence which has long been given to it, and the baneful consequences which have flowed from exaggerations and perversions during centuries of gross superstition. Once disenthralled, the human mind usually rushes, as by a natural rebound, to the opposite extreme. Early in the christian centuries, the simplicity of gospel teaching in this, as in many other matters, gave way before a steadily developing spirit of amplification and elaboration. With the increase of intellectual darkness, which followed upon the downfall of the Roman empire, and which increased during the dark ages, popular sentiment and teaching assumed a deeper tone with regard to spiritual agencies, thereby forming and establishing the general belief.

During the middle ages and onwards, until near the close of the seventeenth century, Satanic personality was a prominent factor in the popular faith.

Choice minds rising above the common level—if any such existed, were unable to curb undisciplined imaginations, or effect a change for the better. Among all classes and stations, Satan and his kingdom possessed the vividness, certainly, and influence of tangible realities. To Anthony in the third, as to Luther in the sixteenth century, an overwrought and unduly stimulated imagination vouched for his immediate presence, and unrelenting hostility, in most grotesque and palpable shapes. Clad in a hair shirt, amid the loneliness of his forest cave, the former supposed himself called upon to wage a ceaseless warfare with the Evil One. And the latter with equal vividness realized to himself, even in the midst of greater light and more refined surroundings, a corresponding presence and antagonism. According to his own statements, there was a realism of belief on his part, amounting to that derived from sight and hearing.*

From such exaggerated and materialistic conceptions of Satanic personality, a rebound was certain, and indeed necessary. Truth however, is rarely, if ever to be found in one extreme more than in its opposite. Exaggerations in so far as they are such, are falsehoods; and the actuality itself, whatever it may be, will not be attained by an indiscriminate onslaught and rejection, but by a careful and judicious elimination of the exaggerations. Had the influence of a

* On one occasion being disturbed by some noise, just as he was about to commence his studies, which he supposed came from Satan, as he narrates, when "I found he was going to begin again, I gathered together my books, and got into bed." "Another time in the night, I heard him above my cell, walking in the cloister; but, as I knew it was the devil, I paid no attention to him and went to sleep." Michelet, *Life of Luther*, p. 319.

rationalistic spirit and methods been confined to that, the cause of truth would have had reason to rejoice. But the hand of spiritual or material iconoclasm is not often arrested, until with the demolishing of the offending object, many important truths and possessions of the sanctuary are overturned and destroyed. As an able writer, when alluding to the deadening and destructive influence wielded by rationalism, says, "The first thing given up, would of course be the personal existence of the Evil One; then (for the sake of Balaam's ass, or Joshua's address to the sun and moon, or the Mosaic history of creation) the authority of the Old Testament; then one after another single miracles of the New Testament; and finally, the doctrine of the Lord's divinity, and all the other revealed foundations on which christian faith is built." *

1. In dealing with the subject of Satanic personality we are brought to consider two distinctly opposite and antagonistic theories,—*a.* Dualism, which presents an original, self-existent Principle or concrete Personality, who, as rival creator, is the source and sustainer of all evil both material and spiritual; and, *b.* a mere *Personification*, or ascription of concrete personality to evil principles and agencies. The former of these embraces two distinct forms, Hylism and Parseism, with the latter only of which we are now concerned. By Hylism all matter was regarded as an eternal Principle of evil, coexistent with Deity; and, as being purely material, it necessarily excludes the idea of personality. Parseism on the contrary, centres in a spiritually concrete Personality, the declared foe of God and righteousness, the creator of all

* Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, p. 2.

that is evil both material and spiritual; which, is moreover sustained by him, and kept in relentless warfare against all beneficent principles, objects and agencies.

As a speculative theory, the Parsee form of dualism found its origin probably, not in any *à priori* conceptions, but in *à posteriori* deductions from the facts and circumstances as manifested in life's experiences. The human race when existing even under most favorable conditions, soon became aware of antagonisms without and within. Contact with the material world led to the discovery, that behind and beneath the seeming and agreeable, there were opposing elements ever ready to break forth and usurp their places. The perpetual conflict observable between the forces of nature, the alternations of the seasons, the overcoming of cold by heat, of darkness by light, the blastings and crashings of lightning and thunder, the convulsions and upheavals of the earthquake, impressed unavoidably the beholder, and suggested the existence of mutually hostile and powerful agencies. Even while primitive Monotheistic belief still existed, the darkness, the blighting and destroying, were ascribed to divine wrath. Thus there was in so far an incipient dualism—Deity pleased and beneficent, and Deity offended and manifesting wrath. From this the steps to the assumed existence of distinct and antagonistic personality was easily taken. And when thought turned from the material to the spiritual, from conflicts without to conflicts within, the difficulty was intensified. In the sphere of the moral and spiritual, reason was perpetually staggered by the seeming inconsistencies and injustices, apparently irreconcil-

able with benevolent and righteous moral government. Those sayings of the Psalmist doubtless voiced the sentiments of myriads, "My treadings had well nigh slipped ; and why, I do see the ungodly in such prosperity. They come in no misfortune like other folk, neither are they plagued like other men." If God regarded and rewarded virtue, whence came its so frequent down-treading beneath the iron heel of vice? Thus the step again was a short one to the idea of a distinct originator, encourager and rewarder of iniquity. How could such bitter waters flow from an eternally sweet and pure fountain? In what way could such aboundings of moral death proceed from the infinite source of spiritual life? And as reason looked within the individual self, and took counsel with the conscience, the sphere of conflict was seen to have extended even there. That "law in the members warring against the law of the mind, and bringing it into subjection," described so graphically by S. Paul, told of inward antagonisms,—of evil passions and propensities conflicting with those that were pure and godly.

In this way some form of cosmological or theological dualism has been developed under all forms of natural religion, whether among civilized or uncivilized nations. The beneficent and hurtful powers of nature, standing in a seemingly perpetual antagonism to each other, have evoked the conception of opposing powers of light and darkness, good and evil engaged in endless conflicts. As stated by Roskoff,*

* Der Dualismus ist in allen Religionen der Naturvölker vorhanden.
—*Geschichte des Teufels*, p. 22.

“Dualism is present in all forms of natural religion.” And the same he shows to have been equally the case in the various religions of ancient, civilized nations. In support of this opinion, he refers to the testimony given by Plutarch,

“This primitive opinion has passed over from theologians and legislators to poets and philosophers, . . . which is found everywhere among Greeks and barbarians, not only in narrations and legends, but also in the mysteries and sacrifices; I mean the opinion that the universe in no way revolves without guidance, as given over to chance; nor, on the other hand, is it steered and governed by only one rational being, as with one helm or bridle, but by many beings, and by such indeed, as are mixed of good and evil; or, to speak accurately, that Nature contains nothing clearer than that one single governor does not, like a tavern-keeper, mix and serve out the elements as drinks from two casks; but that from two opposite Principles, and antagonistic Powers, one of which guides in a straight and direct course both the world and life; and the other turns and twists them in an opposite direction. Hence the condition of mixture and opposition to which all worldly affairs are subject. And as nothing can arise without cause, so must *evil* as well as *good* have a special source and origin. This is the opinion of the most numerous and the best philosophers. Some of them suppose that there are two equal, antagonistic divine beings, one of whom created what is good, the other what is evil.”—*Geschichte des Teufels*.

As a form of philosophic speculation, Dualism is not absolutely extinct. To men of pessimistic tendencies, who reject revealed truth, it presents attrac-

tions not possessed by christian theosophy. Setting aside all questions of moral probation and discipline, and looking only to the present and tangible, they seemingly find therein a rational ground for the observed material and spiritual antagonisms. Thus, John Stuart Mill, in describing his father's antipathy to christianity, and revealed religion, writes (*Autobiography*, p. 36),

"He found it impossible to believe that a world so full of evil was the work of an Author combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness. His intellect spurned the subtleties by which men attempt to blind themselves to this open contradiction. The Sabæan or Manichean theory of a Good and Evil Principle struggling against each other for the government of the universe, he would not have equally condemned; and I have heard him express surprise that no one revived it in our time."

Through what stages of growth Parsee dualism passed, while attaining its perfected form of two eternal, self-existent Principles of good and evil, this is not the time or place to discuss. To Zoroaster however, who, if not the originator was probably the formulator and establisher of it as a distinct system, evil stood in perpetual opposition to good, as a dread and potent reality. He had got far beyond the philosophic conception of it as a mere negation of good. The pantheistic optimism of his ancestral faith, as in the case of Sakya-Muni in after centuries, did not satisfy reason or conscience. To him, the saying which was ever pressed in the midst of conflict exciting doubt or distrust, "Whatsoever is, is right," was an assumption and an evasion. It did not touch, much less

remove the difficulty. Hence the conception of *Dualism* in supernatural agencies, as a matter of speculative faith ; and also the necessity and duty as a prime element of religious practice, for a pronounced and perpetual choice of good, with a determined and ceaseless warfare against evil. Unlike the Hindoo devotee of Brahma, spending his mortal existence in quiet dreams, and viewing evil as only a different manifestation of divine working, and therefore only as another form of good, He would have mankind duly armed and girt for an unrelenting conflict with an ever watchful and untiring foe.

The failure of this Parsee or moral dualism, whether as a philosophic speculation, or as a religious system, lies in its disruption of the Infinite ; and in its direct antagonism to the well-known teachings of revealed truth.

2. At the opposite pole of Parsee Dualism stands the modern and specious theory of Personification. By some of the earlier writers who denied the fact of Satanic personality, the ground was taken that the apostles used the word Satan merely as a symbol of evil principles, desires and gratifications. That was the view entertained by Kant, Erhardt, and the Lutheran Von Cölln, who, although acknowledging the existence of Satan as an evil power, inimical to God and goodness, yet denied his personal existence. As viewed by them, Satan was merely a personification of combined evil agencies. Von Cölln maintained that our Lord's words do not represent him as a personality having distinct outlines and properties ; that they mention no appearances of him ; and especially are they free from all encouragement to the manifold

superstitions which afterwards were connected with the idea of personality.* In most of the passages where the word occurs, he insisted, that instead of a personal existence, a general idea is given of an inimical power of evil, which continually resists good. In the same way the Lutheran De Wette regarded angels as mere personifications of natural forces, or of extraordinary operations and providences of God, to be viewed as symbols having no personal existence.† And as regards demons and Satan, he supposed it to be conceivable that our Lord could have risen above the popular representations; and although proof is not given that He regarded them as untrue, yet, it must not be assumed from the fact that He said nothing in confutation, He participated in the general superstition. In Christ's conviction, he maintained, they could possess only a morally-ideal meaning, and that in the statement contained in S. John, viii. 44, Jesus represents by the Devil the ideal origin of evil.

In close relationship with the above may be considered the objections raised against the personality of

* Doch stellen ihn die Reden Jesu nicht dar als eine bestimmte Persönlichkeit mit festem Umrissen und Attributen; sie erwähnen keine Erscheinungen desselben, und halten sich überhaupt frei von dem mannigfaltigen Aberglauben welcher sich späterhin an diesen Begriff anknüpfte.—Von Cölln, Vol. II. p. 74.

† Zu den mythischen Sinnbildern der Gotteserscheinungen und Gotteswirkungen gehören auch die Engel. Die Engel ursprünglich Personificationen der Naturkräfte sind, (Ps. civ. 4; cxlvii. 15), oder der ausserordentlichen Wirkungen und Schickungen Gottes (1 Mos. xxxi. 17; xxviii. 12).—De Wette, *Christian Dogma*, § 108.

In seiner Ueberzeugung konnten sie nur eine sittlich-ideale Bedeutung haben und aus John (viii. 44), sehen wir dass er mit dem Teufel den Idealen Ursprung des Bösen bezeichnen wollte, § 242.

Satan by Schliermacher, who is regarded as the most acute opponent of that doctrine. As a prime objection he reasons that in the so-called fall of the good angels [and hence of Satan], no motives or influences, such as pride and envy can be supposed, or assumed, which do not involve the fact of an already fallen condition.* And as a further objection, he asks, how it is conceivable, if the angels were created in the same condition of holiness, some of them could have fallen and others not.

This whole argument, as may be seen at a glance, most strangely ignores the existence of a moral probation, under the conditions of free agency; while it overlooks altogether the possibility of a radical and thorough change of moral character, affected by transgression and persistent disobedience. If the question were one of pure mechanism, it might be granted, that the constructor of a machine designed for a certain purpose, was in so far the author of, and responsible for all work thereby wrought. But such is not the case. Free will and human machinery cannot be brought under the same category. As shown in a previous lecture, the creation of moral beings postulates free will, self-determination; and hence, the unavoidable possibility of transgression. Mysterious,

* Zuerst nämlich lassen sich von diesem sogenannten Fall der guten Engel, je vollkommener sie sollen gewesen sein, und so weniger andere Motive angeben, als welche, wie Z. B. Hoffahrt und Neid, einen solchen Fall schon voraussetzen.—Christlieb, *Glaubenslehre*, § 44, I.

Eben so schwer ist nun auch das Verhältniss der gefallenen Engel zu den andern zurecht zu legen. Denn wenn sie sich gleich wären, und es doch für die einen nicht besondere persönliche Motive geben konnte, wie ist es zu begreifen dass die Einen gesündigt haben, und die andern nicht.”—Id.

and awful as is the fact of an outbreking of evil in the midst of celestial goodness under the origin and stimulus of ungodly passion or motive, it must not be overlooked, nor can it be successfully denied, that in the free exercise of volition, lies an independent power to choose, to decide, to act; and hence the *possibility* of resistance and violation of law. Free, moral volition in fact, is in so far an original centre and source of moral creation.*

Another objection raised by Schliermacher, is, that if Satan's natural powers remained unharmed after his fall, it is inconceivable, how, when possessing most excellent knowledge, he could persist in wickedness. For such knowledge must present each strife against God as an entirely useless undertaking, and moreover only to one lacking insight into consequences can sin produce even momentary satisfaction; while for one possessing most distinguished insight, to persist in such a strife, is equivalent to consciously determining to be perpetually miserable.† To which we answer, there is no ground either in reason or the revealed word, for supposing any such "excellent knowledge" to be possessed by Satan, as is here imagined. By the

* "The finite intelligence can collect all within its sphere of knowledge, and, by analyzing and recombining, form for itself such a new creation at will, as on deliberation its judgment or fancy may dictate. It forms its creation first in idea, in its own mind, and then decides whether or not to make further effort to give permanency, or outward actuality, to these internal creations."—Hazard, *Freedom of the Mind in Willing*, p. 45.

† Sollen nun ferner auch nach dem Fall die Natürlichen Kräfte des Teufels unverrückt geblieben sein: so ist es nicht zu begreifen, wie beharrliche Bosheit bei der ausgezeichnetsten Einsicht solte bestehen können."—Christ. *Glaubenslehre*, § 44.

early fathers,* and also by the schoolmen the ignorance of Satan was a subject of frequent speculation. Thus, when speaking of the mystery of the Incarnation as being a surprise to Satan, Gregory Nazianzen affirms, "For when the crafty author of wickedness, supposing himself to be unconquerable, having ensnared as with the hope of divinity, he is himself caught by the bait of flesh; that in making an assault as upon Adam, he might strike against God, and thus the new Adam might restore the old, and the condemnation of the flesh be dissolved; death having been put to death by the flesh."† Indeed, it is a well-known fact, that from the time of S. Ignatius, the opinion has been generally entertained, that in working for the destruction of Christ, Satan was caught in his own snare.‡ As we know on the authority of

* Satan they maintained was designedly kept in ignorance of the fact that the Virgin Mary was espoused to Joseph at the time when Jesus was born, and, also that He was to die by crucifixion. S. Ignatius states that the virginity of Mary, and he who was born of her, likewise also the death of the Lord, three great mysteries which were wrought by God in silence, were concealed from the Prince of this world.—*Καὶ ἔλαθεν τὸν ἄρχοντα τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου ἡ παρθενία Μαρίας καὶ ὁ τοκετὸς αὐτῆς, ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ θάνατος τοῦ κυρίου, τρία μυστήρια κραυγῆς, ἅτινα ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ θεοῦ ἐπράχθη.*—Epis. ad Ephes. xix.

† *Επειδὴ γὰρ ᾤετο ἀήττητος εἶναι τῆς κακίας ὁ σοφιστὴς, θεότητος ἐλπίδι δαλεάσας ἡμᾶς, σαρκὸς προβλήματι δαλεάζεται, ἢ ὡς τῷ Ἀδὰμ, προσβαλὼν, τῷ Θεῷ περιτέσῃ, καὶ οὕτως, ὁ νῖος Ἀδὰμ τὸν παλαιὸν ἀνασῶσθαι καὶ λυθῆναι το κατὰ κρῖμα τῆς σαρκὸς, σαρκὶ τοῦ θανάτου θανατωθέντος.*—S. Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. 39, Tom. I. p. 631. Paris, 1630.

‡ "Schliermacher in his *Glaubenslehre* (I. 219), believes that the agency of the devil can be deduced from a defective knowledge of sin in contradistinction of the opinion that it owes its origin to the profoundest knowledge of evil. But he has seldom reasoned more weakly than when he begins to argue against this doctrine (p. 209). The sophistry and

God's word the mystery of redemption by an Incarnate Christ, is a subject of wondering curiosity to the angels; and why should he have had that mystery divulged to Him? We will however allow Greek to answer Greek.

"It is certainly inadmissible," says Dr. Lange, that "persevering wickedness should be able to exist with the most distinguished insight. But whence has the theologian learned that the most distinguished insight is attributed to the devil in the Bible? He comes forward as a great genius, indeed, equipped with a power of understanding refined to superlative craftiness; but his demoniacal cunning appears as moral stupidity; and on all points in which he manœuvred against humanity, he was decidedly foiled by the action of the divine insight, especially in the history of the Fall, in the case of Job, and of Jesus."*

3. In harmony with these views of German theologians, may be found many statements of leading American writers. Among the earliest, and most prominent, is the formulated statement of the *New Haven Catechism*, by the Rev. John Davenport, whom Dr. Bushnell regarded as the "ablest theologian of all the New England fathers." In response to the question (p. 37), "What is the devil?" The answer given is, "that multitude of apostate angels, which by pride and blasphemy against God, and malice against man, became liars and murderers by tempting him to sin." Following in the same course,

worthlessness of most of his arguments directly appear when we put them to the proof, and apply them to the moral relations of men."—Lange, *Life of Christ*, pp. 371, 372.

* *Leben Christi*, pp. 372, 373.

Dr. Bushnell also states, " According to the Manichees or disciples of Zoroaster, a doctrine virtually accepted by many philosophers, two Principles have existed together from eternity, one of which is the cause of good, and the other of evil ; and by this short process they make out their account of evil. With sufficient modifications their account is probably true. Thus if their good Principle called God by us, is taken as a Being, and their bad Principle as only a condition privative ; one as a positive and real cause, the other as a bad possibility, that environs God from eternity, waiting to become a fact, and certain to become a fact whenever the opportunity is given, it is even so. And then it follows that, the moment God creates a realm of powers, the bad possibility as certainly becomes a bad actuality, a Satan or devil *in esse* ; not a bad Omnipotence over against God, but an outbreaking evil, or empire of evil in created spirits, according to their order. For Satan, or the Devil, taken in the singular, is not the name of any particular person, . . . but the name is a name that generalizes bad persons or spirits, with their bad thoughts and characters, many in one. That there is any single one of them who, by distinction or pre-eminence, is called Satan or Devil, is wholly improbable." *

To the ordinary mind this reasoning of Dr. Bushnell appears to be a combination of Manicheism and fatalism. God is environed from eternity by a "bad possibility," which waits "to become a fact," and which is "certain to become a fact" the moment an opportunity is given. Like a supposable tiger—although as yet non-existent—prepared to spring

* *Nature and the Supernatural*, pp. 134, 135.

upon its prey the moment it comes into view, this "condition privative" is *actual* or *positive* enough to be "waiting" to assume existence, which it is sure to do in due time. God has only to commence the creation of "powers," and instantly the "bad actuality" or devil *in esse*, comes into existence! * One logical consequence of this condition of things, if actual, is the necessary existence of evil, of a devil *in esse*, at some time among all orders of moral intelligences. If the words quoted mean anything, we are to understand that within the bounds of moral freedom, there are no possible safeguards against ultimate transgression. There *must* come a defection, by the passing of the "bad possibility" into the "bad actuality." As applied to the biblical account of the Fall, there was no personal tempter,—only this "bad possibility" in waiting for the removal of the Creator's fingers, to become the "bad actuality." How under such a condition of things, our first parents could have prevented this passing over of the good into the bad, it is not easy to see. If possessing moral freedom, and there was no external tempter, the blame of the first human transgression must have rested upon them. But, beyond, and counterbalancing moral freedom was the assumed environment or fatalistic necessity, evolved by their creation. Now, all this is not only an explicit denial of the Mosaic account, but it is in direct contradiction of the general consensus of Holy Writ, including the emphatic statements of our Lord Him-

* This looks something like a process by which the old maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit*, is set aside, and out of a "bad possibility"—an assumed something *in posse*, but not yet *in esse*—comes forth a "bad actuality," or, "an empire of evil in created spirits."

self. When applied also to the case of our Lord's temptation, the understanding must be, that He was merely pressed upon, or surrounded in some way by this "condition privative," or "bad possibility," which in His case however, failed to become a "bad actuality."

This assumed necessary existence of Satan, or a "devil *in esse*" moreover is thus made a part of God's eternal plan for greater good, and the final regeneration of the whole moral universe.

"It is the problem of Jehovah's government, Dr. Bushnell affirms, "to master Satan," or this "bad actuality." It has been the plan of God, in the creation and training of the powers, so to bring them on as to finally vanquish the bad possibility or necessity that environed Him before the worlds were made, so to create and subjugate, or by His love regenerate the bad powers loosened by His act of creation, as to have them in eternal subjection. . . . He sets good empire against evil empire, and without high words against His adversary, calmly proceeds to accomplish a system of order that comprehends the subjugation of disorder. Nothing that he could have done by omnipotence, no silent peace of compulsion, no unconsenting order of things made fast by His absolute will, could have given any such impression of His greatness and glory as this loosening of the possibility of evil, in the purpose finally to turn it about by His counsel, and transform it by His goodness and patience."

Thus Satan finally vanishes amid this universal restoration; and God's act in creation was simply a sort of Pandora's box on a grand scale, out of which the

“bad possibility” rushed forth into the “bad actuality” or “*devil in esse*,” in order that the necessary eternal environment might be removed, the “bad actuality” be vanquished, and the possibility of evil be loosened through an universal transformation by divine goodness and patience !

In connection with this, Dr. Bushnell adduces as a further argument against Satanic personality, the impossibility of kingship in a kingdom of evil.

“Evil,” he says, “is a hell of oppositions, riots, usurpations in itself, and bears a front of organization only as against good. It never made a chief that it would not shortly dethrone ; never set up any Nimrod, or family of Nimrods it would not sometime betray or expel. That the organic force of evil therefore has ever settled the eternal supremacy of some one spirit called devil, or satan, is against the known nature of evil. There is no such order, allegiance, loyalty, faith in evil as that. The stability of Satan and his empire consists, not in the force of some personal chieftainship, but in a fixed array of all bad minds.”

The whole force of this argument is given away by its author in the admission that evil “bears a front of organization only as against good.” It may indeed be granted, that evil as lawlessness—*ἀνομία*, is anarchy ; and as such, is inimical to all forms of *internal* concord and confidence. That general truth as stated by our Lord, may not be denied, or its application to the realm of evil spirits be disputed, viz. : that a “kingdom divided against itself cannot stand.” But moral agents, whether men or devils, may be allured, or coerced into an union against a dangerous and destruc-

tive *external* power. In human associations for brigandage, or any form of lawlessness, where active co-operation is necessary, internal jealousies and selfishnesses are held in abeyance so long as attention has to be given to the accomplishment of the object desired, and in which all are interested.* That such in substance is analogously the case with Satan and the hosts of darkness, we are distinctly taught by our Lord and His apostles. What internal convulsions there may be within Satan's kingdom ; what outbreaks of individual, or partisan selfishness ; what spite and hatred ; however frequent may be the attempts to dethrone, and deprive him of his kingship and power, we know not, nor are we in any way concerned to know. The question in hand is not of *internal* peace, but of *external* war—of union and co-operation by the powers of darkness against the kingdom of light, truth and holiness. If any biblical statements are clearly expressed those are which speak of Satan as “the prince of this world,” of his “kingdom,” and of the “spiritual hosts of wickedness.” And if any are to be relied upon as inculcating truth, we must

* “The devil has made himself to be the god and prince of this world (John xii. 13 ; 2 Cor. iv. 4), he has established a kingdom of darkness of which he is the head, whose members are the other evil spirits subordinated to him. . . . For even the evil spirits form an organized community, not indeed based upon love, nor upon the voluntary recognition of a higher law, which annuls or subjects self-will, but based upon force and fear, and upon their common opposition to God and His kingdom. And in this community the selfishness which fills their souls, may to a certain degree find its advantages in being strengthened by the co-operation of numbers ; and that too without any one of the body ceasing to make himself the centre of all his efforts. Thus each member of the community will envy and hate each other as a rival and a foe.”—Twisten, *Biblio. Sac.*, Vol. II. p. 114.

believe that our Lord's incarnation, sacrifice and mediatorship were divinely ordered to overturn that Satanic kingdom and power; to destroy Satan's works; and to free enslaved souls from their bondage to him. "For this purpose," S. John affirms (iii. 8) "the Son of God was manifested that *He might destroy the works of the devil*. And in like manner it is stated (Heb. ii. 14), that "as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same; that through death, He *might destroy him that had the power of death, that is the devil*, and deliver them who through fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to bondage." The natural and unforced antithesis is here certainly, between a divine and beneficent *Personality*, and one utterly diabolic and inimical. As the fact moreover is conceded by Dr. Bushnell, that this hostility to God and holiness is concrete, flowing from fallen moral beings—from "an empire of evil in created spirits," and in so far from devils *in esse*; the fact is reasonably possible, that one spirit of pre-eminent position and power, was the leader in the original rebellion, and that in all continued opposition against God, he still maintains that position and power. Certainly the possibility cannot be disproved, by any such arguments as these we have considered; and the resort to personification is not only needless, but stands in manifest opposition to the natural and rational meaning of God's word.

A corresponding position was also taken by the Rev. Theodore Parker, who, with great flippancy and coarseness ascribed Satanic existence, if such there be, to God Himself.

"It is commonly said," he states, "that there are

only three persons in the Deity. But there is really a fourth person, *i. e.*, the devil; for the devil is really the fourth person of the popular Godhead in the Christian churches. . . . The devil is the implacable enemy of the human race, and especially of believers, whom he desires to devour. He is represented as absolutely evil, without any good in him. Well now, this absolutely evil devil, if there were such a being, must have come from God, who is the only Creator, and of course therefore, is as much a part of God's work and design as the Eternal Son. God therefore must have made the devil absolutely evil, because He wanted to make the devil absolutely evil. The devil must be the implacable enemy of the human race, with this extraordinary appetite for believers, because God wished him to be so. God therefore is responsible for the devil; and the character of absolute evil must have been in God first." (*Gleanings* by Rose Winans, pp. 10, 11.)

To dogmatize thus, that if there is a devil absolutely evil, he must not only "have been made so by God," but must "have been in God first," is both to ignore the existence of moral free agency on the part of spiritual beings, and also to adopt a postulate of pantheism. For, if all moral character of whatever kind possessed by them, as in the supposed case of Satan, is merely an emanation, or innate quality derived from God, evil is existent from necessity, and is only another form of good. Indeed, Mr. Parker asserts (*Discourse*, p. 108), that "there is nothing in nature which God did not put in nature Himself."* Now, man exists in

* Thompson, *Christian Theism*, page 423.

a twofold nature. Are there then no such beings as evil men? If there are, whence came the evil? By original creation? Or, from an abuse of moral freedom? If the former, then the evil having been "in God first," can be evil only to finite conception, being in reality, pantheistically considered but a negation and a good. If the latter, then the evil as *ἀνομία*, lawlessness, is the work of the creature in opposition to God, and was never in Him, nor anything to Him but an abhorrence. The question, be it observed, is not as to the extent, or degree of evil in men or Satan, but with regard to its existence *per se*. Dr. Parker, we suppose would not have had the hardihood to maintain, that the vilenesses of ungodly men "were in God first." And if not in the case of men, why so in that of Satan? To admit, in fact, the existence of evil men, and to deny the existence of evil angels, is an unwarrantable assumption, and a glaring absurdity. For, that such beings exist, reason is powerless to disprove; and their existence granted under moral relationships corresponding to those of human beings, corresponding results *might be*, and as revelation informs us *have been* attained by both. Dr. Parker's optimism in short, has overbalanced his logic. He affirms that "there is no child of perdition before an infinite God;" and that "as the infinite God must make all from a perfect motive, for a perfect purpose, of perfect material, as perfect means," therefore he, Dr. Parker, is *perfectly* "sure of the ultimate welfare of everything that God has made."—*Theism*, 109–112.

4. The most subtle and philosophic argument against Satanic personality however, and one claimed

to be logically unassailable, is based upon the assumed negativity of evil. Evil, it is asserted, possesses no objective or substantial existence, being merely disorder, derangement, loss of good, sustained by a nature or personality which is itself essentially good by virtue of its creation. As God is the only Creator, and as all His works are according to their nature good, an absolutely evil being, or Satan, is an impossibility. Even if once existent, as evil in accordance with its degree of moral obliquity, is a *corruptio*, and *privatio boni*, a deprivation of good, tending to the destruction of being itself; a condition of absolute evil, would, if possible to be realized, be annihilation. Therefore Satan as a personal embodiment of absolute evil, is a mere *lusus imaginationis*, an imaginary creature incapable of existence.

That evil is merely *negative*, or more properly *privative* * was a favorite idea with many of the orthodox fathers, who never dreamed of denying the personality of Satan. Anxious in their discussions and teachings to exclude evil from the divine sphere of causation, while accounting for its acknowledged existence, they adopted the theory which had been previously advocated by some of the Neoplatonic and Stoic philosophers, viz., that all evil is a defect or lack of good in finite beings, which has arisen from an abuse of moral freedom. Thus, John Damascenus writes:

“Nor is evil anything else than a privation of good, even as darkness is a privation of light.”† And he

* See the distinction as drawn by Aquinas, *Summa*, P. I. *Quæst.* 48, Art. 5.

† Οὐδε γὰρ ἕτερον ἐστὶ τὸ ἰακόν, εἰ μὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν στέρησις. ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ σκότος φωτὸς ἐστὶ στέρησις.—De Fide. Orthod. Lib. II. Cap. 4.

further states, that, " Evil is not a substance, or the quality of a substance, but an accident, i. e., from that which fights against nature by voluntary deflection or sin.* (Lib. IV. Cap. 20.) Origen, Gregory Nyssen, and Athanasius held the same opinion. With S. Augustine especially, this theory of the negativity of evil, was a favorite one as it seemingly supplied him with an argument against the Manichean notion of evil inhering in matter itself. In several of his treatises he rings innumerable changes upon it, in his endeavor to show, that as evil cannot be ascribed to divine causation, so neither can it flow from an eternally co-ordinate Principle of evil in the material universe. Thus, when describing his ignorance while blinded by the errors of the Manicheans, he says " Because I did not know that evil was only a privation of good, even to its extinction."† And again he states, that " Corruption injures, and unless it diminishes good it can do no harm ; for, all things which are corrupted are deprived of good ; and if they should be deprived of all good, their existence would come to an end. Therefore, as long as they exist they are good : and whatsoever things exist are good."‡ (Lib. XII. Cap. 12.) On this ground of goodness inhering in all concrete substance and being, he laid

* Κακία γὰρ οὐκ οὐσία τίς ἐστιν, οὐδε οὐσίας ἰδιώμα, ἀλλὰ σύμβεβηκός, ἦτοι ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν, ἐκόνσιος παρὰ τροπή, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἁμαρτία. —Lib. IV. Cap. 20.

† Quia non noveram malum non esse nisi privationum boni, usque ad quod omnino non est.—*Confessio*, Lib. III. Cap. 7, 12.

‡ Noscet enim corruptio, et nisi bonum minueret, non noceret. . . . Omnia quæ corrumpuntur, privantur bono. Si untem omni bono privabuntur, omnino non erant, ergo quamdiu sunt, bona sunt.—Lib. VII. Cap. 12.

down that statement which to him and others had all the force of an axiom that "*Omnis natura in quantum natura est, bona est*,—all nature in so far as it has existence, is good." And in this he fully agrees with Damascenus, who states (Lib. IV. Cap. 20), "Evil is nothing else but a privation of good. . . . For nothing in its own nature is evil. All things which God made, in so far as they exist, are truly good. Wherefore while they remain as they were created, they are certainly good. But when they depart voluntarily from that which is in harmony with their nature, and betake themselves to that which is adverse to nature, they fall into evil." *

This theory finds with S. Augustine as with others, an assumed support in an analogy based upon facts in material nature, as light and darkness, heat and cold, disease and health. Thus in the *Enchiridion* (chap. xi.) after repeating the statement that evil is nothing except the privation of good, he continues, "What moreover is anything which is called evil, except a privation of good? For as in the bodies of animals to be affected with disease and wounds, is only to be deprived of health; nor, indeed, is it meant that when a cure has been effected those evils which existed, viz., diseases and wounds, depart hence and exist elsewhere, but are altogether non-existent. For a wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect of a fleshly substance. The flesh itself is a substance, and therefore certainly something good, to which those evils happen, that is, the privations of that good which is

* Τὸ κακὸν οὐδὲν ἑτερόν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ στερήσεις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν. κ. τ. λ.—*Fid. Orthod. Lib. IV. Cap. 20.*

called health. In like manner what are called vices of the soul, are privations of natural good, which when cured, are not transferred to some other place; but, when they exist no longer in the healthy soul, they have no existence." *

5. This argument that evil is merely privative rests upon an assumption. It is privative ethically considered, in so far as it brings the soul from a higher to a lower position of spiritual condition and enjoyment. But, in its powers and activities it is thoroughly and continually positive. "However correct it may be to recognized a privation in every sin, the real nature of sin is by no means adequately expressed thereby, nor is its origin explained. The question remains virtually unanswered,—“What is that which produces the privation? To say that evil has no *causa efficiens*, but only a *causa deficiens*, is not really to answer the question.” (Müller, Vol. II. p. 287.)

In a word, evil as *ἀνομία*, lawlessness, the expression of free, moral self-determination, is an actual *causa efficiens*, breaking down order, perverting truth, working unrighteousness, and prompting to deeds of darkness, impurity and iniquity. The nature of such *ἀνομία* is not defined by speaking of its consequences as negatives to their opposite, and corresponding virtues. Moral impurity is not merely a lack of moral cleanness, but a positive antagonist to it, as a defilement, debasement. Hatred is never a mere negation, or lack of love. As love prompts to, and when possible accomplishes the well-being of its object; so conversely, hatred begets desire, and ordinarily strives for

* *Post Nicene Fathers*, Vol. III.

the injury of the being or thing hated. It is an operative, impelling passion, born of a fallen nature instinctively prone to revenge, and exists within the soul, as a blighting and destroying power.

“Proceeding from will as the basis of all personality,” as Müller truly says, “sin penetrates deeply into human development, entwines itself like a rank and luxurious creeper about all the branches and ramifications of life, hindering, disturbing, and complicating all. No sphere of life presents its normal order or true form undisturbed; as sin cleaves to the will, so error cleaves to the mind, impurity to the imagination, misery to the feelings, pain and sickness to the corporeal nature.”—*Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Vol. I. p. 379.

With S. Augustine, evil was far more than a defect or lack of goodness, when viewed in its operations and consequences. In his conception it had an intensely positive element,—a debasing, perverting, destroying power, even to the consuming of being itself, as the flame consumes that on which it feeds. That result as he maintains, is never reached, however. “Nothing is allowed in the providence of God to go to the length of non-existence.”* But the tendency is ever in that direction, and the impelling power is a principle and force inimical to God and goodness.

The assumed analogy therefore as based upon material conditions, darkness, cold, and disease as privations of light, heat and health, fails, and must be

* Nihil per divinam providentiam, ad id ut non sit pervenire permittitur.—*Mores, Manich.*, Cap. 7.

rejected. Evil cannot be brought into the category of modified good—or diminution of being. Neither evil nor goodness possesses any *substantial* existence. They are not entities, but qualities of entities which metaphysically considered, as the works of divine creation, are good; but which, morally considered, may undergo change. They stand as opposite poles to each other—as irreconcilable antagonists. But, as qualities they are not mere abstractions, but positive realities giving tone to character, the one in its position and degree as much so as the other. Those dispositions and works of the flesh enumerated by S. Paul, envy, wrath, fornication, adultery, murder, are certainly no less positive than their opposites, called works of the Spirit, love, gentleness, goodness, meekness, temperance.

The main weakness of this argument lies in the fact that there is a confounding of moral with metaphysical good. There is a failure to mark the difference between the metaphysical conception of being as essentially good, and the moral evil possible to such being as quality, or character, produced by the independent creative power or agency of self-directed action. Ontologically considered, all being whether material or spiritual, as the work of God's creation, is inherently good. Reason concurs unhesitatingly on this point with the word of God. All good, nothing but good can come from Him. Even the being or nature of Satan as originally created, was thus *metaphysically* considered, good. But, from self-determination and choice of opposition to God, and the consecrations of holiness, his nature *morally* considered has become changed,—vice having usurped the place of

virtue, hatred the place of love. That the nature of moral existences is susceptible of, and has experienced such a change, cannot be successfully denied. For be it remembered, that free moral agency implies action self-selected, and self-directed, in any way, or degree determined upon by the individual; and hence the possibility of transgressing law, despising counsel, and debasing the soul with the defilements of iniquity. And such a course once entered upon, there are, and can be no overpowering restraints which can prevent further progress in the same line. Though motives of reason be presented, and influences of grace be employed, they can be resisted, and the evil course be pursued until the lowest depths of moral defection is reached. As by the right use of moral freedom unfallen beings may choose, and persevere in a course of uprightness and obedience, thereby developing and strengthening character, and securing immunity from further danger; so, on the contrary, the impress of disobedience once made, it may be driven deeper and deeper into the soul, until reason, conscience, and will are all defiled. As Müller affirms, when contrasting the state of good angels confirmed in virtue, with those powers of darkness which kept not their first estate, "We may allow it to be possible, that another portion of those created existences have utterly alienated themselves from God, so that all inclination towards goodness is excluded from their existence." —Vol. II. p. 367.

Admitting this to be true, the argument that no creature can become totally depraved, is a manifest fallacy. Self-consciousness and observation show, that the course of evil is downward to ever widening

and deepening depths of depravity. By a process of moral petrefaction, both reason and conscience may become as it were solidified, and unimpressible by good. S. Peter speaks of "unstable souls" who "cannot cease from sin." Habit becomes formed and fixed. And if such is the case with men, why not with fallen angels? If by self-directed disobedience, and rejection of moral restraints, the betrayer of our Lord could descend to such an abyss of diabolism as to render his condition worse than non-existence, why might not Satan do the same, or even worse? Judas did indeed repent, but Satan never. Indeed, in his case, the process of defection to the depths of diabolism, may have been inconceivably shorter and swifter. He had no tempter—no lying deceiver without, to beguile him into transgression. Within his own mind that original lust was conceived, whatever form it may have taken, which brought forth the first sin, and therewith his eternal ruin.

This assumed unanswerable argument against Satanic personality based upon the asserted negativity of evil, presents itself therefore as a glaring fallacy. Evil as a positive power corrupts being; but, it neither diminishes, nor annihilates it. Indeed in some important aspects, the reverse would seem to be the case. As virtues may increase in power and intensity, rendering their possessors in whom through grace and faithfulness they are developed, continually more and more potent for good; so conversely may it be with vices. And though it be admitted, that as viewed from the patristic and metaphysical standpoint, Satan's existence, or being, in accordance with the Augustinian maxim—" *Omnis natura in quantum*

natura est, bona est," may be regarded as a good ; * yet, it is surrounded and interpenetrated with evil, which inheres therein as quality giving character, and determining position. In a word, no metaphysical conception of *being* as in itself a necessary good, can set aside the facts of a moral defection of nature, and a positive, perpetuated spirit and power of diabolism.

Thus, as was previously shown, there is no *à priori* improbability, but the reverse, that there are other orders of moral-beings in existence besides the human race, and that existing under corresponding relationships of probation, some may have abused their freedom to their moral ruin ; so in like manner, there is no *à priori* improbability that one of the highest and mightiest of those beings placed himself as leader and general of the rebelling hosts, whose continued existence God permits for reasons known fully only to Himself. Men may speculate, and devise theories ; but, when they are used, as in the present instance,

* Even this may be disputed. Setting aside philosophy for the more sure word of God, we find therein intimations that existence itself may become an evil. Poetry has indeed united with philosophy in asserting the essential good of existence, even under the direst of conditions. Milton in one of his finest passages (*Paradise Lost*, Bk. II. 143-151), puts language in the mouth of Belial which draws all its force from this metaphysical view. But neither poetry nor philosophy can overturn the inexorable logic of facts. He whose eye penetrates eternity, and whose wisdom measures all contingencies and consequences, said of his betrayer, "It had been good for that man if he had *never been born.*" And daily experience confirms the low estimate placed by many upon this present existence, and how gladly after a life spent in ungodliness, they would welcome annihilation, rather than undergo the alternate certainty of that "fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation" of a righteous God.

in disproof of God's revealed word, they are powerless and worthless. In nothing is materialism more impotent than when dealing with questions of pneumatology. For they are outside the sphere and limits of its possibilities. It has no line to measure their length or breadth, and no plummet to sound the extent of their depths. Even within the material universe, there are powers in perpetual exercise of which the material senses can take no cognizance, and the existence of which is shown only by their effects. Who ever saw with the eye, or listened to with the ear, or touched with the fingers, that subtle current which draws the magnet to the pole? or, that wondrous attraction which controls the mechanism of the universe, holding each part from the mightiest luminary to the smallest particle of star dust within its appointed orbit? Analogously within the sphere of the spiritual, effects noted by consciousness, and explained by divine revelation, show the existence, not of mere laws which are but expressions of the ever acting will of God, but of personal agents, using moral influences to upbuild and sanctify, or to debase and destroy. The reality of their existence is shown as in the other case, by their effects; not indeed to bodily sense, but to the spiritual apprehension and the graspings of faith.

Certain it is, that in God's word, although with opposite moral qualities, there are clearly defined personal characteristics ascribed to Satan, as much so, as any that are ascribed to the Holy Ghost. Both are represented as persons exercising volition, and bringing to bear upon the human heart and conscience the special influences for which each of them is distin-

guished. In the case of the blessed Spirit by whose new creating breath the soul dead in sin is made to live anew, and by whose accompanying grace the fair buds and blossoms of regeneration develop into the choicest fruits of an elevated, sanctified life, there is the presence and work of a personal Power. Equally so is it in the case of that malign originator of iniquity who, as the Son of God Himself has affirmed "is a liar, and the father of it," whose defiling, soul-deadening work, perverts truth, excites lust and destroys good, there is the presence and activity of personality. He is the "Prince of this world,"—the "Prince of the power of the air,"—the Spirit "that worketh in the children of disobedience." And the soul's greatest warfare (if apostolic teaching possesses any truth or authority) "is not with flesh and blood," and not with personified abstractions, but with—τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας—the spiritual hosts of wickedness.—Eph. vi. 12.

The ground of evidence likewise, as connected with individual experience, is practically the same in the one case as in the other. We do not see with the eye of sense, nor do we touch with fleshly fingers the gracious inspirings which convict of sin, pierce the conscience, soften the heart and uplift the soul as it is led through grace from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God. But what true believer doubts their reality? Such reality is an integral part of the Catholic faith. With the eye of religious consciousness they are seen, and with the touch of spiritual apprehension they are felt to be movements of God the Holy Ghost upon the heart and spirit. So on the contrary is it with the workings of the spirit of darkness. Though we neither see his person, nor

hear his voice with our carnal faculties, we realize at times to the disturbance of the soul's peace, the inbreaking of sinful thoughts, the suggestions of evil purposes, the promptings to unrighteous deeds, which, if not always originating, are intensified from without,—which we brand as vile at the first moment of their appearance within our moral consciousness;—which distress by even their momentary presence;—and which, when true to self and duty, we resist, and by grace overcome. The lip of unbelieving scorn, we are aware will curl at all this; for, as God Himself tells us, “the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit; for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.” Be this as it may, the ground for faith in the personal existence of Satan, is *no more contrary to the natural reason, than is that of the Holy Ghost*; AND IN GOD'S WORD THE ONE IS AS MUCH AFFIRMED TO BE A TRUTH AS THE OTHER.

LECTURE IV.

PARSEE AND HEBREW TEACHINGS COMPARED.

GOD'S method of working within the sphere of the spiritual is analogous to that observable within the sphere of the material. There is a continual progress from the simple to the complex—an unfolding as of the bud developing to the fulness and perfection of the flower. In all forms of organic nature, this is an universal law. To get the oak, you must first have the acorn. *Omne ex ovo*, is the law within both the vegetable and animal kingdoms. The latest dictum even of those scientists, who would gladly have it otherwise, is, that there is no known form of life except from pre-existing life; and that the commencement is ever in the most minute and simplest form, becoming distinguished oftentimes from other forms of existence only as progress is made in its development towards maturity. Even in inorganic nature the fact is demonstrable, that material changes in the line of progress have resulted in adaptations of the highest importance. The cooling down of the earth,—not to speak of changes in earlier conditions, with what followed thereupon, was an advancement in the creative plan for rendering it inhabitable, and of beneficent purpose to establish present arrangements for multiform life, comfort and happiness.

So also has it been within the sphere of divine grace and mercy. There has been progress upwards and onwards from seemingly the crudest forms of divine method and activity, to the grandest consummations of boundless wisdom and love. God is not subject to the limitations of time. He has eternity to work in. One day with Him is as "a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day ;" therefore, He is in no haste, as measured by finite measurements, to accomplish His designs. Through law and orderly development, He does what He does in the light of His own eternal wisdom, and for the highest good of His sentient and moral universe. Hence it was that the seed germ of a prophesied Redeemer was so long, as men count time, in its germination and progress of development. During four thousand years typical sacrifices and foreshadowings continued to excite expectation. Ever and anon fresh gleams were cast upon the continuously illuminating foreground. But, only when the "fulness of time" had come, and the ages had matured and ripened, under providential ordering, for the grand consummation, did God send forth His Son, the promised seed of a woman, when typical shadows were lost in their Substance, and all propitiatory sacrifice was ended in the self-oblation of Him who is the eternal Priest and Sacrifice.

We call attention to these well-known truths, because the same thing is observable in matters pertaining to that antagonistic sphere of satanic cunning and hatred,—the kingdom of the Evil One, and his powers of darkness. There in like manner has been, and from necessity, an analogous progress in the unfoldings of truth. What evil was in itself, and in

its immediate consequences, soon became known in the consciousness and experience of all. But, what was its origin, and where was its central source and controlling head, was understood doubtless at first, only in a crude and germinal form. The full and final knowledge was, as experience has shown, to be acquired through developments in time, and the maturings of divine purpose. All finite knowledge is cumulative, and as conferred by God in His revealings of truth, it has ever been in accordance with present necessities, and existing states of moral and intellectual advancement.

Through lack of attention to this, great mistakes have been made in rightly estimating facts and circumstances connected with religious views and practices; and much harm has thereby been done, to the cause of revealed truth. Such is the case with regard to the personality and agency of Satan. Because he is not mentioned by name as the great foe of God and righteousness, in the earlier books of the Old Testament, the unwarrantable inference has been drawn, that when those books were written, the Jews had no knowledge or conception of a personal devil. Taking this in connection with the further fact, that during the latter years of the national existence, especially subsequent to the Babylonian captivity, there was a marked advance in conception and expression with regard to occult powers in general, it has been assumed that the personality of Satan is only a Persian myth, which the Jews adopted during that period, and which became afterwards an integral part of the national faith. As some able scholars from time to time have advocated this theory, in conse-

quence of which it has obtained a wide-spread influence for harm, it presents a point of sufficient importance to demand a careful examination.

1. Among the most prominent of those who have entertained the opinion that the whole system of demonology and diabolology is of Persian origin, we may mention Rothe, who, in company with the older German Neologists maintained that the Jews derived all their knowledge of Satan and the hosts of darkness from the Persians. "An impartial comparison of the revelation [of the fall] in Genesis with that in the Zend," he states, "forces on us the conviction, that the older Zend tradition of the rebellion of Ahriman, of his strife with Ormuzd, of the position of man between these *two great beings*, and the consequent interest of Ahriman to draw man over to his side, is presupposed, and that one must of necessity refer to it, if the narrative of Moses is to become intelligible." * And corresponding views are held, and pressed upon public attention at the present time. A writer in the *Atlantic Monthly* (Aug. 1869), states as though it was a truth unquestionable, "It was after the return from Babylon that the devil and demons in conflict with man, became a part of the company of spiritual beings in the Jewish mythology. Angels there were before, as messengers of God, but devils there were not; for till then an absolute Providence ruled the world, excluding all interference of antagonistic powers. . . . And then came in also the conception of a future life, and a resurrection for ultimate judgment. These doctrines have been supposed with good reason to

* Rothe, *Heilige Sage des Zend Volks*.

have come to the Jews from the influence of the great system of Zoroaster."

It would be very difficult we imagine for this writer to reconcile his statement that all antagonistic interference was excluded "by the overruling of divine Providence," with the Mosaic account of the temptation and fall of our first parents. The serpent there mentioned—unless the whole narrative is a myth—was certainly "an antagonistic power," thoroughly pronounced and clearly defined. Whatever view be taken with regard to the real agent under that title, the description given is that of an outspoken enemy of God, a suggester, or rather an asserter of falsehood on the part of God, who, for some selfish reason, as he insinuated, was withholding from them a most valuable possession and source of enjoyment. And this description had been before the Jewish mind during many centuries previous to the Babylonian captivity.

A more recent writer in the *Church Review* (Dec. 1887), after referring to the religion of Persia as dualistic, states, "Such was the belief with which the exiled Jews came in contact during the last years of their stay in Babylonia; and it thoroughly permeated their religion. Prior to that time their theology was, as we have seen, free of it; there was no evil angel, much less a Principle of evil; Jehovah was to them the Source of all. However, in that belief in spirits which the Jews held in common with all semi-civilized races as a heritage from barbarous ancestors, these were the elements out of which a personification of evil might be evolved. So in spite of the characteristic radical difference which separated Jewish monotheism from Persian dualism, the wonderful assimilating power of

the Hebrews soon fashioned a place in their religious system for the conception of an individual evil angel, such as meets us in the Post-exilian figure of Satan."

Assuming as we do, the truth of the account given in Genesis of the temptation and fall of our first parents, and that it was communicated to the Hebrews many centuries before the captivity at Babylon, it is impossible from what is stated in that account of the deluding tempter, of the Schedim (Septuagint *δαίμονια*, Deut. xxxii. 17), and of the Seirim (Isai. xiii. 21), that they had no knowledge of concrete, evil personality. It is incredible moreover, that while all the nations of antiquity believed in occult powers and persons, the Jews were free from such ideas and belief. The national history from the time of Moses until after the return from Babylon, shows how prone they were to accept the superstitions and idolatries of the surrounding nations, and even to defile themselves with the vilest of their abominations.

Some writers even go further, and maintain that not only demonology but angelology in all its forms, came mainly from the same source, and belongs "to a class of conceptions no longer possible in the world."*

* "Traces of angelic orders, such as meet us in the New Testament and later writings of the Old, are pointed out as early as the age of Moses and of Joshua; for the 'prince,' or captain of the Lord's host (Josh. v. 13-15), who then comes forward to conduct the family of God into the land of promise, has been held to correspond with the created angel (Exod. xxxiii. 23), who replaced the glorious Angel of the Presence (Exod. xxxii. 20-23) in administering the Sinitic dispensation, after Israel had most grievously offended in the matter of the calf. But be this as it may, the close affinity that exists between the language of the book of Joshua and descriptions of the prince of angels, who, as Michael, reappears for the protection of the Israelites in visions of the book of

In the same strain another writer in the *Expositor* (August, 1888), affirms, "In the Jewish theory of the universe, angelic agency occupied substantially the same place as physical causation in ours." And then after commenting upon the words, "are they not all ministering spirits," he says, "The statement that they all *serve* is absolute, not merely relative to the kingdom of redemption, concerning which a supplementary statement is made in the closing words, 'being sent forth for ministry, for the sake of those who are about to inherit salvation.' Service is not an incident in the history of angels, so far as we have the means of knowing it. They are associated with the elements and powers of nature—are these under another name.* They are changeable in form, appearing now as winds, now as fire. They are perishable, transient, as the pestilence and the storm, as tongues of flame, or the clouds, or the dew. They are one and many in form: the one splitting up into the many, and the many recombining into the one. They are impersonal, or imperfectly personal, lacking will and self-consciousness. . . . No wonder the author of our epistle is so careful to connect angels with the idea of service. It is his protest against angelolatry which had crept into Israel from Persian sources."

We must admit our utter inability to comprehend either the logic or the sense of this reasoning. It

Daniel, may be fairly pleaded as a proof that the familiarity of the Hebrew church with such conceptions is not due to her reputed intercourse with the Ormuzd religion."—Hardwick, *Christ and other Masters*, p. 561.

* The same idea was advanced by De Wette, (Christlieb, *Dogmat.* § as already shown. See Lecture I. p. 13, note.

rests upon the assumption that the sacred writer, in accordance with popular conceptions, regarded his words as mere figurative expressions; whereas it seems impossible not to see throughout the whole argument, a literal meaning and application as a ground for the comparison instituted. On the supposition that nothing is intended to be understood but physical agencies, what a bathos is there in such expressions as these, "Being made so much better than the angels,"—i. e., than the wind, dew, etc. ! "as He hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they." "For unto which of the angels said He at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." And to reach the lowest depth of the absurd in the statement bearing upon the Incarnation with its results, "He took not on Him the nature of angels—i. e. electricity, gravitation, etc., but He took on Him the seed of Abraham."* By assuming human nature the Eternal Word was enabled to realize the grand conceptions and purposes of divine mercy and love in human redemption. But by assuming the "elements and powers of nature,"—wind, water, fire, etc., He would be enabled to realize what? Can we conceive the possibility of a sane man, much less an inspired apostle, making such a comparison? His argument manifestly implies a contrast between one *order of moral existences and another*. Lacking that, the argument is utterly lacking in sense. Perverted ingenuity in the guise of exegesis, can hardly descend

* To what moreover could our Lord have referred by the "twelve legions of angels?" (S. Matt. xxvi. 53.) Some miraculously evoked lightning flash? or earthquake shock?

to any lower depths of absurdity, in order to get rid of, as "belonging to a class of conceptions no longer possible in the world," all biblical statements bearing upon spirits of light, and the hosts of darkness. Such an exegesis, moreover, empties the statement of angelic ministration commented upon of all verity and rational application. For it is *not true*, that "the elements and powers of nature" are specially sent to, and enjoyed by" (as the reasoning manifestly implies) "those who are about to inherit salvation." Our Lord's own words affirm an equality in God's dealings in this respect with mankind at large. "He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."—S. Matt. v. 45. And surely, if the sacred writer wished to enter a protest against a heathen system of superstition which had crept among, and was debasing the religious conceptions and practices of his fellow-countrymen, he might have taken a more direct and efficient course by denouncing it in literal, unmistakable language, and by exposing its falsehood. Instead of that, although writing under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, he used language, which, even if understood figuratively by those immediately addressed, was sure, as the result has shown, to be understood literally by myriads in other nations, and generations, until the end of time. In short, it was to inculcate error instead of truth, and place a stumbling block in the way of believers.

2. The most direct course to take in testing the matter, and thus to judge what attraction Mazdaism in any respect could have had for the Jewish mind, will be to compare the two systems in some leading

points, such as the existence and nature of God, the being and character of Satan, with prevailing conceptions and statements bearing upon creation and the Fall.

The theology of the ancient Persians as formulated in the Avesta, is, *à parte ante* at least, an eternal dualism.* Its personages are Ahura, Mazda, or Ormuzd, the good Deity, and Angra-Mainyas or Ahriman, the evil minded—ὁ διαβόλος. The former is said to be in His nature, the greatest, best, most beautiful, the strongest, most intelligent, most graceful, and most holy; and in His working, “the maker of the pure creation,” the creator of light, of the visible universe, of angels and men. The latter is regarded as the unrelenting foe of Ormuzd,—as the king of darkness, the creator of malignant spirits, and of all impure and noxious substances within the material universe.

Behind this dualism however, there are traces of a

* In the *Introduction to Pahlavi Texts*, the author states, “If it be necessary for a dualism that the evil spirit should be omnipresent, omniscient, almighty, or eternal, then is the Parsi religion no dualism.”—*Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. V. lxix. To which we reply, ‘If it is necessary for a monotheism that its Deity should be omnipotent, omnipresent, etc., then is the Parsi religion no monotheism.’ It is true, “The Bundahis distinctly asserts that the evil spirit is not omniscient, that his understanding is backward, etc.” but it is equally true that the Bundahis as distinctly asserts of Ormuzd and Ahriman, “Both are limited and unlimited spirits, for the supreme is that which they call endless light, and the abyss that which is endlessly dark, so that between them is a void, and one is not connected with the other; and again both spirits are limited as to their own selves.” (Bundahis, Chap. I. 5.) Although possessing more knowledge and power than the evil spirit, Ormuzd is confined within his own sphere of light, and, as will be shown, is compelled to offer prayers and sacrifices to inferior deities, to secure their assistance against Ahriman.

primeval monotheism, which in time become fully developed by an influential party, as an article of faith. In accordance with this, Zervana-Akarana, designated "uncreated Time, or Time without bounds," was regarded as the primeval source of all being, including that of Ormuzd and Ahriman. He was the "personification of eternity, as the primordial and illimitable void from which creation in its various aspects is successively evolved. He was the basis of all other forms of being, whence conflicting powers in the phenomenal world each had derived its origin. . . . The absolute or primal essence like the Tae-keih of the Confusionists, the Bythos of the early Gnostics, or the *ὄν* of Neo-Platonism. Like them he was believed to have existed long before the contrariety of good and evil had been manifested in creation (Hardwick, *Christ and other Masters*, P. IV. p. 162.)

There has been considerable difference of opinion however, with regard to this primal deity among scholars, arising from the fact that earlier translations have been amended by later ones, in which his distinct personality is not as clearly defined. But this is the case only with statements found in the older parts of the Avesta. In the later writings of the Zoroastrians, his personality and agency are distinctly presented; and even granting that in the older books of the Avesta, such is not the case, the germ is there, from which the subsequent development had its origin.*

* Professor Darmesteter in his very scholarly *Introduction* to the Avesta admits that the doctrine existed several centuries previous to the Christian era. "The theory of time and space as first principles of the world of which only the germs are found in the Avesta, was fully

It is indeed possible, that the germ was itself but the remnant of a more primitive faith. Even Professor Spiegel, one of the highest authorities on this point, while holding that Zervanism forms no integral part of the Avesta system, acknowledges that monotheism preceded the dualism.* Hardwick also, although admitting that Zervana-Akerana was never an object of formal worship, being only a "colorless abstraction," yet admits that the conception of him as the "Primal Cause of all things is discernable here and there in the remains of Medo-Persian heathenism." He was as it were, in crude conception the *Urstoff*, the primary element or principle of existence. After a thorough examination of the Avesta statements in the amended translations of passages referred to above, Hardwick says:

"On a careful scrutiny it appears that only one of

developed in the time of Endemos, a disciple of Aristotle." (p. liv.) And when accounting for the existence of Zervanism, he states, "When the Magi had accounted for the existence of evil by the existence of two principles, there arose the question how there could be two principles, and a longing for unity was felt which found its satisfaction in the assumption that both were derived from one and the same principle. . . ." "When Vendidad xix. 9 was written, the Zervanic system seems to have been, if not fully developed, at least already existent." —*Introduction*, p. lxxxii.

* "No division of the Avesta is homogeneous in its doctrine; discordant voices often unexpectedly break in upon us. The most that we can say is that the Gâthas, on the whole, come nearest to Monotheistic teaching; the Vendidad is more tinged with Dualism; while Yasna (except the Gâthas) and the Visparad are more Polytheistic, and the Yashts are the most decidedly so of all. Prof. Spiegel, who had devoted a laborious life to the study of the Avesta, holds that the order was not first polytheism, then dualism, then monotheism, but that the monotheism preceded the dualism. We also believe that a kind of monotheism came first."—*The Zend-Avesta*, J. M. Mitchell, M. A., LL. D.

two inferences is really possible; either, that some elementary substratum was here said to have existed from eternity, and to have preceded the formation of the visible universe; or else, the "Uncreated Time" had been regarded as a species of *material* in and out of which was formed that definite period of duration, which according to the Perso-Aryans was allotted for the lifetime of the present world. But with the lapse of centuries, all uncertainty disappeared. In the later writings, Zervanism was fully developed as a primary article of faith. From those writings we gather the following:

At some period in eternity *à parte ante*, Zevana-Akarana, the primal source of existence, created two divine beings, Ormuzd, the source and king of light, and Ahriman, the king of darkness and all evil. How the latter became evil is not philosophically determined, although from statements made it would appear that, contrary to the will and expectation of Zervana-Akarana, he was inherently evil from the moment of his creation.* In order to counteract his

* Prof. Darmesteter further states, "They came at last to pure Monotheism,"—the prevailing opinion now, under the influence of rationalism, regarding Ahriman as a mere personification. As showing the views held in the fifth century, A. D., we give an extract from a proclamation by Mihr Nerseh, grand vizier of Iran: "Before the heavens and the earth were, the great god Zervan prayed a thousand years and said, 'If I perhaps, should have a son called *Vormist* (Ormuzd), who will make the heavens and the earth?' And he conceived two in his body, one by reason of his prayer, and the other because he said *Perhaps*. When he knew that there were two in his body, he said, 'Whichsoever shall come first, to him will I give over my sovereignty.' He who had been conceived in doubt passed through his body and went forth. To him spake Zervan: 'Who art thou?' He said, 'I am thy son *Vormist*.' To him said Zervan: 'My son is light and fragrant breathing; thou art dark

power, and to exterminate evil, Ormuzd prepared himself for a conflict with Ahriman. And to that end he created six, Amshaspands, or archangels, a company of Izards or angels subordinate to the Amshaspands, and a countless host of other spirits still lower in rank to attend upon and assist the Izards. He created also the visible universe, with all that is pure and good, limiting the duration of the world to 12,000 years, divided into four equal parts of 3,000 years each. During the first period the beings created by both Ormuzd and Ahriman are supposed to have been in a spiritual and ideal state. Until the end of that period, Ahriman was ignorant of the existence of Ormuzd, but when he had discovered the kingdom of light, and what Ormuzd had done, he created a corresponding number of evil beings, Arch-Defs, Defs, and Under-Defs. At the beginning of the second period, Ormuzd, although knowing that the final victory would be his, yet wishing to avoid the terrible evils which he foresaw Ahriman would cause, offered him terms of peace. These Ahriman rejected with scorn,*

and of evil disposition.' As this appeared to his son exceedingly harsh, he (Zervan) gave him the empire for a thousand years. When the other son was born to him, he called him Vormist. He then took the empire from Ahriman, gave it to Vormist, and said to him, 'Till now I have prayed to thee, now thou must pray to me.' And Vormist made heaven and earth; Ahriman on the contrary brought forth evil."—Hardwick, Part IV., Chap. iii. p. 539.

"* Then Auharmazd, with a knowledge of which way the end of the matter would be, went to meet the evil spirit, and proposed peace to him, and spoke thus: 'Evil spirit! bring assistance unto my creatures, and offer praise! so that, in reward for it, ye (and your creatures) may become immortal and undecaying, hungerless and thirstless.' And the evil spirit shouted thus: 'I *will* not depart, I *will* not provide assistance for thy creatures, I *will* not offer praise among thy creatures, and I

and prepared for the contest, but became so terrified at the majesty and power of Ormuzd, that he rushed back into the abyss of darkness, where he remained during the rest of that period. At the beginning of the third period, regarding himself as at last able to contend with Ormuzd, and urged on by one of his creatures, he sprang up from the abodes of darkness, followed by his hosts, and commenced a furious attack upon Ormuzd, and his hosts, defiling where he could not destroy, and causing all the material and spiritual evil from which the creatures of Ormuzd's creation now suffer. This contest will continue until the end of the world, but with ever diminishing power on the side of Ahriman through the last period, when Ormuzd will triumph, the powers of darkness be annihilated, and all evil will come to an end.

Now on this primary question of theology touching the existence and nature of Deity, there is a deep and fundamental difference between the conception and teachings of the Zoroastrians and those of the Jews. If we look at it from the later and fully developed Zervanism, Ormuzd, the creator of pure spirits, and of all that is good in the material universe, is himself a created, and therefore a finite, being. Or, if we set aside the Zervana doctrine, as forming no part of the ancient Zoroastrian faith, we have an eternal *a parte ante* and coördinate dualism, its members standing in ceaseless antagonism during the world period;—primal Good opposed by primal Evil. In either case,

am not of the same opinion with thee as to good things. I *will* destroy thy creatures forever and everlasting; moreover, I *will* force all thy creatures into disaffection to thee and affection for myself.”—Bundahis, Chap. I. § 13, 14.

Ormuzd falls infinitely below the standard of Jehovah. He is not sole creator either of the spiritual or material universe. Ahriman shares equally with him in bringing into existence things that are. He is not omnipotent, for, as he has not brought Ahriman and the hosts of darkness into existence, he is not able to annihilate them, or blast them with the breath of his displeasure. On the contrary, he needs the help of the Amshaspands and the hosts of light, to prevent being himself overcome. He is even represented as praying for assistance from inferior divinities such as Anahita and Vayu; and as confessing that through the brightness and power of the fravishis or guardian spirits of the faithful, he is able to uphold his authority in the sky, and amid the waters, which otherwise would have come under the control of the demons.* Amid atmospheric convulsions and storms, he is described as offering sacrifice to Vayu, the bright storm-god, and implores, "Grant me the favor thou Vayu whose action is most high, that I may smite the world of Angra-Mainyu, and that nobody may smite this creation of the good spirit! Vayu whose action is most high, granted him that boon as the creator Ahura-Mazda did pursue it." (Ram Yast I. 3.) At the birth of Zoroaster also he is represented as anxious to secure his attachment and assistance in the perpetual conflict with Ahriman, and offers sacrifice and prayer in order to obtain them.† Never in fact

* Farvardin, Yast I. 1, 2, 12, etc.

† "To her did the Maker Ahura-Mazda offer up a sacrifice, . . . and with the rightly spoken words, 'Grant me this, O most beneficent Ardvi Sura Anahita! that I may bring the son of Pourushaspa, the holy Zarathustra, to think after my law, to speak after my law, to do after my law!'

do we find amid the loftiest ascriptions of glory and might as expressed by his worshippers, such grandeur of self-presentation as this: "I am Jehovah, and there is none else. There is no God beside me. I form the light and create darkness; I make peace and create evil: I Jehovah do all these things."

He is not omnipresent, for he is confined within the sphere of light, as Angra-Mainyu is within that of darkness, both of which are regarded as limited in extent, and between which in boundless space lies their common battle-ground. Never has any of his worshippers formed such conceptions, or breathed such utterances as those of the psalmist: "Whither shall I go then from thy spirit; or whither shall I go then from thy presence?" etc. While a pure and absolute monotheism underlay the whole system of Hebrew theology, Mazdaism as presented in its sacred writings, was in a state of constant change, presenting at different periods special tendencies to monotheism, dualism and polytheism. Each division of the Avesta presents conflicting statements bearing upon this fundamental article of true religion. And though it be admitted that Mazdaism rose in moral and spiritual conceptions above some other forms of religion, it never reached the idea of a "God who is a Spirit," or dreamed of Him in His moral excellency as portrayed in the words of Jehovah Himself, "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for

Ardvi Sura Anahita granted him that boon, as he was offering libations, giving gifts, sacrificing, and begging that she would grant him that boon."—Ârbân Yast V. 17, 18, 19.

thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty."

Equally great is the contrast between the Parsee Ahriman and the Satan of the Hebrews.* As from the womb of eternal night he came into existence, the embodiment of absolute evil. There is no conception of his having fallen from a higher and better estate through rebellion against the Most High, by whose sufferance alone he is permitted to exist. He knows nothing of good, for there is in his very nature a total lack of capacity for goodness. Metaphysically considered, the nature of Satan as a work of God, may be regarded as good though debased and changed by rebellion and persistent iniquity. But not so with Ahriman. He was from eternity in nature and character absolutely evil,—a concrete evil personality. And yet, although regarded as coeval with Ormuzd, and possessing creative power, he is represented as terrified at times by some of the inferior divinities, and even

* In the *Introduction to Pahlavi Texts*, the author after saying with regard to Ahriman and Satan, "the resemblance between these two ideas of the evil spirit is remarkably close; in fact, almost too close to admit of the possibility of their being ideas of different origin," makes the following singular statements: "The only important differences are that Zoroastrianism does not believe in an eternity of evil as Christianity does. . . . If, therefore, a belief in Ahriman, as the Author of evil, makes the Parsee religion a dualism, it is difficult to understand why a belief in the devil, as the author of evil, does not make Christianity also a dualism."—*Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. V. lxx. Instead of the two ideas of the evil spirit being "remarkably close," they are as wide apart as the poles. The important fact has been overlooked, that the two systems differ *toto calo* with regard both to the origin and the inherent powers of their Evil Ones. While Christianity has never assigned any limits to Jehovah, it has never conceived of Satan but as a created, finite and fallen being.

by Zoroaster himself.* Thus it is stated (Mihir Yast XXIV.) that "Mithra the lord of wide pastures, goes through the earth swinging in his hand a club with a hundred knobs, a hundred edges cast out of red brass. From whom Angra-Mainyu, who is all death, flees away in fear. He is even described as having been ridden upon all over the world for thirty years changed into the form of a horse.† So great a *farrago* in fact are the whole Avesta statements with regard to Angra-Mainyu, as to excite astonishment if not contempt.‡

An examination of the Hebrew and Parsee accounts of the creation reveals it is true, some striking features of similiarity between them; but there are other features so utterly unlike and out of harmony as to be irreconcilable with the idea that one is the offspring of

* "I am Spitama Zarathustra, . . . in whose birth Angra-Mainyu rushed away from this wide, round earth, and he, the evil-doing Angra-Mainyu, who is all death, said: 'All the gods together have not been able to smite me down in spite of myself, and Zarathustra alone can reach me in spite of myself. He smites me with the Ahuna-Vairya, as strong a weapon as a stone big as a house; he burns me with Asha-Vahista, as if it were melting brass. He makes it better for me that I should leave this earth, he, Spitama Zarathustra, the only one who can daunt me.'"—Ashi Yast, II. 18-20,

† Ram Yast, III. 12, 13.

‡ And yet, from such wretched drivel the christian world is given to understand, the Jews derived their ideas of angels, demons, and of Satan! The Avesta system, theological, ethical and ritual in fact rests in the main upon a basis of terrorism and formalism as puerile as it is absurd. In spirituality it falls infinitely below the plane of Judaism as presented in the writings of historian, legislator, poet and prophet. Its worship is debasing, and some of its rites are disgusting. It presents, in short, as its most prominent feature a system of magic and incantation. Not without reason did Bünsen in his criticism of the Avesta writings pronounce them "wretched things."

the other. The main points of resemblance are, first, the Bundahis represents the world as having been created by six classes or orders, which correspond substantially with the Mosaic account; and secondly, that in both, creation closes with the formation of man. But an examination of the details, shows a total dissimilarity. The work of creation both material and spiritual in Parsee conception, was as already stated a dual and antagonistic process. As Ormuzd created the Amshaspands, Izards, and lower orders of spirits, so Ahriman created the Arch-Defs, Defs, and Under-Defs,—for each good being brought into existence by the former, a corresponding evil one was created by the latter. To introduce life upon the world, Ormuzd created the great primal bull, in the body of which, he deposited the germ seeds of all living creatures. Ahriman entered the body of the bull, and destroyed it. Thereupon Gâyômdard the first man, by the power of Ormuzd came out of the bull's right shoulder. From the body of the bull sprang forth all clean animals and plants as they now exist. Upon this Ahriman in fury brought into existence all unclean, ravenous creatures, and all noxious reptiles and plants.

Now what similarity is there in this fantastic description, with the account of God's creative work as described by Moses? How vastly does it all fall below the calm dignity of that account? "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." "And God said," "And it was so," etc. There is no dualism, no antagonistic creator, no shadow or shade of a conception with regard to a counter-plotter, or a coequal obstructor and destroyer. From Jeho-

vah alone proceeded all things, and in Him alone they live and move, and have their being.

In the account of the Fall likewise, there are several points of agreement, which are more than counter-balanced however, by other points of dissimilarity. According to the *Bundahis* Gâyômarđ the first human being who came out of the right shoulder of the primitive bull, was a special object of Ahriman's hatred, who finally succeeded in destroying him. From his remains however, sprang up a plant which bore as its fruit Mâshya and Mashyôî, who were the immediate ancestors of our race. Having been endowed by Ormuzd with noble faculties of body and mind, they continued in the cultivation of humility, purity, and devotion to Ormuzd, until Ahriman, who had entered the world in the form of a serpent, succeeded in seducing them from their allegiance. The facts as thus stated, undoubtedly show a relationship with the Mosaic account. But there is no more proof that the Hebrews obtained their ideas from the Parsees, than that the Parsees obtained theirs from the Hebrews. The probabilities are, that both are derived from a primitive, or patriarchal tradition which, on the part of the Hebrews, was formulated under divine inspiration by Moses into the account as we now have it. And this view is strengthened by the well-known fact, that other, and widely separated nations, have possessed corresponding ideas.

Taking then these marked discrepancies of detail (and we have adduced only the most prominent of them), there remains but little ground in reason, for the assumption we are considering. If the Jews derived their ideas of Satan and the hosts of darkness

from the Persians, why do they contain so little in common with them? How comes it that in the main features bearing upon origin and inherent power, the conceptions formed are as wide apart as the poles? Max Müller, whose statements we may adduce, as those of one thoroughly competent to speak, and certainly an unprejudiced authority on the subject says,

“The power of evil which in the most ancient portions of the Avesta had not yet received the name of Ahriman, may afterwards have assumed the name of a serpent. But does it follow because the principle of evil in the Avesta is called a serpent, or ‘Azhi-dahaka,’ therefore the serpent mentioned in Genesis must be borrowed from Persia? Neither in the Veda, nor in the Avesta, does the serpent ever assume that subtle and insinuating form which it wears in Genesis; and the curse pronounced on it, ‘to be cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field,’ is not in keeping with the relation of Vritra to Indra, or Ahriman to Ormuzd, who face each other almost as equals. . . . As to the serpent in Paradise, it is a conception that might have sprung up among the Jews as well as among the Brahmans; and the serpent that beguiled Eve, seems hardly to invite comparison with the much grander conceptions of the terrible power of Vritra and Ahriman in the Veda and Avesta.”*—*Chips from a German Workshop*, Vol. I. 152, 153.

* Müller begins the article on “Genesis and the Zend-Avesta,” in which he examines this derivation theory as advocated by Spiegel with the exclamation, “Oh, that scholars could have the benefit of a little legal training, and learn at least the difference between what is probable and what is proven.” A little further on he says, “We read his chap-

3. It may be shown moreover, that the whole theory rests upon an assumption. The extent of intercourse between the Jews and the Zoroastrians has been unduly magnified by the supposition that they lived in close connection with them during the years of their captivity. Now let us look at the facts in the case, as they may be gathered from biblical and secular history. The captivity, which, be it remembered, was in Babylonia, and not in Persia, commenced in the year B. C., 598, when the first deportation took place. Ten years later, B. C., 588, the work was finished by the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple, and the removal of the remainder to Babylon. As the destruction of the Babylonian power by the Persians under Cyrus, took place in the year B. C., 538, the Jews first removed, had been in Babylonia sixty, and those last removed, fifty out of the seventy years of their captivity. In so far then as they may be supposed to have adopted the religious opinions of their captors, it would have been, in the greater part at least, those of the Babylonians, which were not Zoroastrian dualism, but gross polytheism.*

ter, 'Avesta und die Genesis, oder die Beziehung der Eranier zu dem Semiten,' with the warmest interest, and when he had finished, we put down the book with the very same exclamation with which we began our article." And in closing he states, "We have given a fair account of Dr. Spiegel's arguments, and we need not say that we should have hailed with equal pleasure any solid facts by which to establish either the dependence of Genesis on the Zend-Avesta or the dependence of the Zend-Avesta on Genesis. Though we by no means deny that some more tangible points of resemblance may yet be discovered, we must protest against having so interesting and so important a matter handled in such an unbusiness-like manner."

* "The ancient religion of Babylonia and Assyria—whatever may have been its esoteric character—bore the appearance of a very gross

It would be impossible moreover to prove that during the remaining years of the captivity, and long afterwards, the Jews were brought (to any extent at least), into close connection with Mazdaism. Even among the Persians themselves, it was at that time a recent importation from Media. Cyrus the Achæmenian being a grandson of Astyages king of Media introduced it, and for a long period it was no more than a court religion. How far it was even that is disputed, as the matter is by no means settled, how far it was adopted by the Achæmenian dynasty as a whole. One fact is certain the Avesta law during many centuries was in a direct conflict with Persian customs, for it prescribed observances which were unknown, or disregarded, and proscribed others which were universally observed. See Darmesteter, *Introduction*, xliv.-xlvi.

The whole argument in fact, rests we repeat upon an assumption. Through mistakes made by Du Perron, the first European translator, who was fasci-

polytheism." He mentions and describes thirteen chief deities.—Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, Vol. I. p. 584.

In Jer. xxxix. 3, 13, the words Rab Mag. i. e., Chief of the Magi, or Magicians, are applied to Nergal-sharezer as one of the princes of the empire, which shows that Magianism was an established and prominent institution. We learn the same also from Daniel (ii. 2, 12, etc.), who mentions five different classes. But with that institution Zoroastrian dualism had no affinity. On the contrary, in the Avesta the *Yâtus*—a word meaning both demons and sorcerers, or practiser of magic, are regarded as the offspring and agents of Ahriman against the power of whom prayers are to be made, and sacrifices offered. See Haptan Yast, III. 11; Tir Yast, VI. 12; Ardi-behišt Yast, II. 5. Zoroaster is traditionally stated to have been a reformer of the whole system, as Magianism (to some extent at least) appears subsequently to have been connected with dualism.

nated by seeming resemblances between the Jewish and the later Zoroastrian doctrines, the assumption had its origin. Neologists took it up, and advocated it with zeal, as is still done by their followers and sympathizers in various ways. As showing the utter confusion into which matters of importance can be thrown, by the over zealous advocacy of some favorite idea, Hardwick has pointed to a statement of Donaldson in his *Christian Orthodoxy* in which he states that "dualism was the creed of the Medes, Persians, and Babylonians." And in regard to this point we are considering, he states,

"The mythology of Babylonia from the earliest period to the Achæmenian conquest, will exhibit scarcely any trace of dualism, which forms as we have seen, the most distinctive property of the Persian system. . . . I shall accordingly dismiss at once the oft repeated fallacy which professes to connect the Hebrew exiles with the advocates of the Ormuzd religion; or, despairing of this pretext, throws together into one the motley tenets of Magi, of Perso-Aryans, and of Babylonians, giving the general name of dualism to the incongruous compound, and concludes by arguing that the Jews who 'spent the long years of their captivity' in the midst of it, 'returned not unimbued with the superstition of their masters.'" —*Christ and Other Masters*, Part IV. Chap. IV.

We may further add, that instead of the Babylonian captivity being the occasion of a corrupting of Jewish faith, the reverse is well known to have been the case. The national history previous to that season of chastisement, displays a continuous deflection from the pure, monotheistic faith of their ancestors, which sunk

them into ever deepening depths of heathen abominations. It was in consequence of this that so calamitous a chastisement was sent upon them. And in great measure it accomplished the end designed. It was in fact, a period of purification rather than of corruption. While the heavy hand of God thus rested upon them, they were brought to realize what they had been, and had done,—what they had sacrificed, and why ; and, as we gather from that later psalm, they hung their harps upon the willows by the waters of Babylon, and wept at the remembrance of Zion. Men in such a frame of mind would not be very likely to adopt views or practices at variance with their ancestral faith. How tenaciously the leading minds among them clung to that faith may be seen by the bravery of Daniel, and his companions, in displaying the martyr spirit, rather than defile themselves with the idolatries of their oppressors. This much is certain, that after the national return from captivity, and all through their subsequent history, there was no relapsing into the idolatry of the Babylonians, or adoption of the creature worship of the Zoroastrians.

4. It is not necessary to remain however, on the defensive with regard to this matter. An assault may be legitimately made on the opposite side, inasmuch as there are more valid reasons for supposing that such resemblances as exist between the two systems, and which cannot be referred to a primitive tradition common to both, were derived by the Parsees from the Jews, than the reverse. On few points of history has there been more speculation and uncertainty than with regard to Zoroaster himself,—when he lived,—whether he ever did live,—and how large a part of the

Avesta was written by him. Some, like Haug, suppose him to have been cotemporary with Moses; others, as Spiegel, have imagined that he lived in the time of Abraham, and that the points of doctrinal similarity under consideration, originated in the intercourse between them. Prideaux assigns a much later period still, and regards him as a cotemporary with Daniel, and as being acquainted with the Hebrew Scriptures, from which he derived much of his theology. See Prideaux, I. 216. Darmesteter regards him as a purely mythical personage.—*Introduction*, p. lxxvi.

How near any one of these suppositions is to the actual truth, can be only a matter of conjecture. Well established facts in later days, however, justify the statement of Müller, "Even if we admitted for argument's sake, that as Dr. Spiegel puts it, the Avesta contains Abrahamic, and Genesis Zoroastrian ideas, surely there was ample opportunity for Jewish ideas to find admission to the Avesta, or for Iranian ideas to find admission into Genesis, after the date of Abraham and Zoroaster, and before the time when we find the first MSS. of Genesis and the Avesta."

Passing over the period of the captivity, evidently as unworthy of consideration, he points to the intermingling of ideas subsequent to the Macedonian conquests, with the political, religious and social upheavings which were thereby occasioned. The expedition of Alexander had been prolific in results, which were wide reaching, and of long continuance. With the spread of the Greek language went a large infusion of Greek thought both philosophic and political. At Alexandria especially, the newly founded

city of the conqueror, intellectual activity was encouraged and fostered under the patronage of the Ptolemies. Most advantageously located through the far seeing wisdom of its founder, it became the great centre to which Europe, Northern Africa, Palestine and Persia, with those parts of the East which had been thrown open by the Macedonian conqueror, converged. Schools of learning flourished. Literary treasures were accumulated. Different nationalities and religions found a common centre. The theocratic Jew, the philosophic Greek, the polytheistic Brahman and the dualistic Parsee had equal tolerance, and opportunity for contest in that intellectual arena. There the Septuagint version of the Hebrew Scriptures was made during the third century before Christ; and there also about the same time the Avesta is said to have been translated into Greek. Müller states,

“ It is well known that about the same time, and in the same place,—namely at Alexandria,—where the Old Testament was rendered into Greek, the Avesta also was translated into the same language, so that we have at Alexandria, in the third century before Christ, a well-established historical contact between the believers in Genesis, and the believers in the Avesta, and an easy opening for that interchange of ideas, which, according to Dr. Spiegel, could have taken place nowhere but in Arran, and at the time of Abraham and Zoroaster.”—*Chips*, Vol. I. p. 149.

We may even come six centuries further down, or to A. D. 400, during which period the later books of the Parsees were written, and in which the main points of the resemblance claimed are found. Of the earlier writings of the Avesta itself, it is impossible

to determine when they were composed. Like the Hebrew Scriptures, the collection was cumulative and extended through many centuries. It is well known that before the Macedonian Conquest there was a somewhat extensive literature in Persia, and the more careful of modern scholars suppose, that the earliest books of the Avesta were composed as early as the seventh century, B. C. The greater part of the work however, is much more recent; and additions have been made as late as the fourth century after Christ. Hardwick, after a careful examination of the matter states,

“Our ablest scholars seem to be persuaded more and more, that works which have been brought together in the Avesta, are not only the productions of different ages, but have all been modified, and modernized by the intrusion of fresh matter.”

This further point must also be taken into consideration, that the Avesta text as now possessed, is comparatively modern. The Parsees affirm that “the accursed wretch Sikander”—(Alexander) burnt all their sacred books except a few fragments. How much truth there may be in the tradition it is impossible to say; but it is certain that the work of collecting and arranging the different parts of the Avesta, must be assigned to a period as late as the third century after Christ. Müller says,

“To prove that the text of the Avesta in the shape in which the Parsees of Bombay and Yezd now possess it was committed to writing previous to the Sassanian dynasty (226 A. D.) Before that time we may indeed infer, that the doctrine of Zoroaster had been committed to writing; for Alexander is said to have

destroyed the books of the Zoroastrians—Hermippas of Alexandria is said to have read them. But whether on the revival of the Persian religion and literature, that is to say 500 years after Alexander, the works of Zoroaster were collected and restored from extant MSS. or from oral tradition, must remain uncertain; and the disturbed state of the phonetic system would rather lead us to suppose a long continued influence of oral tradition.”—*Chips*, Vol. I. 87, 88.

From the above considerations then, it is evident how insecure and untrustworthy the foundations are upon which this derivation theory rests. It is antecedently improbable for the reasons given, that the Jews during the greater part of their captivity, except perhaps in some isolated cases, were brought into close contact with dualistic teachings. And it is equally improbable, that during the remaining part, the religious views of the conquering Persians could have obtained such influence among a hostile and conquered people, as to have changed, or added new points of doctrine to the traditional faith of their captives. In the book of Daniel there is no reference whatever to any dualistic teachings. The conflicts in which he and his noble fellow captives were engaged and the persecutions to which they were subjected, can in no wise be ascribed to the influence of dualism. In the other two books, *Ezra* and *Nehemiah*, known to have been written about the same period, there is also a total absence of any such reference. It is unaccountable moreover, why if the Jews derived their ideas of Satan and evil spirits from the Persians, they did not keep closer to the original conception and statement. Neither in origin, or original constitution,

in inherent power, or extent of dominion, as already seen, does Ahriman agree with Satan. Yet in these points especially, it would be most natural to suppose that they would agree. Such a marked dissimilarity in fact, is a proof to candid reason, that the one is *not* derived from the other.

5. The question in this important matter, however, is one of ontology, and not of mere terminology,—of the actuality of Satanic existence, not by what name he was originally known. Did the Jews believe in a personal tempter, the declared foe of God, and the deceiver of mankind? That is the real point at issue. That the earlier generations of our race possessed a fully developed consciousness with regard to the nature and character of the tempting serpent, is not to be supposed. Even in the time of Moses, there may have been no clearly defined conception generally entertained. That Moses himself however possessed a definite knowledge, is regarded as probable by some able thinkers and writers, who suppose him for prudential reasons, to have written the account of the temptation and Fall, in the way he did. Delitzsch says,

“The narrator keeps his position on the outer appearance of the event without lifting the veil from the substance that is behind. He may well do this, since the heathen sages present an express though deformed notice of the truth ; but the author throws a veil over it, because the unfolding would not have been suitable for those people of his time who were ever inclined to a heathenish superstition, and to a heathenish intercourse with the demon world. . . . It is a didactic aim that determines the narrator to rest

satisfied with the objectivity of the outer event as it becomes perceivable, and to be silent in regard to its remoter ground." *

This view, as is well known, was held by some of the church fathers. Another reason given by Keil, is that silence with regard to the personality and character of Satan "had respect to the inclination which men have to roll the guilt from themselves upon the tempting spirit."

Whatever clearness of insight Moses may have had, and whatever motives may have impelled him to narrate the facts in that form, the reflecting mind could not fail to perceive a background of personal agency, and that background distinguished by intellectual power and malignant cunning. Both Josephus and Philo refer to the tempting serpent. The former gives the account in its popular shape; but that is no proof that he saw nothing beneath the surface of the narrative. The latter in like manner states, that, "The old poisonous and earthborn reptile, the serpent, uttered the voice of a man." But he prefaces this statement with, "It is said," and he concludes his account with the following sentence, showing that a far deeper truth than appeared on the surface, underlay the narrative. "These things are not mere fabulous inventions, in which the race of poets and sophists delights, but are rather types shadowing forth some allegorical truth, according to some mystic explanation."—Vol. I. p. 17, Bohn.

The rational explanation why so little was revealed in regard to Satan and the powers of darkness in the

* Lange's *Commentary*, Vol. I. p. 236.

older books of the Bible, will be found, unless we are greatly mistaken, in the fact already intimated, of a gradual unfolding of truth. It is well known to have been the case in other matters, and there is no reason why it should not be so in this. Indeed, good reasons have been already mentioned why it *should* have been so. A premature statement of literal truth in any department of material or spiritual knowledge, would, as a general rule, be productive of harm. In the realm of physics when sufficient knowledge did not exist to verify statements made, and phenomena seemingly contradicted them, unbelieving opposition would have been the inevitable result. And in the sphere of the spiritual, prone as human nature is to abandon truth for error, there would have been most probably in the case under consideration, a lapse from monotheism into heathenish superstition and demonolatry.

Even though it be granted that little was originally revealed, and that little under the covering of allegory or myth, therein was contained the germ from which the tree of knowledge in this important matter has developed. The malicious spirit of antagonism to the Almighty, and of lying craft for human undoing, are clearly seen there. Thus in the earliest record of our race, the serpent tempter and prevaricator, by whatever name called, is Satanic enough. And all through the after ages additional evidences are given, sufficient to show a general faith in the existence of occult powers. Not to mention the references to Satan in the book Job, in Chronicles, and Zachariah, which may be regarded as *sub lite*, we have undoubted evidence of a belief in "familiar spirits," and of "evil spirits,"

employed by God as agents of punishment, as in the instance mentioned 1 Sam. xvi. 14-23. Indeed the supposition that the Jews had no idea of, or faith in the existence of evil spirits, especially of the serpent tempter, before the residence in Babylonia, is utterly untenable. It amounts to placing them in a position of isolation in religious conceptions, and in so far as superstitious corruptions of the truth were concerned, as far in advance of other nations. And this we know was not the case. For as the thirsty earth drinks in the rain which falls upon it, so did the Hebrews for centuries absorb with manifest avidity the most debasing heathen notions and practices. But as divine plans ripened, increasing knowledge was communicated, and waymarks are found identifying the same tempting spirit of evil from the first to the last book in the whole canon of revelation.

In the book Job, at whatever period it may have been written, Satan stands forth as a lying calumniator and instigator of harm. And equally so is it in 1 Chron. xxi. 1; and Zechariah iii. 1, 2. Even if it should be admitted that all the statements were written subsequent to the captivity, the conception of the Evil One is purely Hebraic, and in no way Zoroastrian. In the book Wisdom ii. 23, man is said to have been created immortal, and made by God to "be an image of His own eternity;" and in the following verse to have become mortal through diabolical envy—"through envy of the devil came death into the world." And when we come to the New Testament, the identification of the serpent tempter with Satan is complete. In our Lord's own words, he is said to have been "a murderer from the beginning,"—a "liar, and

the father of it." S. Paul also uses the same figurative expression employed by Moses, when referring to the lying tempter of our first mother—"as the serpent beguiled Eve," 2 Cor. xi. 3; and S. John in the book of Revelations, xii. 9, speaks of him as "the great dragon, that old serpent called the devil and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world." In fine, there is a perfect *consensus* in the word of God on this whole subject. Reasons sufficient to the divine mind, of which we have no knowledge or conception even, may have underlain the allegorical form given to Satan by Moses; and as stated in our introductory remarks, the imparting of further instruction as human necessities demanded, and divine purposes were unfolded, was in perfect analogy with God's methods of development, within both the sphere of the material and the spiritual.

LECTURE V.

CHRIST'S TEACHING WITH REGARD TO EVIL AND THE EVIL ONE.

IN considering the subject of Satanic personality and ceaseless activity in the promotion of evil, we have loftier heights of certainty to climb than any yet attained. That it is not a mere speculation in philosophy, has already been shown. There is no antecedent improbability against rational views of pneumatology, whether bearing upon the existence of angels, or of demons. Reason alone, it is true, cannot establish the fact of such existence; but neither can it disprove it, and there are various analogical and psychological considerations which furnish very clear and cogent arguments in its favor.

For the believer however, the main and reliable ground of faith, is the testimony of God's word. He who is not bounded by finite limitations, deluded by glittering sophistries, or biassed by human prejudices,—He whose eye takes in at a glance all possibilities and actualities, has declared it. Unless the record which He has given us is an unexplainable enigma,—an insoluble riddle, and is to be interpreted as dreams are sometimes interpreted; we are to understand that within the sphere of the moral universe there are spiritual beings differing in rank, power and

authority, some of whom have preserved their integrity, while others under the leadership of Satan have lost it. And the knowledge with regard to this, as already shown, has been cumulative. Reasons sufficient to the Divine mind led to the withholding of full information, until beneficent plans for human enlightenment and spiritual advancement were sufficiently matured. As in the material world, there was "first the blade, then the ear; after that the full corn in the ear."

And as was also shown, the progress of unfolding was harmonious throughout,—each succeeding development being but an additional step in the line of a further and naturally connected truth. It was moreover, not only what the circumstances in each succeeding age required, but it was at each stage in full accord with the whole Messianic work of spiritual enlightenment and salvation. The light enjoyed by Moses in this, as in other correlative matters, was doubtless far brighter than that possessed by Enoch or Noah; while that granted to David, and the prophets, was much brighter still. Even that possessed by the most enlightened of the Old Testament saints, fell below the measure granted to the first followers of our Lord; to which possibly, there was a still further increase at the final illumination conferred by the descent and abiding presence within the church of the Holy Ghost.

1. In our Lord's own life and teachings we naturally and with reason, expect to find still further developments. And the expectation is justified by events as they transpired. His Incarnation brought Him into a close and vital connection with humanity as debased

by sin, and in bondage to the powers of darkness; and if that original prophecy of a Redeemer, who as the "seed of the woman," was to have its fulfilment in Him, it was necessary that He should come into mortal conflict with the author of human temptation and transgression. At the commencement of His public ministry therefore, as we learn, probably not from subsequent inspiration of the Holy Ghost, but from our Lord Himself, He was brought face to face with the Evil One. In what form the adversary approached, is, and must ever be a matter of conjecture; while to examine in detail the different theories which have been advanced on the subject, is neither possible nor necessary.* All we can know is what He Himself saw fit to communicate to His disciples. But that the contest undergone was with a *personal opponent*, and not an imaginary conflict mythically described, lies upon the face of the narrative, as the most natural and rational understanding. The transaction, even though some particulars are presented in a symbolic dress, rests manifestly upon a historic basis. The time of its occurrence, being immediately after His baptism, and before the actual commencement of His public ministry, is in harmony with the natural order of his undertaking, and is in so far a confirmation of its reality. His withdrawal into the wilderness, the forty days fasting, the subsequent ministration of angels, are all narrated as *facts* evidently to be literally understood,

Lange, adopting the view of Rosenmüller, Kuinoel,

* Lange enumerates five distinct views which have been held with regard to the mode of the temptation.

and Bengel, supposes that Satan appeared as a priest or scribe, "*sub schemate γραμματέως quia τὸ γέγραπται εἰ τὴν ὀππῶνιται*," and says,

"Nothing appears to us more natural, than that immediately after the baptism in which Christ entered upon His work as Saviour of the world, He should have encountered, and entered upon a spiritual conflict with the spurious ideas which the men of that age entertained about the Messiah. The influence of those perverted views concerning the Messiah upon His own mind, would necessarily give rise to an assault and temptation of Satan Thus far, then, the narrative presents an inward transaction indeed; but, at the same time, also a real and actual transaction between Christ on the one hand, and the popular expectations and the kingdom of Satan on the other Satan really employed, it seems to me, some of the chief priests and scribes as his instruments to tempt Christ to undertake the part of such a worldly Messiah, as the Jews at the time expected."*

Ellicott repudiates this view, and maintains that *all* the incidents of the temptation actually occurred as narrated. This, however, is regarded as an extreme position, and it certainly involves difficulties which are seemingly inconsistent, and incapable of explanation. In whatever form Satan may be supposed to have presented himself, he must have been recognized by Christ, who, it is difficult to imagine would have permitted such an intercourse, as a literal understanding of the narrative calls for.* From whence, more-

* "Lange's *Commentary, N. T.*," Vol. I. p. 85.

* One strong argument in opposition to this view, is, that such an ἐνσάρκωσις has no analogy in Scripture.

over, it may be asked, could Satan have obtained such power as to convey Him bodily to Jerusalem, and place him on a pinnacle of the temple? And except on the supposition of a stupendous miracle, such as there is no ground for believing that Satan could have performed, it is impossible that the panoramic view of the kingdoms of the world and their glory could have been presented to Him "in a moment of time," *ἐν στιγμή χρόνου*, as S. Luke narrates. Supposing, moreover, these journeys to have been actually made to Jerusalem, and to some "exceeding high mountain," Satan must have taken Him back again to the wilderness, for there the angels after the temptation ministered unto Him; and from there, as the Gospel narrative would lead us to infer, He returned "in the power of the spirit into Galilee."

If again, the temptation be regarded as having taken place simply within the mind of Christ Himself,—a mere inward, ethical conflict as Eichhorn, Weisse, Ullmann and others maintain, we are met with the fact of His sinlessness, and the impossibility of understanding how such a conflict could have originated there. The conceptions of distrust in providential sustenance, of presumptuous expectation of miraculous upholding under circumstances forbidding it, and especially of securing an immediate possession of carnal pomp and power by homage paid to the Evil One, are so odious as to originate only in a mind already depraved.* And nothing is gained by the supposition that our

* "If Jesus had had even in the most fleeting manner such thoughts, He would not have been Christ; and this explanation appears to me to be the most wretched neoteric outrage that has been committed against His person."—Schliermacher.

Lord, knowing Himself to be the Messiah, and what the popular Messianic expectations were, withdrew to the wilderness in order to secure quiet for considering them; while the temptation consisted merely in being pressed by prudential or carnal considerations to adopt them. For, in the first place, it is difficult to see any such connection between the several particulars of the temptation as this supposition calls for, either with each other, or with the supposed Messianic expectation. And in the second place, knowing as He certainly did, and as He frequently showed in His subsequent teachings, that such expectations were carnal, vain, and incapable of being realized, it is impossible that He could have wasted one moment in dwelling seriously upon them.* To have done so, would have been to tamper with evil, and thus to evince perversion of imagination, and a susceptibility for the carnal inconsistent with absolute sinlessness. It is true, that as man, Christ had the natural instincts, desires, and within due limits, we may add, the ambitions of a man. But the popular conceptions

* "We dare not suppose in Him a *choice*, which, presupposing within Him a point of tangency for evil, would involve the necessity of His comparing the evil with the good, and deciding between them. In the steadfast tendency of His inner life, rooted in submission to God, lay a decision which admitted of no such struggle. He had in common with humanity that natural weakness which may exist without selfishness, and the created will mutable in its own nature; and only on this side was the struggle possible—such a struggle as man may have been liable to before he gave *seduction* the power of *temptation* by his own actual sin. In all other respects the outward seductions remained outward; they found no selfishness in Him, as in other men, on which to seize, and thus become internal temptations, but, on the contrary, only aided in revealing the complete unity of the Divine and Human which formed the essence of His inner life.—Neander, *Life of Christ*.

and hopes pointed to the establishment of a kingdom utterly at variance with the divine intention, and which could have called forth no sympathy or co-operation from Him.*

But, *could Christ be thus self-tempted?*

To fallen beings a temptation is conceivable as purely subjective, which is only as a shadow cast momentarily by the mind upon itself, without finding any resting point, or leaving any moral stain. But even this is inconceivable in the case of our Lord. His human nature, it is true, although hypostatically conjoined with His divine nature, was not untemptable, ἀπειραστος. He could be tempted as we are: but, only from *without*, and endure suffering therefrom. Born of a woman, born under the law, obedience to its enactments was required as a condition of His probationary existence; and connected therewith the trying experiences incident in one way or other, to every form of human life. As intellectually considered, within the natural limitations of His humanity He increased in knowledge, as He grew bodily in size and strength; so morally considered, it was necessary that negative innocence attain to positive holiness through the discipline of a moral probation. The temptation was thus, equally with the daily contradiction of sinners against Himself, an important part of His humiliation. If He magnified the law and made it

* "The whole spirit of the age of Christ held that Messiah's kingdom was to be of *this world*, and even John Baptist could not free himself from this conception. There was nothing *within* Christ on which the sinful spirit of the age could seize; the Divine life within Him had brought everything temporal into harmony with itself; and therefore, this tendency of the times to secularize the Theocratic idea could take no hold of Him."—Neander, *Life of Christ*.

honorable, if He became our Head unto justification and salvation, He must stand unscathed, where Adam our head unto condemnation had fallen. Hence it behooved Him "in all things to be made like unto His brethren;" and as the apostle states, He was "in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." But, with Christ temptation in every instance and degree, *must have been external*. As no spot of defilement could have rested upon His immaculate person, so in like manner, no evil thought could have originated in, or temptation have been cast from within the mind even momentarily upon itself. From a pure fountain defiled waters do not flow. Only as impurity is injected from without, can defilements come.

If it be objected that in the case of Satan, darkness in some mysterious way originated in the very midst of celestial light,—by a moral collapse an archangel became a devil: our answer is, that in the case of Christ, such a moral collapse is inconceivable. In what respects, and to what extent His sinlessness existed, is a subject of intense interest. Some viewing the matter from the human side of His probationary subjection, maintain that it was confined to the *posse non peccare*. Fairbairn * says, "It might be from the first and at every moment certain, that He would achieve holiness, but could never be necessary. He could have been above the possibility of doing wrong only by being without the ability to do right. Obedience can be where disobedience may be, and nowhere else."

If this be true, moral probation can never cease, for

* *Studies in the Life of Christ*, p. 81.

angels or man. The jubilant services of the redeemed are impossible, except as conditioned by the possibility of a future ruin. In like manner Ullmann * states,

“We by no means, however, understand by the term sinlessness an absolute impossibility of sinning. Not the *non posse peccare*, but only the *posse non peccare*, and the *non peccasse* should be attributed to Jesus. Only of God Himself in His everlasting and absolute holiness, can the perfect impossibility of sinning be predicated.”

These statements, if taken literally, are incompatible with the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation. To Nestorianism, Socinianism, and all forms of Christological thought below Trinitarianism, they may be satisfactory. The fact is undeniable, that as man, Christ had to develop character, and perfect holiness under the limitations of a probationary life. And it had to be done under the Holy Spirit's guidance and grace, within the conditions of His human nature. There could have been no overmastering interferences, or miraculous upholdings of Deity except at the sacrifice of independent free agency, and the diminution of personal moral character. By prayer and fasting, and the power of grace thereby secured, as *man* He endured the temptation and defeated the tempter. But, while as man, and within the conditions of His sinless human nature He was temptable, yet that nature in the mystery of the Incarnation, had been hypostat-ically united to the eternal Logos in the one personality of Christ; and without the possibility of a

* *Sinlessness of Jesus*, Sec. I.

disruption of that union, or of the Logos remaining conjoined with human nature in a fallen condition (both of which are unthinkable), the peccability of Christ must have been an impossibility.* If viewed ethically in the light of the necessity for His perfecting righteousness by the exercise of moral freedom, the possibility of a fall may perhaps be theoretically conceivable; but, when viewed metaphysically through the fact of the Incarnation,† to our mind at least, it is absolutely inconceivable. In so far then we must ascribe to Christ the *non posse peccare*.

If further, the temptation be regarded as historically real, but mental, through the agency of Satan acting from without, as Lange and others maintain, all the necessities of the case are met, it is claimed, while the special difficulties attendant upon the other views are

* "To assert that the most entire reality of temptation is no proof even of the least reality of sinfulness in its subject; that not only were our first parents tempted while yet in the innocence of their original nature, but the same was the necessary adjunct of humanity in Him who could not like them, be overcome of evil,—in whom the very supposition of its possibility is not without blasphemy."—Mill's *Sermons*, p. 34.

† "It may then be asked, do not the ideas of the Incarnation of God in Christ and of the operation of grace in man, involve a mystical relation between the Divine and human natures which can be described as a practical interpenetration of the two?*" The doctrine of the hypostatic union of natures in Christ, and of the impersonality of His human nature, shows that the working of His human will must have been in absolute and spontaneous accord with that of his Divine Will, being a different operation of the same One and indivisible Personality."—*Church Eclectic*, April, 1876, p. 12.

* Not as regards the Incarnation, that personal and actual interpenetration which is held by theologians under what is called the "*Communicatio idiomatum*." The two natures in Christ must be kept as jealously from confusion, as if they did not coexist in one Person.

avoided. The Evil One invisibly but actually assailed our Lord, ἐν πνεύματι, and thus the incidents represented as having taken place upon the "pinnacle of the temple," and upon the "exceeding high mountain," are explainable in perfect harmony with His remaining personally all the time in the wilderness.*

Whatever may have been the *actual facts*, it is the most rational supposition that Jesus represented His temptation as a literal truth. Even if it could be supposed to have been subjective merely, and consisted in the upspringing within His mind of the thoughts underlying the description as given, why should He have stated the fact in such a fictitious form? No necessity could have impelled thereto, and no possible good could have been accomplished thereby. On the contrary, such a course would inevitably lead to misunderstanding and superstition. The evangelists

* This view no less than the others has its own special difficulties. That the possibility of a direct working of the Evil One upon the mind of Christ existed, is most certain. His human nature presented a corresponding mark for Satan's arrows as did that of Adam before the Fall. But the psychological process necessary to affect the second and third miracles, involving as they seemingly do, a change of location, demands an exercise of power as difficult to suppose possessed by Satan, as that demanded for the actual bodily movements to the top of the mountain, and the pinnacle of the temple. "Those who will not believe that the devil could convey Christ really and corporeally from one place to another through the air, do nevertheless admit that he could raise in Christ a false persuasion that He was thus transported by him. They are cautious indeed how they ascribe to the devil a power of strengthening the bodily sight that it may reach distant objects; yet really suppose him capable of placing before the imagination scenes of beauty and grandeur, and of causing it to mistake these shadows for realities. Thus while they deny the power of Satan over the body, they grant him a nobler empire, a sovereign influence over the mind."—Hugh Farmer, *Christ's Temptation*, p. 42.

write as men who fully believed in the personal agency of Satan as the tempter. And how could this have been, if the temptation had been merely subjective? If they had misunderstood Christ, it is inconceivable that He would have allowed them to continue in ignorance of the actual truth; or that the Holy Ghost who was to guide them into all truth, would have inspired such an account of the event as to deceive the great body of believers to the present day. S. Matthew states that Jesus was led by the Spirit into the wilderness, *to be tempted of the devil*. As the first Adam's integrity was tested in Eden, so the integrity of the second Adam was to be tested in the wilderness. As the Redeemer of a fallen and enslaved race, and their Head unto justification, His integrity must be tried; He must vindicate His sinlessness, and triumph over the adversary.*

We may also add, that if the temptation was merely subjective, it could have taken place at Nazareth or Jerusalem as well as in the wilderness. On the supposition however, that as the representative Head of the race, He was to engage in a spiritual conflict preceded by fasting and prayer, isolation from worldly contacts and distractions was necessary. In this, as in the subsequent surrender of Himself in sacrifice, He was to "tread the wine press alone." No human sym-

*"The inflexible in morals is what will not bend however immense the strain. Only a Christ tempted, yet 'without sin,' could be the perfect Christ. What he endured proved His adequacy for His work; and out of His great trial He emerged, not simply sinless, which He had been before, but righteous—that most beautiful of objects to the Divine eye, and most winsome of beings to the human heart, a perfect man, holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners."—Fairbairn, *Studies in the Life of Christ*, p. 88.

pathies or companionships could be permitted to encourage, or share in bearing the burden imposed. And knowing moreover, as He did, what the popular Messianic conceptions were, as the tempting thought (supposing, as *we* do not, its possibility) of conforming to them could have been presented only to be instantly repelled, wherein lay the burden of the conflict? In what consisted the sufferings which He endured? * From whence came apparently a state of exhaustion, calling, as after the agony in Gethsemane, for the ministration of angels? That He "suffered being tempted," the apostle to the Hebrews distinctly asserts; and although probably on other occasions also, *then* especially was that suffering endured.

2. These views with regard to our Lord's conceptions of Satanic personality are materially strengthened by subsequent incidents and teaching. To omit for the moment the frequent references to Satan as head and prince of that kingdom of iniquity which is arrayed against the kingdom of God and righteousness; let us turn to those striking statements in His expos-

* The question is sometimes asked, "How could Christ have been tempted, or have suffered from temptation, when He knew that it would be useless?—that in every conflict He would be the conqueror?" We answer, "The asserted knowledge is a *petitio principii*. As God, Christ could not be, and was not tempted. The strain of the trial fell upon His human nature, and as man His knowledge was finite. Whatever anticipations of success He may have formed, or however radiant may have been the hopes in which He indulged, an absolute certainty was beyond what He probably possessed. The condition of His probationary life demanded the straining of every nerve,—the utmost earnestness of endeavor, stimulated by the ordinary springs of human action, under the sense that with less there might be failure. And therein lay a ground deep and broad enough for the sufferings endured through temptation.

tulation with the Pharisees as recorded by S. John (chap. viii.). There we find a most graphic and clearly defined description, evidently intended to be understood of a *person*. Inflated with pride of their ancestry, the Pharisees claimed sonship to God-fearing, God-serving Abraham, although manifesting in their daily life a disposition and conduct utterly foreign to that of Abraham; and thereby showing that in character and life they were assimilated to a different spirit, and were drawing inspiration from a different source. "Ye are of your father the devil," Jesus indignantly declared, "and the lusts of your father ye will do." Besides claiming sonship to Abraham, they had also laid claim of the same to God. "We be not born of fornication; we have one Father even God;" and it is in direct antithesis to this, that their sonship to Satan is affirmed. Instead of being true, spiritual children of God, deserving that name and relationship, as carnal minded workers of iniquity, they showed their spiritual filiation to the devil. Now, by what rational law of exegesis can we ascribe personality to one of the contrasted parentages, and not to the other? "If God were your Father," Jesus replied, "ye would love me, for I proceeded and came forth from God." Here then is an asserted objective Personality from whom He had come, and had come as having been sent by Him—to whom, also, they claimed a filial relationship. Analogously, although in direct antithesis, objective personality with debased moral qualities is ascribed to the devil, whose spiritual children they are declared to be. "He was a murderer from the beginning." And how a murderer, except as a living, acting agent of evil?—as the author

of human transgression, and its result moral degeneracy and physical death? He was also "a liar from the beginning," and "abode not in the truth." As the calumniator of God, whom he represented as having deceived our first parents by misstatements about the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and a falsely threatened death, and thus by lying had brought about that result; so he had continued through the ages, a liar and deceiver. "He abode not in the truth," as our Lord affirms, "because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it."

Now suppose we apply this language to an impersonal devil, to "*sin personified*," or "*a principle of evil*," as is commonly assumed by objectors to Satanic personality, we shall run into a quagmire of absurdities. A *principle* in the sense intended, whether of good or evil, is not an entity, but a quality inhering in, and emanating from some mind or minds.* Webster defines the word, 1. "In a *general sense*, the cause, source, or origin of anything; that from which a thing proceeds; as the principle of motion; the principle of action." Can we then conceive of a cause, source, or origin of anything as independent of underlying subjectivity? Can there be any principle of motion in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, except as connected with some actual existence? or, any principles of action that do not exist in, and emanate from sentient or rational subjects? What a bathos must we descend to on the supposition that

* The "bad possibility emerging into the bad actuality" of Bushnell. "The collective evil in humanity."

our Lord simply meant that "sin personified," or a "principle of evil" was guilty of law-breaking, of murder and lying!"* Where within the moral or material universe did this personification or "principle" come from? How does, or can it exist except as connected with some underlying material or spiritual personality? If it have such existence, then it must be in itself an entity, having rational being like the Parsee Ahriman. The idea, moreover, that our Lord could have solemnly told the Pharisees that they were of their father the "principle of evil," or "a personification of sin," which was a murderer and liar from the beginning, which abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in it, is to our understanding at least, simply absurd.† Had He actually reasoned thus to the understanding of those addressed, they would

* Though it be granted that the "bad actuality," or "the collective evil in humanity," is a reality and a power—a diabolic *Zeit-Geist*, exciting to evil, it is what it is only by virtue of its connection with, and emanation from human beings. Even so must it be in the spirit world. The "bad actuality," or the "collective evil" of devils or demons, must inhere in, and emanate from spiritually fallen existences. But, though now a *cause* of evil, it is itself an *effect*. Before lust had conceived, sin was not brought forth. Previous to that mysterious perversion of moral free agency, resulting in the first transgression, it had not commenced to be. It therefore could not have been an *original cause*. The spirit which leads to lying and murder may be viewed as a lying and murderous *principle*; but it is, nevertheless, an *effect*—the result of rational volition and activity, and therefore not from "the beginning" in the sense intended by our Lord. It is the *child* and not the *father* of evil.

† There is no proof whatever that the main body of the Jews of our Lord's time had any philosophic conceptions with regard to a personified Satan. Excepting the sceptical Sadducees, who denied the existence of angel or spirit, the great mass of the people with whom he was brought into contact, regarded Satan as a real, and dread personality.

never have prolonged the conversation, or have taken up stones to stone Him; but would have regarded, and treated Him as a harmless lunatic.

In perfect harmony with this are the statements of S. John (1 Epis. iii. 6-10). The apostle there states, as an undeniable truth, that sonship to God as acquired by regeneration, is manifested in works of righteousness. "Let no man deceive you: He that doeth righteousness is righteous, even as He is righteous." And in contrast with this, he then shows that workers of iniquity in spirit, will and performance, are under the influence of, or, by a common Hebrewism, are children of the devil. "He that committeth sin is of the devil, for the devil sinneth from the beginning." In the believer's antagonism to sin was manifested a true sign of sonship to God; while the opposite was equally a true sign of sonship to Satan.—"In this the children of God are manifested, and the children of the devil: Whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God." Would any sane man, unless under the influence of some preconceived theory, imagine that these asserted personal relationships have not *equally a reference to a distinct personality*? Would any one gather from the Apostle's statements, that while the former was a *person*, the latter was only a *personification*? And on such a supposition, how may the statement be understood, "the devil sinneth from the beginning?" That sin personified, or a principle of evil sinned ἀπ' ἀρχῆς,—*murdered, lied* from the beginning! A *non ens* transgressed God's law and wrought unrighteousness!

In our Lord's statement of Satan's desire to "sift Peter as wheat," there is also to the ordinary judg-

ment, an unmistakable reference to *personal agency*. This expressed wish is manifestly connected with Peter's threefold denial. "Simon, Simon, behold, Satan ἐξήγησάτο ὑμᾶς, asked to have you," or, obtained you by asking, "that he might sift you as wheat: but I have made supplication for thee, that thy faith fail not; and do thou, when thou hast turned again, stablish thy brethren."* As in the case of Job the temptation was permitted, and Peter's fall was great. But pitying love had forestalled the tempter, so that through the conferred grace of strengthening faith, accompanied by a bitter repentance, Peter's allegiance was secured, forgiveness was obtained, and valuable lessons in self-knowledge, humility, reliance upon God alone, were learned, never thereafter to be forgotten. Here likewise is another instance of *contrasted personality*,—Satan desiring to harass, and if possible overcome with temptation, and a gracious Lord praying that sustaining grace may be conferred upon the tempted one. Now, is it rational to admit personal agency on the part of the latter, and to deny it on the part of the former? Moreover to understand this address of our Lord to Peter in any other than a literal sense, is to play with enigmas. If there be no personal tempter, then Peter influenced by his own fears must have been self-tempted, or himself the Satan asking to have him, that he might beguile or goad him to unfaithfulness! And if so, what could our Lord have purposed by such an unheard of mode of address? That Peter believed in the existence of a personal Satan, we should infer from his own language to Ananias, in which there is also another *contrasted*

* Revised Version.

personality:—"Why hath Satan filled thine heart to lie to the Holy Ghost?"—Acts v. 3. Even if it can be supposed that our Lord knew Peter would understand. His words figuratively, He must have foreseen that through coming ages, they would be understood literally, and thus be misapplied by millions to the fostering of, what on this supposition, is one of the most baneful forms of superstition and falsehood. Such an uncalled for, and pernicious result CANNOT be in harmony with the spirit and purposes of Him whose "word is truth."

A similar reference to a personal tempter is found in the asserted fact of Satan's agency in our Lord's betrayal by Judas. "After the sop Satan entered into him," S. John states (xiii. 27). By comparing this verse with S. Luke (xxii. 3, 4), it will be seen that that dark crime was not the working of a sudden impulse. What actual motives underlay the betrayer's purpose and work, it is impossible to determine. Whether disappointed ambition through the conviction that popular wishes and hopes of Messiah's kingdom were not to be realized, or the heart hardening and deadening power of avarice, it is evident that affection had turned to hostility; and on this state of mind Satan fastened. Before the Last Supper, the plan for the betrayal, as we learn from S. Luke, (xxii. 3-6), was already consummated. Judas had learned in some way that the chief priests and scribes were seeking an opportunity to put Jesus to death, but that they feared to arrest him publicly. On this his dark soul meditated, and under the prompting of the devil, he took the first step. As the evangelist states, "Then entered Satan into Judas surnamed

Iscariot, and he went his way, and communed with the chief priests, and captains, how he might betray Him unto them. And they were glad, and covenanted to give him money." How soon he could accomplish his purpose, he evidently at that time did not know; for S. Luke states (xxii. 6), that "he promised and sought opportunity to betray Him unto them in the absence of the multitude." The entering in, or inward suggestion made by Satan in connection with the receiving of the sop, was the final prompting of the Evil One to hasten forward the work, as the opportunity sought for was at hand. Having received the sop he went immediately out, and as the subsequent events showed, hastened to the chief priests to secure the assistance necessary for our Lord's apprehension.

If now, in this case, as is asserted with regard to that of Peter, there was no personal tempter outside of Judas' own bad heart as influenced by carnal motives, the language of the evangelists is meaningless. Yea, in connection with a great number of other passages of Scripture, its use, as we have already pointed out, has been a perpetual stumbling-block in the way of rightly understanding God's word, springing from *no necessity*, having no ground whatever of *rational justification*, and by perverting the simplicity of truth, it has fostered superstition and accomplished only harm. Whether such a course is in accordance with divine wisdom and love, for the believer, is not, and cannot be, an open question.

3. Not only however does our Lord use language, which, by all enforced and rational exegesis implies His belief in Satanic personality, but He intensifies

what He says by speaking of him in connection with an antagonistic host of evil spirits, as their leader and head. That there exists a Satanic kingdom of moral darkness and iniquity, in ever active hostility to the kingdom of God and righteousness, appears to have been constantly present to His mind. In His parable of the tares and wheat, the good attempted to be done by Him, the "Son of Man," is represented as being counteracted, and in great measure frustrated by the opposition of the Evil One. The kingdom of Heaven is likened to a field in which the owner had sown good seed, but in which also a personal enemy had sown tares. And in His subsequent explanation of this parable, He points to Satan as His own personal enemy, and thereby in the privacy of intercourse with His disciples, shows the same belief in Satan's existence and agency for evil, which He had manifested when addressing the multitude. "He that soweth the good seed is the Son of Man; the field is the world; the good seed are the children of the kingdom; but the tares are the children of the wicked one, τοῦ πονηροῦ, the enemy that sowed them is the devil," ὁ διάβολος. Thus, not only in parable, but in the explanation of it, Jesus ascribes personal agency *equally to the one sower as to the other*. The tares represented concrete evil as much as the good grain represented concrete good; and we must confess our utter inability to comprehend how it could be otherwise with the sowers themselves.* Certainly the standard Catholic interpreters

* The argument gathers strength from the fact that the parable rests upon a basis of actual occurrences.—See Trench, *Parables*, p. 78. A malicious enemy in the material world in sowing wild oats, or tares, furnishes the analogue of a corresponding enemy in disseminating evil in

in all ages, have regarded the Evil One mentioned there as a person,—as much so in his sphere, as our Lord was in His.

In perfect accord with this representation of Satanic hostility towards Himself personally, and to the work of His ministry, our Lord points out a corresponding hostility in connection with His approaching sufferings and death. It is evident that He regarded Satan as the instigator and encourager of Judas in the work of His betrayal; and in His remonstrance to those who came to take Him, He affirmed their connection with diabolic agency. "When I was daily with you in the temple, ye stretched forth no hand against me; but this is your hour and the power of darkness,"—*ἡ ἐξουσία τοῦ σκοίου*. As the agents of Him whom on another occasion He had called the "prince of this world," and of its moral darkness, they were for the time being permitted to accomplish their designs. Successful resistance He showed could be made by Him if He were so disposed. Angelic legions at His summons, would have descended for his preservation. But He knew the necessity for the approaching sacrifice. How then could the divine purposes have been accomplished that "thus it must be?"

In that striking *reductio ad absurdum* narrated by

the spiritual world. The former certainly is inconceivable except as connected with personality, and equally so must it be with the latter. As Trench truly says, "in the householder's reply the mischief is traced up to its origin: '*An enemy hath done this.*' It is attributed not to the imperfection, ignorance, weakness which clings to everything human, and which would prevent even a Divine idea from being more than inadequately realized by man, but to the distinct counter working of the great spiritual enemy."—*Parables*, p. 84.

S. Luke (chap. xi. 17-20), where our Lord pointed out the folly of supposing that a demoniac could be set free from the power of Satan *by* the power of Satan, He not only testified to Satanic personality, but placed Satan's kingdom in opposition to the kingdom of God. Unwilling to recognize the hand of God in His marvelous works, His enemies ascribed them to the devil. And as He then showed, their statement involved a manifest absurdity. No kingdom or house warring against itself could stand; yet, if what they said was true, Satan was warring against himself,—pulling down his own kingdom. “If Satan be divided against himself how shall his kingdom stand? But if I with the finger of God cast out demons, no doubt the kingdom of God is come unto you.” So in like manner in that graphic description of the last judgment, the rewards of the righteous are set in opposition to the punishments of the ungodly. Under the figure of sheep, the former are to be placed on His right hand, and welcomed to inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world; but the latter, under the figure of goats, are to be set on His left hand, and commanded to depart into “everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels.” In both these instances we are unable to see on what honest and rational ground of exegesis the Son of Man and His kingdom with its enjoyments, are to be regarded as *actual realities*, while Satan and his kingdom, with its punishments, are to be viewed as mere *shadowy personifications*.

4. If we consider in connection with this our Lord's bearing and words in cases of demoniac cure, the prospect into the regions of diabolism is more widely

extended, and the evidence of His faith in the objective reality of Satan's kingdom is materially increased. One of two alternatives must be taken.* Either there was an accommodation of manner and language to a popular superstition; or, the possessions mentioned were actual, and the expulsions equally so. That there could have been any misunderstandings or collusions with regard to the facts involved, is impossible. In the case of the demoniac in the synagogue at Capernaum, and especially in that of those in the country of the Gadarenes, the cure, whatever the nature of the disease may have been, was public, and thoroughly attested. In support of the former alternative, it is claimed, that neither our Lord nor His disciples believed in any actual possessions by demons. The persons healed, it is supposed, were simply afflicted with a more or less violent form of insanity popularly ascribed to a diabolic indwelling; and that all the formality of speaking to the imaginary demon was in compliance with prevailing ideas. It is also declared to be more consonant with scientific knowledge and common sense to suppose, that in condescension to the ignorance and prejudices of the common people, Christ simply adopted the customary language used in such cases, than that diseases which can be accounted for by natural causes, should have been produced by, or connected with demoniacal possessions. Farmer, assuming an analogy to exist between the descriptions given of demoniacal possessions, and the

* For a more full consideration of the subject of demonology than is possible or necessary here, see Trench, *Miracles*, pp. 125-136, Neander, *Life of Christ*, pp. 145-151.

phenomenal language applied to material facts in cosmogony, states,

"The evangelists might describe the disorder and cure of demoniacs in the popular language, that is by possessions and dispossessions, without making themselves answerable for the hypothesis on which this language was originally employed That the sacred writers do in several instances adopt the popular language, though grounded in opinions now known to be erroneous, without any design of establishing the truth of those opinions is certain!" And in giving a supposed answer of Galileo to Pope Urban VIII., he further states, "The prophets of God never received, nor professed to have received, any supernatural instruction on any points of philosophy; consequently our judgment on such subjects, is not to be determined by their modes of speaking. Nor have those divine messengers *professedly* taught any erroneous principles of philosophy; not even as their own private opinion, though many incidental expressions are accommodated to that false philosophy which prevailed at that time. Now, this we have seen is precisely the case with respect to possession. It is not included in the supernatural instruction of the first founders of Christianity. Accordingly they never teach as a doctrine, nor do they assert it as their private opinion, though they adopt the vulgar language concerning it."*

The position thus taken opens up the question of accommodation as practised by our Lord, and the sacred writers in general. As was shown in a previous lecture the assumed analogy is not a legitimate

* *Letters to Dr. Worthington.*

one, and must be rejected. That Christ employed the popular language by a formal accommodation to the phenomena of the material world is certain. And the same thing may also be said with regard to the use of words applied to certain conditions of the human body and mind. *E. g.* The word in common use for epilepsy was *σεληνιάζομαι*—lunatic, moonstruck; and in classic usage the cognate words *σεληνιακός*, and *σεληνιασμός* were applied to that disease, because originally it had been supposed to be caused or aggravated by the moon. Thus in the instance mentioned by S. Matthew,* where a father imploring help for an afflicted son, stated *ὅτι σεληνιάζεται*, “he is lunatic.” But no evidence is given that he ascribed his child’s affliction to the moon, or reason for supposing that the evangelists by using the word had faith in, and gave countenance to a popular delusion. Even if he addressed our Lord in Greek, the etymology of the word and its literal application may have been as far from his thoughts as it is ordinarily with ourselves, when we speak of a lunatic. So in like manner, our Lord may have made a *formal* use of the word without any regard to its etymology or popular application, as He doubtless did to scientific accuracy when using the phenomenal language of the rising and setting sun.† The case, however, would have been entirely different, if, in extending help, He had

* Chap. xvii. 15.

† With this likewise should be classed His references to Mammon and Beelzebub. The men of His day had no faith in the personality of either, in the original heathen sense; and if in popular language the latter was spoken of as a person, it was merely as a synonyme for Satan in whose personality *they did believe*.

addressed the moon as He did the demons, and commanded it to cease from afflicting the child. There would then have been a *material* accommodation to a silly delusion, with an inculcation of falsehood !

The sacred writers use the word also when there was *an actual possession*. Thus in the case before us, in the 18th verse, it is stated that "Jesus rebuked the demon, and he departed out of him." In the narrative of the same incident as given by S. Mark (chap. ix. 17), and S. Luke (chap. ix. 37), the father when appealing to Jesus for help, ascribed the affliction to demoniacal agency. When thus intended and understood, the matter assumes a totally different aspect. Language is so used as to be unintelligible on the supposition of accommodation. Had nothing more been done by Christ than a quiet passing over of the asserted possession, while performing the cure, He might be regarded as simply ignoring a popular notion. He went however far beyond that, not only in addressing and commanding the evil spirits, but in calling out from them responses, and performances utterly unexplainable, *except on the ground of their actual existence*. For, to assume as an alternative, that those responses and performances were brought about by a combination of ventriloquism and jugglery, is not only to antagonize His divine and perfect human character, but to place Him in the low rank of an impostor and knave.

Farmer however says,

"From Christ's addressing demons, rebuking them, and issuing forth His commands to them, you can no more infer that He considered them as intellectual agents, than you can infer that He regarded the

winds, and seas, and fevers as such, because they are said to be rebuked by Him, and to obey His command. As to demons being commanded *to come out*, I only observe that the command could be designed only to evince Christ's power and authority to effect that cure which was implied in, and expressed by the expulsion of demons. The people understood the language of Christ, in the sense in which it is here explained." (pp. 142, 143.)

In other words, our Lord condescended to adopt a manner of action, which, on Farmer's supposition, had its origin in ignorance, and its fostering in superstition; and which moreover, was perpetually fertile with harm! * A lie may be acted as well as spoken;

* We are unable to agree with Neander in his estimate of the moral influence of belief in demonology, if only a popular delusion. He says because Christ "did not *dispute* the current opinion does not prove that He participated in it. This would have been one of those errors not affecting the interests of religion, which His mission did not require Him to correct." In writing thus he appears to be out of harmony with himself in what he says about "accommodation," p. 114; and he must have overlooked for the moment the difference between harmless errors, and those which injuriously affect "the interests of religion." The abuses and superstitious usages which have fastened themselves upon it, and have drawn encouragement from it, even as a revealed truth, have been too numerous and baneful to justify his statement. How much worse must it be regarded if the whole system is a falsehood and delusion? Truth is ever antagonistic to error in every form; and certainly He who is the absolute and eternal Truth would not sanction by word or act that which, whether flowing from perversions of truth, or resting upon absolute falsehood, debauched the understanding, while violating the majesty of truth. As Bp. Warburton forcibly says, "It is an unquestionable fact, that the evangelic history of the demoniacs hath given occasion to the most scandalous frauds, and sottish superstitions, throughout every age of the church; the whole trade of exorcisms, accompanied with all the mummery of frantic agitations, having arisen from thence."—*Sermons*, Vol. III. p. 241.

and it is beyond our comprehension, how such conduct could obtain sanction from Him whose *ways* as well as *words* were truth. In addressing the wind and the sea, He spake to actual existences, evincing thereby His divine power and authority over them. But, on the supposition we are combatting, in addressing the demons, He spake to imaginary beings—to the empty fancies of ignorance and superstition. The cases as stated by Farmer moreover might be regarded as analogous, and the argument be accepted as satisfactory, if we could find it asserted, that the winds, sea, and fever addressed our Lord in return, and thus gave evidence of personal and intellectual existence. But it stands no where recorded that the wind ever cried out with a loud voice, “Art thou come to torment us before the time?” or, that a fever begged, if driven away from a sick person, to be allowed to afflict some one else. Nor on this supposition are we able to explain what *that could have been* which going out from the demoniac, entered into a herd of swine, and thereby caused such a panic among them as drove them headlong to destruction. That the demons are represented as speaking through the organs of the possessed, and not the possessed themselves, is certain from our Lord’s own words, when, in addressing a demon He distinguished him from the one possessed.—“*Hold thy peace*, and come out of him,” He said, as S. Mark narrates (chap. i. 25), to one which had deprecated His interference, and proclaimed knowledge of Him as the “Holy One of God.”

In connection with this same case, we see also that Christ confirmed the reality of the possession by His

subsequent language to His disciples. Chagrined at their failure to expel the demon, they asked Him privately, "Why could not we cast him out?" and His reply was, "Because of your unbelief." Having perhaps like Moses at Meribah, associated themselves too closely with Him as miracle workers, their humble trusting faith in the alone miraculous power of God, had become weak and inefficient. The casting out of demons had formed a special mark of our Lord's Messianic work as pointed out by the evangelists; and it had been comprised in the miraculous power conferred upon the apostles and the seventy disciples when sent to preach the gospel. It was in consequence of the jubilant exclamation upon their return, that He made that remarkable statement, "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven. Notwithstanding, in this rejoice not that the spirits are subject unto you; but rather rejoice because your names are written in heaven." On the supposition of mere mental derangement, reason is powerless to explain such statements as we find in these cases. The commission of the seventy disciples included probably the curing of all kinds of sickness and suffering; and yet, their great joy arose from the fact, that above and beyond all else, the powers of darkness were subject unto them in the Saviour's name. And what special connection can be found with the cure of epilepsy, or any form of insanity, and Christ's beholding "Satan as lightning fall from heaven?" And why, if that was all, the greater joy at the cure of that disease than of any other? On the supposition however, of an actual expulsion of demons by Christ's authority, and the evidence thereby given that Satan's kingdom and

rule were being overcome, the assertion touching the great adversary's downfall is pertinent and forcible. Neander in his clear, calm way says,

"Christ had previously designated the cure of demoniacs wrought by Himself as a sign that the kingdom of God had come upon the earth, so now He considered what the disciples reported as a token of the conquering power of that kingdom before which every evil thing must yield. *I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven*; i. e. from the pinnacle of power which he had thus far held among men. By the intuitive glance of His spirit laid open the results which were to flow from His redemptive work after His ascension into heaven; He saw in spirit the kingdom of God advancing in triumph over the kingdom of Satan. He does not say, 'I see now,' but 'I saw,' He *saw* it before His disciples brought the report of their accomplished wonders. While they were doing these isolated works, He *saw* the *one* great work—of which theirs were only individual and particular signs—the victory over the mighty power of evil which had ruled mankind, completely achieved. And therefore (v. 19), He promised in consequence of this general victory, that in their coming labors they should still do greater things. They were to trample the power of the enemy under foot; they were to walk unharmed over every obstacle that opposed the kingdom of God." *

It would greatly increase the strength of the arguments in opposition to demoniacal possessions if it could be shown that all cases of epilepsy were regarded

* *Leben Christi*, p. 307.

as possessions, and that all possessions were confined to cases of epilepsy, mania, or melancholia. This however was not the case. S. Matthew when enumerating the various disorders and sicknesses cured by Christ, clearly distinguishes (chap. iv. 24), cases of lunacy—*σεληνιαζομένους* from demoniacal possessions—*διαμονιζομένους*. On the other hand, the affliction was connected with cases of physical derangement—blindness and dumbness. S. Matthew (chap. ix. 32, 33) mentions the case of a “dumb man possessed with a demon,” who, after the demon was expelled, regained his speech. And in another place (chap. xii. 22), he mentions one both blind and dumb who was possessed with a demon, and who, in like manner after the expulsion of the demon, “both spake and saw.” Both these cases stand widely apart from ordinary lunacy, and there is nothing in the narratives which indicate any mental derangement. From these instances therefore it is evident that all lunatics were not demoniacs, and that all demoniacs were not lunatics. And in cases of physical disorder, it would seem to have been only in special instances discoverable by some clearly recognizable signs, that there was any form of possession. In the cure of the man blind from his birth, of the blind men who were restored to sight near Jericho, and of others, there is not the slightest reference to demoniacal influence. It is in fact very evident, that demoniacal possession rested on a basis peculiarly its own, and that it was clearly distinguished in the popular judgment, as well as in that of Christ and the evangelists, from other forms of sickness whether physical or mental.

5. When we proceed to examine the statements of

the apostles and other New Testament writers, who on this subject, as on others, were in perfect harmony with their Lord, we find a perfect *consensus* both in idea and language. Satanic personality stands out prominently in such expressions as these, "Who went about doing good, and healing all who were oppressed of the devil"—(Acts x. 33); "Put on the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil" (Eph. vi. 12); "Resist the devil, and he will flee from you" (S. James iv. 7); "Watch, because your adversary the devil as a roaring lion goeth about seeking whom he may devour" (1 S. Peter v. 8). Now, in these passages there is the same *antithetic personality* as in the cases pointed out in the gospels. The "doing good" of Christ stands in opposition to the being "oppressed of the devil." To be arrayed in "the whole armor of God," is enjoined as a defence against the assaults of the devil. And with the injunction to "Resist the devil, and he will flee from you," is conjoined the antithetic direction, "Draw nigh to God, and He will draw nigh to you." Could language we ask, on the supposition of *non-Satanic personality*, be better calculated to deceive than this? Indeed, if there be no such personality, it *has deceived* all classes ever since, and will continue to do so until the end of time. And the deception we assert again, has been most baneful and debasing. It has been a stumbling block in the way of the learned as well as of the ignorant, and has occasioned most scandalous frauds and superstitions which have been the disgrace of the church in each succeeding generation.

And equally clear are the statements made with

regard to the *kingdom of Satan*. In his epistle to the Ephesians (chap. vi. 12), S. Paul as a reason for enjoining believers to be arrayed in the whole armor of God, shows that the conflict to be waged is not with mere carnal foes,—“flesh and blood”—human opponents and agencies of destruction; but “against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against wicked spirits; or, as the revised version renders the passage—“the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places”—*τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας, ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις*. And to Christ's victory over the same spiritual foes, especially over their leader Satan, the apostle also refers in that assertion (Col. ii. 15), that by the mighty work accomplished on the cross, “having spoiled principalities and powers, He made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it.” Language in short (especially when taken in connection with the rest we have been considering), full of important meaning and individual application, as understood of an actual king and kingdom of darkness; but mere bathos and babble, a snare and a delusion, on the supposition of mere metaphor or personification. In fine, on that supposition, the revealed word instead of being a light to enlighten, has been the mightiest of all agencies to darken the understanding, and to pervert the judgment in matters of the soul's deepest interest, generation after generation! CREDAT JUDÆUS APPELLA; NON EGO!

LECTURE VI.

THE SIXTH PETITION.

THE change which was made in the sixth petition of the Lord's Prayer, by the Revisers of the New Testament, has excited more adverse criticism, and called out a stronger objection perhaps, than any other that was made. And it is not at all surprising that such should have been the case. Old habits of thought, and forms of expression regarded as embodying truth, from long existence and usage acquire a sort of prescriptive right, and all attempts at changing or displacing them are viewed with disfavor, and are usually resisted. Nor should changes or displacements be made, except for reasons which justify and demand them. The existence in itself and long continuance, argue at least some original ground of *raison d'être*. By changes heedlessly or needlessly made, old ideas are upturned, old associations are deranged, while with many, reason is perplexed, and the feelings are wounded.

In the present instance, however, we cannot suppose the change of "evil" for the "Evil One," to have been made without due consideration—without a most careful examination of evidence, and the existence of weighty reasons, which, in the mind of a large majority of the revisers fully justified it. Truth we are

aware, is not the creation of, nor is its declaration dependent upon the suffrage of a majority. *Vox populi* is not always *vox Dei*. But where, as in this case, there has been a careful sifting of evidence, and a close balancing of probabilities carried on in a judicial spirit, the decision of a majority may be regarded as having probability at least in its favor.

As connected with our general argument the subject challenges a candid and independent examination. This we propose to make by considering, First, The words in dispute τοῦ πονηροῦ, *a*, in connection with their immediate context, and *b*, in accordance with the exigency of thought seemingly demanded in other instances of their use; Secondly, Early exegesis as embodied, *a*, in the primitive versions, *b*, in patriotic statements and arguments, and *c*, in the emphatic language of several of the ancient liturgies.

1. The Greek original apparently gives satisfactory evidence in favor of the change made from the abstract to the concrete. While in the petition itself, the words ἀπό τοῦ πονηροῦ are not decisive; yet when taken in connection with a corresponding use in other places, such a change appears to be demanded. The attributive adjective πονηρός with the article, is used in both the masculine and neuter genders, of persons, and things. It occurs sixteen times in the New Testament,* and in no case possessing with certainty an abstract meaning. As proof we give the passages where they are found, with what appears to be the relevant connection of thought.

* The last clause of the petition in S. Luke xi. 4, in which the word occurs, is rejected by scholars as an interpolation.

In five instances the masculine use is determined by grammatical forms. *E. g.*, Our Lord stated (S. Matt. xiii. 19), "When any one heareth the word of the kingdom, and understandeth it not, then cometh the wicked one, ὁ πονηρὸς—manifestly a well understood designation of Satan,* and rendered by S. Luke (viii. 12), 'the devil,'—and catcheth away that which was sown in his heart." S. John also states (1 John, v. 18), "He that is begotten of God keepeth himself, and that wicked one, ὁ πονηρὸς toucheth him not." S. Paul enjoins (1 Cor. v. 13, "Therefore put away from you that wicked person—τὸν πονηρὸν ; and in like manner S. John (1 John ii. 13), says, "I write unto you young

* In a letter to the Bishop of London opposing the change made in the petition, Canon Cook lays great stress upon the fact that although ὁ πονηρὸς is used in the Septuagint version to designate a wicked man, it is never thus used of Satan. He also contends that "in our Lord's time, and for many years after, the term corresponding to ὁ πονηρὸς was not employed as an equivalent for Satan." But his whole argument is a manifest *petitio principii*. As all language is in a condition of perpetual change, no reason can be assigned why a term applied to an evil person in one generation, might not in a succeeding one be applied κατ' ἐξοχὴν to the author of evil himself. The facts in the case, moreover, settle the question ; for that our Lord *did* use the term as one well understood is certain ; and if we are to believe the statement of the evangelist, He used it under circumstances which postulate a clear and definite understanding on the part of his hearers. It did not fall from his lips obscurely, or as by accident, but in a deliberate explanation of other words. "The good seed are the children of the kingdom ; but the tares are the children of the wicked one." Now, we cannot suppose, that whether he spoke in Greek, or in his native vernacular, Our Lord would have used a term which was not well understood by them. As Bishop Lightfoot rightly says, "Would not this have been to interpret *obscurum per obscurius* unless ὁ πονηρὸς had already this recognized sense?" Certainly when S. John wrote his epistles, the term was manifestly regarded as an ordinary designation of Satan, for, he uses it on several occasions, and in a way which implies a general familiarity with it.

men, because ye have overcome the wicked one—*τὸν πονηρὸν* ;” which is also repeated in the following verse, “ And ye have overcome the wicked one, *τὸν πονηρὸν*.” In two instances in like manner, the neuter use is determined by the grammatical form. *E. g.*, The first (S. Luke, vi. 45) contains our Lord’s assertion, “ An evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart, bringeth forth that which is evil—*τὸ πονηρὸν*,” viz.: the generically concrete,* *that which is evil*, thought, aspiration, determination; and the second (Rom. xii. 9), expresses the injunction, “ Abhor that which is evil,” *τὸ πονηρὸν*—the evil thing, where the concrete application is also demanded, i. e. every form of evil whether in imagination, emotion, word or deed.

Thus in seven instances the concrete application is placed beyond doubt by the grammatical forms. In the other nine instances, where the case endings are common to both masculine and neuter, the meaning must be determined by the exigency of thought which is in harmony with the context, and the general spirit of God’s word. Taking them in the order in which they stand, we come first to (S. Matt. v. 39), where our Lord in rejecting the *lex talionis* commands, “ I say unto you that ye resist not [the] evil ”—*τῷ πονηρῷ* where the reference to a personal adversary is manifest from the connected direction, “ Whosoever smiteth thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other

* The neuter *τὸ πονηρὸν* is of much more frequent occurrence in the Old than in the New Testament, and always with the concrete application. Lightfoot states, “ Though the occurrence of *τὸ πονηρὸν* is so frequent in the LXX. it is not once used as an equivalent to *ἡ πονηρία*. It never denotes the abstract quality, but always the concrete embodiment, The deed or thing which is evil.”—*Guardian*, September 7, 1881.

also.” The rendering of the revised version is, “Resist not him that is evil.” In (S. Matt. xiii. 38), where our Lord says, “The tares are the children of the wicked one—*τοῦ πονηροῦ*—the concrete application is made certain, by what is said in the nineteenth verse about the wicked one, *ὁ πονηρὸς*, who is identified in that verse with the devil,—*ὁ διάβολος*. When describing the christian’s conflict as not being nearly or mainly with human adversaries, “flesh and blood,” but with the unseen powers of evil, S. Paul (Eph. vi. 11–16) urges the necessity of spiritual means of defence. “Be strong in the Lord, and in the power of His might. Put on the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil, *τοῦ πονηροῦ*. Here the apostle places *τοῦ πονηροῦ* in direct antithesis with *τοῦ θεοῦ*, and after mentioning the various parts of the christian warrior’s outfit, he says, “Above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked one” *τοῦ πονηροῦ*. The concrete application is manifestly demanded here also, as the “fiery darts” mentioned cannot in harmony with the context, be regarded as cast by any mortal foe, and the “wicked one” of verse 16, is evidently identical with “the devil” of verse 11.

Among the rules of godly living laid down by our Lord in His Sermon on the Mount, He specifies (S. Matt. v. 35–37), abstinence from profanity, as being not only a useless and foolish thing in itself, but an evidence of a carnal and irreverent mind. “Swear not at all. . . . But let your communication be Yea, Yea, Nay, Nay; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of [the] evil” *τοῦ πονηροῦ*, or, rather, as it would more correctly be, if the abstract meaning is

intended, τῆς πονηρίας. That the injunction refers to profanity, and not to promissory oaths, or to judicial confirmation of testimony by swearing or affirming, is manifest from the fact, that the Bible in other places recognizes and furnishes precedents for such swearing. Moses as recorded (Deut. xxix. 12-14), when urging obedience to the divine covenant established with an oath, said to the Israelites, "That thou shouldest enter into a covenant with the Lord thy God and also into His oath which the Lord thy God maketh with thee this day. . . . As He hath sworn unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob." "I have sworn," said the Psalmist (Ps. cxix. 106), "and I will perform it, that I will keep thy righteous judgments." Profanity has always been prevalent among Eastern nations; and in the injunction before us, relevancy with the general trend of the contest, shows our Lord's reference to have been to the senseless and evil habit of interlarding ordinary conversation with meaningless imprecations or blasphemous invocations. Even the refining influences of religion, and personal intercourse with Him whose life and teachings opposed it, were not always able to overcome it, as may be seen in the case of S. Peter when denying his Master and Lord. How common the evil must have been, is also shown by the emphasis placed by S. James upon his injunction against it. "Above all things," (chap. v. 12), "my brethren, swear not, neither by heaven, nor by the earth, neither by any other oath, but let your Yea be Yea, and your Nay, Nay; lest ye fall into condemnation." To assert, moreover, that this evil habit comes from evil considered in the abstract, not only verges upon the meaningless, but is out of har-

mony with the general spirit of our Lord's instructions. With Him the source of all moral evil was rational personality, and traced back to its origin, it came from the Evil One.

S. John states (1 Epis. v. 19), "We know that we are of God, and the whole world lieth in [the] wickedness" τῷ πονηρῷ. On three occasions he had spoken of the "Evil," or "Wicked One," where, as already seen, grammatical construction demands the concrete; and in a fourth (1 Epis. iii. 12), consistency of thought makes the same demand. "This is the message that ye have heard from the beginning, that we should love one another. Not as Cain who was of that wicked one — τοῦ πονηροῦ — and slew his brother." In the verse immediately preceding he had said, "He that is begotten of God keepeth himself, and that wicked one ὁ πονηρὸς toucheth him not." "And we know," he continued, "that the whole world lieth ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ^{*} — evidently meaning "in the Wicked One." To render the word by the abstract "wickedness" puts it out of harmony with the apostle's meaning in the other four places, where he uses it, and occasions a manifest loss of force and relevancy with his general teaching. Moreover, if the abstract meaning was intended, the

* An examination of the context cannot fail to show that the apostle contrasts the position of believers with that of the ungodly, — the former being subject to Christ, and the latter to Satan. In the verse immediately preceding (v. 18), he had stated, "He that is born of God keepeth himself and the Wicked One toucheth him not," and in the verse immediately following (v. 20) he says, "We are in the True One, — ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, — in His Son Jesus Christ. Now in manifest opposition with the position thus claimed by the apostle for himself and his brethren in the faith of Christ, he places that of the world, — "The whole world lieth in the Wicked One." — ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεῖται.

more natural rendering would have been, here also, *τῇ πονηρίᾳ*. No one more fully realized than did S. John, that Satan was not merely a personal enemy of God; but that he was the king of a hostile kingdom,—that as leader of the hosts of darkness, the ruler of diabolic “principalities and powers,” he was waging a relentless war against the kingdom of God, and of His Christ. On three different occasions he represents our Lord as calling him “the prince of this world” (S. John, xii. 31; xiv. 30; xvi. 11), and in his epistles he sets “the world,” and “the love of the world” in marked antithesis to “the Father,” and “the love of the Father”; thereby manifesting his conviction that all who had not become members of the kingdom of righteousness, were still subjects of the kingdom and rule of the Evil One.

And in perfect consistency with this is S. John’s record of our Lord’s supplication for his disciples’ protection from the [evil]—*τοῦ πονηροῦ*—in His eucharistic prayer (chap. xvii. 15), “I pray not that thou should’st take them out of the world, but that thou should’st keep them from the Evil One.” The shadows of Calvary had already fallen upon His spirit, and realizing the trials and dangers to which they would be subjected, especially after his final removal from them, it was most natural that He should supplicate for their protection, not merely from ordinary sources of harm, but from the great foe of righteousness and truth—the originator and ceaseless instigator to evil in all its forms. That He regarded Himself as beset on all sides by Satan is evident from His own words. In the dark background of diabolic agency He recognized perpetual hostility looming up, not only

for His own assailing, but for that of all those who believed in Him. Just before he had warned Peter of Satan's desire to "sift him as wheat," and shortly after in His address to Judas and those who apprehended Him, He showed His recognition of Satanic instigation,—“This is your hour, and the power of darkness.”

In 2 Thess. iii. 3, S. Paul writes, “The Lord is faithful, who shall stablish you and guard you from [the] evil”—*τοῦ πονηροῦ*. At first sight the concrete application here is not as apparent as in the other places considered; but, the grammatical construction is the same, and as the general bearing of the context is in harmony with S. Paul's thought as already shown in his epistle to the Ephesians, it may seemingly, and with justice be claimed as coming under the same law of concrete usage. The revisers at least have so regarded it, as they have all the other instances of this usage, and have rendered the passage, “The Lord is faithful, who shall stablish you, and guard you from the Evil One.” In the preceding chapter the apostle had recalled to the mind of the Thessalonians his former instruction with regard to the coming anti-christ, as a manifestation of Satan's hostility. “The mystery of iniquity doth already work . . . and then shall that lawless one—*ὁ ἀνομος*, be revealed, whose coming is after the working of Satan.” And here is another instance of an attributive adjective with the article referring to concrete personality, showing S. Paul's familiarity with that grammatical usage, and in so far testifying in favor of the concrete application in the present instance.

To give by way of a summary of the whole, we

submit the following tabulated view of all the passages.

I. FORMS GRAMMATICALLY MASCULINE.

S. Matt. xiii. 19, Then cometh the wicked one *ὁ πονηρός*.

I S. John v. 18, That wicked one toucheth him not
ὁ πονηρὸς.

I Cor. v. 13, Put away from you that wicked person
τὸν πονηρὸν.

I S. John ii. 13, Ye have overcome the wicked one
τὸν πονηρὸν.

I S. John ii. 14, Ye have overcome the wicked one
τὸν πονηρὸν.

2. FORMS GRAMMATICALLY NEUTER.

S. Luke vi. 45, An evil man bringeth forth
. . . . evil *τὸ πονηρὸν*.

Rom. xii. 9, Abhor that which is evil *τὸ πονηρὸν*.

3. FORMS COMMON TO BOTH GENDERS.

S. Matt. v. 39, Resist not him that is evil *τῷ πονηρῷ*.

I S. John v. 19, The whole world lieth in the evil one
τῷ πανηρῷ.

S. Matt. v. 37, Whatsoever is more than these is of
the Evil One *τοῦ πονηροῦ*.

S. Matt. vi. 13, Deliver us from the Evil One *τοῦ πονηροῦ*.

S. Matt. xiii. 38, The tares are the children of the
Evil One *τοῦ πονηροῦ*.

S. John xvii. 15, That thou should'st keep them from
the Evil One *τοῦ πονηροῦ*.

Eph. vi. 16, Quench all the fiery darts of the Evil
One *τοῦ πονηροῦ*.

- 2 Thess. iii. 3, Guard you from the Evil One τοῦ πονηροῦ.
 1 S. John iii. 12, As Cain who was of the Evil One
 τοῦ πονηροῦ.

Of these forms common to both genders, the following, S. Matt. v. 39; xiii. 38; Eph. vi. 18; 1 S. John iii. 12, must be referred to distinct personality, and should be added to those passages determined by grammatical forms,—in all eleven out of the sixteen, about which there can be no doubt or dispute. Setting aside the one in the sixth petition, the remaining four present no gain of thought or force of application, by assuming the abstract, but most emphatically the reverse. Keeping in mind, moreover, the fact ever present to the spiritual consciousness of Christ and the Apostles, that the kingdom of Satan was in active hostility against the kingdom of heaven, that as the originator and instigator to sin, and the woes that come therefrom in myriadfold ways, the Evil One was, and would be until the end of time, directly or indirectly connected therewith, the reference in that instance also, should seemingly be in harmony with the others. By adopting the concrete application, the petition is thus brought into perfect congruity with the whole body of gospel teaching; and completes the idea of deliverance from evil in its concentrated, personal, and most malignant form. Nor can such an application properly be regarded as a restriction, or a contraction of the sphere of evil from which deliverance is implored. Indeed, the direct opposite is the case. The greater ever includes the less, and as all evil, bodily, intellectual or spiritual,—the world with the flesh and its lusts, originating in, or stimulated by

the Evil One may in the spirit of the embolismus of the ancient Liturgies, be rightly regarded as indirectly included in the petition, "Deliver us from the Evil One."

This rendering is likewise in perfect congruity with the whole prayer, and especially with the first half of the petition, "Lead us not into temptation." The temptation from which we are to pray to be delivered, is primarily and mainly, such solicitation to evil as springs from the world and the flesh under the enticing and encouraging of Satan. As "all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works do proceed" from God, under the promptings and assistings of the Holy Spirit; so, conversely, all unholy desires, all evil counsels, and all unjust works "do proceed," directly or indirectly from Satan, whose blandishments and enticements as cunningly laid snares are ever in our pathway. To refer the petition, moreover, except remotely, and under peculiar circumstances, to the ordinary trials which form part of our necessary disciplining, is contrary to the spirit and teaching of the Scriptures. The call to discipleship involves the daily bearing of a cross, and the after developings of faith, and consecrations of service, are attained in good measure through trials and chastenings which are sent by God to work out in us the peaceable fruits of righteousness, that we may be "partakers of His holiness." To come upon these was to S. Paul a source of rejoicing, even though accompanied with pains and distresses. "We glory in tribulations also, knowing that tribulation worketh patience, and patience, experience; and experience, hope." And in a like spirit S. James bids us to "count it all joy when

we fall into divers temptations, knowing this, that the trying of your faith worketh patience." The import of the petition in fact, as summed up by Whitby, is this, "Suffer us not, O Lord, either by the assaults of Satan, or the withdrawal of thy grace, or by putting us for the punishment of our sins, into those circumstances, which may prove snares and stumbling-blocks unto us, to be led into, and overcome by the power of temptation; but be Thou pleased always to afford us such a measure of Thy grace as may keep us from falling into temptations. The transition from this to the petition for deliverance from the power of the great tempter to all sin and wickedness is natural and direct.* Intensity, moreover, is added to the conviction of personal weakness, by the realization of danger from the cunning and power of our deadliest foe. Not from ourselves alone,—not from the working of carnal passions, or of mental concupiscence,—not from the bitternesses, the losses and crosses incident to this present life; but, from him whose subtlety and power underlies and gives intensity to them all, do we implore deliverance."

* "If the tempter is mentioned in the second clause, then, and then only, has the connection $\mu\eta$ $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$. . . its proper force. If on the other hand, $\tau\omicron\upsilon\breve{\nu}$ $\pi\omicron\nu\eta\gamma\rho\omicron\upsilon\breve{\nu}$ be taken neuter, the strong opposition implied by these particles is no longer natural, for "temptation" is not coextensive with "evil." We should rather expect in this case, "And deliver us from evil." Several of the Fathers remark that S. Luke omits the last clause, "because he gives the prayer in an abridged form, and this petition was practically involved in the other. The comment is just, if $\tau\omicron\upsilon\breve{\nu}$ $\pi\omicron\nu\eta\gamma\rho\omicron\upsilon\breve{\nu}$ be masculine, but not so if the neuter be adopted. Thus the contrast decidedly favors the masculine.—Bp. Lightfoot, *Guardian*, September 14, 1881.

EARLY EXEGESIS. *a.* THE PRIMITIVE VERSIONS.

2. With this concrete application the Sahidic Coptic, and the Peshito Syriac versions are in perfect agreement. The Vulgate Latin having corresponding case endings with the Greek text, the same ambiguities are found in the instances where the grammatical forms are common to both genders. Jerome's rendering of S. Matt. vi. 13, is *Libera nos a malo*, which had been the same in the different recensions of the *Vetus Latina*. The earliest Latin writers, however, who have left any evidence on the subject, as will be shown hereafter, manifestly understood the word as masculine. The *Memphitic* Coptic version is also ambiguous in consequence of a lack of consistency in translation. Like the Syriac, the Coptic language possesses no neuter gender, and the feminine gender usually supplies its place, but sometimes the masculine is used. In the case before us, the adjective *pct-hôou*, *evil*, with the masculine article *pi*, as the equivalent of ὁ πονηρὸς is used not only in all the instances where the grammatical forms are indisputably masculine, and in all the instances (except some of those in the first epistle of S. John), where the forms are common to both genders, but also in the two instances (S. Luke vi. 45; Rom. xii. 9), which are neuter. There, although the reference is to the generically concrete, grammatical consistency requires the feminine, *ti-pct-hôou*, but custom is not uniform as in this instance. In 1 S. John iii. 12, v. 19 the rendering is *pi-pct-hoou*; but in (1 S. John ii. 13, 14; v. 18), for some reason (perhaps to avoid repetition) the Greek

word *πονηρὸς* is used with the Coptic masculine article, —*pi-poneros*.*

The version of Upper Egypt, the *Sahidic*, on the contrary, however, is quite explicit. Unfortunately, as in the case of the Curetonian Syriac, although not to the same extent, the version is in a somewhat fragmentary condition; but, in so far as its testimony goes, it is decisive. It differs from the *Memphitic* version, by a much more frequent incorporation of Greek words, even when Coptic equivalents existed. In the present case, it uniformly employs the Greek *πονηρὸς*, with the Coptic masculine article, marked by its dialectic difference, *pponeros*, instead of *pi-poneros*.

When we come to the most important of the early versions, the Peshito Syriac, we find perfect harmony, and most important testimony in favor of the masculine. The attributive adjective *bish*, answering to *πονηρὸς*, and *bisho*, in which the last syllable marks the *status emphaticus*, rendering the word equivalent to *ὁ πονηρὸς*, are generally used with corresponding applications in the Peshito New Testament. As, the language however possesses no neuter gender, the feminine, as in the other Semitic dialects, is ordinarily used in its place. Thus (S. Matt. ix, 4), “Wherefore think ye evil in your hearts,—*ponera*, the Syriac is *bishotho* ;” and it is also employed as a translation of other Greek neuters. In Rom. ii. 9, “Upon every soul of man that doeth evil,”—*to kakon*, the rendering is *bishotho* ; and in S. John v. 29, “they that have done evil,”—*ta phaula*, it is the same. But in (S. John

* The revised version of Schwartz in the Gospels, and of Boetticher in the Acts and Epistles, are uniform in all these places with the text of Wilkins.

iii. 20), "everyone that doeth evil," *ho phaula prasson*, there is a different construction and usage,—*sanyotho obed*,—literally, "doing that which is detestable." The usage, in fact, is all but uniform in the rendering of *poneron* and *to kakon* by *bishotho*. But in every instance where *ho poneros* in any of its forms, which are undoubtedly masculine, occurs, the uniform rendering is *bisho*; and in no instance where the word evil is indisputably in the abstract, is it translated by *bisho*. The following table will help to confirm the truth of this:

I. FORMS GRAMMATICALLY MASCULINE.

S. Matt. xiii. 19, Cometh the wicked one,	Bisho
I S. John, v. 18, Wicked one toucheth him not,	Bisho
I S. John, ii. 13, Overcome the wicked one,	Bisho
I S. John, ii. 14, Overcome the wicked one,	Bisho
I Cor. v. 13, Put away that wicked person,	Bisho

2. FORMS GRAMMATICALLY NEUTER.

S. Luke, vi. 45, An evil man. . . . that which is evil,	Bishotho
Rom. xii. 9, Abhor that which is evil,	Bishotho

3. FORMS COMMON TO BOTH GENDERS.

S. Matt. v. 39, Resist not him that is evil,	Bisho
I S. John, v. 19, The whole world lieth in the Evil One,	Bisho
S. Matt. v. 37, Is of the Evil One,	Bisho
S. Matt. vi. 13, Deliver us from the Evil One,	Bisho
S. Matt. xiii. 38, Children of the Evil One,	Bisho
S. John xvii. 15, Keep them from the Evil One,	Bisho

Eph. vi. 16, The fiery darts of the Evil One,	Bisho
2 Thess. iii. 3, Guard you from the Evil One,	Bisho
1 S. John iii. 12, Cain who was of that Wicked One,	Bisho

To these places may be added Acts x. 38, where bisho is used as a translation of *ho diabolos*; and from which when taken in connection with S. Matt. xiii. 19; and 1 John v. 18, it is evident, that in Syriac, bisho as used by Christ and the apostles, was as distinctively a name of the devil as the other terms used, *Okelkartzo*, *Sotono*, or *Marmono*. Why it was thus used, it may not be possible to determine;* but the fact of such use must remain unchallenged. All the names are descriptive titles of the great enemy of God and man, and the first one especially is a striking cacophemism pointing to a peculiar characteristic or feature in character and conduct. The word means literally an eater of the flesh of any one, hence metaphorically a slanderer, or false accuser. *Sotono* designates one who is an adversary,—an enemy; and *Marmono* is applied to a deceiver, impostor, and seducer. But *Bisho*, *Ho Poneros*, referring to the author and instigator directly or indirectly of all evil, κατ' ἐξοχήν the *Evil One*, stands in direct antithesis to God, or the *Good One*, and in so far embraces them all, as the greater including the less.

It is impossible to overestimate these facts in their bearing upon the translation of S. Matt. vi. 13. Of

* S. Chrysostom states that he is thus called on account of his great malice,—διὰ τὴν ἐπερβολὴν τῆς κακίας,—and because while uninjured by us, he persecutes us with relentless hostility.—*Homily* xix. on S. Matt. vi. 13. See also Origen, *In Psal.* § 661.

the sixteen places considered, nine, as may be seen, either by grammatical form, or relevancy of thought, refer unmistakably to concrete personality, and are rendered by the masculine *bisho*. Two others, neuter in form, and impersonal, are translated by the feminine *bishotho*. Omitting for a moment the one under consideration, the remaining four not only may refer to concrete personality, but logical consistency and harmony of thought apparently require such a reference. Now if the Peshito translators regarded the words τοῦ πονηροῦ as the genitive of the neuter τὸ πονηρὸν, they would have rendered them, it is reasonable to suppose, as in the other two instances given, by *bishotho*. Both Syriac and Greek were in great measure vernacular to them, and they must have been well versed in all the idiomatic forms and grammatical niceties of each language. Indeed, if the ground be taken, as it certainly may be with a good degree of probability, that the prayer was originally given in the Semitic vernacular, the very words used by our Lord would naturally continue in use, and thus become incorporated in the version when made. If the neuter form therefore had been used by Him, and the translators had preserved it as embodying the correct meaning, the petition would be *Patson men bishotho* instead of *Patson men bisho*. And from this form there has been no variation in any of the other Syriac versions. In the fragments of the *Curetonian Syriac*, which are regarded as parts of an earlier version than the *Peshito*, and bearing probably a relationship to the *Peshito* corresponding with that of the *Vetus Latina* to the *Vulgate*, the masculine form *bisho* is found in S. Matt. xiii. 19, 38; and also in the petition of the Lord's

Prayer. And this evidence in favor of the masculine, although limited in consequence of the incomplete condition of the fragments themselves, furnishes even fuller proof than the Peshito of a general usage of the expression *Bisho*,—the Evil One, as a synonym for Satan. For, in S. Matt. xiii. 39, where the Greek is ὁ διάβολος, and the Peshito *Sotono*, the Curetonian has *Bisho*,—thus corresponding with the Peshito in Acts x. 38, *men bisho*, the translation of τοῦ πονηροῦ. And in the Philoxenian Version, made in the early part of the sixth century, although marked by many changes, and following with slavish accuracy the minutiae of the Greek original, even at the sacrifice of idiomatic accuracy, the word remains unchanged. Though the syntactical arrangement of the words has been altered, and violence thereby done to the Syriac idiom—*Patso lan men bisho*, the masculine form is retained.

b. PATRIOTIC STATEMENTS.

That the words τοῦ πονηροῦ in S. Matt. vi. 13, were regarded as masculine by the earliest of the Greek and Latin fathers, whose works contain a reference to them, is evident from their comments upon them. And this was also the case with the writer of the so-called Clementine Homilies, in which they frequently occur in their necessarily varied grammatical forms. *E. g.* In the second chapter of the XIXth Homily, they occur at least seven times; and among them are several instances of a masculine rendering of passages, where the words as considered above are common to both genders. Thus, in reply to the question of Simon, “Do you maintain that there is any prince of

evil or not?" Peter said, "I allow that the Evil One exists—*ὁμολογῶ εἶναι τὸν πονηρὸν.*" And He pointed out that He saw the Evil One—*τὸν πονηρὸν*, as lightning fall from heaven." Again, "Give no pretext to the Evil One—*τῷ πονηρῷ.* Moreover in giving advice He said, "Let your Yea, be Yea; and your Nay, Nay; for whatsoever is more than these is of the Evil One—*τοῦ πονηροῦ.* Also in the prayers which He delivered to us, we have it said, '*Deliver us from the Evil One.*'" In the third, sixth, ninth, twelfth, and seventeenth chapters also, and in the second, third, eighth and ninth chapters of the XXth Homily, the words occur with the same application.

The position taken by Origen on this question is well known. He not only regarded the words in the petition as referring to Satan; but, in commenting upon the nature of the temptation mentioned in the first half of the petition, he reasoned as though no other reference was possible, or known to him. With several of the early Fathers, he supposed that S. Luke, omitted the latter half of the petition by way of an abridgment, and because he regarded it as implied in the former half. "Luke appears to me," he said, "to have taught this same thing in those words, "Lead us not into temptation." To the disciple indeed it is probable that the Lord spake by an abridgment; but to those for whom there was need of a fuller statement, "He spake more openly." * And on an-

* Δοκεῖ δέ μοι ὁ Λουκᾶς διὰ τοῦ· Μὴ εἰσενέγκης ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμὸν, δυνάμει δεδιδαχέναι καὶ τὸ· Ρῖσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ· Καὶ εἰκός τε πρὸς μὲν τὸν μαθητὴν, ἅτε δὴ ὠφελημένον, εἰρηκέναι τὸν κύριον τὸ ἐπιτομώτερον, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πλείονας δεομένους τρανότερον διδασκαλίας, τὸ σαφέστερον.—*De Oratione*, § 265.

other occasion when giving an exegesis of the petition, he said, "But the Lord in the Gospel not only called the devil a *sinner*, but the *malicious* or *Evil One*, as when He teaches, or says, "But deliver us from the Evil One." *

Cyril of Jerusalem is very explicit in his reference of the words to Satan. "If that 'Lead us not into temptation,'" he says, "signified not to be wholly tempted, He would not have added, 'But deliver us from the Evil One.' For the Evil One is that antagonistic demon from whom we pray to be delivered. † "

Gregory Nyssen is equally explicit. After quoting the petition, he asks, "What, brethren is the force of these words? It appears to me that the Lord called the Wicked One by many and diverse titles, when according to the difference of his evil influences and iniquitous performances, He named him Devil, Beelzebub, Mammon, Prince of this World, Murderer, father of lies, and others similar." He then suggests the possibility that *Temptation* (or, understanding the concrete *Tempter* in place of the abstract), was also one of his names; and he regards it as confirmed by the language of the petition,—the latter clause meaning substantially the same as the former. ‡

* Sed et Dominus in Evangelio diabolum non dixit peccatorem tantummodo, sed malignum vel malum, et cum docet in oratione vel dicit, *Sed libera nos a malo*.—In *Psal.*, xxxvi. § 661.

† *Sed libera nos a malo*. Si illud, *Ne inducas nos in tentationem*, significaret omnino non tentari, non adjecisset, *Sed libera nos a malo*. Malus vero, est adversarius dæmon, a quo liberari oramus.—*Catech.* xxiii. 18.

‡ "Quænam, patres, horum verborum vis est? Videtur mihi Dominus multis ac diversis vocabulis malum illum nominare, dum, juxta differentiam pravarum efficientiarum et improborum exercitiorum, multis nom-

Chrysostom in like manner says, "He there (S. Matt. vi. 13), calls the devil the *Evil One*. He is thus called in a special manner on account of his great malice, and because though in no way injured by us, he wages a ceaseless war against us." In consequence of this, he then states, that the application of the petition, is not deliverance from evils in general, but from the Evil One.*

Theophylact, likewise, in quoting and commenting upon the petition, remarks, "Deliver us from the Evil One. He did not say, from wicked men : for they do not injure us, but the Wicked One." †

In turning to the earliest of the Latin Fathers we see the same concrete understanding and application of τῷ πονηρῷ to Satan. E. g. Tertullian says, "He Himself, when tempted by the devil, demonstrated who it is that presides over, and is the originator of temptation. This passage he confirms by subsequent ones, saying, "Pray that ye be not tempted"; yet, they were tempted (as they showed), by deserting

inibus eum appellat, Diabolum, Beelzebul, Mammoram, principem mundi, homicidam, improbum, patrem mendacii, aliisque similibus. Forsitan igitur unum aliquod ex iis quæ circa eum intelliguntur nomini-
bus est etiam tentatio, ac confirmat nobis ejusmodi opinionem concordantia atque convenientia dictorum. Cum dixisset enim, *Nec inducas nos in tentationem* : subjunxit, *Libera a malo* ; quasi res eadem per utrumque nomen, significatur.—*De Orat. Dom.* V.

* Malum autem hic diabolum vocat, jubens nos cum illo bellum inexpiabile gerere, et ostendens ipsum non natura talem esse. Malitia enim non ex natura, sed ex voluntate gignitur. Ille autem præcipue sic vocatur ob ingentem malitiæ magnitudinem ; et quia nihil læsus a nobis, inexplabile contra nos bellum gerit ; *idco non dixit, Libera nos a malis sed, a malo*.—*Hom.* xix. in S. Matt. vi. 13.

† Sed, *Libera nos a malo* ; Non dixit, a malis hominibus : non enim illinos injuria afficiunt, sed malignus.—*Ennar, in Evangel. Matt.* Cap. vi.

their Lord, because they had given way to sleep rather than prayer. The final clause therefore is consonant, and interprets the sense of "lead us not into temptation," for this *sense* is, "But convey us away from the Evil One." * A similar application is made also by Tertullian, when speaking of persecution as among the greatest of temptations. "In the prayer prescribed for us," he says, "when we say to our Father, 'Lead us not into temptation,' (now what greater temptation is there than persecution?), we acknowledge that that comes to pass by His will whom we beseech to exempt us from it. For this is what follows, "But deliver us from the Evil One," that is, do not lead us into temptation by giving us up to the Evil One; for then we are delivered from the power of the devil, when we are not handed over to him to be tempted." †

Cyprian also regarded the petition as offered against the temptation and power of Satan. Although including other forms of evil, they were manifestly in his judgment, such as flowed directly or indirectly from Satan's agency and cunning. Behind the world and its seductions, he recognized the Satanic background

* Ipse a Diabolo tentatus, præsidem et artificem tentationis demonstravit. Hunc locum posterioribus confirmat. Orate, dicens, ne tentemini. Adeo tentati sunt Dominum deserendo, qui somno potius indulserat quam oratione. Eo respondet clausula interpretans quid sit, Ne nos inducat in tentationem. Hoc est enim, *Sed devehio nos a malo.*—*De Oratione*, § viii.

† Sed in legitima Oratione cum dicimus ad Patrem, Ne nos inducas in tentationem, (quæ autem major tentatio quam persecutio?) ab eo illam profitemur accidere, a quo veniam ejus deprecamur. Hoc est quod sequitur, *Sed erue nos a maligno*; id est, ne nos induxeris in tentationem, permittendo nos maligno. Tunc enim eruimur diaboli manibus, cum illi non tradimur in tentationem.—*De Fuga in Persecutione*, § 2.

of evil suggestion and prompting. "For we conclude," he argues, by saying, "But deliver us from evil," comprehending all adverse things which the enemy attempts against us in this world, from which there may be a faithful and sure protection if God deliver us, if he afford His help to us who pray for and implore it. And when we say, Deliver us from evil, there remains nothing further which ought to be asked." *

c. THE ANCIENT LITURGIES.

The language of some of the early Liturgies is equally explicit. So emphatic and unmistakable in fact is the testimony there given, as to have called out a vigorous but unsuccessful attempt to show, that the passages in which it is contained are later interpolations. In the *embolismus* to the Lord's Prayer in the Liturgy of S. James, the language is, "And lead us not into temptation, Lord, Lord of Hosts, who knowest our weakness; but deliver us from the Evil One, and his works, all his insults and devices." † In the corresponding portion of S. Mark's Liturgy we also read, "Even so, Lord, Lord, lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from the Evil One: for thy great mercy knoweth that we are unable to bear up through our much infirmity, but make with the temptation

* In novissimo enim ponimus, *Led libera nos a malo*, comprehendentes adversa cuncta quæ contra nos in hoc mundo molitur inimicus. . . . Quando autem dicimus, *Libera nos a malo* nihil remanet quod ultra adhuc debeat postulari.—*De Oratione Dominica*, § 27.

† Καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν, Κύριε, Κύριε τῶν δυνάμεων, ὁ εἶδὼς τὴν ἀσθενεῖαν ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ ῥύσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ, καὶ τῶν ἐργῶν αὐτοῦ, πάσης ἐπηρείας καὶ μεθοδείας αὐτοῦ.

also a way of escape, that we may be able to bear it. For thou hast given us power to tread upon serpents and scorpions and over every power of the enemy." And in the Liturgy of Adæus likewise we read, "Lead us not, O Lord, into temptation, but deliver and save us from the Evil One and his hosts." In this connection we also give an ancient exposition of the Roman Mass from Martene, which is specially curious and interesting, considering the fact that subsequently to, and mainly through the influence of Augustine, the neuter application became general in the Western Church. The petition, "Deliver us from evil," has this comment, "That is, from the devil, who is the origin and author of all evil. The devil was celestial in nature, now he is spiritual wickedness; of greater age than the world, expert in injuring, most skilled in the art of troubling, whence he is not only called the Evil One, but Evil, from whom comes everything that is evil." *

From these passages then, without stopping to adduce more, it is evident how general and firmly fixed the conviction was, that the petition, "Deliver us from evil," referred primarily and mainly to Satan; and to other forms of evil, only in so far as they emanated directly or indirectly from him. And there is no counterbalancing or opposing testimony from writers of the same period. Canon Cook, in his letter above mentioned, says:

* Hoc est a Diabolo qui totius mali et auctor est, et origo. Diabolus natura cælestis fuit, nunc est nequitia spiritualis; ætate major sæculo nocendi usu tritus, laedendi arte peritissimus, unde non jam malus, sed malum dicitur, a quo est omne quod malum est.—*De Antig. Ecc. Ritibus*, Lib. I. p. 450.

“ I venture to assert that no allusion to this view of the meaning of the petition is to be found in the so-called Apostolic Fathers, or in Justin Martyr, or in Irenæus, or in Clement of Alexandria, or any of their cotemporaries, or in short, in any Greek speaking Father earlier than Origen.” And in a note to the third edition of his letter he states, “ Considering the absence of testimony as to any early admission of a reference to Satan in the Lord’s Prayer, and on the other hand the very remarkable influence of Origen upon the exegesis of the Greek and Latin Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries, I am disposed to believe, though I should hesitate to assert, that this interpretation was first introduced, as it was certainly urged upon the church, by Origen himself.”

Now, if Canon Cook had adduced one single passage in opposition, from the writers, or from any one of them, whose name he mentions, it would have been to the point, as showing that even then, the question was an open one. But that he does not do ; and for the simplest of reasons—no such passage exists. If those Fathers do not bear testimony in favor of the masculine application, it is simply for the reason that they have not alluded to the subject in any way. And in tracing the origin of the reference to Satan in the Lord’s Prayer to Origen, he is strangely forgetful of the fact that Tertullian was not a Latin Father of either the fourth or the fifth centuries ; and that the Clementine Homilies are probably quite as ancient as the writings of Origen. Tertullian was a quarter of a century the older of the two, and there is not a particle of evidence to show that his opinion on the matter was derived from Origen. The masculine application

was too general throughout the church at too early a date, to have been derived from Origen, even supposing (which was not the case) that his influence was sufficient to have thus extended it. And how on such a supposition shall we account for the testimony given by the Peshito Syriac, and Sahidic Coptic versions? Long before Origen wrote, the old Latin version was in existence, and Professor Westcott states in speaking of the Peshito Syriac, "there is no reason to doubt that it is at least as old as the Latin version. In speaking also of the Coptic versions he says, "The greater part of the (Memphitic) version, cannot well be later than the second century," and the "Sahidic was probably little if at all inferior in antiquity." Origen was not born until the latter end of that century—A. D. 185; so that all his comments on the subject were made within the first half of the following century. And yet, as already shown, the testimony borne to the masculine application, in those versions, especially the former, is full and complete.

Another position taken by Canon Cook in this matter, must appear to the reflecting mind, as at least, a very singular one. He assumes that because divine grace is sufficient to enable the watchful, faithful christian to triumph over Satan, that the New Testament writers and the earliest of the Fathers regarded him as an expelled and defeated enemy, against whose power there was no necessity to pray for deliverance.

"The earlier Fathers agree," he states, "as I believe, with the scriptural view, which looks upon him as an enemy who has been expelled from the precincts of the church, whom the christian as such opposes, resists and overcomes. . . . But after the

absorption of great masses into the visible church, the most earnest and influential Fathers recognized Satan as an enemy within the camp, leading captive many a redeemed soul, and as such the object of deprecatory petitions. The prayer, 'Deliver us from the Evil One,' might then be of intense interest."

To this we would say in reply, that fighting and praying against evil, are most intimately conjoined in christian philosophy and conduct—standing ever with face to the foe, but with upliftings of the soul for grace and strength to resist and overcome. Surely if we are cautioned to be on the constant watch against his stealthy cunning, and are bidden to have upon us the whole armor of God, as our main spiritual conflict is with the spiritual hosts of darkness under his leadership; we not only may, but it will be our highest wisdom, to secure God's strength for the encounter by prayer. For, deliverance in the sense understood by the Fathers whose words we have quoted, was not a setting free from a binding grasp already fastened upon us; but, from the fierceness of his assaults, and the mighty power of his temptations. How far Satan was regarded "as an enemy who had been expelled from the precincts of the church" in the time of Tertullian, may be judged from these words:

"Wide and diffusive is the Evil One's operation, hurling manifold irritations of our spirit, and sometimes trifling ones, sometimes very great. But the trifling ones you may condemn from their very littleness; to the very great ones you *may yield* in regard of their overpoweringness."

To the mind of Tertullian Satan was not expelled so far from the precincts of the church, as to obviate

all danger of the believer's yielding to the "overpoweringness" of his solicitations; and such being the case, prayer for deliverance from his "manifold irritations," would certainly not have been regarded by him as useless or superfluous. And as it was with him, so was it also in a greater or less degree with all the great Fathers of the church. As in the case of our Lord Himself, they recognized with an intensity of belief, the dark background of diabolism in the spiritual universe,—the existence of a Satanic kingdom and king; and they realized the necessity for perpetual watchfulness, preparedness for encounter, and prayer for sustaining grace to ensure a victory.

While then we would be far from dogmatizing upon a matter of so great importance, and on which an honest difference of opinion may be entertained; we do not hesitate to express the conviction, that in our judgment the balance of probability is on the side of the concrete rendering,—“Deliver us from the Evil One.” The evidence adduced is so manifold and weighty, as almost to enforce conviction. Grammatical usage, congruity of thought, harmony of context are all in its favor. The testimony of the early versions and liturgies, in so far as it is positive, and of any weight in the argument, sustains it; and the comments of all the Greek, and the earliest of the Latin fathers who have referred to the matter at all, give it an emphatic endorsement. As Bp. Lightfoot asserts,

“There is no evidence that the neuter rendering was adopted by a *single Ante-Nicene writer, Greek or Latin*. The first direct tendency to it appears half a century or more after the conversion of the Empire.”
—*Guardian*, September 21, 1881.

In conclusion, we may add, the concrete rendering is in most perfect harmony with our Lord's general teaching on the subject of Diabolic personality and agency; and if we accept it as the correct one, we have not only the fullest possible endorsement of the fact of such personality, but a clear and profound insight into the original and perpetual source of our spiritual conflicts, and a most powerful stimulus to watchfulness and prayer for deliverance from impending dangers. It is with no abstract principle—no *Zeitgeist*—no shadowy personification that our conflicts have to be waged; but, with personal hosts, and organized powers of darkness. In this view moreover, the subject of Satanic personality, instead of being, as many suppose, one of little consequence, or, as others assert, worthy only of scorn and ridicule, in this scientifically enlightened century, it is one which demands the profoundest, and most anxious consideration. As on the one hand, the knowledge of angelic personality and agency enlarges our conceptions with regard to the extent and variety of God's moral universe,—intensifies the consciousness of our spiritual elevation in its connection with the unseen world,—increases our confidence, and gratitude, through the conviction of their personal interest in us, as ministering spirits employed in blessed offices and services,—and stimulates to higher and more persevering endeavors after holiness and the future equality with them, as “children of the resurrection;” so on the other hand, the conviction that our sinful state is the result of subtle and diabolic influences, emanating from the realms of moral darkness and death, deepens our sense of the blighting contagion

of iniquity,—impresses our mind with the necessity of constant vigilance and resistance to each and every solicitation to carnal and worldly indulgences, and also excites our loving gratitude for that divine mercy which brought redemption and safety through the death of Him who loved us and died for us, the incarnate Christ,—the “Seed of the woman,” who “bruised the serpent’s head.”

THE END.

